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Nearby Syria is an isle called Cyprus, most rich and good and full of all 
sorts of growing things. There were many lovely towns on the isle which /
shall list for you.
The city where the knights dwell, chief among them all, is called Nicosia; it 
is inland. There is another, which is on the seacoast, called Famagusta; and 
another on the coast called Limassol; another on the coast called Paphos; 
and another on the coast, fortified, with its city enclosed by walls, called 
Kyrenia. inland are three castles: Dieudamour, Buffavento, and Kantara. 
(Templar of Tyre, § 514, p. 119)
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All are those of the author except where stated otherwise.
The Castles of Cyprus,
BufTavento -  the Department of Antiquities' plan* with my amendment 
and numbering,
Famagusta castle -  from Corvisier in Vaivre et Plagnieux, p.352 with my 
amendments and numbering,
Famagusta town walls,
Gastria -  from Vaivre in Vaivre et Plagnieux, p. 371 with my numbering, 
Kantara -  from the Department of Antiquities' plan* with my numbering, 
Kolossi -  the plans in respect of the keep are from Vaivre, La Forteresse 
de Kolossi in Monuments..., pp. 96-7, as are the outworks to the east, 
the plan of the southern and western outworks are my own; all numbering 
is mine.
Kouklia -  adapted from the plan in Maier with von Wartburg, p. 57 
with my numbering,
Kyrenia castle -  the Department of Antiquities’ plan* based on the survey 
work by Johns and Last with my extension of its numbering system, 
Kyrenia water tower,
Kyrenia town walls and harbour area,
La Cava,
Larnaka -  the pentagonal ‘tower’ facing the sea is from Corvisier 
in Vaivre et Plagnieux, p. 392 but otherwise the plan is mine,
Limassol -  from Corvisier and Faucherre, p. 349 with my numbering, 
Paphos -  Saranda Kolones -  the base of the plan draws on those in 
Rosser, Crusader Castles, p. 44 and Megaw, A Castle Attributable, 
p. 43 with my supplementary details and insets,
Paphos -  Prato -  from:
http://wwfw.mondimedievali.net/Castelli/Toscana/prato
p. vii
p. 122
p. 158 
p. 170 
p.203 
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p.214
p.219
p.240
p.247
p.254
p.265
p.273
p.283
p.292
p.336
p.355
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Paphos -  Saranda Kolones gate-tower and Pembroke 
gate-tower -  derives from Chepstow Castle. Its History»c$ Buildings, 
ed. R. Turner and A. Johnson (Logaston, 2006), p. 90 
Paphos fort -  from Corvisier in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 401 
Pyla,
St. Hilarion -  the Department of Antiquities' plan* with my 
amendment and numbering, p.144
p.359 
p.380 
p.387
* Thanks are due to the Department of Antiquities for permission to reproduce their 
plans.
The following list constitutes short descriptions only; fuller details appertaining to 
each photograph are included in captions given under each illustration. All 
photographs were taken personally at various times between 1983 and 2009.
Akaki 1: tower from the west, p. 114
Akaki 2: tower from the east, p. 115
Alaminos 1: front of tower, p. 118
Alaminos 2: rear of tower, p. 119
Buffaveno 1: building at centre of upper ward, p. 127
Buffavento 2: east end of Byzantine range at upper level, p. 128
Buffavento 3: outer structures of lower ward, p. 129
Buffavento 4: Byzantine and Franksish buildings of lower ward, p. 130
Kntara 1: south end of east front, p. 138
Kantara 2: tower at highest point within the enceinte, p. 138
Kantara 3: north end of east front, p. 139
Kantara 4: interior of northern eschaugette, p. 140
Kantara 5: entrances on east front, p. 141
St. Hilarion 1: barbican and main entrance, p. 150
St. Hilarion 2: main entrance, p. 151
Photographs
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St. Hilarion 3: Byzantine curtain, p. 152
St. Hilarion 4: Frankish entrance to upper ward, p. 153
St. Hilarion 5: south curtain of upper ward with Prince John tower, p. 154
St. Hilarion 6: Prince John tower, p. 155
Famagusta: fortified corridor-breakwater from castle to port tower, p. 156
Famagusta Castle 1: interior of south-west tower, p. 165
Famagusta Castle 2: interior of west curtain, south section, p. 166
Famagusta Castle 3: interior of west curtain, north section, p. 166
Famagusta Castle 4: north-east interior of the enceinte, p. 167
Famagusta Castle 5: interior of enceinte from the west, p. 168
Famagusta Castle 6: entrance to north-east chamber, p. 169
Famagusta town walls 1: interior of Lusignan sea wall south of castle, p. 184
Famagusta town walls 2: interior of Lusignan sea wall south of castle with converging
stairs, p. 185
Famagusta town walls 3: interior of Lusignan sea wall south of castle with converging
stairs, p. 186
Famagusta town walls 4: detail of interior of sea wall, p. 187
Famagusta town walls 5: Venetian Arsenal tower, p. 188
Famagusta town walls 6; detail of masonry of Arsenal tower, p. 189
Famagusta town walls 7: south wall between bastions with walled up entrance, p. 190
Famagusta town walls 8: interior of the torre del Diamente, p. 191
Famagusta town walls 9: interior of wall north of castle, p. 191
Famagusta town walls 10: interior of wall north of castle, p. 192
Gastria 1: fosse at the north-east angle looking north-west, p.206
Gastria 2: fosse at the north-east angle looking south-east, p.206
Kolossi 1: general view from the south-west, p.222
Kolossi 2: general view of keep and compound wall from the south-west, p.223
Kolossi 3: entrance to fifteenth-century keep, p.224
Kolossi 4: apsidal tower on east side of keep, p.225
Kolossi 5: interior of gun-port in north-east mantlet wing, p. 226
Kolossi 6: interior of gun-poit in north-east mantlet wing, p.227
Kolossi 7: exterior of gun-port, p.228
Kolossi 8: entrance through eastern mantlet, p.229
Kolossi 9: profile of fifteenth-century mantlet wall on east side of keep, p.230
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Kolossi 10: south-west area of compound to south of the keep, p.231 
Kolossi 11: screen of two arches in southern compound, p.232 
Kolossi 12: spandrel between the two arches, p.232
Kolossi 13: south-west cylindrical tower of fifteenth-century enceinte, p.233 
Kolossi 14: view of earlier ‘castle’ foundations to west of keep, from south-west 
cylindrical tower, p.234 
Kolossi 15: junction of fifteenth-century south-west cylindrical tower with wall of 
earlier‘castle’, p.235 
Kolossi 16: excavations in 2005 on western area of earlier ‘castle’, p.236 
Kolossi 17: aerial view of excavated area of western earlier ‘castle’, northern section, 
p. 237
Kolossi 18: aerial view of excavated area of western earlier ‘castle’, southern section, 
p.237
Kouklia 1: south-west comer of courtyard, p.242 
Kouklia 2: general view of interior of east range, p.242 
Kouklia 3: entrance to main ground floor chamber of east range, p.243 
Kyrenia Castle 1: south curtain depicting a pentagonal tower of the Byzantine outer 
curtain and Lusignan curtain beyond, p.258 
Kyrenia Castle 2: interior of Frankish gateway opening from inside the east curtain, 
p.259
Kyrenia Castle 3: exterior of east curtain showing ‘kink’ separating Venetian and 
Lusignan work, p.260 
Kyrenia Castle 4: aerial view of water-tower, p.261 
Kyrenia Castle 5: exterior of north-east tower, p.262 
Kyrenia Castle 6: exterior of east section of northern curtain, p. 263 
Kyrenia Castle 7: right-angled entrance through inner west curtain, p.264 
Kyrenia town walls 1: exterior of south-west angle tower, p.267 
Kyrenia town walls 2: D-shaped tower on west wall, p.267 
La Cava 1: exterior of west tower from the south, p.276 
La Cava 2. interior of west tower looking west, p.277 
La Cava 3: interior of west tower looking east, p.277 
La Cava 4: main entrance to west tower, drawbar slot, p.278 
La Cava 5: steps in north-east angle of west tower, p.279 
La Cava 6: west tower and central wall from the east, p.280
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La Cava 7: east tower with west tower and central wall beyond, p.280 
La Cava 8: west tower, connecting wall and east tower, p.281 
La Cava 9: part of aqueduct, p. 281 
Lamaka 1: east, seaward aspect, p.286 
Lamaka 2: interior of apse, p.286
Lamaka 3: uppermost level of the medieval pentagonal work, p.287 
Lamaka 4: south end of pentagonal work and adjoining wall at uppermost level, 
p.287
Limassol: reproduction of engraving on grave slab to a Hospitaller of Margat, p.300 
Limassol 1: general exterior view from the south-east, p. 311 
Limassol 2: latrine brattice at roof level on south-west side of post medieval fort, 
p.312
Limassol 3: partly blocked pointed arch within entrance, p. 313 
Paphos/Saranda Kolones 1: cut-water tower on west, outer curtain, p.340 
Paphos/Saranda Kolones 2: cut-water tower from the south-west, p.340 
Paphos/Saranda Kolones 3: outer, right-angled entrance, p.341 
Paphos/Saranda Kolones 4: stone troughs within stables inside south-east quadrant of
inner enceinte, p. 341 
Paphos/Saranda Kolones 5: inner,right-angled entrance, p.342 
Paphos/Saranda Kolones 6: portcullis groove in inner gatehouse, p.343 
Paphos/Bel voir 1: sally port concealed in an angle of the outer enceinte, p. 347
Paphos/Belvoir 2: exterior of outer enceinte, p.348 
Paphos/Caeseaea: exterior of outer enceinte, p.348
Paphos/Gisors: exterior of cut-water towers on Gisors’ outer enceinte, p. 356 
Paphos/Pembroke: aerial view of right-angled entrance tower at Pembroke, p.359 
Paphos/harbour forts: interior of first floor chamber in outer, mined fort, p.384 
Pyla 1: exterior of west face with entry at first floor level, p.388 
Pyla 2: exterior of east face with latrine at roof level, p.389
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KYRENIA KANTARA
ST. HILARION A Gastria
BUFFAVENTO
NICOSIA
AKAKI* SIGOURI FAMAGUSTALA CAVA
(Potam ia)
PAPH O S
Yermasoyia(Kouklia)
(Episkopi)
THF. CASTLES OF CYPRUS karpas
PENINSULA
KORM AKITI
PENINSULA
Bay of Morphou
AKAMAS
PENINSULA
LARNAKA*J Cape Pyla 
Khirokitia. A la m in o s ^ J '
Cape
Apostolos
Andreas
I ^ U M A S S ° L
Cape Zevgan Cape Gata
25 miles
Cape Greko
Cape Kiti
(?) KYRENIA - royal ca stle  and walled town
•  SIGOURI - royal castle  
A  BUFFAVENTO - royal castle  in north m ountains
•  Gastria - military order fortification
•  Pyla  - non royal tower
•  (Kouklia) - manor (royal or noble) with no 
apparent pretence o f fortification
INTRODUCTION
Historiographical overview
The study of Crusader Castles has preoccupied a number of scholars, predominantly 
French and British, since as long ago as 1871, when Emmanuel Guillaume Rey 
published his Eludes} Rey included Cyprus in this survey but the first scholar to 
write exclusively on the medieval buildings of Cyprus, of which castles were merely 
one type, was another Frenchman. This was Camille Enlart, whose voluminous L ’Art 
Gothique et de la Renaissance en Chypre was published in 1899. It is still a most 
valuable tool, especially in respect of building work that has not survived. After 
Enlart, the history of the island and its castles came to be of considerable interest to
1 Full details o f  all the works mentioned in this Introduction can be found in the bibliography.
G:\b INTRODUCTION - CYPRUS -T.doc
British scholars, principally because of British rule there: from 1878, Cyprus was 
under British administration, first under the suzerainty of the Sultans of Turkey, then 
from 1914 annexed to the British Crown and finally from 1925 as a British Crown 
Colony until its independence in 1960. Accordingly, in 1918, the Curator of the 
island's Ancient Monuments -  the architect George Jeffery FSA - produced his 
Description. Aspects of the medieval defences of the town walls of Famagusta were 
written up by T. Mogabgab in the Reports of the Department of Antiquities in the late 
1930s and about the same time, Jeffery wrote a pamphlet supplementing his earlier 
book which is mainly of interest in respect of his thoughts that there were numerous 
lesser towers all over the island. Sir George Hill’s great work of the 1940s is of value 
in tracing in detail the events in which the island’s fortifications were involved; his 
general history of the island remains the fullest in the English language. Cyprus 
featured in general surveys that subsequently appeared (notably Fedden and Thomson 
- 1957; Muller-Weiner - 1966) and in the early 1960s the Department of Antiquities 
published a series of guidebooks which dealt with some of the castles. The partition of 
the island in 1974 lefr all but one (Kolossi) of the sites thus surveyed in Turkish hands 
and as a consequence they have not been updated. Nonetheless, they compare well 
enough with those produced, for example, by the contemporary Ministry of Public 
Building and Works in England.2 Most of these guidebooks were written by A.H.S. 
(Peter) Megaw, who later, in 1977, contributed the section on Cypriot fortifications in 
the Wisconsin History of the Crusades. During this period, from 1957 until 1983, 
Megaw, assisted in particular by John Rosser, led a series of excavations at Saranda
2 Thank* are due to the Department of Antiquities for its permission to reproduce the diagrams of St. 
Hilarion, Kantara, Buffavento and Kyrenia from these guidebooks.
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Kolones, Paphos. These produced a number of articles by both scholars. Megaw died 
recently3 and the full report on Saranda Kolones has still to appear.
Recent works dealing generally with Cypriot medieval Castles include Gianni 
Perbellini's article of 1973, which though helpful for its many illustrations, is not 
without its problems. It depends very heavily on Enlart, does not appear to be 
supported by the author's own direct use of primary material and contains a number 
of errors. It is of greater value in its treatment of the Venetian period -  this being the 
matter he returned to in later articles in 1988 and 1992. Kristian Molin is another to 
have commented recently on the island's castles. Although Molin’s works are based 
on primary sources, they make a number of interpretations which, certainly for 
Cyprus, are doubtful and in any case, attempt little more than a snapshot, or 
summary. 4
Megaw’s and Rosser's conclusions on Saranda Kolones prompted others (Cadei; von 
Wartburg; Molin) to suggest alternative lines of thought. These in turn have induced 
John Rosser to restate his views, yet the history of the site should remain a cause 
celebre for there are very good grounds to doubt the accuracy of what Rosser urges 
with regard to the castle's origins and its occupants in the very early years of the 
Lusignan period. Over the last fifteen years three French scholars -  Christian 
Corvisier, Nicolas Faucherre and Jean-Bemard de Vaivre - have written up their 
investigations into four other sites (Limassol, Kolossi, Gastria, Sigouri). They have 
summarised these articles and produced new observations on other sites in a volume
1 Megaw’s publications are conveniently listed in Mosaic. Festschrift for A.H.S. Megaw -  see 
Bibliography.
4 Sec the favourable review of Unknown Crusader Castles by Malcolm Barber in English Historical 
Review, 117 (2002), pp. 955-6 and the rather more neutral comments of Denys Pringle in Crusades,
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published in honour of Enlart.5 These vary in detail and draw on some primary 
source material but look at the sites in isolation from each other and provide little or 
no analyses of such important issues as functions and hence the nature of the value of 
the castles to the Lusignan Crown or the military orders to which they belonged. In 
addition, rather too much focus on architectural analogies has led to some doubtful 
assertions of building periods and typologies.
Finally, among the many other recent works that help shed light on our subject, 
particular reference should be made to Peter Edbury’s numerous articles and his 
general work on the period up until 1373. Though not specifically concerned with the 
island's castles, these works have brought a fresh assessment to many aspects of 
Crusader Cyprus, which help in understanding the context in which the castles were 
commissioned and alternately developed and neglected. It is with acknowledgement 
to all this earlier work that this essay is presented.
Chronicle source material
The dearth of relevant documentary material inevitably makes for heavy reliance on 
what narrative sources we have. These are of varying reliability in relation to how 
near they were written to the events they describe, whether they were first hand 
accounts or compilations from other sources and the degree to which they were biased 
or written to entertain particular audiences. I have given some account of these
1 (2002), pp. 205-6.
5 Limassol received a thorough architectural investigation by Corvisier and Faucherre, while research 
by Catherine Otten-Froux supplied additional information on its occupation in the 1460s. Kolossi 
has been the subject of a lengthy monograph by J-B de Vaivre. Vaivre has also investigated the 
all but lost sites of Gastria and Sigouri. The volume of collected summaries and new monographs is 
cited as Vaivre and Plagnieux (see bibliography and gazetteer entries).
G:\b INTRODUCTION - CYPRUS -T.doc
matters with regard to the chronicles dealing with the invasion of 1191 in an appendix 
to Part I, History and in respect too of some of the other narratives, primarily Philip of 
Novare and Leontios Makhairas within Part I itself. I have not, however, thought it 
necessary to deal comprehensively with this given that much has already been written 
on such matters, both in general and in the introductions to various editions of these 
chronicles.
That said, and for the narratives on which we mainly depend for events in Cyprus 
from about the beginning of the wars of 1228-33, readers are particularly referred to 
Dawkins’ excellent introduction to his edition of Makhairas6 and Hill’s notes.7 
Makhairas in fact, is a very significant source for the history of later medieval Cyprus 
and I use him extensively in this thesis, especially with regard to the period after 1359 
when his account is more dependable. Dawkins is especially illuminating in 
evaluating the various merits of the three recensions of his chronicle and the possibly 
related chronicle owned by Francis Amadi (d. 1566) that bears his name. As Dawkins 
says, Amadi’s author may have had access to certain sourcefs) that Makhairas drew 
from and is sometimes correct in detail over the Makhairas variants, but it is in any 
case hugely important for the events of Henry II’s reign from 1306 suggesting of
Q
course that its source for that period is of unparalleled significance. The Amadi 
chronicle appears to have been used as the main source for the narrative written in the 
later sixteenth century by Florio Bustron who otherwise drew mainly on the eye 
witness accounts of his father and his kinsman George Bustron or Boustronios. This 
does of course mean that Florio Bustron’s material that antedates the second half of 
the fifteenth century that is not found elsewhere has to be treated with circumspection,
6 Makhairas, 2. pp. 1-24.
7 Hill. 3. pp. 1145-7.
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a point that is especially relevant to our study of Limassol (see below, p. 302). For his 
part, George Bustron’s chronicle is especially valuable for the reign of James II. 
George was that king's contemporary and sometime companion so his is an eye­
witness account, though as Dawkins commented, sometimes less intelligible that 
Florio's where they covered the same ground. Finally mention may also be made of 
Stephen of Lusignan who, like Florio Bustron, wrote in the later sixteenth century.
His works, the Description and the Chorography, provide some details relevant to this 
thesis but given that he is demonstrably unreliable especially for the early period of 
Lusignan rule, I have generally been sceptical of his information and consequently 
added notes of caution in my text when I have cited him and felt this to be 
appropriate.
Plans
In the main, the sites catalogued in the gazetteer in this thesis include plans and a list 
of these is provided above. A few sites are not, however, accompanied by plans. The 
explanation is that the remains of these are wholly or almost wholly lost (Nicosia, 
Yermasoyia) or so meagre or simple (Akaki, Alaminos, Khirokitia) that plans would 
add little or nothing to our understanding. The latter group includes Sigouri. This once 
important site in particular would benefit from thorough archaeological investigation 
but until that may happen, attempts to create a ground plan could only be vague and 
achieve little more than a reflection of what we may describe in just a few lines.
* Edbury, Suppression of the Tempalrs, p. 30. 
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Objectives of the study (and the extent of archaeological investigation within the 
thesis)
The work that follows fells into four parts. In Part I, I attempt to provide a 
comprehensive and I hope accurate record of the fortifications in the history of 
Cyprus during the Lusignan years -  how they influenced that history and were in turn 
affected by it. This focus -  set on a chronological, island-wide framework -  has not 
been carried out before. The exploration falls into halves: until 1373, Cyprus was 
generally a peaceful island and in this important respect very different from 
neighbouring crusader lands in the Eastern Mediterranean. After that, conflict with the 
Genoese and Mamluks at a time of sharp economic and demographic decline changed 
the context altogether. It is clear that the development - and often the absence of 
development -  of castles and town walls were both products and drivers of what 
occurred during both these periods.
Part II capitalises on the information contained in Part I and draws heavily too on the 
gazetteer (Part IV) through assimilating understanding on matters of fundamental 
importance that transcend interest on individual buildings. Castles and fortifications 
were a feature - a symptom - of the social structure, of the state’s economy and of a 
type of culture as well as constituting the tools of (in our case) kings and military 
orders as their residences, administrative centres and weapons of war. So the radical 
question that needs addressing is simply why the island’s fortifications were created, 
for all other interpretations of their value must stem from that. This is addressed in the 
sections entitled ‘Raison d'efre and functions’ and ‘An Urban Aristocracy’. While 
being wary of the current tendency to underplay the role of warfare in the
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development and maintenance of fortifications, it seems fair to conclude that in 
Cyprus military exigencies did not always dominate castle planning. In this respect, 
Kyrenia and Saranda Kolones may have been exceptions but they were not 
necessarily the rule. Another section in Part II -  ‘The Fortifications in War’ -  
however, looks at the role that castles played in the conflicts in which Cyprus was 
involved and attempts an additional dimension of understanding through comparison 
with matters in England which, like Cyprus, experienced civil wars in the thirteenth 
and later fifteenth centuries and foreign threats in the later fourteenth century. Part II 
also pays specific attention to the matter o f ‘Walled Towns’. The massive investments 
involved in creating these at Kyrenia, Nicosia and Famagusta are to be inferred from 
their respective entries in the gazetteer but what inspired that commitment? Once 
again, we require an investigation into this -  which Part II provides. The solution is 
complex; it is made up of a number of lines of thought. These reflect that, like the 
castles, the island’s town walls were constructed for a number of reasons of which 
defensibility was merely one. The thesis aims to move us from a position where we 
have visualised the castles and town walls as adequately or inadequately defending 
Cyprus to a place where we understand these buildings in a wholly different light and 
almost incidentally, through this exercise, see quite why some of our castles are 
hardly fortifications at all.
Part III constitutes a section entitled ‘Architecture’ which summarises the principal 
features of the fortifications and draws analogies with developments on the Syrian 
mainland, Anatolia and Europe. It serves as an analysis and introduction to Part IV, 
the site-by-site gazetteer. As noted above, the degree to which sites have already been 
written up varies considerably but I have absorbed these findings and used them,
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sometimes disputed them, in the catalogue. Debating theories and presenting 
alternatives as I have in places have occasionally required lengthy excursions into 
aspects of structures and analogies as with Saranda Kolones but generally speaking, 1 
have tried not to repeat too much of the minutiae of what has already been 
satisfactorily presented. Rather, through my own field-work, I have taken a fresh look 
at the remains of our buildings and attempted to give a level of detail that is roughly 
even from one site to another. That said, where previous commentaries have not gone 
beyond summaries, or indeed where there has been no comment at all, I have tended 
to provide somewhat more detail. In every case, however, I have utilised and captured 
as much relevant historical material as could be quarried. So this longest section of 
the work serves two purposes. First, it contains new material both in terms of fresh 
information and conclusions and suggested revisions of those of others who have 
gone before. Second, it presents a survey of all the sites, benefiting from all the 
studies already undertaken on them, both archaeological and historical. Such a 
complete survey has not yet been undertaken.
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1PART I 
HISTORY
THE FRANKISH CONQUEST OF 1191
The history of the Crusader state of Cyprus began with the conquest of the island by 
Richard I of England in May 1191 and its subsequent conveyance, first to the 
Templars and very quickly thereafter, in 1192, to the Lusignans. This Poitevan family 
was to rule their island kingdom until 1474, the Venetian widow of the last king then 
reigning until 1489. At the outset of the period, Cyprus had been ruled for several 
years by Isaac Comnenus -  a member of the imperial Byzantine family who had 
broken with Constantinople, setting himself up as an independent prince. By his time, 
it appears that the island’s fortifications were in part decayed and in part in some 
order. Today nothing remains of any castle in Nicosia but as we shall see, it is clear 
that the Byzantine castle there was very weak, quite possibly even semi-ruinous. If we 
accept what little evidence we have that attests the existence of what were probably 
comparable towers at Limassol and Famagusta, then it is apparent that they too were 
very minor affairs and quite likely defunct. The Byzantine castle at Kyrenia was a 
more substantial fortification, originating in all likelihood in the mid-seventh century 
when the island was first subjected to Arab raids. As we shall see, the Franks were 
quite content to take it over, gradually developing it into the most important castle of 
the country. It is unlikely, however, that it also had town walls; careful interpretation 
of a reference of 1211, as discussed below, reflects that we have insufficient evidence 
for any such town walls. There was certainly a Byzantine fortification at Paphos but 
quite what this constituted in relation to the extant works and indeed whether they 
involved town walls or a castle or both, is a matter of much debate, discussed at 
length in the gazetteer. Conclusive evidence for Byzantine town walls elsewhere is
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2lacking.1 Finally, the three Byzantine mountain castles of St Hilarion (Dieudamour), 
Buffavento and Kantara crowned the heights of the northern Pentadakthilos or 
Besparmak range: like Byzantine Kyrenia, these were more substantial affairs, though 
they may have originated much later -  probably no earlier than the eleventh century.2 
There too, the Franks were content to take them over, ultimately adding considerably 
to all three.
This varied state of the island's defences was reflected in the parts they played in 
King Richard's conquest of 1191. The several, diverse sources for this are not entirely 
consistent but it does seem clear that only Kyrenia and the three mountain castles 
were of any significance. The sources for the 1191 conquest have been evaluated and 
assessed against each other by a number of scholars, most notably by John Gillingham 
in 1999 and Angel Nicolaou-Konnari in 2000.3 It is abundantly clear that the 
historiography of the conquest leads one into much complexity, necessitating an 
attempt to understand the relationships of the sources and their different versions to 
each other. A commentary on this is given in an appendix but in all of this it is 
essential to be mindful of what were first hand accounts and what were not.
What follows then is an attempt to trace the events of the conquest of 1191 in relation 
to the island's castles, and from this, discern the existence of the various sites, infer 
what we can of their strength, what value was attached to them by their defenders and 
assailants, noting anything of relevance in relation to castle warfare of the time.
The Itinerarium, written about thirty years after the conquest,4 recorded that some of 
Richard's men, who arrived on the island before the main body, were able to 
withdraw to a 4castellum vicinum\ where they subsequently barricaded themselves in. 
Later still, deciding against the threat of possibly being blockaded there, they made a 
desperate sortie from this 4caste!lum\ succeeding in surprising their Greek enemies.
It is reasonably clear that this was Limassol. There are, however, difficulties in
1 Edbury, Kingdom o f Cyprus, pp. 9, 14. and in general, see below.
2 For commentaries on the political-military position of Cyprus in the century up until the Ricardian 
conquest, see A. Nicolaou-Konnari, pp. 32-3 and Galatariotou, ch. 3.
1 Gillingham's radical approach in dealing with the sources was to take the most reliable and adhere to 
that, refusing to ‘embroider’ it with details taken from those who were less informed. See his 
Richard the Lionheart, p. 10; Nicolaou-Konnari, passim.
4 Stubbs, Itinerarium, pp. 185-6; Nicholson, p. 180-1 and see appendix below, pp.57-8.
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3accepting this and other matter not contained in sources written nearer 1191, as 
explained in the appendix. A slightly different version was given by Richard of 
Devizes, who wrote in the 1190s. He related that the early arrivals who reached the 
island before the main body took refuge in a Limassol church, and that near-by, ‘on a 
cliff of native rock was a lofty and fortified castle* subsequently captured by King 
Richard on his arrival. This is arguably an excellent example of this chronicler’s 
tendency to indulge in rodomontade, as noted in the appendix (p. 60).5
Other sources, including Ambroise’s near contemporary Estoire also refer to these 
first arrivals, but say nothing of any castle.6 The Estoire and the Itinerarium and 
Roger of Howden make it clear that when Richard landed at Limassol shortly after, on 
6 May, he had to fight a battle on the sand near by to effect a landing but they make 
no mention of a castle in this attack. Our very thinly detailed Greek/Byzantine 
sources do not even refer to fighting of any sort and certainly make no mention of any 
fortification.7
No fortification at Limassol is mentioned in Emoul, this part of that narrative 
probably written in the late 1220s, or the principal recensions of The Continuations o f 
William o f Tyre written probably in the 1240s. In the Lyon version, it is said that Isaac 
had garrisoned Limassol with men-at-arms, both horse and foot ( ia  garni de genz 
d’armes a pie et a cheval’) but it is not stated quite what in Limassol was garrisoned. 
This recension goes on to say that Richard forced a landing but again makes no 
mention of any fortification. The Colbert-Fontainbleau or b version (‘Eracles’) 
similarly makes no mention of a castle at Limassol and indeed its only reference to 
castles in the entire campaign comes at its end when we are told merely that ‘All the 
castles were surrendered to him’ (Richard).8
Whatever occurred at Limassol, it appears likely some sort of fortification existed and 
that it did not play a part in Richard’s landing, suggesting that it was of no military
5 Richard of Devizes, pp. 36-7.
6 Ambroisc. pp. 51-2
7 Stubbs, Itinerarium, pp. 190-1; Nicholson, pp. 183-5; Ambroise, pp. 51-3; Gesta Regis. 2, 
pp. 163-4. Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Houedene. 3, pp. 105-7; O City o f Byzantium, pp.
229 - 30.
* Emoul, p. 272; Lyon Eracles, (Morgan) § 116, pp. 117-9, and Edbury, Third Crusade, pp.
102 -3. For the quotation from Eracles, Edbury, Third Crusade, p. 178.
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4significance. As is the case at Paphos, it is perhaps not wholly clear whether this was 
a castle or some town wall. Certainly a number of scholars have interpreted the 
sources to indicate the latter. Thus Mas Latrie wrote that Richard established camp 
outside Limassol's walls, while Hill and following him, Perbellini believed that 
Isaac Comnenus had improved its defences against Richard. Most recently, Megaw 
repeated Mas Latrie’s inference of town walls in 1191.9 However, there is neither 
clear historical evidence nor any archaeological evidence for Byzantine town walls in 
Limassol. The complexities of unravelling the development of the present Limassol 
castle and indeed serious doubt that the building we now have is even on the same site 
as one that may have existed in 1191, are discussed in the gazetteer.
The sources are not consistent as to the strategy by which Richard's army conquered 
the island and correspondingly it is not wholly clear as to the order in which the 
island's castles were captured or surrendered but it is clear that whatever existed in 
Nicosia did not impede its occupation. It appears that Isaac retreated here, to what the 
Itinerarium called ‘castellum quoddam firmissimum' - ‘a very strong castle ...called 
Nicosia'.10 Our other sources for the 1191 campaign make no mention of a castle in 
Nicosia in 1191 but one certainly existed for there are references to it in relation to an 
incident in 1192 when the Templars retreated there. Those references are especially 
interesting because they convey a quite different impression of the castle: Emoul said 
of that incident that Mi castiaus n'estoit mie fors pour tenir encontre tant de gent’ 
while the Colbert-Fontainbleau Continuation similarly described it as ‘feible’ and 
‘povre’. The Lyon Continuation also referred to the castle in connection with this 
incident, though without any adjectival comment.11 No doubt these very different 
ascriptions of strength and weakness reflected the impressions the authors wished to 
convey in relation to their heroes: King Richard did well to capture it as it was strong; 
the Templars were unable to defend it because it was weak. As it seems highly likely 
that the Templars would have elected to remain in the castle had it seemed capable of
9 Mas Latrie. Histoire. 2, pp. 19-21; Hill, 1, p. 318; 2, pp. 15-16; Perbellini. 1973, pp. 44-5; Megaw, 
Reflections, p. 148.
10 Stubbs. Itinerarium, p. 194; Nicholson, p. 188.
11 Emoul. p. 285; Eracles. Receuildes Histonens des Croisades 2, p. 190; Lyon Eracles,
(Morgan). § 133. pp. 135 -  6. Later sources also record this incident. Amadi, p. 84; FI. Bustron. pp. 
50-1; Lusignan. Chorograffia -  Grivaud, f t 14a, 48a and 49a; Lusignan, Chorographv -  Wallace, 
§§ 39, 247 and 255-6 on pp. 20, 65 and 66; Lusignan, Description, ff. 31-2.
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5resisting the poorly equipped locals coming against them, it does appear that Nicosia 
castle was indeed very weak. 12
In the peace negotiations that followed, it is interesting to note that King Richard was 
careful to ensure that Isaac conceded control of the island's castles as a pledge of co­
operation, clearly indicating that they were of some importance at least.13 Isaac 
rapidly reneged on such arrangements for collaboration, withdrawing as the 
Itinerarium relates, to the ‘castrum Famagustam’, from which he quickly moved on 
because he grasped that it was too weak to withstand a siege.14 No other source 
makes reference to a ‘castrum’ at Famagusta and we do not have any other near­
contemporary reference to what may be a fortification there until 1231/2 (see 
gazetteer), so there may be doubt over the interpretation of this allusion. That said, we 
can at least infer that any fortification there was insubstantial.
Shortly after his marriage in Limassol on 12 May, Richard sent his land and naval 
forces round the coasts taking control of its strongpoints -  ‘civitas et castella 
imperatoris et munitiones’.15 One such castle may have been Paphos, - ‘castellum 
quod dicitur Baffes’ - though here again we need to note that only one source 
specifically mentions this and that source is Roger of Howden’s later chronicle. It is 
nonetheless a valuable allusion, discussed in context in the Gazetteer.16
Guy de Lusignan had landed on 11 May 17 and joined King Richard in his campaign 
to conquer the island. Plainly they agreed that the next, vital objective was the 
capture of Kyrenia Castle, though we have different reports as to which of the two in 
fact accomplished this. According to the Lyon Continuation18 it was Richard himself 
who took the castle ‘on his arrival’, capturing into the bargain, Isaac’s daughter and 
‘great riches’. Roger of Howden similarly has Richard capturing ‘castello fortissimo
i: I am grateful to Prof. P. Edbury for his correspondence on this detail.
n  (iesta Regis, 2, p. 165; Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Houedene, 3, p. 109.
14 Stubbs. Itinerarium, p. 199; Nicholson, pp. 191-2.
*' (iesta Regis, 2, p. 166. repeated in the Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Houedene, 3, pp. 109-10.
18 Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Houedene, 3. p. 111; Gillingham, Richard I, pp. 144, fn. 16 and p. 151,
fa. 38; Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 50.
17 Ambroise. p. 55.
18 Lyon Eracles. (Morgan), § 117, p. 119; Edbury, The Third Crusade, p. 103.
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6quod dicitur Cherin’, ‘on his approach’, implying perhaps that it was surrendered 
without a fight.19
The more detailed western sources describe an attack on Kyrenia and credit this and 
its capture to Guy. Given that Richard was reported as stricken with illness in Nicosia 
about this time, it does seem likely that it was Guy who led the attack. According to 
Ambroise, Guy and his forces
...besieged it by land and sea, attacking in strength. The inhabitants had no 
support so could not hold out but had to make terms.
While similarly the Itinerarium had Kyrenia ‘heavily besieged, with the army divided 
to attack from both land and sea’, inducing a demoralised defence into a rapid 
capitulation, and thereby surrendering too Isaac’s treasure and his daughter.20
Kyrenia was plainly extremely useful to Richard, becoming in effect his headquarters, 
‘for he had found a base for himself and his navy ’. 21 This description of the military 
value of Kyrenia no doubt reflects too the view held by Richard and Guy and so says 
much about the importance of this sea castle and its harbours, even at this early stage 
in our period.
According to the Itinerarium and Ambroise, Guy then turned his attention to St
Hilarion, the natural defensive site of which made it a considerable challenge. The
Itinerarium recorded that:
It was very strong in situation and completely impregnable. Those within 
prepared to defend themselves and fired stones and darts at the besiegers for 
some days, until on the Emperor’s orders the castle was surrendered to King 
Guy 22
19 (iesta Regis, 2, p. 167, repeated in the Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Houedene, 3, p. 110, and in the 
Memoriale, 1, p. 442.
20 Ambroise. pp. 59-60; Stubbs, Itinerarium, pp. 201-2; Nicholson pp. 193-4.
21 Lyon Eracles, (Morgan), § 117, p. 119; Edbury, The Third Crusade, p, 103.
22 Nicholson pp. 193-4.
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7Ambroise similarly stressed the great natural defensibility of the castle:
Didemus is a strong castle that could never be taken by force.
Its defenders ‘cast down large stones [on our men].’ 23
Ambroise similarly recorded that after thus resisting for some days, the castle was 
given up to Guy on Isaac’s orders.24 Both these sources added that Guy then used St 
Hilarion as a secure place in which to hold Isaac’s daughter. 25 Roger of Howden 
only mentioned the capture of ‘castellum quod dicitur Deudeamour’ in his later work, 
the lack of any detail suggesting that King Richard may not have been personally 
involved.26
About this time, it appears that King Richard recovered and joined the siege of 
Buffavento -  described by Ambroise as ‘a most strong castle’. 27 Buffavento was 
similarly described by Roger of Howden as ‘exceeding strong’ and by the Lyon 
Continuation as ‘a very strong castle called Buffavento’ (‘un chastiau mout fort que 
Ton dit Buffe Vent’). This Lyon recension had Isaac in Buffavento and recorded that 
he accordingly fell into Richard’s hands when the King of England duly captured it, 
though Roger of Howden had it that Isaac escaped to ‘abbatia fortissimo quae dicitur 
Caput Sancti Andreae’. The later Meaux chronicle followed Howden, but added a 
detail that Richard ‘ei machinas porrigebat’ (‘he was putting forward machines 
against i t ') . In another later chronicle, Peter of Langtoft also claimed that King 
Richard directed siege engines, and that these threw night and day. Some appreciation 
of these two sources is given in the appendix but in any event, given the nature of the 
site of the castle, this episode of bombardment seems unlikely, so one wonders if the 
Meaux Chronicle’s ‘machinas’ might have been rams or other such devices of direct 
assault. The reference is of passing interest, however, as being the only allusion to the 
use of siege engines in 1191, with the sole exception of another difficult source -
21 Ambroise. p. 60.
24 Ambroise. p. 60.
2' Nicholson, p. 194; Ambroise, p. 60.
26 Chronica Magistrt Rogeri de Houedene, 3, p. 111.
27 Ambroise. p. 60; and Slubbs, Itinerarium, p. 202; Nicholson, pp. 193-4.
28 Lyon Eracles, (Morgan), §§ 116, 118, pp. 118-21 and Edbury, Third Crusade, p. 103; Gesta Regis,
2. p. 167; Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Houedene, 3, p. 111.
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8Richard of Devizes. Devizes provided a confusing detail that after Limassol Castle 
was captured, a second castle was taken and Isaac was then besieged in a third castle: 
‘the walls were knocked down by huge stones hurled by stone throwers (ingentia 
saxa)’.29 Ambroise and the Itinerarium did not locate Isaac in Buffavento and relate 
instead that for a short while, he skulked in ‘son chastel’ of Kantara. They continued 
that his men melted away and demoralised by the loss of his treasure and his 
womenfolk, he recognised that his position was untenable, so ordered the surrender of 
St. Hilarion as noted above and on 31 May or 1 June gave himself up to Richard. This 
‘castellum quod dicitur Candare’ is another listed in Roger of Howden’s later work as 
captured by King Richard.30
The conquest of Cyprus had been an extremely efficient operation.
What more can I say? In two weeks, as I do not lie, since God willed it so, the 
king held Cyprus securely, so that it was inhabited by Franks.31
The points of interest gleaned from this story of invasion and conquest so far as the 
fortifications are concerned is that in 1191, Kyrenia apart, coastal castles appear to 
have been defunct and hence were of little consequence, while inland, only the 
mountain castles were of sufficient strength to influence the course of the war. It is of 
course the case that even Kyrenia and the mountain trio did not cause any significant 
delay to Richard's and Guy's triumph, Indeed, it is interesting that King Richard 
himself, who undoubtedly appreciated fully the prime importance of fortifications in 
warfare, made only passing reference to the matter, for in his own announcement of 
his conquest of Cyprus in a letter of 6 August 1191 to his justiciar in England, he 
wrote merely that ‘we have subjected... all its strong points'. This need not 
indicate, however, that Kyrenia and the mountain castles were of little military worth. 
Possibly they would have been capable of significant defence had they been resolutely 
defended. This is perhaps reflected by a conclusion written by the composer of the 
Itinerarium that ‘the fortresses surrendered, which were so strongly sited that they
29 Chronicon Monasterii de Melsa, I, p. 258; Chronicle of Peter of Langtoft, 2, pp. 66-7; Richard of 
Devizes, p. 38.
10 for ‘son chastel' of Kantara -  Ambroise, line 1930. In general. Ambroise, pp. 59 - 60; Stubbs, 
Itinerarium, p. 201; Nicholson, pp. 192 -  3. The dates are from, respectively, Stubbs, Itinerarium, 
p. 202; Nicholson, p. 194, and the Gesta Regis. 2. p. 167. Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Houedene,
3 .p. 111.
Ambroise, p. 60. The Itinerarium too (Stubbs, Itinerarium. p. 203; Nicholson, p. 195) has 
‘quindecim diebus’ -  ‘fifteen days’.
,2 Epistolae Cantuarienses, p. 347, and translated by Edbury, Third Crusade, p. 179.
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9seemed impregnable to all siege machinery, [but] they were surprised by treachery’.33 
Apart from our few unreliable references to one or more incidents of bombardment, as 
narrated above, it appears then that these castles were not really subjected to the full 
test of war in the campaign of 1191.
1191-1222
In little more than a month, King Richard’s regime had to suppress a Cypriot uprising 
that was most likely staged by Isaac’s ex-followers taking advantage of the small size 
of the English forces. The absence of any reference to the use of castles in respect of 
this revolt does not appear significant. It seems that the Franks did not have to resort 
to withdrawing into the castles which were certainly in their hands. Although the 
revolt was easily suppressed, very likely it helped induce King Richard to sell Cyprus 
on to the Templars. In April, 1192, they in turn had to deal with an uprising. This 
second Cypriot uprising appears to have been a popular and spontaneous incident 
localised to Nicosia. In the event, its castle played little more than an incidental role, 
very much in the same way that Limassol castle had done a year before, but this in 
itself gives us some impression of its state at the time.
We have already noted the contrasting references to the castle of Nicosia in respect of 
Richard of England’s campaign in May, 1191 and in respect of this incident in April,
1192. As stated above, on balance, it seems highly likely that the castle was indeed 
very weak, as the sources for the 1192 episode assert. It appears that the local Greeks 
(the ‘Grifons’), enraged at the Templars’ oppressive regime, knowing how few Latins 
were in the capital, decided that an attack on these invaders from the West would be 
successful. The Templars’ force was indeed small: we are told that they only had 
fourteen knights, twenty-nine other horsemen, and seventy-four people on foot. Under 
the direction of Hemaut Bouchart, this force withdrew into the castle, but rapidly 
realized that they did not have enough provisions to be able to hold out for long and
”  Nicholson, p. 194.
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that the castle was anyway not strong enough to withstand the numbers opposing 
them (see the descriptions and references given earlier). Accordingly the Templars 
resolved to make a desperate sortie and having been to confession, armed themselves 
and issued forth -  all bar ten who were too weak and whose role was to stay behind to 
open the gate should any return. As it happened, the ferocity of their desperation and 
no doubt their superior equipment and training, made up for their inferior numbers 
and they completely overwhelmed their ‘Grifon’ enemies. This castle must of course 
be the old Byzantine castle, the vulnerability of which had been demonstrated twice in 
short order.34
The Templar victory was a desperate affair and this no doubt persuaded them to 
relinquish the island, the recipient being Guy of Lusignan.35 Whether the Cypriots 
did indeed take advantage of the Templars' departure to demolish entirely this Nicosia 
Castle, as Stephen of Lusignan asserted,36 Guy and his successors must have been 
minded to strengthen their hold on the capital as quickly as possible in order to 
overawe and guard against future opposition from a conquered people. Indeed, the 
Colbert Fontainbleau recension goes on to mention that in 1192, Nicosia castle was 
not as strong as King Guy made it later,37 which tells us that some work on this castle 
was undertaken during the short period of his lordship of 1192-1194. Perhaps this 
work was carried out as something of an emergency measure and was not seen as 
wholly sufficient for the needs of the new dynasty in its capital. This would explain 
quite why further work had either just been carried out, or indeed was still in 
commission when a German visitor, Bishop Wilbrand of Oldenburg, visited Nicosia 
in 1211. Wilbrand wrote that ‘nullam habens munitionem. In qua nunc temporis forte 
castrum elaboratum.’38 It seems that Wilbrand was making it clear that the town of 
Nicosia had no town walls but that there was a castle. As noted below (gazetteer), it 
remains uncertain whether the castle that Wilbrand saw was indeed a brand new castle 
or rather a further elaboration of the old castle, as the site remains unidentified. Either
14 see hi. I labove.
Edbury. Templars, pp. 189-90; Nicolaou-Konnari, pp. 61-6.
*  Lusignan, Chorograffia -  Grivaud. f. 49a ; Chorography - Wallace, § 256, p. 66.
,7 Recettii loc. cit. (see fn. 11 above). Amadi, p. 84.
“  Wilbrand, xxviii, (ed. Laurent), p. 181; Wilbrand, in Cobham, p. 14. On the difficulties with 
‘munitio’, see Coulson, p. 33.
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way, it became sufficiently important, symbolically at least, to feature as Castellum 
Nicossie on the seal of King Hugh I (1205-1218).39
Wilbrand had made landfall on Cyprus at Kyrenia which he described as ‘civitas 
parua, sed munita, castrum habens in se muratum et turn turn.’ This certainly says 
something of the castle itself but it should not be taken as necessarily implying the 
existence of town walls. Wilbrand added that "in finibus... habet quatuor bona castra’. 
If Wilbrand was indeed referring to four castles in the area, then presumably these 
would have included two of the mountain castles (St. Hilarion and Buffavento) 
though he would have had no real personal knowledge of them. The reference is 
however difficult in relation to the number of sites. In the circumstances, it is 
tempting to question quite what the author had in mind in this reference to castra.40
It has been proposed that Guy, or his immediate successors, established other 
elementary towers elsewhere: at Famagusta, Paphos, and possibly in Limassol. 41 All 
three are mentioned by Wilbrand in the context of the paucity of their fortifications. 
Taking these in turn, the most recent detailed architectural analysis has repudiated the 
identification of a very early tower at Famagusta. This may well be reflected in 
Wilbrand’s report of his visit in 1211 when he noted that this port was "non multum 
munita'. He used exactly the same phrase of Limassol: the remains there are, 
however, very hard to disentangle. Indeed it is likely that the present castle is a quite 
distinct building altogether, any early Lusignan tower being on a now lost site.
Finally, the large scale excavation at Saranda Kolones, Paphos, carried on over a 
thirty years period from 1957, revealed the remains of a tower and a connected wall. 
These have been ascribed to these first years of Lusignan rule and correspondingly 
they may be the subject of Wilbrand’s allusion to a ‘turns’ but there are particular
w Enlart. p. 387; Jeffery, p. 21; Hill, 2, p. 14; Perbellini. (1973). p. 50; (1988), p. 33; (1992). p. 15; 
Leventis. pp. 9. 147.
40 Wilbrand, xxviii. (ed. Laurent), p. 181; Wilbrand, in Cobham, p. 13. On the nomenclature for 
castles, R.E. Latham, passim and R. Allen Brown, p. 24 - now totally revised by Coulson, pp. 2, 
16, 33.42, 53-4, 61. See too Fedden and Thomson, pp. 18-19; Liddiard, p. 40; Ellenblum, 
Crusader Castles, pp. 295-6; Kedar, Civitas and Castellum in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem: 
Contemporary Frankish Perceptions -  forthcoming.
41 Mol in, Clermont, pp. 187-90, 192-3, 195; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, pp. 105, 108-10. 
See too Hill. 2. pp. 14, 37; A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 196.
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difficulties here, both in relation to the archaeology and Wilbrand’s reliability on 
Paphos -  matters discussed in detail in the gazetteer.42
This matter of the scale of the first Lusignans’ commitment to developing the island’s 
fortifications is of special interest because of differing views as to the threats 
confronting the Lusignans in these initial years. Thus, Kristian Molin was at pains to 
emphasise that the Lusignans needed fortifications against the indigenous Greek 
nobility and the local population, while Edbury, and following him, Nicolaou- 
Konnari, took the opposite view. Edbury observed that, somewhat mysteriously, ‘the 
Greek landowning class did not survive the Latin take-over’,43 and as he and 
Nicolaou-Konnari record, after 1192, there were no revolts against the Frankish 
regime until those in 1426-7 and 1472, the indigenous population co-habiting 
peacefully with the Lusignan government. 44
The native population was predominantly peasant and rural and from what one can 
gather, for generations had been largely unconcerned as to the identity of the ruling 
regime; all that really mattered to them was its harshness. In 1192, Guy was of course 
in an uncertain position: he was a newcomer and he could not be wholly confident in 
the obedience of the indigenous population. He would have known of the revolts of 
1191 and 1192. It is reasonable to suppose therefore that he might think to establish 
fortified bases to overawe his new subjects and indeed we have noted that 
accordingly, work took place at Nicosia. But we should not overstate Guy’s 
apprehension. The fact that three of the four first castles that have been attributed to 
the Lusignans were located on the coast where they would be unlikely to exert much 
influence on a restive population and the disinclination of the ruling house to allow 
even their tenants in chief to erect castles of their own, argue that Guy saw civil 
disobedience as merely a secondary threat. As the Lusignan regime became more 
established with the passage of time, Guy’s successors must have seen it as no threat 
at all.
42 Wilbrand, xxix. xxxi, xxxii. (cd. Laurent), pp. 181-2; Wilbrand, in Cobham, p. 14. For the
identification of very early Lusignan work at Paphos, see especially A Castle in Cyprus, p. 45 and 
plan on p. 43. In general -  see gazetteer.
44 Edbury, in Caterina Comaro, p. 26.
44 Nicolaou-Konnari, pp. 69-71, 105; Edbury, Kingdom, pp. 20-1; Edbury, Franco-Cypriot 
Landowning Class, p. 4; Edbury, Lusignan Regime, pp. 2-3.
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Molin also considered that the Lusignans believed that they needed to protect the 
coasts against occasional pirate raids. He drew particular attention to a Greek called 
Cannaqui, who absconded with Aimery de Lusignan’s family. On the other hand, it 
has been emphasised that Cannaqui’s exploit was an isolated escapade of an 
individual malcontent and that we should not over-represent its significance.45 Even 
so, we know that the collapse of the imperial navy allowed an upsurge of piratical 
activities in Byzantine waters, so it would be odd if Cyprus was not also thus 
afflicted. Pirates were operating in Cypriot waters at the time of the Fifth Crusade for 
example. 46 This does not mean, however, that the Lusignans commissioned small 
coastal towers as a consequence. It would have been clear that such fortifications 
would have neither deterred nor protected against sea-borne raids, so it seems very 
unlikely that we can adduce this real threat of piracy as a reason for creating 
fortifications on any scale.
More important, however, is the issue of a perceived threat of a Byzantine attempt to 
recapture Cyprus; any such attempt would of course be seaborne, thus involving the 
coastal towns and ports in the first instance, especially Paphos which was the closest 
port for Constantinople. For Peter Megaw, this threat was all important and explained 
the rapid transformation of what he identified as the very early Lusignan tower 
mentioned above into the much more elaborate quadrangular, concentric Saranda 
Kolones. For him, ‘it can hardly be doubted that the ... fortification at Paphos arose 
from the attempts of successive Byzantine emperors to recover Cyprus, both when the 
island was seized by Isaac Comnenus and after Richard the Lionheart had taken it 
from him.t47 According to this view then, the tower of Paphos, its successor, Saranda 
Kolones and presumably, any other very early Lusignan work elsewhere, were all 
inspired primarily by the threat of a Byzantine reconquista. Owing to the debate on 
Saranda Kolones -  its dating and builders -  it is worth considering this argument to 
see if it holds up, for if it does not, Megaw’s raison d'etre for Saranda Kolones and 
by implication, the other coastal castles, appears doubtful.
45 Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 70.
46 Oliver of Paderbom (ed. Peters), ch. 50, p. 107; Ahrweiler, pp. 289-92.
47 A Castle in Cyprus, pp. 45-8.
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In fact, it appears extremely unlikely that the Empire posed a serious threat to the new 
Lusignan regime. From about the death of Manuel Comnenus in 1180, the Empire 
quite lost the initiative in controlling its subject peoples and dealing with its various 
neighbours, the more important of whom had been on peaceful terms with it until 
then. In the west, it survived the Norman war of 1185, but from the late 1180s it 
fought a losing battle in maintaining its authority in its Balkan territories over its 
Vlach and Bulgarian inhabitants. These peoples, aided by Cumans from beyond the 
Danube, inflicted a heavy defeat on the Byzantine army in 1190, ultimately, in 1202, 
gaining independence from Constantinople, leaving the Empire with considerably 
reduced territories. Factional squabbling, symptomised by several changes of 
emperor, helped paralyse central government, this in turn facilitating regional 
governors to declare their independence. Such separatism was especially marked in 
the east, where matters were further aggravated by raids from Turcoman nomads on 
border territories and the breakdown of the understanding that Manuel Comnenus had 
had with the Seljuk Sultan Kilidj Arslan (1155-1192).48
This loss of territory and control in turn meant loss of revenue through the inability to 
collect taxes which naturally weakened imperial resources further. Cyprus itself is a 
good example of just this. It had been heavily exploited by Constantinople, when in 
1184, Isaac Comnenus took control in his own name. The Emperor Andronicus 1 
Comnenus (1183-5) simply did not have the means to do anything about this and 
though his successor, Isaac II Angelus (1185-95) initiated an attempt in 1187, Isaac 
Comnenus of Cyprus was able to negate it with the aid of a fleet led by the Sicilian 
admiral and freebooter, Margaritone. There were no resources to attempt a further
49Byzantine expedition to regain Cyprus.
Byzantine sea power similarly decayed. Manuel’s last attempt to create a large fleet 
was in 1172-3 but this programme was not continued. The navy’s vessels were not 
maintained and consequently decayed quickly. It shrank to a series of forces based on 
the principal imperial ports which could only offer some measure of protection for 
coastal commerce. Such as it was, the fleet thus became disconnected provincial
u  Brand, pp. 16-18.47, 88-96, 113-4, 125-133,156, 160-72; Angold, pp. 299, 300-1, 304-15;
Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 34.
49 Brand, pp. 62-3, 109-10, 172; Angold, pp. 308-9; Ahrwciler, pp. 284,289; Edbury, Kingdom o f
Cyprus, pp. 4,10; Nicolaou-Konnari, pp. 34-5.
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forces under local authorities, whose loyalties, as just noted, were not necessarily to 
the Emperor. This disintegration of central, imperial power simply encouraged a 
proliferation of pirate forces, whose depredations caused further damage. Ultimately, 
the Emperor found his only course of action was to hire one lot of pirates to counter 
another, the remnants of the imperial fleet itself being used, with or without the 
Emperor’s consent, for further piratical enterprises. In the end, it could not even 
defend its own capital during the course of the Fourth Crusade.50
This dramatic decline of Byzantine sea power rendered the Empire even more 
vulnerable than before to the attitude of Venice, on whom it had sometimes depended 
as a naval counterweight to the Normans of Sicily in particular. Earlier Emperors, 
from Alexius I Comnenus (1081-1118), had granted various concessions to the 
Venetians and as matters became more difficult, there were frequent attempts by 
different Emperors from the time of Andronicus to bribe Venice with subsidies. These 
efforts appear to have achieved little other than to help deplete the imperial treasury, 
for relations deteriorated, especially from the revolution which put Alexius III 
Angelus on the throne in 1195. Further, in 1194, Henry VI had become King of Sicily 
and through thus uniting traditional German and Norman hostility to the Empire, 
Sicilian naval resources remained a danger to Byzantine interests.51
As has been commented, the Angeli must have wanted the return of Cyprus to 
Byzantine rule. Recovering Cyprus was, however, of comparable insignificance to the 
desire they must have had for the recovery of their far greater losses elsewhere as 
mentioned above but they were powerless to accomplish this. Their efforts to retrieve 
the island afrer the accession of the Lusignans amounted to nothing more than sending 
an embassy (in 1192) which -  even had it reached Cyprus -  could hardly have hoped 
to achieve its objective and seeking the aid of such disparate partners as Saladin (in 
1192) and Pope Innocent III (in 1201): initiatives that seem to have been highly 
optimistic. The Angeli could not have been surprised at the rejection of these 
overtures and indeed it may be that the approach to Innocent III was merely a 
negotiating tool to deflect his support for a crusade against the Empire. How far
50 Brand p- 5; Angold p. 322; Ahrweiler, pp. 257-8,268-70,280-92; Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 34; 
Edbury, Kingdom of the Lusignans. p. 226.
51 Brand pp. 5-7, 15- 16, 20,41-2, 172, 195-206; Angold pp. 168-9, 185-6,226-33, 320-1.
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Guy’s successor, Aimery, really feared a Byzantine expedition may therefore perhaps 
be questionable. Taking the Emperor Henry VI as suzerain in 1195 was perhaps some 
evidence of this, but the ‘fears of a Byzantine revanche’ as expressed by Aimery’s 
ambassadors at the papal court in 1199 may have been pure diplomatic 
manoeuvring.52
In short, to quote Steven Runciman: ‘The ancient Empire had become a third rate 
power with little influence in world politics’. On balance then, it is clear that 
Constantinople was not the threat to early Lusignan Cyprus that Megaw thought it 
was: it would be most odd if this reality had not become increasingly apparent to Guy, 
Aimery and their successors.53
We have argued against the view that there were compelling military reasons for the 
first Lusignans to erect fortifications. Apart from the tower they commissioned in 
Nicosia to dominate the local population, our knowledge of other towers they may 
have built at the outset of their regime remains meagre as we have seen. Having said 
this, if we accept the alternative view - that Guy of Lusignan and his successors did 
in fact perceive some need to defend themselves - then is it reasonable to see such 
possible towers as the result? At best these would have been simple structures, 
presumably not dissimilar to those that had been constructed in the early twelfth 
century by their fellow Franks in the Holy Land. They could never have been seen as 
serious obstacles to invasion by a foreign power or to large scale domestic uprising. 
Similarly they could have had little value as refuges against passing raiders. We 
should not forget that the Lusignans did not feel sufficiently vulnerable to encourage 
their followers to erect their own fortifications, for, as with high justice and coinage, 
castellation appears to have remained a royal prerogative throughout the Lusignan 
period, the only exception being the fortifications that the military orders were 
permitted.54 Clearly then, a major reason -  quite possibly the major reason -  for the 
Lusignans’ use of these towers was -  as it continued to be throughout our period -  to 
emphasise their own regality to their subjects. The establishment of the Lusignan
Hill, 2. pp. 62-3; Coureas, Latin Church, pp. 8-9; Edbury, The Kingdom, pp. 10-11, 31-2.
S. Runciman, A History' o f the Crusades, 2, p. 429. For the alternative view -  that the early
Lusignans did apprehend a Byzantine attack; Edbury, The Kingdom, pp. 11,31-2.
M Fcdden and Thomson, p. 108; AH.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 196; Edbury, Kingdom, pp.
21, 185.
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dynasty and the consolidation of the Franks in Cyprus succeeded for a number of 
reasons and we should not overstate the importance in this of any fortifications they 
might have constructed, as Molin did.55 In conclusion, these fortifications constituted 
principally a statement of the Lusignans1 success: their towers and castles were more 
a result than a cause of the establishment of their regime.
The other developments that we may assign with certainty to these first twenty years 
of Frankish rule, involve the works of the military orders, as just mentioned. On the 
north side of Famagusta Bay, the Templar fort of Gastria, must date from this period. 
It is a simple curtain on a promontory with a rock-cut ditch on the landward side. It 
was first mentioned in 1210 when Walter of Montbeliard fled there and then 
mentioned again, in 1232, when Imperialist fugitives sought refuge there after their 
defeat at the Battle of Agridi (see gazetteer entry, p. 205). It may have been partly 
dismantled by King Hugh III when he confiscated the Templars1 Cypriot possessions 
in 1279. The estate of Kolossi was granted to the Hospitallers in 1210 and their first 
building, most likely a quadrangular curtain, presumably dates from the ensuing 
years. Certainly no castle is mentioned in the narratives of the Ricardian conquest: in 
this respect, it is worth adding that the Colbert-Fontainbleau Continuation and the 
Lyon Continuation make specific mention of the village or casal of Kolossi in 1191: it 
seems highly improbable that they would have omitted to refer to a castle had one 
existed.56
Kolossi and Gastria were perhaps administrative centres first and fortifications 
second. Elsewhere, the two orders also came to have towers or strong houses: the 
Templars at Nicosia, Limassol, Khirokitia and Yermasoyia; the Hospitallers also at 
Nicosia and Limassol. These too could have served only as residences, administrative 
offices and prisons.57 The Templars also acquired property centred on Paphos, a 
point that has been adduced in an argument that it may have been they who were 
responsible for the erection of Saranda Kolones. This is but one aspect of the debate
M Molin, Clermont, pp. 198-9; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 109.
*  Lyon Eracles. (Morgan), § 117, p. 119 and Edbury, Third Crusade, p. 103. Eracles, Edbury,
Third Crusade, p. 177.
57 Hill, 2, pp. 23-4, 202, who included a Hospitaller castle at Episkopi, but see below -  Part II: An 
Urban Aristocracy, pp. 79-80; A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 206; Edbury, Kingdom, 
p. 78; Edbury. Templars in Cyprus, p. 192 (for ‘fortified towers’ at Limassol, Yermasoyia, 
Khirokitia, and for Gastria. citing Eracles, Receuil, p. 316 and Enlan, pp. 473-5); A. Luttrell, The 
Hospitallers in Cyprus after 1291, pp. 169-171; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, pp. 131-2.
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on the origins and end of that castle that has become something of a cause celebre and 
is explored in the gazetteer.58
THE WARS OF THE 1BELINS AND FREDERICK II 1228-1233
The accession of Henry I in 1218 when only a few months old provided the Emperor 
Frederick II with an opportunity to confirm his over-lordship of the Kingdom and to 
this end, he landed at Limassol in July 1228. He was met by the leading baron of the 
Kingdom, John of Ibelin, Lord of Beirut, but the two quickly fell out over Frederick’s 
requirements. Thus began a contest which was to continue until 1233, in which the 
island’s castles played a key role. Our principal source for these wars is the chronicle 
of Philip of Novara. Philip was a partisan of the Ibelins and accordingly his narrative 
is very much a justification of their cause and a glorification of their martial deeds. 
Nonetheless, he played a leading part in many of the events so the detail he provides 
is extremely valuable, the more so because he shows sufficient interest in matters 
relating to casdes to record some helpful information about them.S9
It is significant that even at this very early stage in this conflict, the control of castles 
emerged as an important issue. We are told that Frederick was warned that John 
would provision the casdes against him, which indeed John was mindful to do, 
certainly readying St. Hilarion where he took his family and from which he defied 
Frederick for a few days. However, John then agreed to Frederick’s terms, which 
involved placing imperialists in control of Cypriot castles and accompanying him to 
Syria.60 In May 1229, when Frederick left Syria to return home to the West, once 
more he was very careful to arrange that the island’s castles were in the hands of his 
own supporters. On his departure for Italy, he gave control of Cyprus to five anti-
** Cadei. p. 138; Megaw, A Castle in Cyprus, passim, Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, pp. 115, 
125-7. See below gazetteer entry for Paphos.
59 Guerra di Federico 11 in Oriente (1223-1242). a cura di Silvio Melani, and The Wars o f Frederick 
11 against the Ibelins in Syria and Cyprus, trans. and ed. J. La Monte. References cited below are 
horn these works, as noted in the bibliography. For his comments on Novara's perspective, see P. 
Edbury, John of Ibelin, pp. 34-5. For the timing of Frederick’s arrival in Cyprus and his initial 
negotiations with John of Ibelin, see Novara, § 30 (126), Melani, p. 82.
60 Novara, §§ 35 (13D-39 (135), Melani, pp. 96-100.
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Ibelin Cypriots: baillis led by Aimery Barlais.61 Later in 1229, the Ibelins returned 
from Syria to Cyprus, quickly taking Gastria, no doubt with the co-operation of the 
Templars. The bailtis retired to Nicosia, where they were defeated in battle on 14 
July .62 After that, most of them, under Aimery Barlais and Aimery of Bethsan 
withdrew to St Hilarion where they already had the young King in their custody, 
though one of their number -  Gauvain of Cheniche -  occupied Kantara, while some 
of their men held Kyrenia. On the day after the battle, the imperialists’ castles were 
invested. John of Ibelin himself took charge at Kyrenia, while his three sons directed 
matters at St. Hilarion with Anseau of Brie in charge at Kantara. At Kyrenia, Philip 
of Novara arranged with the defenders for the conditional surrender of the castle if 
they were not relieved within a certain time limit, and accordingly it was ultimately 
given up to him.63 The capture of St Hilarion and Kantara did not prove to be so 
easy.
From Kyrenia, John of Ibelin went on to join his sons at St Hilarion. However, as in 
1191, its strength rendered it impervious to assault:
Le chasteau si est en mout fier luec et en mout fieres montaignes, et mout y 
covient de gent quy bien le veaut asseger, car de mout de leus n’en y peut Ton 
issir que par la porte, et il y avoit dedans mout de gamison de gens a cheval et
a pie.
The castle is in a very strong location in most high mountains and many men 
were needed in order to besiege it well, for one could go out by many places 
other than the gate and there was within a large garrison of men both on horse
and on foot.
Accordingly the Ibelin forces settled down to a blockade. Knowing that the 
imperialists were famished slackened the vigilance of the besiegers and as a 
consequence the Ibelins dispersed, John going to observe proceedings at Kantara and 
his sons to Nicosia and their estates, leaving very few knights at the siege. The 
imperialists, under Barlais, exploited this complacency and made a sortie, capturing
61 Novara, § 43 ( 139), Melani, p. 104; Hill, 2, pp. 97-9; Edbury, Kingdom, pp. 59-60.
62 Novara, §§ 48 (144)-49 (145), Melani, pp. 116-120.
6i Novara, §§ 49 (145)-50 (146), Melani, pp. 118-120; Hill, 2, pp. 103-5; Molin, Unknown Crttsader 
Castles, p. 110; A.H.S.Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 1.
64 Novara, § 52 (148), Melani, p. 124; trans. in La Monte, p. 105.
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the camp and the provisions of the besiegers. Swiftly returning, Balian of Ibelin 
recaptured their siege encampment and drove the imperialists back into the castle, so 
restoring the situation, but their capture of provisions enabled the imperialists to 
prolong their resistance. This incident prompted John of Ibelin’s three sons, Balian, 
Baldwin and Hugh, to arrange to take it in turns to remain at the siege for a month at a 
time, with a force of a hundred knights and ‘a goodly number’ of foot. Philip of 
Novara had joined the Ibelin forces outside the castle: he provides a spirited and no 
doubt elaborated narration of events. According to his account, he was wounded by a 
lance thrust, the iron tip of which remained embedded in his arm. Undeterred, he had 
himself carried before the castle where he sang two stanzas of his own composition 
taunting the besieged. Having been reduced to eating their own horses and even a 
donkey, enduring such antics most likely completed the garrison’s demoralisation and 
they surrendered in April or May 1230.65
A similar sequence of events can be followed at Kantara. Notables among the 
besieging Ibelin forces included Anseau of Brie and Lord John of Caesarea, one of 
whose crossbowmen killed the imperialist commander, Gauvin of Cheniche. Philip of 
Novara relates that Anseau had a trebuchet constructed. This was the new wonder 
weapon of siege warfare and excited much interest: it was to see this that John of 
Ibelin left the siege of St Hilarion. Yet, though reportedly it had a devastating effect, 
the castle was so strongly positioned on its rock that it still proved impervious to 
assault and its garrison, now under Philip Chenart, like that in St Hilarion, capitulated 
on terms only in April or May 1230.66
The fact that both castles had remained untaken for some ten months and were only 
then given up rather than captured by assault, is ample testimony to their strength in 
particular and a reflection of the superiority of defence over attack in general. That the 
fighting had focused on just these three castles also suggests that at this time, only 
these three were of any real consequence. Indeed, the only building work on the 
island’s castles during this period appears to be some work carried out at St Hilarion 
and Kyrenia, more fully discussed below. It is also worth noting that though the
65 Novara, §§ 52 (!48)-55( 151), §56 (152), Melani, pp, 124-8, 132.
66 Novara, §§ 52 (148)-56 (152), Melani, pp. 124-132.
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outcome of the fight at Nicosia was clearly important, the occupation and siege of 
castles were the dominant aspects of this war and in this, very typical of the period.67
Precisely the same conclusions may be derived from the second half of the war, which 
commenced in Autumn 1231, when the Emperor sent large forces to the East, and 
attacked John of Ibelin’s lordship of Beirut. The Ibelins followed to Syria and while 
they were absent from Cyprus, the baillis led by Aimery Barlais, took possession of 
the castles except Kyrenia, St Hilarion and Buffavento, suggesting, incidentally, that 
the others were either poorly guarded or incapable of serious resistance. Of the three 
that were held for the King and the Ibelin faction, Kyrenia capitulated quickly but at 
St Hilarion, where the king's sisters had been taken for safety, Philip of Caffran, the 
Castellan, and Arneis of Jubayl, the Baillie of the Secrete, withstood a siege of the 
imperialists. At Buffavento, whither Balian of Ibelin’s wife, Eschive of Montbeliard, 
had gone, an old knight named Guinart of Conches held for the King.68
At the end of May 1232, the Ibelins returned from Syria, took Famagusta and took 
Kantara on terms 69 On the 15 June, they defeated the Emperor’s men at 
Agridi/Aghirda and relieved St Hilarion. Some of the Emperor’s men fled to Gastria 
but the Templars did not admit them, so they hid in the fosse only to be captured.70
However, the Emperor’s men were in a much stronger position in Kyrenia. In 
command were Philip Chenart who had been at Kantara and Walter of Acquaviva, 
with a force of some 50 knights and 1000 crossbowmen and sailors and engineers.71 
The Ibelins commenced the siege in mid June 1232 but at first they were unable to 
prevent the garrison from being resupplied by sea. In December, the Ibelins made a 
formal military alliance with Genoa, whose vessels enabled the siege to proceed by 
both land and sea. Both besieged and besiegers constructed a number of ‘trebuchets, 
stone throwers, and mangonels’. The Ibelins additionally made ‘many movable 
shelters to bring against the walls’ and ‘two great wooden towers’ which were drawn
67 For a slightly different view, see Edbury, John o f Ibelin, pp. 43,47.
“  Novara, §§ 62 (158)-83 (179), Melani, pp. 146-174; Hill, 2, p. 114; Kyrenia Castle, p. 2;
Edbury, Kingdom, p. 64; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 111. 
w Novara, §§ 87 (183)-90 (186), Melani, pp. 176-80.
70 Novara, §§ 92 (188)-100 (196), Melani, pp. 182-194; Enlart, pp. 473- 4; Hill, 2, pp. 118-22.
71 Novara, §§ 195, 101 (197)-I02 (198), Melani, pp. 192, 194 - 6; Molin, Unknown Crusader 
Castles, p. 111.
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over the fosse but the imperialists resisted all such assaults, setting fire to the towers. 
Clearly the fighting was intense and deadly ‘for there was a great number of 
arbalesters’: Anseau of Brie was hit in the thigh by a quarrel from one such 
crossbowman - the iron head broke off and he died six months later. There was 
treachery too: Martin Rousseau, a captain of sergeants among Ibelin’s men and an 
accomplice, secretly communicated with the garrison advising them on when to attack 
the besiegers. The Ibelins disovered this conspiracy; they executed the traitors and 
Martin’s body was thrown by a trebuchet against the castle wall.72
The siege went on for ten months with the Ibelins being unable to reduce the castle by 
assault and typically it was hunger and disease that, in the long run, proved the 
deciding factors. We know, for instance, that Queen Alice of Montferrat who was 
within the castle, fell sick and died. With no hope of relief, the Emperor’s men agreed 
to terms, surrendering the castle shortly after Easter (3 April), 1233.73
1233-1373
While the Crusader states in Syria continued to survive, Cyprus was well behind the 
front line, insulated against Muslim attack by Christian naval dominance of the Syrian 
coast.74 Moreover, after the Fourth Crusade of 1204 captured Constantinople, any 
possible apprehension that Byzantium would seek to recapture its one time 
possession, must have evaporated. The thirteenth century was then, very much a 
century of peace, and consequently was the golden age of the Frankish regime in the 
island. There were very occasional raids by pirates or by Muslim vessels in response 
to Crusading activities but nothing to warrant that significant attention be paid to the 
island’s fortifications. Not surprisingly, what effort there was, was located on the 
Syrian mainland -  at Acre. There, both Hugh III and then Henry II added to its 
defences in the 1270s and 1280s by building a new round tower and a barbican at 
their most vulnerable point -  the outer defences of the north-east
72 Novara, §§ 102 (198)-103 (199), Melani, pp. 194-8: in La Monte, pp. 157-60.
71 Novara, §§ 98 (194), 102 (198)-105 (201), 113 (209), Melani, pp. 191-2, 194-200, 208: Hill, 2, 
p. 123 : Kyrenia Castle, p. 2: Molin, Unknown Crttsader Castles, p. 111.
74 Edbury, The Lusignan Kingdom, p. 236.
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enceinte 75 Henry II was crowned King of Jerusalem in Acre in 1286 and 
consequently had both a duty and interest in augmenting its security.
In spite of Henry’s presence and that of his brother, Amaury, in May 1291 Acre fell to 
the Mamluks and by August, the remaining Christian strongholds were also lost.76 
Thus the last vestiges of the Crusader state in Syria was extinguished. The general 
view taken is that this completely transformed the situation regarding Cyprus: that the 
island had now become the next objective of the resurgent Muslims. Indeed the 
sources provide some evidence that invasion was in fact expected.77
But how fundamental was fear of invasion in the aftermath of 1291? Was it really the 
cause for a massive investment in the elaborate fortifications that clearly did emerge -  
principally in Famagusta and Kyrenia ?
The answer is complex. It needs to be attempted against the realization that military 
works are built to exploit an opportunity for expansion as much as against the threat 
of attack. In the eighty or so years between the fall of Acre in 1291 and the outbreak 
of the Genoese War in 1373, both these motives are apparent. Let us begin by 
studying the threats to Cyprus.
Beginning with the threat of a Muslim invasion, we know now that invasion did not 
come and we are able to appreciate quite why. It is reasonable to believe that the 
Lusignans similarly understood the various factors that restrained the Turks in 
Anatolia and more especially the Mamluks in Egypt and Syria and that consequently 
the fear of invasion from those quarters was not so great. Prior to 1291, Egyptian 
naval assaults on Cyprus had been very rare: a raid on Limassol in 1220 at the time of 
the Fifth Crusade and Baibars’ abortive attack on the same port in 1271. The events of 
1291 did not change matters. Even a provocative raid by a joint Genoese and Cypriot 
force on Alexandria in 1293 foiled to trigger any expedition, Sultan al-Ashraf Khalil’s 
emirs preferring to assassinate him rather than endorse any possible plans he might
75 Jacoby, p. 95; Pringle. Town Defences, pp. 84 and 96; Pringle, Secttlar Buildings, p. 15.
76 Nicolle, Acre 1291, passim.
77 Templar, § 524, p. 121; Edbury, The Lusignan Kingdom, p. 234.
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have had to sail against Cyprus.78 Amaury’s charge against Henry II in 1306 that he 
was failing in his duty to fortify Cyprus against the Mamluks and Amaury’s 
communique of 1308 to Pope Clement V regarding the Mamluks’ readying of an 
invasion fleet, were not necessarily entirely based on a genuine apprehension of an 
assault from Egypt, for there is no evidence on either occasion that there was any such 
real threat.79 However, there were other powers who threatened attack on the island, 
powers who had the advantage of sea power and about which therefore the Lusignans 
must have been concerned.
The most significant of these powers was Genoa. There is evidence that in the early 
1260s the Genoese and Michael Vlll Paleologos planned an attack on the island.80 
There were Genoese moves to attack in the early 1310s and in particular they 
prepared hostilities, notably in 1305-6, 1319-20, 1343-44 and 1364-5. Genoese raids 
actually occurred - in 1302 when privateers abducted the Count of Jaffa from his 
estate at Episkopi, then in 1312 on the coast near Paphos and on a larger scale in June 
1316, when eleven galleys commanded by Nicholas of Sono, descended on the same 
area and caused much destruction. At the same time, there may well have been an
O  I
escalation in Muslim pirate raids on the island. In this context, it is very significant 
that the charge brought against Henry 11 in 1306 that he had done nothing to improve 
the island’s defences named the Genoese as well as the Mamluks as the main 
threats.82
These threats were at least a pretext if not an actual cause for Amaury’s coup of 1306 
as a result of which Henry II was overthrown. Amaury remained in power till his 
murder in 1310 whereupon Henry II was restored. Of course, Amaury’s dubious 
entitlement to govern merely added to the island’s insecurity and in this respect it has 
been suggested that, from 1308, he was concerned that a crusading force might
n For the 1220 raid, Emoul, pp. 429-30; Eracles, Receuil, pp. 345-6; Hill, 2, p. 87. See discussions in 
Edbury, The Lusignan Kingdom, pp. 236-40; Edbury, The Kingdom o f Cyprus, p. 102. Richard, in 
Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 64,68.
79 Edbury. The Lusignan Kingdom, p. 234; Edbury, The Kingdom of Cyprus, pp. 113, 120.
80 Edbury. Cyprus and Genoa, p. 111.
81 Molin. Unknown Crusader Casdes, pp. 116-7; Edbury, The Kingdom o f Cyprus, p. 132, 135; 
Edbury, The Lusignan Kingdom, p. 231 for pirate attacks in 1302 and 1312; Edbury, Cyprus and 
Genoa, p. 109. Amadi. p. 398 for the attack of 1316.
82 Edbury, The Lusignan Kingdom, p. 234; Edbury, Cyprus and Genoa, p. 113; Housley, Cyprus and 
the Crusades, pp. 198,200-1.
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descend upon the island, either to restore Henry II or overthrow the Lusignans 
altogether.83
Not surprisingly, one of Amaury’s first actions on gaining power in 1306, was to 
secure the allegiance of Kyrenia (where he was initially resisted by Sir Eudes of Vis, 
the captain of the castle, who ‘held the castle for the king’), Paphos, Limassol ‘and all 
the castles’. As we will see, we know that work was in progress on Famagusta’s 
fortifications in 1308 and though this may possibly have been initiated by Henry II it 
can hardly be doubted that Amaury had cause to continue the work.
These threats to the island coincide with, and are coupled with a clear expansion in 
Lusignan naval activity which was a further stimulus for developing the defensibility 
of the major ports. From shortly after 1291, campaigns were launched against the 
Turkish held Anatolian coast, sometimes in league with other Christian powers. These 
campaigns continued throughout the reigns of Henry II, Hugh IV and Peter I and were 
a considerable naval commitment.85 Indeed Peter I’s initiatives against various parts 
of the Levantine coast and particularly his attempt on Alexandria in 1365 and his 
acquisition and then defence of Antalya and Korykos constituted an especially intense 
naval effort.86 Inevitably however, they prompted reprisals. One such was a surprise 
attack on 10 December 1347 on Kyrenia, where the Turks managed to enter the castle 
beheading the castellan and killing a good many of its other ‘residents’. 87
As has been pointed out by Peter Edbury especially, these campaigns against various 
towns on the Muslim mainland were most likely an important aspect of the 
Lusignans’ aggressive mercantile ambitions. Pope Nicholas IV’s bull of 1292 banning 
trade with Muslims, created the circumstances in which the Lusignans could channel 
a large proportion of East-West trade through Cyprus, thus allowing them to benefit 
from customs and market dues. They achieved this by implementing the ban against 
western merchants sailing directly to Syria and Egypt, while encouraging Cypriot- 
based middlemen to trade at Muslim held mainland ports and deal with western
si Edbury, Kingdom o f Cyprus, p. 123; Housley, Cyprus and the Crusades, pp. 198, 200. 
u  for Amaury’s effective usurpation, sec Templar, § 662, p. 167 et seq. For Amaury’s seizure of the
castles and towns, Makhairas, § 54 on p. 53.
*5 See, eg. Templar of Tyre, § 525, pp. 121-2; Edbury, The Crusading Policy of King Peter I, p. 91.
96 Edbury, The Crusading Policy, passim.
97 Chronica Byzantia Breviora in Boustronios, p. 252.
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merchants based primarily in Famagusta. Locally produced goods for export from 
Cyprus itself added to business. Accordingly, the Lusignans established naval patrols. 
There is a possible reference to one as early as 1294 and certainly they were well 
established by about 1310. Indeed, the first reference to an admiral of Cyprus is in 
1298. However, policing the seas did not make the Lusignans popular and in 
particular their interception of Genoese vessels trading with Alexandria for slaves and 
other goods was greatly resented, which in turn helps to account for the fear of Genoa 
in Henry IPs reign.88
These marine campaigns and patrols must have made it essential to have defensible, 
naval dockyards and certainly the obvious port to develop in particular for this 
purpose, was Famagusta, in spite of the shallowness of its harbour. It appears to have 
served as a base for naval operations against the Muslims from at least as early as
og
1247. Indeed, Famagusta was especially important to the Lusignans. From about 
1265 an increasing number of immigrants arrived there from the mainland Crusader 
states, so it was already expanding when the final flood of fugitives arrived in 
anticipation of the eventual fall of Acre in 1291. Henry II welcomed them -  their 
arrival in Famagusta with their riches and mercantile traditions must have effectively 
supercharged that town's economy in a dramatically short time. In this context, 1291 
was perhaps seen more as a wonderful opportunity rather than the start of a period of 
fretful insecurity and indeed we know that Henry IPs government tried to establish 
Famagusta as the monopolistic entrepot through which all this trade could flow. The 
construction of town walls was an obvious means to help achieve this -  both to 
provide some security for merchants and so attract them and also to facilitate royal 
control and exploitation of this mercantile community. 90 This was reflected in the 
words of Stephen of Lusignan, who wrote in the late sixteenth century that ‘Henry II 
fortified [Famagusta] and made it like Acre, placing there a market where all the 
foreigners from the East would come and do business in all kinds of merchandise.' 91
** Edbury. Cyprus and Genoa, pp. 117-8; Nicolaou-Konnari and Schabel, p. 8; Coureas, Economy, 
p. 156; Ottcn-Froux in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 111.
89 Eracles, Recetiil, p. 433.
90 Ottcn-Froux in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 111, and see Town Walls in Part II.
91 Lusignan, Description, ff. 24 and 25.
G:\c Part I - History - T.doc 26
27
In this matter, it was especially valuable to have a wall with appropriate entry points 
on the harbour side, and indeed the Customs House was located close to the main gate 
on this side. This was supplemented by a system for regulating entry to port. We 
know that royal officials issued licences to vessels to enter and leave harbour and 
upheld a right to inspect vessels for prohibited cargoes. It is clear that while this 
policy worked, the income thus generated was considerable and Cyprus 
correspondingly wealthy. Perhaps inevitably however, it brought its problems. 
Merchants naturally sought to avoid paying dues and being searched and the powerful 
maritime city states of the western Mediterranean exerted pressure to have their 
citizens exempted. By 1365, the Lusignans were compelled to waive their right to 
search and license Genoese vessels in Cypriot ports. Similarly the demands of the 
Italian and later Catalan communities in Famagusta especially were to become 
increasingly difficult to accommodate as the fourteenth century progressed. 92
Opportunities to concentrate, control and tax maritime mercantile wealth, a need for a 
naval base and threats from hostile powers help account for the considerable works at 
Famagusta. We have certain knowledge of work on Famagusta in 1308 and after, as 
noted in the gazetteer. The work was part of a massive programme that resulted in a 
considerable quadrangular citadel, which itself was merely the centrepiece of newly 
erected town walls. It certainly impressed an unknown Englishman who visited in the 
1344-5 as noted fully in the gazetteer.93 No doubt the harbour defences were further 
developed at the same time and one can speculate that particular attention was paid to 
the chain and chain tower that already existed.94 Kyrenia’s fortifications were also 
enhanced at this time if not before: it certainly possessed town walls in the reign of 
Henry II (1285-1324).95
Elsewhere, it was later believed that Henry II 'began the castle wall’ of Nicosia - 
which might have been connected with the pre-existing Frankish tower, though that 
remains unclear. He is also credited with building at Akaki and though that is not
92 Edbury. Famagusta, p. 337. For the creation of town walls to promote and control trade, in general 
see H. T. Turner. Town defences... . Edbury, The Crusading Policy of King Peter I. p. 96; Edbury, 
Cyprus and Genoa, p. 123. For the Customs House, Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, p. 522.
93 Itinerarium Cuiusdam Anglici, p. 448; Western Pilgrims, p. 61. See gazetteer entry.
94 Edbury. Famagusta, pp. 338-9 and see gazetteer.
95 Templar of Tyre, § 514, p. 119.
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stated as being a castle, its scant remains reflect an element of fortification.96 It is 
improbable, however, that Paphos reacquired fortifications at this time, as Molin 
proposed was the case as a consequence of the Genoese raids (above) of this time.97 
As noted earlier, it is difficult to accept that the sole reason for building coastal towers 
at any time was to guard against pirates. A raid on a prosperous town could simply 
by-pass a tower. True, they had value as observation posts but a vantage point did not 
require a tower and such small buildings were quite useless as protection for large 
numbers of townsfolk and their goods. Indeed, the island's continuing prosperity 
probably made pirate raids inevitable: it appears that there was always some danger 
from them and that this continued well into the fourteenth century and beyond.
By Henry II’s death in 1324, if not before, the period covered by the chronicle of the
Templar of Tyre had come to an end. Unfortunately, the last pages of the extant
manuscript are missing, so it is impossible to be precise, but this approximation is of
value as furnishing an impression of quite when the Templar may have been writing.
In his chronicle, he wrote a description of the island which tells us something of the
state of its fortifications at the time.
Nearby Syria is an isle called Cyprus, most rich and good and full of all sorts 
of growing things. There were many lovely towns on the isle which I shall list 
for you. The city where the knights dwell, chief among them all, is called 
Nicosia; it is inland. There is another, which is on the seacoast, called 
Famagusta; and another on the coast called Limassol; another on the coast 
called Paphos; and another on the coast, fortified, with its city enclosed by 
walls, called Kyrenia. Inland are three castles: Dieudamour, Buffavento, and 
Kantara.
The unknown author of this chronicle appears to have settled in Cyprus a little while 
after the fall of Acre, so his was first hand knowledge of the island and so is of prime 
importance. If he was writing up his history in the 1320s, it is odd to note no allusion 
to the emerging fortifications of Famagusta, the more remarkable because of his care 
to report on the defences of Kyrenia. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that this 
passage appears at a point in the narrative that describes the fall of Acre in 1291, so it 
is possible that the Templar’s chronicle was something of a logbook that he had been
96 Makhairas. § 41, p. 43 for Nicosia, and § 597 on p. 593 for Akaki. The text of the Chronicle is 
contained in vol. 1 and all references cited below are from that, except where stated otherwise. See 
introduction above in respect of Makhairas’ reliability for events before 1359. Molin, Unknown 
Crusader Castles, p. 102 ; Hill, 2, p. 14 ; AH.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 196.
97 Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, pp. 116-7.
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writing as events unfolded and that this passage may be taken as an accurate 
description of the island's fortifications in the 1290s. Clearly, this would explain the 
absence of commentary as to significant fortifications at Famagusta. Just as 
important, it may confirm the absence of any fortification then in commission in 
Paphos.98
It appears that Nicosia casde continued to be developed after Henry II’s death and that 
around this same time in the early fourteenth century that most of St Hilarion’s 
considerable residential and other domestic buildings were created. Similarly, it was 
quite probably at this time that corresponding facilities were created at Kyrenia, 
relatively near to both St Hilarion and Nicosia and in that respect, the most convenient 
access point to the sea.
By the reign of Peter I (1359-69), the fortifications of both Kyrenia and Famagusta 
were no doubt largely complete. At Famagusta the harbour chain may possibly have 
been improved during the fourteenth century. Incidents in 1297 and 1368 might 
suggest this. In 1297, the Venetians were able to sail right into the harbour and bum a 
Genoese vessel, though whether this was because the chain was at that time of no 
great significance or simply not raised, we do not know. In 1368, the chain may have 
deterred an attack by two Moroccan pirate galleys: it seems to have been kept in the 
‘closed' position to protect the harbour.99 Indeed, during Peter’s reign, Kyrenia and 
Famagusta acquired additional importance as the fortified ports from which he 
launched his expeditions to the Anatolian coast. There, he occupied Korykos and 
Antalya from 1360 and 1361 respectively, strengthening the defences of both. At 
Antalya, Peter I’s captains:
filled up the ditches, because the Turks used to hide in them and leap out to 
attack people, .. .and.. .built up the wall of the castle and also heightened the 
towers.
Sir John de Sur (Tyre) had... in many parts heightened the wall of the castle 
and the keep.
99 Templar of Tyre, § 514, p. 119; Templar of Tyre, (Introduction), p. 1.
99 For the incident of 1297, Hill, 2, p. 209; for the incident of 1368, Makhairas, § 221, p. 203; 
Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 117.
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No doubt partly as a consequence of these additional works, Antalya was able to 
withstand a number of Turkish attempts to recapture it, though as it transpired, it was 
lost quickly -  in 1373. On the other hand, Korykos remained in Lusignan hands until 
1448.100 Its defences are of particular interest, (see below in Part III, Architecture).
Peter I was no less assertive within Cyprus itself. In Nicosia, it appears that at last 
serious work began on the town walls. In addition, he constructed a new building on 
the outskirts of the city, called the Margarita Tower, as more fully discussed in the 
gazetteer. Its purpose and the harsh measures employed to accelerate its construction, 
appear to have considerably exacerbated his unpopularity. In 1369, he was 
assassinated.
THE GENOESE INVASION OF 1373-^4
Peter I was succeeded by his son, Peter II. His reign is marked by the war with Genoa: 
a war which the Lusignans survived, owing principally to the strength of its greatest 
castle -  Kyrenia and the resolution of its defenders. However, the war greatly 
impoverished the monarchy and the Frankish regime and accelerated a decline that 
had begun earlier in the century.
The war began with a Genoese attempt to capture Famagusta. Philip of Ibelin, Lord of 
Arsur, had been placed in command there early in 1373 and was ordered to take 
certain measures against the Genoese:
Et similmente ordino de fabricar et fortificar le muraglie del arsinal de 
Famagosta et far mantiletti et altri fortificamenti de la cita. 101
100 For the acquisition of Korykos in 1360, Makhairas, §§112-4. pp. 99-101. For the acquisition 
of Antalya in 1361, works on its fortifications and its return in 1373 to the Turks -  Makhairas, §§ 
121-2, p. 107. (and Makhairas, 2, pp. 102-3 for the inscription in the walls of Antalya recording 
Peter’s capture of the town), § 126, p. 111, § 132, p. 117, and §§ 366-8, pp. 345-7; Hill, 2, 
pp. 320-2; Edbury, Kingdom, pp. 163-4; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, pp. 127-9.
'0I Amadi, p. 439. See too FI. Bustron, p. 294. (Makhairas omits any reference to these preparations.)
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It is not known what Philip achieved. On the night of 12 May 1373, the Genoese 
launched two successive attacks with troops landed from galleys. Both assaults were 
driven off, the first by the watch on a tower close to the harbour who let fly with 
arrows and stones, and the second by knights and foot soldiers led by John of Colie, 
who assembled outside the round tower of the Arsenal, at the south-east comer of the 
enceinte, by the sea. The Genoese vessels fell back to the Island of the Oxen, but 
were quickly dislodged by a sortie of knights and foot under the command of the 
captain of Famagusta.102
The King’s uncle, James the Constable, took steps for the protection of the rest of the 
island. He left a thousand men to guard Famagusta, assigned others to Nicosia and 
distributed more around the coast. He seems to have been in personal command of a 
force of some 800 based around Morphou. Foiled at Famagusta, the Genoese sailed 
round the coast raiding at will. They were forestalled at Kyrenia where its captain had 
a strong garrison and had to avoid the Constable’s force further to the west. James 
was unable, however, to check the Genoese everywhere, for they appear to have had a 
free hand on the southern coast of the island. Here, they pillaged and sacked 
Limassol, freeing prisoners, which has been taken to imply their capture of the castle, 
though this need not be so. They collected 2000 Bulgarians, Romanian Greeks and 
Tartars and
took the castles of Paphos. At that time the castles had low walls, and they set 
to work and heightened them, and they cut a trench, so that the sea flowed in 
and surrounded them with water, making the place so strong that, when the 
Cypriots brought up fighting-towers and soldiers in them, they resisted the 
attack without anxiety for the result. 103
The Cypriots’ siege towers were evidently elaborate affairs, being equipped with 
springals and their top platforms protected by brattices.104 Makhairas goes on to 
describe two attempts by Lusignan forces to recapture the castles and it seems likely 
that the abortive use of the siege towers may belong to the first of these, although that
102 Makhairas, § 362, pp. 341-3; Amadi, p. 440; FI. Bustron, p. 295; Hill, 2, p. 387.
103 Makhairas, § 377, pp. 357-9. See too Amadi, p. 444 and FI. Bustron, pp. 300-1 who refer to 
the fortification (‘forteze’/’fortezze) at Paphos in the singular. Hill, 2, p. 390.
IW Makhairas, 2, pp. 157-8.
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is not altogether clear. Thus, John, Prince of Antioch, the king's other uncle, was 
placed in command. He led ‘a thousand good fighting men’ from Nicosia to Paphos, 
where he was joined by the local commander and his forces. Together they attacked 
‘the tower of Paphos’ on 3 July.105 The Genoese used their galleys to help ward off 
the Cypriots, the fighting lasting for some hours. Although Prince John’s force used 
Greek Fire against the enemy galleys, the Lusignan attack failed because, we are told,
the Genoese had great help from the Bulgarians; and our people were not 
carrying shields, and on this account many of them were wounded.106
Prince John withdrew to Nicosia, leaving the Genoese in situ. With this base, they 
were able to raid at will, compelling local people to seek refuge in the hills. In 
response, the Lusignans made a further attempt to retake ‘le fortezze’ of Paphos, this 
time led by James the Constable. This too came to nothing, in part at least, because 
the Genoese again used their galleys in defence of the fortifications.107
These are of course valuable references to what must be the harbour fortifications of 
Paphos that are still in evidence today. The inferences to be drawn from these 
references from Makhairas and Florio Bustron, along with others, are discussed under 
Paphos in the gazetteer.
With the attack on Famagusta, the loss of Paphos and then the arrival of many more 
Genoese, the Lusignans could have been in no doubt as to the threat that confronted 
them. In Nicosia, on 2 October, a curfew was imposed and the watch assigned to 
‘guard the walls of the castle’. On the following day, King Peter
rode with his people and made the circuit of the town inside the walls. And the 
walls were very strong, but they were low; and he sent word to the country 
round, and men came together and built them up with earth and stones; and 
they dug out the ditch and constructed one hundred and thirty-three platforms 
to fight from in addition to the towers. 108
105 Makhairas, § 378, p. 359. See too Amadi. pp. 444-5; FI. Bustron, p. 301. Hill, 2, p. 390
gives a date of 30 July, but his source, Makhairas, is quite clear about this.
106 Makhairas, § 378, p. 359 and Amadi, p. 444; FI. Bustron, p. 301. (JHill, 2, p. 390.
107 Makhairas. § 382, p. 361; FI. Bustron, p. 302 (‘fortezze’ is Bustron’s word). Cf Hill, 2,
p. 391; Edbury, Kingdom, p. 204.
108 Makhairas, §§ 383-4, p. 363.
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FI. Bustron commented that these platforms were about 175-210 feet apart. If so, this 
indicates that the whole circuit of the city walls was just under five miles: 
considerably long by any standards. This whole emergency programme of works was 
reportedly rushed through in twenty days, which if true must have been a remarkable 
accomplishment. Armenians and crossbowmen were recruited and all males of fifteen 
and over called up. 109
Having arranged for the capital’s defences, which he left in the charge of John of 
Neuville, the viscount, the King led a force of 2000 soldiers to reinforce the defenders 
of Famagusta which was once again the focus of the Genoese. Fighting their way into 
the city, the King’s force was able to join the garrison, although this combined force 
was heavily outnumbered by the Genoese, reported as 6,000 strong, albeit all infantry. 
With the strength of Famagusta’s fortifications as a base and with the advantage of 
having a number of mounted troops, the Lusignans were able to keep the Genoese at 
bay and on 5 October, under James the Constable, a force of 500 volunteers made a 
punishing sortie from ‘the Cava gates’ at the north-west angle of the urban 
enceinte. 110
In spite of their defensible position, the King and his party were anxious to reach an 
accommodation with the Genoese, although, it would seem, for different reasons. 
Certainly a principal reason must have been a desire to bring about a cessation of 
hostilities so that Genoese depradations stopped, for it is clear that their pillaging was 
very damaging. Accordingly, after much debate, the King’s party agreed to withdraw 
his garrison from the castle and hold a parley there, the King’s representatives to enter 
via the Land Gate and the Genoese party by the Sea Gate. In the event, the Genoese 
exploited the occasion to occupy the castle by force and very shortly after, were able 
to secure the person of the King, his mother, and the Prince of Antioch into the 
bargain.111 Thus ensconced in the castle, it appears that the Genoese maintained the 
initiative by consolidating their position with their own emergency works. This seems 
to have involved digging a trench outside the castle thereby separating it from the rest
109 Makhairas, § 385, p. 363; Amadi, pp. 439 et seq\ FI. Bustron, pp. 294-5. See too Hill, 2, 
pp. 386, fa. 4. 391-2.
1.0 Makhairas, §§ 386-8, pp. 365-7; Amadi, pp. 446-7; FI. Bustron, pp. 302-3. Cf Hill, 2, p. 392.
1.1 Makhairas, § 390, p.369, §§ 411-416, pp. 389-397; Amadi, pp. 447,450-2; FI. Bustron, 
pp. 304-10.
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of the city, which the Genoese quickly overran as well.112 They were to move on 
quickly from this success to another at Nicosia, where they similarly fortified their 
position, as noted below.
It is noteworthy that while these events were unfolding in Famagusta, James, the 
Constable, who had arrived in Nicosia on 6 October, was careful to take steps to 
ensure that Kyrenia castle remained secure. Alarmed no doubt by the report of a 
Genoese ruse to take that castle by means of a letter purportedly from the King 
ordering the garrison to hand over command to one Francis Satumo, James was 
careful to direct that Kyrenia’s defenders received pay, funds for victuals and 
reinforcements. Acting on Peter’s command, which on this occasion was plainly not 
at the direction of his Genoese custodians, on 21 November, James and his household, 
slipped out of the Saint Paraskevi gate, avoiding the capital’s citizens who were loathe 
that he should go, to take personal command at Kyrenia.113 Whether Peter and James 
thought that Nicosia was adequately defended and being inland, unlikely to be 
attacked, or alternatively that James saw that it was really not defensible and so 
decided to abandon it, is impossible to say. However, that no less a personage as the 
King’s uncle, holding the prominent military post of Constable, should go to Kyrenia 
at such a time of crisis, is ample testimony to the perceived and actual importance of 
its castle and town.
Shortly afrer James’ departure to Kyrenia, in late November, the Genoese proceeded
to Nicosia where they captured a long stretch of the capital’s wall.
And they held the town and the wall of the casde from the Market Gate [or 
Lower Gate] to the Tower of St. Andrew, and they made the walls higher and 
held the place in great force. And the tower which stands near the Market Gate 
they filled with earth and stones and made it like a castle. 114
This should have provided the Genoese with a sound base from which to overawe the 
city but it is plain that this attempt to use fortification to underwrite their position was 
insufficient. The Genoese were too few and not prepared for the reaction of Nicosia’s 
citizenry. As George Hill put it: ‘In the irregular kind of warfare which went on the
1 This from Makhairas, § 4 2 0 , p. 401; Amadi, p. 453; FI. Bustron, p. 311. See too Makhairas,
§ 4 1 4 , p .393  and §§ 4 1 6 -7 , pp. 395-7; Hill, 2, p. 396; A H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, 
p. 197 Edbury, Kingdom, p. 295 .
,n Makhairas, §§ 4 0 2 -8 , pp. 381-7; Amadi, pp. 448 -50 ; FI. Bustron, pp. 307-8 . C/Hill, 2, pp. 397-9 .
1,4 Makhairas, § 4 2 4 , p. 4 0 5 . and 2, p. 164. See too Amadi, p. 4 5 4  and FI. Bustron, p. 312 .
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Genoese seem usually to have been the losers’. 115 Given the role of the town’s 
defences in the series of Cypriot reactions to the Genoese invasion, it is worth tracing 
them in detail.
On 6 December, the citizens seized the keys to the Gate of St Andrew. The Genoese 
concentrated on the Market Gate, but the townspeople seized the keys to it as well. It 
was only at the Queen’s command that they desisted and the Genoese were able to 
regain control.116 Next, on 7 December, James, the Constable came up from Kyrenia. 
Again, the citizens rose up, broke through the St. Paraskevi Gate and went out and 
joined him. As on the 6 December, the Cypriots are reported as having the better of 
the ensuing combat and once more, the Genoese were compelled to persuade the 
Queen to order that James and the citizens withdraw. 117 On 9 December, Armenians 
and Syrians took over the Gate and Tower of St. Andrew. Yet again the Queen 
intervened, ordering that they evacuate these fortifications. Though she was obeyed, 
very shortly the Syrians changed their minds and reoccupied the Tower and
the Genoese... placed two platforms one on one side and the other on the other 
side of the tower, and sent a good company of men at arms, and they took up 
their position and closely besieged the said tower.
The Syrians were eventually overwhelmed and the Genoese retook the Tower.118
Meanwhile, James’ arrangements to victual Kyrenia, appear to have at least partly 
miscarried as a consequence of the greed of his lieutenant. Once alerted to this, James 
acted with energy and personally took charge of collecting provisions for the castle, 
overcoming Genoese attempts to impede this in the process. In addition, he took steps 
to provision St. Hilarion, which was very shortly occupied by his brother John, the 
Prince of Antioch, who had managed to escape imprisonment in Famagusta. 119
1.5 H ill, 2 , p. 40 1 .
1.6 Makhairas, §§ 4 3 2 -3 , p. 4 1 7 , and 2, p. 167; Amadi, pp, 455-6; FI. Bustron, p. 313. Cf Hill, 2, pp. 
3 9 9-400 .
1.7 Makhairas, §§ 4 3 4 -6 , pp. 4 19 -2 1 ; Amadi, p. 456; FI. Bustron, pp. 313-4 . C JH ill, 2 , p. 400 .
1.8 M akhairas, § 4 3 9 , p. 4 2 5 . C /H ill, 2, p. 400.
1.9 Makhairas, § 4 2 5 , p. 4 0 5 , §§ 4 4 4 -6 , pp. 429-31; Amadi, pp. 4 5 4 ,4 5 7 ;  FI. Bustron, pp. 314-5 . Cf 
Hill. 2, p. 4 0 1 .
G:\c Part I - History - T.doc 35
36
After their successes of October and November, the Genoese must have now realized 
that they were losing their impetus. Further attempts to contrive the acquisition of 
Kyrenia by pressurising the young king to order its surrender had failed, while they 
had even been threatened in Famagusta by a Cypriot knight acting on his own 
initiative.1' 0 As a result, the Genoese naturally looked to their defences in Famagusta. 
Orders were issued to ‘raise the height of the walls wherever they were low, and 
(they) tried to bring the sea all round the place, so as to make an island.' 121 Judging 
by the description of the castle that we have from 1394, (see gazetteer), it appears that 
this work was carried out and the sea let into the ditch surrounding the castle that had 
been excavated only two months earlier.
The war now focused on the Genoese effort to take Kyrenia. From the start, they were 
confronted by considerable difficulty. To begin with, they were unable to force the 
pass over the northern mountain range, which was well guarded by Bulgarian archers 
and crossbowmen who had deserted the Genoese in favour of the Lusignans. Next the 
Queen mother defected, reaching the safety of Kyrenia where her money was well
Iused in providing yet another round of provisions for the people of the town. At
length however, the Genoese were able to gain control of the pass, inflicting about 
100 casualties on its Bulgarian defenders who withdrew to St. Hilarion.123
About the beginning of the last week of January 1374, the Genoese land forces 
arrived outside Kyrenia. This appears to have taken Kyrenia’s defenders by some
1 7 4surprise in that they did not have time to bring their cattle within the walls.
However, they raised the bridges and nailed up the gates and rejected a call for their 
surrender, unceremonially showering the Genoese with bolts and stones,
and used perrieres as well. And the stones were hurled as far as the camp, and 
they had Greek fire also: many men were wounded.
120 Makhairas, § 4 2 5 , pp. 4 0 5 -7 , § 448 , pp. 433 -  5; Amadi, p. 457; FI. Bustron, p. 315. Cf. Hill, 21, p. 
401 .
121 Makhairas, § 4 5 0 , p. 43 5 ; 2 , pp. 1 6 3 -4 ,1 6 8 , and see too Hill, 2, p. 401 .
122 Makhairas, §§ 4 5 8 -4 6 7 , pp. 443 -5 1 ; FI. Bustron, p. 316 . Cf. Hill, 2, p. 402 .
123 Makhairas, §§ 4 6 8 -9 , pp. 45 1 -3 ; Amadi, p. 460 .
124 This date may be inferred from Makhairas, § 4 6 8 , p. 45 1 .
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The Genoese promptly withdrew out of range and set their carpenters to make ladders, 
‘and engines and mangonels in great numbers’ and stones for them. By 3 February, 
this initial preparatory work was complete.125
Leontios Makhairas’ account of the six week siege that follows is fairly detailed and 
as usual for events of this period, fuller than other narrative sources which in any 
event corroborate it. Peter Edbury noted that Makhairas had a relative among the 
defenders and considered that this quite likely led the chronicler to exaggerate their 
exploits. 126 Inasmuch as Makhairas wrote of heavy Genoese casualties with no 
mention of Cypriot losses, this may at first seem true and yet this imbalance is wholly 
plausible given the distinct advantage of defence over attack and the seeming 
recklessness of the Genoese assaults. That Leontios had a relative in the garrison -  in 
fact he had two -  his ‘brothers’ Nicholas and Paul -  reflects of course the source of 
his information, drawing, as it does generally, from first-hand accounts. In this 
context, it is interesting to note that Leontios himself, conscious perhaps that he might 
be subject to accusations of bias, writes, a little afrer his account of the siege,
you must not think 1 am doing this in any way to make a boast of our Cypriot 
armies as against the Genoese armies. 12
In sum then, although in all likelihhod he was not bom until later so could not have 
been at the siege himself and although too he is incontestably hostile to the Genoese 
invaders and thus prejudiced, his is a detailed narrative drawing directly from the 
accounts of older contemporaries128 who were present. Consequently Leontios’ 
account deserves close attention from the student of the island’s Latin Castles. In it 
we have a description of a medieval siege and the various techniques used, that rank 
among the best we have from both the Latin east and indeed, the west.
On 4 February, a Genoese party bringing up ladders from Nicosia was intercepted by 
the Lusignans’ Bulgarians and severely mauled, losing twenty of their ladders. At the
125 Makhairas, § 470, pp. 453-5.
126 Edbury. Kingdom, p. 207. See Dawkins’ Introduction in 2, pp. 1-24 of his edition of Makhairas. and 
the bibliographical note in Hill, 3, p. 1145.
127 Makhairas, § 484, p. 467.
,2t Makhairas, 2, p. 16 where Dawkins assigned Makhairas year of birth to around 1380 while L. 
Philippou, writing in 1937 suggested 1350-60 partly on the basis of his brothers being at the siege 
(Hill, 3. p. 1145).
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siege, the Genoese filled in the fosse with branches and dry wood and set up ladders 
anacking under cover of large wooden pavises  motivated by promises of rewards for 
planting banners on the walls. This crude attempt at taking the fortifications by 
escalade was pressed home for two and a half hours. The Genoese quite possibly 
imagined that their opponents would not offer any real resistance -  a view the 
Cypriots encouraged by not showing themselves. Consequently this first assault 
proved to be costly -  the attacking forces sustaining 400 casualties, a substantial 
proportion of whom must have been at the hands of the defenders’ crossbowmen. The 
employment of such specialist troops in the defence of fortifications was long 
established. The utility of the crossbow and its efficiency in these circumstances were 
clear. At the relatively short ranges involved, the crossbow bolt was lethal. Makhairas 
tells how his relative Nicholas, killed one Genoese with a crossbow bolt which 
penetrated right through the unfortunate Italian’s bascinet.129
On 5 February, fifteen defenders ‘went out together from the hidden gate’ and 
captured two scaling ladders, demolished ‘the penthouse’, ten planks of which they 
took back into the castle, burning the rest and igniting brushwood in the moat. The 
fifteen then invited the Genoese to combat and as if permitting the Italians to the 
appointed spot, the defenders ‘opened the gate and let down the bridge of the castle, 
the outer and shorter part of which was so contrived with a pivot and counterpoise 
that when the Genoese came on it, they fell into the ditch, where they were peppered 
with crossbow bolts. A ffesh assault by 500 quickly followed, led by Louis Doria, 
which was repulsed and Doria wounded.130
The experience of the 4 and 5 February demonstrated for the Genoese their need to try 
other tactics -  clearly Kyrenia’s defenders were made of sterner stuff than had been 
expected: they were unlikely to be beaten by a force equipped with little more than 
just ladders. Undermining was probably not an option: it was a lengthy process but 
more importantly, the natural defensive site on which the castle stood and the ditch 
skirting its southern, landward side, made this all but impossible. Short of a simple 
blockade, the alternative was bombardment, followed by a more sophisticated method 
of escalade. The construction of assault towers was of course a considerable matter:
129 Makhairas, §§ 471-6, pp. 455-61; Amadi, p. 461; FI. Bustron, p. 318. Cf Hill, 2, p. 403.
130 Makhairas, §§ 477-9, pp. 461-3. Cf Hill, 2, p. 404.
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they took some time to put together, so although such devices may now have been 
commissioned, there was none for immediate use. Nevertheless, the besieging force 
sent for help to their comrades in Famagusta and on the 10 February, Genoese vessels 
arrived carrying
mangonels and perrieres, which hurled stones as far as a good bow could 
shoot. And there was also a war-ship, which arrived on the tenth of February,
1374 after Christ. In her was a mangonel like a trebuchet, and it shot just like a 
crossbow, but at short range, with a great stone.131
This vessel attacked the castle from the seaward side, bombarding the north wall. 
However, the defenders patched it on the inner side and lined it with another wall so 
that the bombardment proved ineffective. A more closely pressed seaborne assault 
also proved abortive, the Genoese troops being repelled by the defenders throwing 
down stones and jars filled with stones and sand. Simultaneously, another assault was 
made on the landward side, again by ladders, and this again was beaten back, clearly 
with considerable loss to the Genoese:
And when they (the ladders) were crowded with men, from above they 
threw down a great beam which was lying on the battlements: and they killed 
the men and broke the ladder, and they all fell into the ditch. And they hurled 
down so many stones from above that they killed any one who might still be 
alive. And by means of ropes they let down anchors over the other ladder, and 
dragged it upwards by force. And four Genoese were upon it, and they did not 
notice that the anchors had hooked on to the ladder, and when they looked at 
the ladder and saw that they were being carried up with it, they threw 
themselves down and fell into the ditch.132
On the 28 February, a further assault was made, which was similarly beaten off. 133 
Another problem confronting the Genoese, was the force of Bulgarians based at St. 
Hilarion. It seems wholly reasonable to suppose that this force under the command of 
Prince John was acting in concert with the Cypriots inside Kyrenia, to whom they 
rendered assistance by raiding the supplies coming up from Nicosia to the Genoese
134army.
1,1 Makhairas, § 480, p. 463, and 2, pp. 175-6. See too Amadi. pp. 461-2 who describes the weapon as
‘un igneno... come un trabocco’; FI. Bustron, p. 319. Cf Hill, 2, p. 404.
132 Makhairas, § 480, pp. 463-5. See too Amadi, pp. 461-2; FI. Bustron, p. 319. Cf Hill, 2, p. 404.
133 Makhairas, § 483, p. 467. See too Hill, 2, p. 404.
134 Makhairas, §§ 481and 483, pp. 465-7; Amadi, p. 462; FI. Bustron, p. 319, and Hill, 2, p. 404.
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Shortage of provisions within Kyrenia135 and the failure of the assaults prompted both 
sides to parley, but the talks came to nothing.136 Consequently, on 3 March, the 
Genoese renewed their effort to take Kyrenia, again by a co-ordinated land and sea 
attack. On the harbour side, a galley lifted up the entrance chain and cut it with a 
chisel but it was quickly repaired by the garrison. On land, yet another attempt was 
made at escalade with ladders, which inevitably was repulsed by a barrage of stones 
and missiles, the Genoese leader, Thomas Taga, being hit by two crossbow bolts. By 
this time, however, the Genoese had ready four wooden assault towers, which must 
have been under preparation for some days. The first of these, called the Sow, had 
three storeys. It was no doubt similar to the more fully described Cat, also of three 
storeys or fighting platforms, one above the other. On the first floor was a ram or at 
least men with picks and other tools to make holes in the wall; the second floor rose to 
a height level with the castle battlements and from it crossbowmen were able to pin 
down the castle’s defenders thereby providing covering protection to the men below 
chipping away at the wall; finally the third floor, which wholly overtopped the castle 
wall, provided the attacking force with a commanding view of the castle’s interior. A 
third tower was called the Falcon carrying ladders for scaling and the fourth tower 
had a cage filled with crossbowmen at the end of a beam. Six Bulgarian defenders 
sortied out of the casde, set fire to the Falcon and "the cage’ and cast the Sow to the 
ground, killing the men in all three towers. When the Genoese withdrew, at night the 
defenders collected the nails from the machines and fixed them points upwards in 
planks which they placed in the fosse and covered with sand, so that when the 
Genoese attacked again the next day their feet were injured and they fell prey to the 
bolts and stones showered down from the walls.137
1,5 Makhairas, § 485, p. 469, and Hill, 2, p. 404.
136 Makhairas, §§ 485-494, pp.469-83; Amadi, pp.463-5; FI. Bustron, pp. 320-3 and Hill, 2, pp. 404-5.
137 Makhairas, §§ 495-7, pp. 483-5; Amadi, pp. 465-6; FI. Bustron, pp. 323-4 and Hill, 2, p. 405.
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Next the Genoese lashed together two galleys fastening a yard crosswise between 
their masts, to the central part of which they fixed an upright beam carrying a shielded 
platform for crossbowmen, which stood so high it overlooked the castle wall. This 
assault was countered by the construction of a wooden screen on the castle wall 
opposite, impeding the crossbowmen’s fire. One of the castle’s three trebuchets then 
demolished the platform while the other two were employed against the Genoese land 
forces, one of which finished off the Sow.138
It may be noted in passing that there was nothing particularly novel in these various 
Genoese attempts at assault -  even their contrivances in attacking by sea had clear 
precedents. In their attack on Constantinople in the Fourth Crusade, the Venetians had 
bombarded the city using mangonels and other petrarie on board their vessels and 
erected scaling ladders on their decks. They fixed boarding ramps from their 
mastheads ‘so that they easily mounted the walls of the city’. The city’s defenders 
countered this threat by heightening their walls. 139 Later, in 1264, the Venetians 
mounted another seaborne attack, this time on Tyre, then occupied by the Genoese. 
The Venetians had bound their vessels together and raised over the resulting platform 
a contraption that enabled them to look down on the sea walls. On that occasion too, 
the defenders responded by building up their parapet with timbers. 140 As it is 
apparent that Kyrenia's north curtain was heightened on at least one occasion, we may 
suggest that once their coast was clear, it was then that its defenders replaced their 
hastily improvised wooden screen with masonry.
The Genoese gave up the siege and withdrew, probably on 15 March 1374. The 
Italians continued to hold the capital with a small garrison. Before the end of the 
month, there was another attempt to retake Nicosia for the Lusignans, led this time by 
two Genoese noblemen who had defected. The Genoese defenders based themselves 
in the towers of the Market Gate, which of course included the ‘castle’ they had 
thrown up on first capturing Nicosia. The Lusignan force was too small, however, to
131 Makhairas, § 498, pp. 485-7; 2, p. 179; Amadi. p. 466; FI. Bustron, p. 324; Hill, 2, p. 405; Megaw, 
Kyrenia Castle, p. 3.
139 Robert ofClari, pp. 71, 85, 92.
140 Templar of Tyre, § 322, pp. 41-3.
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make any headway. It was soon overpowered, its Genoese leaders retreating to the 
‘Tower of Trakhona’ where they were captured.141
NEW WORK AND ATTEMPTS TO RECOVER FAMAGUSTA
1374-1441
Although they had defended Kyrenia successfully, the war with Genoa had, in all 
other respects, been a disaster for the Lusignans. Indeed, it was probably only the 
Genoese failure to take Kyrenia that permitted the survival of the Lusignans as an 
independent dynasty. The Genoese imposed harsh terms in exchange for peace. 
Among other conditions, King Peter was obliged to require that his uncles leave their 
posts at Kyrenia and St. Hilarion, and he similarly ‘sent to all the other castles as well, 
to relieve the men in them.’142
The Peace Treaty of 21 October 1374 consolidated arrangements. Among the 
conditions imposed, Buffavento was to be given to the Hospitallers but it is unlikely 
that this in fact occurred.143 Plainly this peace treaty could never have endured and 
indeed it was soon forgotton as the Lusignans attempted to recover Famagusta. The 
first attempt began in 1375, at the initiative of one Thibald Belfarage, though with the 
assent of King Peter. Belfarage raised 800 men at arms in Venice and scored a notable 
naval victory over two Genoese galleys sent out to intercept them en route to Cyprus. 
This force of mercenaries appears to have formed the core of the army -  a mixture of 
horse and foot, equipped with crossbows and longbows, which proceeded to 
Famagusta, perhaps not until 1376. Under the command of Alexis the Cretan, the 
Turcopilier, this force appears to have achieved very little. A change in command in 
1376 made no difference and we assume any attempt at a siege fizzled out.144
The next attack was made in September 1378 with the aid of Venetian sea power. On 
this latter occasion, a joint attack seems to have been contemplated but poor co-
141 Makhairas, §§ 503-510 and 520, pp. 491-501 and 511; Amadi, pp. 466,468-9; FI. Bustron, 
pp. 325-7 and Hill, 2, pp. 406-9 (and p. 409, fn. 1 for the date of the withdrawal).
142 Makhairas, §§ 528-9, p. 521.
143 Hill, 2, p. 414; Opoypion Boyoabento, p. 2.
144 Makhairas, §§ 556-564, pp. 551-61; 2, pp. 192-3; Amadi, pp. 482-3,486; FI. Bustron, pp. 342-5; 
Hill. 2, p. 420.
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ordination brought all to nothing. Realizing that the primary threat lay from a 
Venetian seaborne assault, the Genoese
constructed forty wooden platforms and wooden towers, building them also 
above the tower of the harbour, and they worked at nailing them and making 
them ready ... they put fourteen men on every platform, and left one man only 
(as guard on the landward side:) and (all) the others they posted on the 
seaward side, on the platforms which they had just newly made, and on the 
tower.
The Venetians forced their way into the harbour and attempted to scale the sea wall, 
but this may have been premature, for certainly any Lusignan forces were not 
organized for an attack from the land. As a result, the Genoese defenders were able to 
concentrate virtually all their forces on the seaward, in consequence of which they 
forced the Venetians to withdraw.145
During his reign, Peter II began and largely completed a very considerable fortified, 
palatial complex in Nicosia. Elsewhere, he founded a new castle -  palace at La 
Cava, at the Nicosia end of a route to Lamaka and a manor at Potamia, about twelve 
miles south-east of Nicosia.146
When Peter II died in 1382, his lineal successor, his uncle James, was a prisoner in 
Genoa. This situation allowed the Genoese to impose a further advantageous treaty, 
which was agreed on 19 February 1383. This recognized a Genoese zone of two 
leagues around Famagusta within which the Cypriots were banned from building 
castles, while for their part, the Genoese agreed not to create fortifications outside 
their zone. The Genoese were to take over Kyrenia in pledge, but it is clear that they
147never came into its possession.
In 1385, James was finally able to return from Genoa, whereupon he reconfirmed at
148least that part of the treaty allocating Famagusta and its hinterland to the Genoese. 
Effectively, he was obliged to recognise the new status quo, by which he was not king 
of the whole island and that he now had to contend with a land frontier with an
145 Makhairas, §§ 583-586. pp. 583-5; Amadi, p. 488, FI. Bustron, pp. 347-8; Hill, 2, pp. 424-5.
146 See gazetteer.
147 Hill, 2, pp. 433-4; Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 3.
,4* Makhairas. § 613, p. 605.
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unpredictable and demanding neighbour. To deal with this new phenomenon, James I 
is credited with carrying out works on the fortifications at Paphos and Limassol, 
adding to the new castle-palace complex and city walls in Nicosia and establishing a 
wholly new fort at Sigouri. In addition, he had work carried out on the ‘Tower of St. 
Lazarus’, which is probably an allusion to Lamaka, supporting a view therefore that it 
was James who first established this fortification. Over and above these specific 
locations, Amadi adds that James was involved with ‘many other buildings and 
repairs’ and among these unnamed places we may perhaps include strengthening 
Kantara, as Stephen of Lusignan and after him, modem scholars have suggested. 149 
However, it is clear that James was equally keen to enhance the beauty and comfort of 
his various buildings in addition to his caput in Nicosia. We know that he added to 
the castle-palace of La Cava and that he made a grant to one ‘Perot’ to develop the 
house and gardens at the manor of Potamia. This ‘Perot’ was a ‘craftsman’ from 
Kyrenia and so it may have been he who supervised work on the elaborate royal 
apartments set against the west wall of Kyrenia Castle that are generally attributed to 
this period.150
The next king, Janus (1398-1432) decided to renew the campaign to recapture 
Famagusta and to this end he collected 6000 men and hired thirteen Catalan galleys. 
His first attempt, on 26 March 1402, came to nothing. Arrangements had been made 
by which Lusignan sympathisers inside Famagusta would open the gates to the King’s 
men waiting outside but knowledge of the plan leaked out and consequently was 
forestalled. Janus mounted a siege but in August 1402, reinforcements arrived from 
Genoa whereupon the royalist forces dispersed and the thirteen galleys were scuttled, 
bringing the siege to an end.151
In 1403, Janus tried again, settling down to a desultory siege with the aid of siege 
engines. In 1406, Janus burned his engines and gave up. The siege was briefly
149 Amadi. p.495 for a list of James’ works: Lusignan, Description, f. 35; Hill, 2, pp. 445-6; A.H.S. 
Megaw. Military Architecture, p. 206; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 118. See 
individual gazetteer entries.
150 Makhairas, § 620, p. 611 for ‘Perot’ and Potamia; Hill, 2, p. 445; for modem views on James 1 and 
Kyrenia Castle, see e.g. Perbellini (1973), p. 30; (1988), p. 19. See individual gazetteer entries.
151 Makhairas, §§ 630-1, pp. 617-9; Amadi, pp. 496-7; FI. Bustron, pp. 354-5; Hill, 2, pp. 449-51.
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resumed in 1408.15“ On this occasion, both sides used cannons obtained from 
Venice. The King's bombards -  ‘pezzi grossi d’artiglierie’ knocked down a stretch of 
the walls towards ‘Chrussoprassini’, but the breach was not entered. The Genoese 
cannons 'brought in secret from Venice’ were used against the Lusignan forces - 
Janus’ general, John Castegna, had his thigh blown away by a ball and 'the man died 
of the wound.’153 Once again Famagusta remained in Genoese hands. Shortly after 
this, the Genoese retaliated by attacking Limassol castle with a great cannon they 
hauled over from Famagusta. However, the Genoese force was attacked and 
overwhelmed by a force led by the Seneschal of Cyprus aided by a Venetian named 
Carlo Zeno. The royalists inflicted a number of casualties on the Genoese, capturing 
some and taking the cannon ('un gran pezzo d’artiglieria’) as well.154
This war of 1408 is primarily of interest because this was the first occasion that 
cannon were recorded as being in use in Cyprus. Clearly they had a considerable 
impact, though not enough to bring about the capture of Famagusta. Indeed, Peter II’s 
and Janus’ several, abortive attempts on Famagusta demonstrated emphatically the 
strength of the town’s defences. Janus had no alternative but to recognize this, making 
peace in 1409, which was ratified in December 1410 and reconfirmed in December 
1414.155 In December 1441, King John II (1432-1458) gathered 24 vessels in 
preparation for a sea and land attack. Three assaults were made but once again, the 
Italian defence held. It was not till 1464 that the Lusignans recaptured it.156
THE MAMLUK ATTACKS OF 1424-6
From 1404 Janus encouraged a series of Cypriot piratical attacks on Mamluk 
territories that culminated in a raid on Syria in 1413. Although Janus agreed to 
withdraw his support for these attacks in arrangements made with Sultan al-Malik al- 
Muayyad Shaykh in 1414, Cypriot-based pirates later resumed raids into Egyptian
152 Makhairas, §§ 634-5, p. 621; Amadi, p. 497; FI. Bustron, p. 355; Enlart, p. 489; Hill, 2, p. 458, fn. 
4; p. 459, fn. I.
153 Makhairas, § 635, p. 621; Amadi, p. 497; FI. Bustron, p. 355; Enlart, p. 445; Hill, 2, p. 458; A.H.S. 
Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 197.
,M Makhairas, § 635, p. 621; Amadi. p. 498; FI. Bustron, p. 355.
155 See fn. 153 above, and Hill, 2, pp. 458-60.
156 FI. Bustron. p. 371; Hill, 3, pp. 503-4,618.
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waters which climaxed in an attack on the port of Alexandria in 1422. In the same 
year, Janus seized a vessel sent bearing presents from the new Sultan, al-Ashraf Sayf 
al-DTn Barsbay (1422-37) for the Ottoman Murad II, prompting two counter raids on 
Cyprus. Then, in June 1424, Cypriot pirates appeared off Damietta and captured two 
Muslim vessels with their cargo and over a hundred men on board, which were 
subsequently sold to Philip Picquigny, the bailli of Limassol and John Gasel, the 
commander of Laraaka.157
Barsbay thereupon decided to mount a more considerable expedition against Cyprus. 
The first of these was launched in August 1424 but it was of limited scale consisting 
of only five galleys. In September it proceeded to Limassol where it was opposed by 
forces that withdrew into the castle.The Mamluks quickly moved west to pillage the 
casal of Kouklia, before returning to Egypt.158
In August 1425 a much bigger force -  carried in 40 to 50 ships -  landed near 
Famagusta. Despite the opposition of the King's brother, various places were sacked, 
including ‘the lodging of the tower of Aliki’ (Makhairas)/4la stantia della torre de 
Salines'/ (Amadi) 4la stanza de la torre de Salines' (FI. Bustron).159 This appears to 
be only our second reffence to the fortification in Lamaka commenced, as we saw, by 
James I, here at a port that James may have hoped could serve in some measure as a 
substitute for Famagusta. Next, the Mamluks went to Limassol where the Cypriots 
again withdrew into the castle. With the aid of a canon, the Mamluks breached the 
defences and killed its garrison. The arrival of a royal army shortly afterwards appears 
to have then induced the Mamluks to abandon their enterprise to return to Egypt, 
although not before they damaged the castle.160
157 Makhairas, § 636, pp. 621-3; §§ 645 and 647, p. 629; § 651, p. 631; Ziada, 1, pp. 90-2.
,M Makhairas, §§ 651-2, pp. 631-3; Petite Chronique, pp. 324, 337; Amadi, p. 500; FI. Bustron, pp.
356-7; Khalil Ibn Shahin al-Zahiri and Salih B. Yahya, Arab Sources, pp. 96, 103; Ziada, 1, pp. 
93-4; Hill, 2, p. 470; Edbury, The Lusignan Kingdom, p. 225.
159 Makhairas, § 654, p. 633 and § 657, p. 635; Strambaldi, p. 270; Amadi, pp. 500-1; FI. Bustron, pp.
357-8; Khalil Ibn Shahin al-Zahiri, Salih B. Yahya and M. Ibn Sayyid Hasan al-Roumi, Arab 
Sources, pp. 97, 105-6, 128; Ziada, 1, pp. 96-7.
160 Makhairas, §§ 657 and 659, pp. 635-7; Amadi, p. 501; FI. Bustron, p. 358; Khalil Ibn Shahin al- 
Zahiri, Salih B. Yahya, al-Maqrizi and M. Ibn Sayyid Hasan al-Roumi, Arab Sources, pp. 97, 106, 
122, 128; Enlart, p. 488 ; Ziada, 1, p. 97.
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In 1426, an even bigger force, 180 sail, landed on 1 July and marched to Limassol.161 
It appears that the damage sustained by the castle in 1425 had been made good and its 
fortifications even enhanced. However, the Mamluks took it by esacalade with little 
trouble on 3 July and held it for three or four days, slighting it before proceeding on to 
meet the king's army.162
Although they failed in their attempts to suiprise Kolossi and the 'casaV of Episkopi, 
it has been suggested that some damage was inflicted and indeed there is some 
evidence for this at Kolossi but any such damage did not in itself cause the immediate 
erection of the present castle at Kolossi which dates from 1452. Janus gathered his 
forces in Nicosia and marching via Potamia, reached Khirokitia on 5 July, where he 
and his knights occupied the tower of the Commandery.163 Subsequently, the King 
was defeated in battle and captured. The Regent took the royal family and treasure to 
Kyrenia for safety, while the Mamluks went on to bum the royal lodge at Potamia, en 
route for Nicosia where they similarly burned the 'king's most marvellous palace' and 
royal records.
The damage inflicted on the royal buildings in Nicosia by the Mamluks is interesting 
in that the sources make it clear that what was burned was the court, not the castle as a 
whole. Makhairas related that Janus:
finished the castle, and the houses in which he was to live on account of the
burning of the court.
161 For the size of the fleet, see Hill, 2, p. 476, fh. 6, which seems more likely to be correct than the 
150 given in Makhairas, § 672, p. 653; Amadi, p. 505 or FI. Bustron, p. 361.
162 Makhairas, §§ 672-674, pp. 653-5; Amadi, p. 504; FI. Bustron, pp. 361-3; Petite Chronique. pp. 
325, 337; Lusignan, Description, f. 155; Chorograffia -  Grivaud, f. 59a; Chorography- Wallace, 
§ 342, p. 80; Salih B. Yahya and Ibn Sayyid Hasan al-Roumi, Arab Sources, pp. 108, 129; Ziada, 
I, pp. 100-1; Hill, 2. p. 477, fits I and 2.
163 For Episkopi and Kolossi, see below, Part II, An Urban Aristocracy and the gazetteer entry for 
Kolossi. For the progress of the royal army, Makhairas, §§ 672-675 on pp. 653-5; Amadi, p. 510; 
Hill, 2, p. 478.
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while Boustronios remarked that
because ever since the royal court had been burned, King Janus, on his return 
from Syria, took possession of the residence of the knight Sir Richard de la 
Baume and dwelt there; and it has remained the royal court down to this 
day.164
From Makhairas* comment, we may infer that Janus completed the castle in any 
event, and that only the court buildings needed repair because of Mamluk damage. 
Boustronios* comment of course does not actually say anything about the castle as 
such, merely the royal court. Running on from that, it is interesting that, while 
Boustronios emphasises that Janus and his successors never reoccupied the original 
royal court buildings, taking over instead the apartments of a knight, there continued 
to be ample references in his chronicle to the monarch occasionally occupying the 
castle.165
THE LUSIGNAN CIVIL WAR: 1460-1464
On the death of King John II in 1458, the throne passed to his daughter, Charlotte 
whose marriage to Louis of Savoy was finalised later that year. Her rule was shortly 
challenged by her half brother, James the Bastard, who fled to the Egyptian Court 
where he was recognized as rightful ruler. Aware that James would return and claim 
the throne by force, Charlotte and her party abandoned the capital and withdrew to the 
principal castle on the island -  Kyrenia. With an Egyptian fleet and army at his back,
For the defeat at Khirokitia, the capture of the king, and the resort to Kyrenia, Makhairas, §§ 678- 
687, pp. 657-69; Amadi, pp. 505-9; FI. Bustron, pp. 363-9. For the burning of ‘the lodge of 
Potamia’, Makhairas, § 692, p. 669; Amadi, p. 510. For ‘the king’s most marvellous palace' in 
Nicosia, Makhairas, § 694, p. 673, and Amadi, p. 512. Ziada’s coverage of the battle and 
subsequent events is in his 1, pp. 102-4 but Hill is much more comprehensive in his 2, pp. 479 -  85. 
The quotation on Janus’ rebuilding is from Makhairas, § 702, p. 679 and that on the move to the 
Baume house from Boustronios, § 1, p. 67.
165 eg. § 19, p. 79.
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James returned to Cyprus, landing on 18 September 1460.166 Charlotte’s tactical 
decision is of interest because it says something of the relative strength of the 
fortifications of Nicosia and Kyrenia. On the one hand, Charlotte may have feared a 
blockade in her capital but her party would have known that the Egyptian fleet would 
effetively have the same effect on her at Kyrenia. Her advisers must also have realised 
that abandoning the capital to her opponent would constitute a very considerable loss 
of face and symbolically be disadvantageous. In conclusion, one can only consider the 
move to Kyrenia was largely because it was by far the most defensible castle on the 
island.
Appreciating that he could deal with only one adversary at a time and that the 
Genoese had cause to favour Charlotte and Louis’ party, James made it a priority to 
gain control of Sigouri. No doubt this was to gain a base from which to exert control 
in the area adjacent to Famagusta, while simultaneously imposing a force that might 
intimidate the Genoese there from a move towards Nicosia in support of Charlotte. 
James’ forces appear to have achieved surprise for some of the senior officers were 
outside the castle at the time. This seems to have been key in inducing its captain, 
Thomas Mahes, to yield the place up, once the appropriate safeguards were agreed. 
One of James’ men, Philip of Pezzaro, was then installed as Sigouri’s captain.167 
About the same time, another of James’ detachments similarly prevailed upon the 
commander of the fortifications at Paphos, James Mahes, to surrender upon 
safeguards, although in this instance, the commander was permitted to stay in his post 
holding it for the new king. It is perhaps noteworthy, however, that James seems to 
have made no attempt to secure any of the island’s other fortifications at this juncture, 
concentrating rather on proceeding to occupy the capital.168 James himself and his 
forces entered Nicosia unopposed on 26 September but they stayed only long enough 
to assert control, for by the end of the month, they had begun to establish a siege of 
Kyrenia. Three main camps were set up: one ‘by Kamouza’ -  identified as one of 
Kyrenia’s town walls’ towers -  perhaps the round tower at the south-west comer of
166 Boustronios, §§ 42-3, p. 91; FI. Bustron, p. 394; Hill, 3, pp. 560-1.
167 Boustronios, § 44, pp. 92-3; FI. Bustron, pp. 394-5; Hill, 3, p. 561.
168 Boustronios, § 68, pp. 102-3; Ibn Tagribardi, Arab Sources, p. 94; FI. Bustron, p. 401.
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the town walls, near the market place; another at ‘Casa Epiphani’, north-east of 
Kyrenia, and a third created by the emir, Kun the Circassian, in the ‘royal casaP.169
We have a reasonably detailed picture of James’ siege arrangements. From the ‘royal 
casaP, Kun dragged forward a cannon that had been acquired at Sigouri and 
positioned it ‘into the barbican’. Another two cannon were set up by two emirs at the 
camp near Kamouza while another two emirs placed two more cannon ‘on the side of 
Sperouniou’, most likely the area of the western spur of the main harbour at the 
seaward end of the town wall. James himself set up a serpentine (‘una serpentina’) on 
the roof of a Greek church which, we are told, killed 23 men in Kyrenia. He 
commissioned an Egyptian to make another large cannon and to that end ‘500 olive 
trees and many other trees were cut down at Casa Epiphani’ most likely to fuel the 
furnaces necessary for fashioning the gun, though it turned out to be ineffective and 
hence was broken up.170
It seems apparent that the ordnance thus employed was varied. Those by Sperouniou 
were small and caused more alarm than real damage, whereas the serpentine was 
clearly rather more effective. The Epiphani piece that was mismade was probably 
even larger. All must have been trained reasonably closely to their targets, judging by 
the reference to Kun’s cannon being in the barbican and indeed it is clear that to be 
useful, such short ranges were vital. The effective range of a serpentine, for example, 
has been estimated to be 250 yards. In this, we can reject the observations of Hill that 
‘the bigger guns’ would have been effective from the camp at Casa Epiphani itself - 
‘a good three miles from the castle of Kyrenia’; indeed it is fairly clear that the 
cannon were hauled forward for use and were not intended to be operated from the 
besiegers’ encampments. It seems clear that gunpowder artillery was not the only 
means of assault, however, for mention is made of the construction of ‘many siege 
engines’ which could well relate to older devices of bombardment, implying perhaps 
that even at this stage, new techniques were not seen as having wholly superseded
m  Boustronios, §§ 45-50, pp. 93-4; FI. Bustron, pp. 395-6; Hill, 3, pp. 561-2;
Boustronios, ed. Dawkins, p. ix; P. Newman, p. 7; Joachim, pp. 60-1.
170 Boustronios, § 50, pp. 94-5; Ibn Tagribardi, Arab Sources, p. 94; FI. Bustron, p. 396; Enlart, 
p. 420; Hill, 3, p. 562 who rightly corrects Dawkins' translation of § 50 in his Boustronios, p. 22 
as stating that the cannon was used to destroy the olive trees. For the locations of ‘the side of 
Sperouniou', and ‘Kamouza’, Dawkins, Boustronios, p. ix and P. Newman, p. 7.
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more easily created and reliable traditional artillery pieces. Scaling ladders were also 
made, in readiness for close escalade.171
The defences were however, considerable. The castle was ‘fomito a sufiftcientia’, 
possessed various artillery pieces of its own and had the support of galleys in the 
harbour. Charlotte and Louis had the support of a good many lords and so they had a 
significant force, which they organised, seemingly giving the Sicilian, Sor of Naves, 
overall charge, while authorising 'Brother Celli’ and his Hospitaller brethren to keep 
guard over the castle itself.172
No doubt this persuaded the Egyptian commander to agree to a parley with 
Charlotte’s representatives and eight days after that, the bulk of the Egyptians 
withdrew from the island, destroying their engines and encampment equipment and 
abandoning their food which was promptly taken by Kyrenia’s defenders. Charlotte, 
perhaps accompanied by Louis, took this opportunity to sail off to Rhodes to seek 
help from Hospitallers as James was obliged to fall back. By 7 November he appears 
to have been back in Nicosia with his those Egyptians left to him, which we are told 
numbered 200 Mamluks and 200 infantry, under ‘Janibek’. He managed his 
remaining forces well and summoned local troops, these including a 125 cavalry and 
100 foot soldiers and archers from Lamaka under its ‘Chevetain’ -  George Bustron 
(the chronicler), and prisoners who had been freed from Sigouri and on 9 November 
left the capita] to return to Kyrenia.173 On this occasion, he had far few resources to 
mount an aggressive siege and it is not at all clear that he was able to maintain even a 
loose, containing force at Kyrenia over the winter, as Hill thought. Both sides 
attempted to contrive ambushes, one such episode in April 1461 involving a brief 
skirmish in ‘the ditch of the barbican’.174
At some point, Charlotte returned from Rhodes and ‘disembarked at Paphos, making 
port by the castles.’ James’ commander, John Mistachiel, was easily induced to
171 Boustronios, § 50, p. 95; FI. Bustron, p. 3%; Hill, 3, p. 562, n. 4. For the effective range of
a serpentine. Norris, p. 124. For a more general discussion on gunpowder artillery used in Cyprus, 
see Part II - The Fortifications in War.
172 Boustronios, §§ 50-1, pp. 95-6; FI. Bustron, pp. 396-7; Hill, 3, pp. 562-3.
173 Boustronios, §§ 52-9, 85, pp. 96-100, 109-10; FI. Bustron, pp. 398-400,409; Hill, 3, pp. 563-4, 
571. fn. 2.
174 Boustronios, §§ 60-70, pp. 100-4; FI. Bustron, p. 401; Hill, 3, pp. 564-5, 570-1.
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restore the castles — ‘li castelli’ to her; she then appointed her own commander, Peter 
Palol, as captain, with ‘una buona compagnia’. Palol was quickly superseded when 
Sor of Naves, presumably still in Charlotte’s service, arrived from Kyrenia, and 
placed his brother Peter of Naves in command.175 Paphos may not have remained in 
the Queeen’s hands for very long, however, for it appears that James reacted swiftly, 
appointing one of his supporters in the area -  Dimitrios of Coron -  as captain of 
Paphos, whose ‘turcopoles and emancipated peasants’ besieged the fortifications. 
Naves with his ‘Franks and Cypriots’ sallied out and fought with them, but 
Mistachiel, who seems to have joined Charlotte’s party, changed his loyalty again and 
induced Naves to go over to James. It appears that Mistachiel was restored to the 
general command of Paphos, being in this post in October, 1461.176
James was also confronted by the Genoese based in Famagusta of course. From 
November, they launched various raids into Lusignan territory, prompting James’ 
men to counter with their own punitive expeditions. This led ultimtely to an attempt to 
take Famagusta itself. On 22 March 1461, James’ assault began. Plainly however, he 
had few forces. His men located a hole in the wall of the tower on the side of the 
arsenal and attempted to enlarge it with picks. At the same time, they tried escalade 
but found their ladders too short, which they tried to remedy by joining them together. 
Reportedly they also had ‘many engines of war’, but James’ force appears to have 
been too tiny to have coped with an artillery train and one guesses that this was really 
an attempt to capture Famagusta by surprise with what slim forces that were available. 
The attempt was soon abandoned.177
In May, James made another attempt on Famagusta, pitching camp ‘on the side of St 
Nicholas’, that is, opposite the south side of the walls while the Egyptian forces 
camped at the Limassol Gate. On 2 June, James captured a vessel bringing victuals to 
the Genoese garrison, but four days later reinforcements, ordnance and munitions got 
through to Famagusta on the initiative of Sor of Naves, who had fooled James into 
believing he had changed sides. Naves sailed on and similarly was able to replenish 
Charlotte’s garrison at Kyrenia. For the second time, James was compelled to give up
175 Boustronios, § 85, p. 110; FI. Bustron, p. 409; Hill, 3, pp. 571-2.
176 Boustronios, §§ 83 and 85, pp. 109-111; FI. Bustron, p. 410; Hill, 3, p. 572.
177 Boustronios, §§ 60-2, 71-2, 74, pp. 100-1, 105-6; FI. Bustron, pp. 401,404-5; Hill, 3, p. 573.
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the attempt on Famagusta, and so once again, its garrison was at liberty to forage 
outside the protection of its walls: it is noted that they raided as far afield as Akrotiri 
in October. Supplies continued to reach them by sea as well. James returned to 
Nicosia. He continued to pose an occasional threat to Kyrenia, but it seems that he 
could not maintain a regular blockade. At best he could have kept small companies of 
his forces in the area to intimidate Charlotte’s men from venturing out for supplies.178
Given the detail of the campaigning we have for 1460 and 1461, it is odd that we have 
nothing for 1462 and 1463. We can assume that James persisted with his pressure on 
both Famagusta and Kyrenia, as we know that both were very severely affected by 
want of provisions. We know that in January 1464, such circumstances compelled the 
defenders of Famagusta to come to terms. These were that if help failed to arrive 
within fifteen days, it would surrender, but that if help arrived in that time the siege 
would be lifted and a truce granted for one year. Towards the end of the fifteen days, 
James foiled an attempt to bring victuals into the port by sea and under the treaty, 
Famagusta duly capitulated on 20 January. James appointed Nicholas (Conella) 
Morabit as Captain and gave him strict instructions to let no one enter the castle at 
night, even if it were the King himself -  obviously mindful of the way it had fallen to 
the Genoese originally. Very shortly after that, Janibek and his Mamluks, ostensibly 
still in James’ service, arrived at the castle at night and called for admission. Morabit 
followed his orders and refused.179
By this time, Kyrenia was in such straits that its garrison was reduced to eating 
horses, dogs, cats and mice. Looking to his own interests, its captain, Sor of Naves,
responded to James’ overtures and ceded the great fortress, most likely, as Hill
* ] 80estimated, in Autumn 1464, thus ending four years of the castle’s resistance.
Yet though the Kingdom was whole once more, it was impossible to recover its 
former economic health and the rest of James’ reign was crippled by insufficient 
revenue. After his death in 1473 and that of his baby son and successor, James III in
,7* Boustronios, §§ 75-81, pp. 106-8; FI. Bustron, pp. 405-6; Hill, 3, pp. 573-4.
179 Boustronios, § 88, pp. 112-3 which has the date of surrender as 29 August, 1464, which as Hill,
3, p. 589, fn. 6 comments is ‘unexplained’. FI. Bustron, pp. 411-6 which includes the full text of 
the treaty made by the Genoese and James dated 6 January.
180 Boustronios, § 87, p. 112; FI. Bustron, pp. 406,411; Hill, 3, pp. 593-4, 618-20.
G:\c Part I - History - T.doc 53
54
1474, his widow, a Venetian noblewoman, Catherine Comaro ruled until 1489, when 
she resigned the Kingdom to Venice.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the island’s castles fulfilled an important role in Lusignan times. 
Control of these strongpoints was usually a primary objective in times of warfare as 
more fully discussed below.181 This control ultimately effected, even decided, such 
fundamental issues as the survival of the independent Kingdom. The exigencies of 
war and of the threat of war naturally influenced the development of the fortifications 
and we have noted this happening at different times at Famagusta and Kyrenia 
especially. At the same time, increasing demands for more sophisticated 
accommodation meant that castle facilities were gradually improved, conspicuously in 
the capital but at Kyrenia, St. Hilarion and elsewhere as well. As we have seen, all 
this reached an apogee in the fourteenth century, resulting at Kyrenia at least, in a 
castle of the first rank. Such building work was very much a symbol of the needs and 
aspirations of the crown, made possible by the prosperity of the country.
The period of the thirteenth and the first half of the fourteenth centuries was, however, 
the high tide mark, for during the final 150 years of the Lusignan period, the resources 
of the Kingdom were attenuated by a series of misfortunes. The first of these was 
disease: the effects of the Black Death were particularly severe, especially of course 
on the towns. Makhairas recorded that (half the island died’ when the plague first 
struck in 1348 but it revisited the island on many subsequent occasions. Harvests 
ruined by attacks of locusts, their first recorded appearance being in 1351 and 
occasional earthquakes, added to the list of natural disasters. But there was political 
and military misfortune too. The demands created by Peter I’s expeditions in the 
1360s, the Genoese invasion and occupation commencing in 1373, attacks from Syria 
and Egypt, followed by the drain of the Egyptian tribute made matters infinitely 
worse. The Lusignan Civil War of the early 1460s appears as a Gotterdammerung in
181 In Pan II. The Fortifications in War.
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this catalogue of disasters born from within. Even when established as undisputed 
King, James II was forced both to borrow and to tax heavily. Matters were 
exacerbated by a major famine; in 1472 the usually quiescent peasantry rose in revolt 
in an uprising which was suppressed with some brutality.182
Changes further afield made matters worse. The drastic reduction of the population of 
western Europe itself led to a sharp decrease in the demand for eastern products, 
adversely affecting commercial centres such as Famagusta. Moreover, as noted 
earlier, about the same time as the first appearance of the plague, it appears that 
Cypriot mercantile fortunes were further damaged by other factors: the advantageous 
papal embargo against direct trading with Muslims was effectively rescinded in 1344 
at a time when the diminishing volume of east -west trade appears to have been 
shifting away from the ports on the mainland opposite Cyprus.183 Famagusta was 
particurly damaged by these developments and as a consequence had been in decline 
well before its capture by the Genoese.
The combined effects of these factors are reflected in comments we have on urban 
depopulation. Thus the Lord of Anglure visiting Limassol in 1395 wrote how the 
town was 4for the most part uninhabited*. By the end of the fifteenth century, it had 
shrunk to just a village of about 30 to 40 houses clustered around the cathedral. At 
Paphos a Catalan visitor in the late 1430s described it as depopulated by reason of its 
unhealthiness. In Nicosia the settled area had earlier spread out beyond the city walls 
so that its perimeter was some nine miles but this had shrunk dramatically and did not 
recover, for in 1507, Peter Mesange found the population too small for the walls with 
the city then only a quarter inhabited. 184
1.2 Makhairas, §§ 66 and 135, pp. 61 and 119, §§ 622-3, p. 611, §§ 636,638,639, pp. 623-5, § 643, 
p. 627, § 648, p. 629, § 707, p. 683; Petite Chronique, p. 333; Boustronios, §§ 91-2,94, pp. 114- 
5; Benedetto Bordone in Cobham, p. 62; Edbury, Kingdom, pp. 13-14; Grivaud and Schabel 
inVaivre and Plagnieux, p. 91. For Peter I’s demands on the island -  Edbury, Kingdom, pp. 176-7. 
For retaliatory raids from MamlOk lands in the early fifteenth century, Makhairas, §§ 645-6, p. 
629. The main Mamlftk attacks of 1424-6 are dealt with in detail above. For the Egyptian tribute, 
see Edbury, The Lusignan Kingdom, pp. 223, 239. J. Richard in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 85; 
Joachim pp. 72,77.
1.3 Edbury in Calerina Comoro, p. 33; Edbury, The Lusignan Kingdon, p. 239; Edbury, The Kingdom 
o f Cyprus, p. 152; Coureas, Economy, p. 138; Nicolaouu-Konnari and Schabel, Introduction, p. 3.
IM in Cobham, pp. 28, 33; Enlart, p. 503; Hill, 3, pp. 809, 811; Perbellini (1973), pp. 46,51.
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The sum total of all these difficulties was decline and the chronic insolvency of the 
royal treasury. Quite simply, this is a major explanation for the lack of attention to 
fortifications in the fifteenth century.185
By the time the Venetians took over full control of the island in 1489, the 
fortifications were clearly in a state of decay. In the late fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, the Venetians plainly exerted themselves considerably, though of course on 
fortifying communities rather than castles. Castles per se had no place within the 
socio-political complexion of Venetian administration and with the break up of 
feudalism generally, they became anachronistic - even where warfare was virtually 
endemic. Accordingly the Venetians abandoned or even dismantled redundant sites, 
notably the mountain castles, concentrating their attentions on the development of
1 ttAartillery fortifications at Nicosia, Kyrenia and Famagusta. Impressive though these 
are, the medievalist must regret that their construction brought about the loss or 
drastic alteration of the most important earlier castles and town walls of Cyprus.
185 cf. A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 207.
186 See various gazetteer entries and Hill, 3, p. 850 for Kyrenia; p. 853 et seq. for Famagusta, and pp. 
862-4 for the mountain castles.
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Appendix 
The sources for the Ricardian conquest
The most detailed sources that we have and with which we can most conveniently 
start, are the closely related western chronicles Estoire de la Guerre Sainte and the 
ltinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi. The author of the Anglo Norman 
rhyming Estoire was one Ambroise, who was probably a Norman and a cleric rather 
than a jongleur as was once thought. It is most likely that he was an eye witness of the 
events he describes, as indeed he claims on several occasions and that consequently 
his narrative is extremely valuable. He wrote this between 1194 and 1199 so it is very 
near to Richard I’s conquest. He appears to have been in that portion of King 
Richard's fleet that made landfall in Cyprus on 6 May and quite probably he was 
intimate with the King’s subsequent manoeuvres. He also seems to have been close to 
a prominent crusader, the Earl of Leicester, or at any rate his sources were. By 
contrast, the provenance and therefore value of the ltinerarium has been a matter of 
much debate. It is now thought to have been written, most likely between 1217 and 
1222 by Richard of the Temple, prior of the Augustinian priory of Holy Trinity in 
London from 1222 to 1248/50 and that he compiled this Latin narrative (known as 
IP2) principally from an earlier version that ends with the events of Autumn 1190 
(IP1) most likely written c. 1191-2 by an English Templar, chaplain of Tyre, who 
participated in the Third Crusade; from a Latin translation of Ambroise’ Estoire, 
(which may be superior to the version now extant), from Ralph of Diceto, Roger of 
Howden and other sources that have not been identified. Richard may have added his 
own experiences and observations as a possible participant on the crusade himself. 
Certainly IP2’s detailed description of what King Richard was wearing when going to 
confer with the Emperor of Cyprus has led its latest editor to think that Richard of the 
Temple was most likely present in Cyprus in May 1191. Whether Richard of the 
Temple’s IP2 has the merit of including material deriving from his own first hand 
experiences or not, it does appear at least that he and Ambroise were independent 
authors. It is clear, however, that we need to retain some caution in accepting the 
reliability of the additional detail furnished in the ltinerarium, that can not be verified 
by any other reliable historical or archaeological means. That Ambroise was less 
dependent on information derived from others on crusade and writing nearer to the
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events described, makes him the superior source.187 For my present purpose, the 
ltinerarium is crucial as being the only source that refers to what may be fortifications 
in Nicosia and Famagusta at the time of King Richard’s invasion. Although we can 
verify the existence of a castle in Nicosia at least from references to it in relation to 
the rebellion against the Templars in 1192, there is no other source that can be used to 
adduce the existence, in 1191, of a possible castle in Famagusta. Similarly, the 
ltinerarium refers to another possible castle, most likely in Limassol, which, as we 
saw, is only mentioned elsewhere in an especially difficult source. The problem of 
certainty is compounded by what our chroniclers meant by their nomenclature. In 
narratives compiled in the West at this time, the use of the words castrum and 
castellum were generally used imprecisely and could refer to a fort, walled town, even 
a village or to indicate a place of administrative and judicial significance or the 
residence of a personage of some status. The authors of chronicles that were 
compiled in the Latin East, however, appear to have been rather more judicial in their 
employment of these terms. Although they too could use castrum in allusion to an 
estate, a forthcoming study suggests that they more often employed these two words 
to indicate a fortification.188
Another western account that draws on first hand experience is provided by Roger of 
Howden, a royal clerk who was present during King Richard’s occupation of Cyprus 
though, unlike Ambroise, probably not in the King’s immediate contingent. In what 
is taken as his initial draft -  the Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi et Ricardi (once known 
as the Chronicle of Benedict of Peterborough) -  we have references to ‘castles’ at 
only Buffavento and Kyrenia. However, in Roger’s later, reworked narrative, the 
Chronica, written we may assume, with material gleaned from others that was not 
available to him when he first wrote, he mentions, in addition, ‘castles’ at 
Dieudamour (St Hilarion), Candare (Kantara) and Baffes (Paphos). The compilation
1,7 The most recent edition of the Estoire, with a translation, is Ailes & Barber. For the Estoire’s 
Authorship and date. Ailes and Barber, 2, pp. 1-3; for a mild note of caution in taking Ambroise’s 
claim of first hand knowledge at face value, see Helen Nicholson, p. 14. The ltinerarium was 
printed in Chronicles and Memorials o f the Reign o f Richard 1, 1, published in 1864. This was 
issued in a translation by Helen Nicholson in 1997. Recent analyses of Richard of the Temple’s 
sources, the possibility that he too was an eye witness of some of the events related in his 
chronicle, and the relationship of his ltinerarium with the Estoire are matters discussed by 
Nicholson, pp. 12-14; Ailes and Barber. 2, p. 13, and Nicolaou-Konnari, pp. 29-30. Gillingham 
however, remains unconvinced that Richard of the Temple necessarily went on crusade. See his 
Richard /, p. 127, fn. 11.
IM See fn. 40 above.
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of Roger’s Chronica is not much further removed from its subject matter than the 
Gesta Regis: it is thought to have been begun as early as 1192 or 1193 and certainly 
the two earliest extant manuscripts were produced between 1199 and 1201 or 1202, 
Roger dying in 1201. For Cyprus in 1191, the Gesta and the Chronica therefore have 
comparable status. This helps to persuade us that we can accept the veracity of these 
allusions to all five ‘castles’: certainly four are mentioned in several other sources. 
This leaves one on the list, and therefore the Chronica's reference is especially 
important. This is Paphos. As will be set out in the Gazetteer, this particular reference 
has helped fuel much controversy on that site.189
Three other contemporary English chroniclers have information on Richard’s 
conquest of Cyprus, and though these are not their own experiences, they are quite 
likely derived directly from those who were on crusade with King Richard. Thus, 
Ralph, Abbot of Coggeshall claimed he had information from his neighbour Hugh of 
Nevill who had been with the King. Ralph of Diceto, the Dean of St. Paul’s, who was 
dead by 1202, received information from his chaplain, William, who was also on the 
crusade, had access to public archives and had connections with the royal court. 
William, a canon of Newburgh Priory who had finished writing by 1198, almost 
certainly by autumn 1197, and who died at some point before 1201, appears to have 
had access to reliable information: he is careful to record when his information 
derives from ‘those who were there, or heard from those who were there’. William 
also drew from the Latin translation of the Continuation of William of Tyre, this 
being composed in England around 1220 and seemingly merely a summary of IP2 
with extracts from Roger of Howden’s work grafted on. Unfortunately however, none 
of these three gives information on castles in the campaign of 1191 in anything other 
than the most general sense.190 A fourth chronicler with the virtue of being 
contemporaneous with the events he records is Richard of Devizes, a monk of St. 
Swithuns, the cathedral abbey of Winchester. His Chronicon was composed probably
,w On Roger of Howden, Nicholson, p. 2; Ailes and Barber, 2, p. 14; Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 31; 
Gillingham, Roger of Howden, pp. 141-53; Gillingham, Richard I, pp. 144, fh. 16, p. 338; D. 
Comer, Roger of Howden, pp. 303,310; D. Comer, Gesta Regis, passim. There is a translation of 
Stubbs* edition of the passage of the Gesta Regis that deals with the Ricardian conquest of Cyprus 
in Cobham, pp. 6-9.
190 Radulphi de Coggeshall Chronicon Anglicanum, pp. 30-1; Radulfi de Diceto Decani Londoniensis, 
2, pp. 91-2; Historia Rerum Anglicarum of William o f Newburgh, 1, p. 351. Ailes and Barber, 2, pp. 
14-15; Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 31; Gillingham, Richard I, pp. 338,343; Partner, Serious 
Entertainments, pp. 55, 61. The quotation is from Newburgh, Historia Rerum Anglicarum, p. 498.
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before 1194, certainly before 1198, and covers the period 1189-92. His account 
appears to draw on no other written account and is therefore original, but it is not 
clear how he derived his information for Cyprus, his principal informant of whom we 
know, accompanying the crusade only as far as Sicily. Richard of Devizes does, 
however, appear to have spoken to several participants so his work may have value. 
His account is, however, highly stylised, containing hyperbole and is more moved by 
knowing his readers would expect chroniclers to ‘work the crude stuff of experience 
into ... a good story’, than are, in all likelihood, the other early accounts we have. In 
consequence, his account is both factually unreliable and not inclusive. One or two of 
his comments on castles in Cyprus may be of passing interest however, in reflecting 
what could have been expected of castles and castle warfare at that time.191
A number of later English chroniclers also relate events in Cyprus in 1191, these 
generally following our earlier sources so far as we can see. Of these later works, the 
Chronicle of the Abbey of Meaux, a fourteenth-century compilation, may, however, 
be of special value in that the Abbey had been connected with King Richard’s right 
hand man, Robert of Thomham, who was briefly one of two governors of the island in 
1191 after Richard's departure to Acre. The connection may have been strong: Robert 
was married to Joan, daughter and heiress of a local magnate, William Fossard.
Robert was buried in the abbey, so it is not surprising therefore that it is possible to 
discern "some instances [of] indication of information derived from personal 
authority’.192 Another later writer, though not regarded as especially trustworthy, is 
Peter of Langtoft, who wrote in the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century. For 
affairs in Cyprus in 1191, we can not ascribe any credibility to his narrative, but for 
my purpose, his account is of interest with regard to the siege of Buffavento, insofar 
as it correlates with what is said by Meaux and perhaps Devizes.193
191 Richard o f Devizes, intro, pp. xvii-xviii; Partner, Serious Entertainments, pp. 143-4, 162,167-8, 
173; Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 31; Ailes & Barber, 2, p. 15. The quotation is from Partner, pp. 167-8.
192 Chronica ... de Melsa, pp. lxxviii; Nicolaou-Konnari, pp. 55-6.
193 Chronicle o f Peter o f Langtoft, 2, pp. 66-7; Nicolaou-Konnari, pp. 55,61-2.
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Apart from Anglo-Norman sources, we also have two Eastern, Frankish sources: the 
Chronique d'Emoul et de Bernard le Tresorier and the Continuations o f William of 
Tyre. Our extant text of Ernoitl ends in 1231 and though elements of it are based on 
material written earlier, its account of events in 1191-2 may not have been written 
until the late 1220s. It is in any case extremely concise in respect of the Ricardian 
conquest though more detailed with regard to the revolt of 1192. The original version 
of the Continuation, which was probably written by a native of the Latin East in the 
1190s, is lost and in its place we have 49 extant manuscript copies all of thirteenth- 
century date. Indeed some of these take their accounts up until 1277. Which of these 
copies of particular recensions is the closest to the original, what their inter­
relationships are and their connection with Ernoul, are issues of much debate. For our 
purposes with 1191-2 in Cyprus, the main recensions are those called the Colbert- 
Fontainbleau or b recension and the Lyon recension. These seem to represent a 
reworking of the Emoul narrative written probably not until the 1240s, but they 
contain additional information although we do not know from where. The b and Lyon 
Continuations are very similar but b is sometimes more detailed; in both cases, of 
course, we need to be guarded as to matter not contained in eye-witness accounts. We 
have the additional problem to allow for that the author(s) of these recensions could 
have been aware of castles existing in their own day and that they simply assumed 
that those castles were involved in the events of 1191. Moreover, as with all such 
sources, they may have been imprecise in their use of terminology and that hence our 
interpretation of ‘castles* may in any case be inappropriate. Ultimately, we need to be 
clear that these chronicles are not as close to the events of 1191 as those of Ambroise 
and Roger of Howden, and it is interesting to note that because of this, Gillingham 
deliberately ignores them, as indeed he largely does the ltinerarium, in his 
reconstruction of the Cypriot campaign.194
194 For the Lyon version of the Continuation, see Lyon Eracles, (Morgan), and the translation given 
by Edbury, Third Crusade. For the Colbert-Fontainbleau or b recension, see Eracles, Receuil des 
Historiens des Croisades, 2, that part which relates to the Ricardian Conquest of Cyprus being 
translated in Edbury, Third Crusade, pp. 176-8. For recent discussions of the various recensions 
and their relationships and derivations, and similarly their relationship with the Chronique 
d ’Emoul,, see especially M.R. Morgan’s Chronicle o f Emoul and the Continuations o f William o f 
Tyre; Edbury, The Lyon Eracles; Edbury, Third Crusade; Nicolaou-Konnari, pp. 27-9. Full 
references are given in the bibliography. Gillingham, Richard /, p. 146, fn. 27.
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For their part, the Greek sources give us virtually no detail whatever. The 
contemporary Neophytus the Recluse was a prolific writer but was more concerned 
to direct belief than record history.195 On the campaign of 1191, Neophytus is in fact 
very brief, providing virtually no detail at all. Given his reclusive existence and 
apparent indifference to worldly matters, it is quite likely that his first hand 
knowledge of events was limited. He detested both the western crusaders and Isaac 
equally, so in this, he may at least be said to have been impartial!196Nicetas 
Choniates, writing in Constantinople in the thirteenth century, is no more informative 
and neither are his followers, Theodore Skoutariotes and Ephraem Aenius.197
195 Neophytus , p. clxxxvi. Nicolaou-Konnari, pp. 26-7; C. Galatariotou, passim.
196 Galatariotou, pp. 211-2; Hill, 1, p. 315 ; Thubron, pp. 43-4; Nicolaou-Konnari, p.27.
197 O City o f Byzantium y pp. 229-30; Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 27.
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PART II
UNDERSTANDING THE FORTIFICATIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON 
PURPOSES; THEIR USES AND VALUE IN PEACE AND WAR
RAISON D ’ETRE AND FUNCTIONS
The essential question of why castles, as distinct from structures intended to be purely 
fordfrcations, were built in the medieval period has rightly been a continuing issue. 
This is true in respect of castle studies both in the West and in the East. With regard to 
the West and in particular the castles of England and Wales, useful summaries of 
current thinking have been provided by Creighton in 2002 and Liddiard in 2005.1 
These reflect the present focus on castles as residences, as administrative centres for 
their related seigneurial estates, as symbolical expressions of domination and 
sometimes as the nuclei of complexes of tailored landscapes of gardens, water 
features, viewpoints and parks. The corollary has been a diminution of their roles as 
military bases, certainly in a defensive capacity and to some extent in an offensive 
capacity as well. Although we may argue, as Johnson urged in 2002,2 that we should 
have reservations in subscribing wholesale to such modem views, there is little doubt 
that in the West, most castles were for most of the time neither meant nor used for 
military purposes. In the West at least, the ambiguity of what in fact was meant by the 
terms ‘castrum ’ or ‘castellum ’ -  certainly until after the end of the thirteenth century, 
supports such a broader view of their purpose and status.3 With regard to the Crusader 
States of mainland Syria in the East, Ronnie Ellenblum has lately furnished a review 
and analysis of previous thinking. As he noted, there, what seemed like recurring 
warfare naturally created different conditions from the West and consequently 
attention on why castles were built or developed, was in the past influenced by that 
conviction. Nevertheless, here too we see a realization, through a careful dissection of 
periods showing that there were often times when warfare was not endemic, that 
castles were created for much the same purpose as in the more settled West -  to
1 see bibliography.
2 M. Johnson, p. 180.
5 Coulson, pp. 2, 16, 33,42,53 and 61 and see History fh. 40 above.
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promote and exploit nascant settlements — the process of incastellamento, as it is now 
called.4
As noted elsewhere, in Cyprus the Lusignans were fortunate in possessing a state with 
two very significant advantages. First its native population never appeared likely to 
pose any internal threat -  indeed after 1192 there was no revolt until well into the 
fifteenth century. Second it was an island that for much of the period was also free of 
external threat. It was of course against this background that the Lusignans were able 
to maintain what in effect, amounted to a royal monopoly over building fortifications, 
and why what castles and town walls they did commission, were not necessarily 
always in reaction to military need. That said, there were occasional periods when 
there may have been perceptions of external threats and in understanding why our 
Cypriot fortifications were built, we should first see how far they are connected to 
these periods.
Reflections on this are included elsewhere in this Part, in Part I -  History and in the 
Gazetteer. The first period in question comes at the beginning of our period when 
there may possibly have been an apprehension of a Byzantine reconquista. As noted 
in the History and Gazetteer, the building of Saranda Kolones in particular has been 
set in that context. It is clear however, that a castle could not impede the landing or 
passage of an invasion force and that had a Byzantine attack materialised, the castle at 
Paphos could have been by-passed.s A similar view can be taken with reference to a 
second period, this being a hundred years later when there was a possible 
apprehension of an Islamic or even Crusader initiative. Here again, it is not 
necessarily the case that the primary works of this period -  at Famagusta -  are to be 
explained merely as the simple consequence. Concern of assault may well have 
stimulated this massive effort, but it can have only been one of several causes. It is 
especially instructive that a third period of apprehension of foreign attack -  from 
Mamluk Egypt in the mid 1420s, prompted no programme of fortification of note 
whatever. We can only speculate as to whether that would have changed had the
4 Ellenblum, Frankish Rural Settlement, pp. 32-4, 36; Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, passim but 
especially pp. 172-7.
5 c f  this view with those in Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, pp. 110-7; 172-7 and for England and 
Wales, Creighton, p. 44.
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razzias continued and Janus not been defeated and captured and Cyprus made a 
tributary state.
The assaults of 1424-6 were of course transitory inasmuch as they did not result in 
occupation, though it is doubtful that Janus had the security of that knowledge at the 
time. This moves us to the Genoese war of 1373-4 and Genoa’s subsequent 
possession of Famagusta and its hinterland. In that context, we do know of works 
carried out -  by both sides -  to strengthen existing defences. Plainly this reflects the 
circumstance of enduring hostility between what were then two neighbouring states. 
The resulting Lusignan works that were carried out have been cited by a number of 
scholars as a particular example of strategic planning. They have discerned a chain of 
castles and envisaged that they have in some way been linked together. Notions of 
castles generally constituting some sort of continuous defensive line were commonly 
held in the past and have been rightly shown to be illusions. Inasmuch as there has 
been no repudiation of this argument with special reference to Cyprus, however, it is 
worth looking at this in more detail.
So far as the Crusader mainland is concerned, earlier scholars, notably Prutz, Rey and 
Deschamps imagined that a primary purpose of castles was to constitute an 
interconnecting and mutually supporting line that could somehow defend borders. In 
1956, Smail was the first to show this to be a misconception and that Crusader castles 
in the Holy Land were primarily created as centres of lordship and administration, an 
interpretation subsequently developed by Prawer in particular. Most recently, 
Ellenblum has traced the historiography of such opinions, reconfirming in the process 
Smail’s assessment and thereby reasserting that Mines’ of castles buttressing some sort 
of frontier, simply did not exist.6 In the West, we could adduce plenty of examples of 
eminent historians who similarly once envisaged networks of castles that acted in 
concert as hubs of a defended border. That they wrote even after Smail’s work reflects 
how alluring the idea of a castellated border once was. Thus in 1961, Sir F. M. 
Powicke still saw ‘a strong ring fence of fortresses’ protecting Angevin Normandy 
from the Capetians. In England itself, Prof. R. Storey saw a line of castles across 
north Yorkshire, refortified in the later medieval period as an in depth defensive line
6 Smail, pp. 204-15; Prawer, pp. 281-6; Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, pp. 106-10.
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against long distance Scottish raids.7 So far as Cyprus is concerned, Enlart wrote of 
‘a complete system of co-ordinated defence*8 which may have launched Perbellini to 
comment extensively on what he saw as three defensive systems. His 1973 and 1992 
articles are arranged on this basic precept. Later still, Kristian Molin referred to James 
I’s works as a ‘ring of fortifications’.9
As Smail first made clear, such views as these are of very limited worth. Generally 
they are modern attempts to impose a sense of order onto an untidy past. Nowhere 
were there ‘lines of castles’ in any meaningful sense that were co-ordinated to halt 
invasions or mere razzias. Similarly in Cyprus we cannot generally pigeon hole its 
fortifications into groups that were conceived as entities, each group having a 
particular function common to all its individual units. Attempts to do so are 
unconvincing. Indeed, Perbellini for example, made nonsense of his own 
classification when he said of one of his three systems -  the so called east/south-east 
system -  that this was ‘a complex set of fortifications which do not form part of one 
single strategic design';10 and ‘albeit accounting for at least three distinct 
units’.11
So, we should be careful not to see the island’s castles in the context of overall 
strategic planning and in particular, James I’s works as attempting to fortify the new 
‘border’. Castles could not serve that purpose.12 There was no ‘line’ stretching from 
Kantara in the north via Sigouri to Lamaka in the south. Sigouri was built primarily to 
create a new centre and in that context serve as a balance against Genoese Famagusta. 
In much the same way, Kantara may have been recommissioned to reassert Lusignan 
presence rather than as outpost to monitor activity in Famagusta -  which given the 
distance, was hardly practicable anyway. These castles were then one means by which 
the Lusignans re-established control in parts of the sector contested with the Genoese. 
As an element in this, they could serve as bases from which Genoese raids could be
7 Sir F.M.Powicke, The Loss o f Normandy. 2nd ed (Manchester 1961), p. 178; Prof. R.L. Storey, The 
North of England, in (ed.) S.B. Chrimes, C.D. Ross, Fifteenth Century' England 1399-1500, 
(Manchester 1972), p. 130.
* op. cit., p. 375.
9 Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 122.
10 Perbellini, (1973), p. 31.
11 Perbellini, (1992), p. 4.
12 see Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, pp. 106-10; 118-45,292,297.
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countered as Stephen of Lusignan said with regard to Sigouri but they could be no 
more than the nuclei for the control of localised areas.13
Indeed it is perhaps worth considering the extent of such areas of control. Scholars 
writing of castles in the West have suggested that this constituted a radius of some 
eight to ten miles if the castle's mounted contingent wanted to return to base before 
nightfall.14 It is perhaps noteworthy then that Sigouri was built at a point just under 
eleven miles from Genoese Famagusta. The garrisons of castles could of course 
intimidate much larger areas. Thus for example the Spanish Muslim traveller Ibn 
Jubayr, who visited the Levant in the early 1180s, remarked that Krak des Chevaliers 
was developed by the Franks to threaten Homs some 25 miles away,15 while there is 
documentary evidence that attests that the rebels in Kenilworth in 1266 disrupted the 
King's peace and his administration throughout the county of Warwickshire.16 But as 
a rule of thumb, the concept of the eight to ten mile day-long reach of a cavalry 
contingent from its base is a reasonable indication of the area that a castle could 
control. Sigouri in fact may well have been founded very much as a cavalry station. It 
is of very simple design that may have been primarily created for this purpose. 
Undoubtedly it contained a complex of residential quarters and perhaps even the 
arrangements for local government but in any event, its position near a junction of 
roads implies rather that Stephen of Lusignan was right and that this castle was sited 
and built as the main epicentre for a Lusignan presence next to Famagusta.
Having rejected attempts at the wholesale allocation of fortifications to strategic 
groups, we can go on, however, to discern certain 'castle strategies' in Cyprus, but on 
a considerably lesser scale. As shown above, some of the works of James I have been 
presented as a response to the Genoese occupation of Famagusta. Although we have 
shown the ‘strategy’ involved was not to create a defensible border, it is apparent that 
James' works had a common purpose of asserting Lusignan control in newly rendered 
sensitive areas.
13 see Gazetteer entry on Sigouri.
14 Brown, English Castles, pp. 173, 198; Hackett, Introduction in Anderson, p. 13; Hackett, Foreword 
in Brown, Castles. A History and Guide, pp. 8-9.
15 Ibn Jubair, p. 268.
16 Petre, Defence and Attack, in Brown, Castles. A History and Guide, p. 92.
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James* works apart, the only other ‘strategic’ group we may detect are the three 
mountain castles: at least they have geography, and probably origin in common. For 
Perbellini, they constituted an identifiable system with Kyrenia, largely because their 
intervisibility and hence their potential for signalling implied some common cause.
We may perhaps see some integrity in this but this is as far as we can go. Indeed, the 
whole issue of the extent to which ‘strongpoints’ communicated with each other and 
with nearby settlements, primarily to serve as an early warning system of the 
approach of hostile forces, is a matter of some interest. It is of course unlikely that 
castles were built to be look out posts or glorified watch towers but to what extent 
were they used for this purpose?
Scholars have generally assumed that such ‘networks’ of signalling were extensive, 
inferring that where there was intervisibility, there was bound to be this type of 
communication. Such a view has been applied to the Crusader Castles of both the 
Syrian mainland and to Cyprus. The Byzantines are said to have relied considerably 
on signalling and we know of instances in Crusader Syria when castles did indeed 
signal to others as in the 1183 siege of Kerak in Moab.17 But how far did this really 
happen? A recent review of the evidence for the mainland has cast doubt on the use of 
castles in communications,18 so it is worth examining in detail the position in Cyprus. 
Here, the only written evidence we appear to have is from Stephen of Lusignan who 
commented at some length on the measures employed during the Venetian period to 
keep watch on the coast. He described an extensive network of guard stations capable 
of signalling by fire in time of need. The only castle that featured in this was 
BufTavento which could signal alerts to Nicosia and Kyrenia.19 It is not clear from this 
how far such an ‘early warning system’ was in operation during the Lusignan period 
and if it was, whether we may assume that such a wide signalling network included 
castles. Did, for example, St. Hilarion communicate to the west via far-away Pyrgos 
on Morfou Bay and thence to the even more distant Akamas and beyond, as has been 
claimed? Did Buffavento -  clearly the northern apex of any such system, also link 
with Kantara far to the east, as well as Nicosia and Kyrenia? 20 Intervisibility meant
17 Fedden and Thomson, p. 53.
18 Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, pp. 117.
19 Lusignan, Description, f. 35; Lusignan, Chorograffia, Grivaud, fT. 8 la-82; Chorography, Wallace, 
§§ 560-1, pp. 109-10.
20 Enlart, p. 469; Fedden and Thomson, p. 114; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, pp. 116-7.
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that there was the capability of linking by fire and smoke signals and so forth, though 
how far they did in practice is another matter. It might be added too that, unlike the 
Muslims and to a lesser extent, the Crusaders of the mainland, there is no evidence 
that the Lusignans used carrier pigeons to transmit messages -  either between 
strongpoints or anywhere else in Cyprus.21
A recent study of the contemporary position in southern Rhodes makes for interesting 
analogy. There, Michael Heslop has put forward an elaborate pattern of 
intercommunications served by beacons, mirrors and so on, largely based on sight 
lines. However, his only written evidence is a note of Ludolph of Suchen (Sudheim) 
who was travelling in the eastern Mediterranean at some point between 1336 and 
1341. Ludolph reported that on Rhodes the Hospitallers signalled by fire and smoke 
signals. If the Franks on Cyprus did the same, it escaped Ludolph’s attention, for he 
made no mention of such activity when he proceeded there after leaving Rhodes. 
Heslop’s note of a bonfire pit in Rhodes, above Stelies, reminds us anyway that any 
intention to create a signalling system did not actually require strongpoints.22 In 
short, fortifications might serve as signalling stations but such a function was 
certainly not a primary purpose or reason for their construction and it is far from clear 
on Cyprus how far they were actually used as such.
Certainly there can be little doubt that siting a castle was often prompted by a careful 
consideration of quite how this would best serve the reason for building it. One such 
factor was the ability to access and dominate routes, as well as areas. In this 
connection, La Cava and Sigouri are noteworthy inland examples. Locating them next 
to established roads facilitated the peregrinations of the King and his officers. On 
the other hand, the island’s castles did not serve as posts from which road tolls could 
be levied. The Lusignans exercised exclusive control over the right to use public 
highways 24 but there is nothing to show that castles were sited or used in any way as 
bases from which to tax traffic. Just as we noted (above) that castles could not 
necessarily stop an invading army, equally they could not guard roads against the 
passage of hostile forces. Those based in adjacent castles could, however, have an
21 Fedden and Thomson, p. 53; Edgington, pp. 167-175.
22 Ludolph of Suchen in Cobham, pp. 18 -  20; M. Heslop, fh. 28.
23 c f the siting of castles in England and Wales in this respect - Creighton, pp. 35, 39-40.
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intimidating effect, as evinced in the case of St. Hilarion in the Genoese war. Indeed 
this potential for offence must have been a major reason for the establishment of all 
three mountain castles in Byzantine times, though how far this remained their raison 
d'etre in our period is doubtful, given the very limited extent to which they were then 
maintained as military bases.
Of course, most of the important Cypriot castles are on the coast and whether 
constructed by the king or the military orders, the implication is clear. There can be 
few better illustrations of the fundamental purpose of these castles than by siting them 
thus: to facilitate local control and provide bases for economic growth in locations of 
paramount importance for communication and trade. The connection of castle and 
local economy is perhaps paradoxically reflected in the adaptation of Saranda 
Kolones to an agro-industrial centre. In its transformed state, it became a complex of 
workshops and stores and it seems that the later harbour fort at Paphos was also used 
to serve as a storage facility. Kolossi was an estate centre throughout its life. It was 
located amid a number of local Hospitaller estates which came to be used to grow 
sugar cane. This was then refined in various structures erected around the core of the 
original buildings. At least one structure of this early 'castle1 was assigned for storage 
purposes while the basement of the extant 1450s donjon was clearly constructed to 
house produce that would have been greatly in excess of what was merely required for 
the sustenance of the Grand Commander and his staff. At Kouklia, the chateau was an 
estate centre first and foremost with almost no veneer of fortification whatever but we 
can be certain that parts of it were assigned for secure storage purposes. Another, 
subsidiary use of castles and urban fortifications was the storage and perhaps also the 
manufacture of weapons. This is reflected both in the considerable amount of artillery 
ammunition found at Saranda Kolones and in the names of the Arsenal Towers at both 
Nicosia and Famagusta. Indeed we know that Famagusta possessed a military store 
and a naval arsenal, the latter articulating with the urban enceinte}5
Castles were of course centres of political authority. In Cyprus, this is reflected in 
some measure by the status and insofar as we know of it, the power and jurisdictions 
of those appointed as castellans discussed below. The development of considerable
24 Coureas, Economy, p. 118.
25 Edbury, Templars, p. 191, fh. 7; Creighton, p. 44; Edbury, Franks, p. 74.
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castles such as those at Famagusta and Kyrenia should be linked to the need to 
provide the necessary services and resources to support the discharge of such power 
and duty. The chambers and halls within the ranges of these quadrangular castles 
could certainly have served as courts and administrative offices. Kyrenia in particular 
is famous as the principal state prison and its gaols are still discernible today; it is 
highly likely that they accommodated at least some who may have been tried within 
the castle itself. It is also likely that certain castles also served as treasuries -  for the 
storage and display of wealth -  just as appears to be the case with castles of the Latin 
Principality of Achaia in the Morea which, like Cyprus, was a stable area of Crusader 
rule for much of the thirteenth century.26
Castles were then instruments and images of rule. As was commonly the case 
elsewhere, conventional depictions of a castle in Nicosia featured on royal seals 
symbolising authority and power.27 Although King and country generally lived in 
harmony, his castles were not there for the benefit of the people. There is no evidence 
whatever that the island’s castles were made available as refuges for either the urban 
or rural popultions in times of danger. They were generally too small or ill sited to 
serve this purpose. The damage and destruction wrought by the Genoese and the 
Mamluks are chronicled with no suggestion that the people either were encouraged to 
seek refuge in castles or attempted it in any event. It is in any case, far from clear how 
much subject populations were thus 'accommodated’ when need arose in other 
contemporary states. There is for example, no evidence that castles served as refuges 
in Frankish Greece, even where there were large enclosures and room. Creating 
extensive walled areas to provide a haven for large numbers of people may perhaps 
have been a policy of the Byzantines but it does not appear to have been an aspect of
J O
feudal society in Cyprus or Greece.
In studies of castles in the West, it has been noted that quadrangular castles were 
particularly suited to serving the needs of the larger households of the rather less 
peripatetic aristocracy of the later middle ages, while at the same time providing for a 
somewhat improved quality of comfort and sanitation. Consequently such castles
26 Lock, pp. 175-8, 184.
27 For Lusignan seals, see p. 10 above; for seals in the West, see Creighton, pp. 65-8.
2* Lawrence, pp. 188,202,204,226; Lock, passim.
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became common in France and almost the norm in fourteenth and fifteenth-century 
England for example.*9 What was different about these from earlier, roughly 
quadrangular forms, was that purely domestic buildings became increasingly 
articulated into the outer, martial shell. In Cyprus, both Saranda Kolones and Kyrenia 
were early medieval courtyard castles and we have suggested elsewhere that a reason 
why both took that shape was in response to the dictates and needs of a Byzantine 
origin -  certainly in the case of Kyrenia and arguably in the case of Saranda 
Kolones.30 As it was developed in the later medieval period, Kyrenia’s ranges came 
to be integrated with the building as a whole. The quadrangular castle at Famagusta, 
seemingly built from scratch soon after 1300, had its various buildings with their 
several uses integrated into a defensive shell from the outset. These Cypriot castles 
were not the homes and headquarters of powerful barons surrounded by their families 
and households, from which they controlled their fiefs and administered justice; they 
were rather the bases of senior royal officials who would have had corresponding 
impedimenta, power and responsibilities. For most of our period, Kyrenia and 
Famagusta were the two most important and apparently powerful castles on the island 
and so it is worth noting that their overall form was very likely dictated as much by 
considerations of administrative and residential needs as military precepts. In the case 
of Famagusta, this interpretation of what lay behind the castle's development and 
design, may perhaps increase our scepticism that it was purely an apprehension of 
Muslim invasion at the close of the thirteenth century that prompted the Lusignans to 
fortify their principal port. Sigouri was another quadrangular casde. As noted in the 
Gazetteer, it may have housed the apparatus of local government, perhaps even a 
mint. It was certainly created because of the problem of a hostile neighbour but its 
defences would appear to have been sufficient only to deter raids rather than resist 
sustained attack.
In this respect it is noteworthy that, as developed towards the end of the fourteenth 
century, the Lusignans' main castle-palace in Nicosia was also laid out according to 
the quadrangular-courtyard form. In this, there can be no clearer indication of what 
really lay behind the design of our castles as distinct from what in later times were 
purely forts. As noted in the Gazetteer the capital castie was remarkable in its
29 eg, Brown, English Castles, pp. 142-6; Libal, pp. 83-4; Liddiard, pp. 59-64.
30 Gazetteer entry for Paphos.
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sumptuousness: it greatly impressed those who entered it. Of course, this was exactly 
what it was intended to do. Its sophisticated and complex array of buildings, 
complemented and integrated with other features such as fountains and arboreta, were 
dazzling and there can be little doubt that the approach to the whole complex was 
engineered to enhance the impact of all this on the visitor. This certainly seems to be 
the case also at La Cava, the core of which may also have been intended to be a 
quadrangular design, or at any rate, part of such a lay-out. La Cava was a retreat, a 
royal playground, a chateau de plaisance in which the King could take his ease and 
entertain his visitors amid the orchards and fountains which were subtly interleaved 
with its buildings. As noted in the Gazetteer, La Cava had the veneer of strength as a 
consequence of its site and the substance of its masonry but both these characteristics 
were primarily for the sake of appearances rather than military potency. Interstingly 
too, both Nicosia and La Cava were closely associated with religious foundations and 
here in Cyprus as elsewhere in Europe, this juxtaposition of the manifestions of 
Crown and patronised Church constituted a deliberate demonstration of both the 
power and sanctity of the ruling house. 31
St. Hilarion is another castle that should be seen in the context of its landscape. As 
developed by the Lusignans, it is possible to detect that it was configured in such a 
way as to impress the visitor as he wound his way first into and then upwards through 
stages of suites and services of increasing sophistication, the route switching to give 
alternating views of the spectacular landscape. Indeed the sense of an appreciation of 
its landscape setting is well attested by the provision of the elegant belvedere in the 
Middle Ward and ultimately the vista built into the Great Hall, the “Gloriette”, of the 
Upper Ward, each giving quite distinct panoramas.
Ultimately then, there remains the question as to how far we can see the island's 
castles as designed fortifications, intended, per se, for use in war. In this section, we 
have traced the several other functions that our castles served. Analogies have been 
drawn with England -  another island which was generally peaceful in this period -  
where recent castle studies have greatly revised the traditional view of castles being
31 c f the landscaping of castles set in England and Wales - Creighton, pp. 75-84 and Liddiard, pp. 131- 
41.
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built and used as military tools.32 It is clear that in England, castles were created and 
hence designed, primarily to serve the regular, day-to-day functions that their owners 
intended. In England the great majority of castles belonged to the nobility rather than 
the Crown and so first and foremost they were homes above all else. Perhaps as a 
result, in a good many cases, they were not built with the primary aim of being 
capable of withstanding determined attack. In this important respect, Cyprus was very 
different. As we have noted, nearly all of the few castles were under direct royal 
control and only a minority were ever intended to serve as royal residences. Their 
various purposes demanded that at the least, they were secure buildings. Yet apart 
from the very short lived Saranda Kolones, only two in particular constituted serious 
fortifications, as is evident in the castles and the town walls of Kyrenia and 
Famagusta. The provision of such features as double banks of fighting levels in 
towers and curtains is proof of this. We know too that on those few occasions when 
there was war, Famagusta and especially Kyrenia, stood the test very well, never 
being taken by assault. How may we account for this -  two sites with the attributes of 
first rate fortifications in the context of the alternative purposes that Cypriot castles 
were apparently intended to serve?
The stimuli that caused the erection of the works at Famagusta has been discussed 
elsewhere in this work (above pp. 27-8). As we have suggested, threat of attack was 
but one consideration, for the fortifications were closely linked with the town's 
economic rise and hence importance in the Kingdom's prosperity and with its 
importance as a naval base. The development of its fortifications was almost a 
celebration and furtherance of this growth. There especially, it must be that there was 
the intent to impress visitors with the strength of the Kingdom through the substance 
of martial display. Kyrenia's circumstances were different. Kyrenia is also more 
problematical in that we have no certain dating for building work beyond what may 
be loosely inferred from architectural detail and the comment of the Templar of Tyre 
(see title page). It was of no such importance to the wealth of the Kingdom and 
generally not visited nearly as much as Famagusta and the south coast towns by those 
who wrote up their travel diaries. At Kyrenia the Lusignans inherited a considerable 
castle at the beginning of their regime: one that was convenient to develop. As the
32 see fn. 1 above.
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nearest harbour to Nicosia it had some importance in communications with the 
outside world. Its gradual elaboration over a long period of time may reflect a 
Lusignan tendency (if not a policy) to maintain it as a retreat if necessary and a 
bulwark as occasion might demand. That Kyrenia in fact amply fulfilled this role, 
does not of course mean that this was intended but it cannot have escaped the 
Lusignans* grasp that its possession determined whether invasions succeeded or 
failed. We have argued that both the castles at Famagusta and Kyrenia had a number 
of purposes to serve and though their origins were very different, their quadrangular 
design perhaps best accommodated those functions. We can conclude by accepting 
too that such a design was adequate militarily. Those who planned and built these 
castles were therefore fortunate in being able to provide for a number of quite distinct 
requirements.
AN URBAN ARISTOCRACY
Reference was made above to what amounted to the royal practice of monopolising 
the building and possession of fortifications and quite why that may have been 
implemented and maintained.33 It remains for us to consider both where the royal 
family resided and where the nobility resided.
In order to understand this, we need to reflect on what had already been the position 
in Crusader Palestine and Syria. The general view put forward by most scholars is that 
there, the King and his greater nobles lived largely in the towns, visiting their rural 
estates very rarely and were thus an 'urban aristocracy*. This conviction has been 
supported by the apparent absence of royal or noble palatial-castle capita outside the 
major centres of population.34
How far this was wholly the case is perhaps not so clear. We know that when the 
Crusaders first established themselves in Palestine, they made a considerable effort to 
colonise some of their new territories. Frankish settlers were encouraged to settle both 
in towns and in rural areas inhabited by Eastern Christians -  a process stimulated by
”  see History, p. 17.
34 Riley-Smith, The Feudal Nobility, p. 47; Prawer, The Crusaders ’ Kingdom, pp. 66-7; Prawer, 
Crusader Institutions, p. 102; Pringle, The Red Tower, p. 14; Kennedy, p. 64.
G:\d Part II - Understanding the fortifications - T.doc
76
establishing centres of lordship which might be fortified or not. The lesser nobility -  
what we might call the knightly class -  appears to have taken a leading part in this 
process of incastellamento. This is attested by the large number of small castles -  
principally simple, two storey towers -  that have been traced in rural areas and that 
date from the first half of the twelfth century. The higher nobility no doubt 
contributed to this policy of colonization in order to develop their own fiefs, centring 
their estates and administration in castles, though how far they actually personally 
resided in them rather than in their town houses in Acre and Jerusalem and elsewhere 
is hard to gauge. That leading nobles chose to adopt surnames such as Ibelin (Yibna) 
and Toron (Tibnin) that derived from their fiefs does not mean of course that they 
lived there regularly. Royal charters suggest that the king and his accompanying 
barons were quite peripatetic - although the charters appear to show that the king and 
his aristocracy based themselves in the towns - it may be that estate centres, fortified 
or otherwise, were occasionally occupied by their noble owners. However, it has been 
shown that this pattern of settlement declined as early as the second half of that 
century, in the face of the insecurity that came with the advances made by the 
Crusaders' enemies. Even the greater feudatories were disinclined to commission and 
maintain the more elaborate fortifications needed to withstand a more united and 
resourceful opposition and like simple knights, they passed their castles on to the 
Crown and the military orders. So, by the start of the thirteenth century, very few 
castles remained in the hands of the lay nobility. Whatever the balance had been 
between their earlier urban and rural existence, they came to live increasingly in the 
towns. Ludolph of Sudheim (Suchen) saw their deserted residences in Acre when he 
visited in 1336 or shortly after. He wrote that ‘all the nobles dwelt in very strong 
castles and palaces along the outer edge of the city.’ Although very few of their 
structures there remain, their residences are likely to have been at least of two storeys, 
the grander resembling towers, possibly ranged around a courtyard with a fountain.35
35 Jeffery, pp. 22-3; Riley-Smith, The Feudal Nobility, p. 25; Prawer, Crusader Institutions, pp. 103- 
9; Pringle, Towers, pp. 335, 337-8; Kennedy, pp. 32, 61,64,120; Ellenblum, Frankish Rural 
Settlement, pp. 12-13; 32-4, 36,281-4; Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, pp. 172-7; Regesta 
Regni Hierosolymitan, eg (1893), pp. 61-177 and (1904) pp. 16,20,37-42 for charters sealed 
from the 1140s to 1187; Ludolph of Suchen, trans. Stewart, p. 51. Cf too the gravitation of the 
aristocracy to towns in parts of Europe at this time, eg, in Tuscany, McLean, p. 90.
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When the Crusader aristocracy left the Holy Land to settle with the Lusignans in 
Cyprus, at the end of the twelfth century, their aims and expectations must have been 
to simulate as far as possible the best of what they had known on the mainland. ‘Old 
habits die hard ’ -  as Peter Edbury wrote in his 1994 article on the Templars in 
Cyprus.36 It would be surprising if we were to find that the Cypriot Crusader nobility 
behaved in any other way.
Consequently, theirs too appears to have been a cosmopolitan society. Even though 
living on the island did not include the threats that had faced the Crusaders on the 
mainland, the Franks of Cyprus preferred the culture and civilization that came with 
living in established urban conurbations. Historians appear agreed that ‘... in Cyprus, 
as in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the nobility, as well as the non-noble Frankish 
burgesses, generally lived in the towns... \ 37 Country estates were important for 
generating the revenue required to support a gracious style of living and of course 
were necessary for the chase but they were not seen as places to stay for any length of 
time. Indeed, in the thirteenth century, Nicosia was described as ‘where the knights 
dwell*.38 In 1336, James of Verona observed that it was “adorned with many gardens, 
and has many nobles*.39 When Ludolph of Sudheim (Suchen) visited Cyprus that year 
or very soon after, he too remarked that the Frankish aristocracy, including the 
knightly class, ‘chiefly live* in Nicosia.40 In fact we could accumulate ample 
references to houses in Nicosia of named members of the aristocracy especially after 
1300. Similarly there are plentiful allusions to private residences held by members of 
the nobility in the Kingdom's second city -  Famagusta and as at Nicosia, there is no 
evidence that they were fortified in any way.41 The same may be said of Limassol.42 
Amadi's allusions to knights of Limassol and Paphos offering their services in 1308 
and 1310 to the ousted Henry II also reflects that some of this class resided in these 
provincial towns.43 Such residences are now lost or almost impossible to distinguish 
from later development but at the end of the nineteenth century, Enlart was able to
36 Edbury. Templars, p. 195.
37 Arbel, p. 203. See loo J. Richard in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 79; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and 
Plagnieux, p. 92.
3* TemplarofTyre, § 514, p. 119.
39 James of Verona, p. 177, and in Cobham, p. 17.
40 in trans. Stewart, pp. 42-3, and in Cobham, p. 20.
41 Edbury, Famagusta, pp. 345-6.
42 Ludolph of Suchen, trans. Stewart pp. 42-3; in trans. Cobham, p. 19.
43 Amadi, pp. 265, 360.
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discern a number in Nicosia. He characterised these as having vaulted lower floors 
and passages carried on arches: very likely therefore identical in lay-out to the 4hotels ’ 
or ‘loges’ the Franks had built earlier on the mainland. Most likely many had chapels 
and in Nicosia at least their own water supplies drawn from the capital’s extensive 
system of water pipes and aqueducts.44
The aristocracy took its lead from the King. It is clear that he resided mainly in 
Nicosia. Ludolph of Sudheim (Suchen) noticed this in the reign of Hugh IV.45 Even 
James 1, who is sometimes said to have preferred Kyrenia,46 in reality spent most of 
his time in his capital. Thus in 1394 Nicolas of Martoni recorded that he resided in 
‘Nicosie pro majori parte temporis’. The Lord of Anglure, who visited Cyprus in 
1395-6, similarly noted that the King stayed in Nicosia more than anywhere else.47 
This is not to say that the Lusignan monarchs did not, on occasion, base themselves 
elsewhere. The palatial works in the middle and especially the upper wards at St. 
Hilarion suggest that it was envisaged as a royal resort.48 In particular, Henry II 
appears to have favoured Strovolos if he wanted to leave Nicosia while Hugh IV may 
have stayed sometimes at the Premonstratensian Abbey of Bellapais where he had 
‘stantia maravigliosa’ ('marvellous apartments’) built. Hugh is credited with 
providing the funds for other building work there too, including possibly the 
considerable gate tower with its drawbridge and attached enclosure wall with wall 
walk and loop holes 49 In the next century, Janus appears to have resorted to La Cava 
for leisure time.50 Nevertheless, it is clear that the Lusignans were based in their 
capital for the great majority of the time.
The contention that the nobility of Cyprus was based principally in the towns is 
supported by the seeming paucity of the evidence that they utilised residences in the 
country. There are certainly neither remains nor references to any fortified structures 
that could be ascribed to the nobility. While we can not go so far as to say that there
44 Enlart, pp. 402-14; Vaivre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 40,42; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and 
Plagnieux, pp. 90, 92.
45 see fh. 40 above.
46 eg Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 3.
47 Nicolas of Martoni, pp. 634 - 5, trans. in Cobham, p. 26; the Lord of Anglure in Cobham, p. 29.
48 see Gazetteer entry for St. Hilarion
49 For Henry II and Strovolos, see eg, Amadi, p. 253; for Hugh IV and Bellapais, FI. Bustron, p. 258; 
Hill, 3, p. 1125 fn. 4; Bellapais Abbey, pp. 4-5.
50 see Gazetteer entry for La Cava.
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was a royal prohibition on the establishment of baronial fortifications, it is clear that, 
as Edbury wrote ‘the Lusignans retained exclusive control of defence’,51 extending 
the right to fortify only to the military orders. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the 
rebels of Aimery’s party could only flee to the remote headland of Kormakiti on the 
return of Henry II in 1310: they had no fortress of their own to which they could 
resort.52 This appears to have remained the case until almost the end of our period.
For example, during the reign of Peter I, the two most important fiefs on the island 
were held by the King’s brother, John, Prince of Antioch (Alaminos), and another by 
Peter’s nephew, Hugh, Prince of Galilee. Neither had, as Jean Richard wrote, a 
‘chateau veritable, susceptible a 1’occasion d’appuyer une rebellion armee ou une 
pretention, quelconque a une autonomie de son fief.’ 53
This said we should not discount the likelihood that members of the nobility 
maintained unfortified residences on their estates in addition to their town houses. 
Certainly we would expect them to have possessed hunting lodges. This may perhaps 
be reflected in a passage from Philip of Novara when he recounted how, in 1229, the 
three Ibelin brothers and their knights failed to mount an adequate blockade of St. 
Hilarion, then in the hands of the Imperialists. ‘Messire Balian estoit a Nicossie... car 
il estoit yver. Si estoyent les chevaliers en leur terres, ou ils oyseloyent et se 
desduyoient.’ (‘Lord Balian was at Nicosia... for it was winter and the knights were 
on their own lands, where they were idling and making sport.’)54 The sport in 
question was hunting and hawking and we know that for much of the time involved, 
the nobility lived in tents and had their victuals brought to them by their servants,55 
but it is surely the case that the Frankish aristocracy possessed residences on their 
estates, though they may have been neither fortified nor very grand. Occasional 
references suggest that this was so. Thus, Amadi recorded that in 1308, Philip of 
Ibelin, the Seneschal of Cyprus, was banished to his estate at Alaminos.56 Amadi also 
alluded to Raymond Visconte’s casal of Nisou in 1308 and Balian of Ibelin’s casal of 
Akaki in 1310 though it is not clear that either nobleman resided in those places.
51 Edbury, Kingdom, p. 21.
52 Amadi, pp. 364-5, 371,380,384.
55 Richard, Chypre sous les Lusignans, p. 66.
54 Novara.§ 53 (149), Melani, p. 124; trans. in La Monte, p. 106.
55 Ludolph of Suchen in trans. Stewart, pp. 42 -  3 and in Cobham, p. 20; Edbury, Franks, p. 83; J. 
Richard in Vaivre et Plagnieux, p. 79.
56 Amadi, p. 263 and see Gazetteer entry for Alaminos.
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Perhaps more indicatively, Amadi recorded that in 1302, Guy of Ibelin, the Count of 
Jaffa and his family were plainly residing in his casal of Episkopi when they were 
abducted by pirates.57
Episkopi is in fact an interesting location to consider, for what little we know reflects 
how careful we must be in adducing the existence, or not, of an occasionally occupied 
lordly residence. It was clearly a village of considerable wealth and importance 
judging by the ruins of the churches and chapels that still surround it. By 1302, the 
Ibelin Counts of Jaffa had held an estate here for some time - at least from 1248 - so it 
may be that they had a residence there of some sort.58 The same may well be said of 
the Venetian Comaro family who acquired an estate here, most probably in Peter I’s 
reign after the Ibelin-Jaffa family died out in the early 1360s. This must have been of 
major importance to them for the wealth derived from the cultivation of sugar-cane 
which they appear to have initiated: the sugar refinery here was thus founded rather 
later than those at Kolossi and Kouklia. Like the Ibelins before them, however, given 
that the Comaros were an increasingly influential family in fifteenth-century Cyprus, 
it is most likely that they preferred to reside in the capital near the centre of power and 
saw their estate at Episkopi as a revenue source and little else.
Yet the Comaros certainly possessed a residence of sorts at Episkopi in the fifteenth 
century. Various travellers’ notes refer to this, starting with the allusion of Peter Rot 
in 1453 to ‘Schloss Episcopata’ being a centre of the sugar cane industry,59 
continuing with Roberto da Sanseverino in 1458 to ‘uno picholo castello nominato 
Episcopia’, belonging to the Comaro family60 in turn followed by a note by Hans- 
Bemhard von Eptingen of 1460 also referring to a ‘schloss’.61 Plainly though, the 
buildings were not of any military significance. Indeed in the diary notes of his visit in
57 For Visconte and Nisou, p. 285; for Balian of Ibelin and Akaki, p. 384 and see gazetteer entry, for 
Guy of Ibelin and Episkopi, p. 238; Edbury, Kingdom, p. 16; Edbury, Franks, pp. 79, 81.
58 Swiny, pp. 156, 160; Edbury, Kingdom, p. 79.
59 in Grivaud, p. 70. For Episkopi and the Comaro family. Hill, 2, p. 439, n. 5; Swiny, pp. 156-9; 
Edbury, Kingdom, pp. 197-8; Edbury, Franks, p. 97; Wartburg, The Antiquaries Journal, 63, 
p. 301; 81, pp. 307-9, 327-9; Coureas, Economy, pp. 111-2; Solomidou-Ieronymidou, p. 66.
60 in Grivaud, p. 71.
61 in Grivaud, p. 73.
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1494, Pietro Casola called them merely a ‘great farm’.62 The remains, explored by the 
Department of Antiquities from 1977/8 would appear to bear this out.63
In his account of the Mamluk raid of 1426, Stephen of Lusignan reported that the 
MamlQks attempted to surprise both it -  ‘le chasteau’ of Episkopi and Kolossi but that 
they failed. Elsewhere, Lusignan commented that the Hospitallers had ‘fortifie le 
chasteau* here, though when he does not say. Lusignan’s account is of course very 
late; it is uncorroborated by other sources so far as these matters are concerned and in 
any case, it is unlikely that such a strong force as that of 1426 would have had any 
difficulty in taking anything less than a major fortress were they so disposed. In the 
absence of supporting evidence for a Hospitaller chasteau at Episkopi, it seems safe to 
assume that it was the Comaro estate centre with its sugar refinery that was the 
subject of Lusignan’s Mamluk raid and that his account was therefore inaccurate in 
respect of Episkopi’s owners and the status of its building.64
By then, the increasing insecurities that must have stemmed from the inroads of the 
Genoese and Mamluks no doubt discouraged the aristocracy from living outside the 
safety of Nicosia in any event. If they do originate from the end of our period rather 
than later, the towers at Alaminos and Pyla (gazetted separately), both located not far 
from the southern shore, would appear to be exceptions and should not be taken as 
being the sole survivors of a greater number of now vanished defensible residences. 
Neither was, in any case, so salubrious as to reflect a desire for a serious base for a 
major landholder, defensible or not. Two other ‘towers’ now extant: Kiti and 
Xylofogou, both also near Laraaka appear more certainly Venetian, so are not 
gazetted in this study. Enlart made mention of another tower, on the beach at Amathus 
but only traces were visible in his day.65 A further site on the top of Mount Olympos,
62 in Grivaud, p. 146.
63 Swiny, pp. 153-9.
64 for the 1426 raid, Lusignan, Description, f 154 and Hill, 2, p. 477. For a Hospitaller fortification at 
Episkopi, Lusignan, Description, f.18. Lusignan, Chorogrqffia -  Grivaud, p. 7a; (Chorographv, 
Wallace, § 9, p. 11 omitted to translate the sentence that includes this reference) also mentions a 
‘castellum’ without identifying its builder or owner. Hill, 2, p. 24 takes Lusignan’s accounts of a 
castle at Episkopi at face value.
65 Except for Xylofogou these towers were covered by Enlart, pp. 375 and 482-6; Jeffery, pp. 13,187 
-8,348 and Vaivre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 53. For Xylofogou, see G. der Parthog, p. 236. 
Vestiges of what may have been Enlart's tower at Amathus appear on a photograph of 1905, 
published in L. Bonato et al, p. 15.
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Pirgo, shown as a tower on the Attar map of 1542, has also wholly disappeared but 
was judged to be a Venetian enceinte when investigated in 1910.66
In his pamphlet of 1935, Jeffery asserted the existence of numerous other ‘forts and 
watch towers* and ‘smaller block-houses’ created variously to be bases to house those 
watching out for pirates and as additional measures taken by James I against the 
Genoese. He mentioned specifically ‘several towers’ on the bay of Lamaka, at 
Lefkara and on the Akamas peninsula. He explained that a massive export trade of 
second hand building material carried out in the nineteenth century accounts for the 
elimination of almost of all of these alleged structures but that the foundations of one 
or two may be traced as at Lefkara and the Akamas. Vaivre too envisaged a number 
of lost towers of small size built to hold down the countryside and to watch the coasts. 
With regard to the latter he mentioned the remnants of such a structure near 
Kormakiti. In fact, it is much more likely that the few remains both had in mind were 
of something else altogether. One explanation is that they were, essentially, estate 
buildings. Thus, we know that most villages had a cluster of such edifices belonging 
to their lord and that in a few cases these approached the dimensions of an unfortified 
manor house. These were built on stone foundations rising up to about one m above 
ground, over which mud brick walls and a terraced roof were raised.67
An alternative explanation applies to the site on the Akamas. There, Enlart had also 
made mention of a fortification which ‘dominates one of the hills’ which he 
categorised alternatively as a fort and as a tower. He described it as rectangular, of 
rough construction and still possessed of a ground and first storeys and in signalling 
communication with Paphos, which appears impossible, and St. Hilarion courtesy of 
a beacon at Pyrgos, (on the west coast of Morphou Bay), which appears unlikely.
This is likely the structure on the Attar map of 1542 where it is labelled Merovigli.
We now know, however, that the medieval remains to be seen today on this remote 
Peninsula, are neither tower nor fort but rather a monastic establishment, as 
excavations in the early twenty-first century have revealed. These ruins, now called 
‘Pyrgos tis Rigainas’, constitute a roughly square enclosure with thin outer walls of
66 Attar, pp. 47,96; Jeffery, pp. 289-90.
67 Jeffery, Historical and Architectural Buildings, pp. 13,15-16; Vaivre in Vaivre and Plagmeux, p. 
53; Coureas, Economy, p. 113.
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poor composition, attached to the exterior of which are small square chambers on two 
of its sides. Internally it is possible to identify a series of adjacent chambers of 
approximately similar size set against one wall, a chapel, and elements of kitchen 
facilities. The square was entered through a narrow arched doorway suitable for the 
passage of one person at a time, located adjacent to a single storey barrel vaulted 
chamber still retaining its roof, set at one comer of the square compound. This small 
complex bears some resemblance to the nearby arrangement of Ayios Minas, a small 
establishment that constituted six monks.68
THE FORTIFICATIONS IN WAR
Cyprus experienced remarkably little warfare during the Lusignan period. Although it 
was where Christian West met Muslim East, especially after the end of the Cruasder 
states on the Syrian mainland in 1291, its island nature largely protected it from 
Islamic expansionism. The fleets of the Italian city-states were a more potent weapon 
than those of the Muslim powers and their general domination of the Eastern 
Mediterranean helped ensure that Cyprus would remain in Christian hands. Through 
their fleets, the Italian city-states played an increasingly significant part in Lusignan 
Cyprus* history, culminating in invasion and a subsequent partial occupation which 
involved occasional campaigning. This was not until 1373 however. Up until then, the 
only external threats to Cyprus that resulted in warfare were the Crusaders* own 
invasion of 1191 and the wars of 1228-33 with Frederick II’s supporters. There was 
no warfare at all that led from internal tensions: as we have seen, the native 
population appears never to have posed any threat to the ruling regime until well into 
the fifteenth century and of course any possible Frankish aristocratic resistance to the 
King was handicapped by the their lack of fortifications.69
In Part I, History, we traced the path of what campaigns there were insofar as 
fortifications were involved and gave some intimation as to their significance in
68 Attar, pp. 46-7,96; Enlart, pp. 375,415 and 485. Personal site visit on 12 May 2006. Pyrgos tis 
Rigainas was excavated over two or three seasons at the beginning of the twenty-first century by 
John Howells, then of Trinity College, Carmarthen. I have not been able to discover any report on 
this work. For Ayios Minas, G. der Parthog, pp. 86-7.
69 see above, in Raison d ’etre and functions, p. 64 and in An Urban Aristocracy, p. 75.
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determining both why campaigns were conducted as they were and their outcomes. 
Here, I wish to attempt an overarching assessment, drawing in comparisons with what 
was happening simultaneously in wars fought elsewhere.
The aims of those engaged in the early wars of our period were similar: the 
achievement of direct possession of the island while inflicting as little damage as 
possible. In the invasion of 1191 and the wars of 1228-33, there were both field 
actions and sieges which in nearly every instance led ultimately to castles changing 
hands. Which was the more significant in terms of how the outcome of the wars were 
determined? Useful comparison may be drawn by analogy. Contemporaneous warfare 
provides a common answer. So for example, in the Third Crusade on the Syrian 
mainland of 1191 and the civil wars in England of 1215-17 and 1264-6, we have a 
common theme. This is that actions in the field were caused by, and in that sense, 
were incidental to, campaigns that concentrated on acquiring control of key locations. 
Such field actions had important consequences but our point is that victory in battle 
was only seen as the sine qua non of achieving war objectives if it caused the enemy 
such loss that he could not thereafter defend his fortified bases. Before 1373 then, it 
was therefore mainly the rarity of war and general absence of the threat of war, that 
led to an omission to develop the island's fortifications. As we have noted elsewhere, 
castles and town walls were more than just fortifications and as such, their 
development must be seen in quite a different light -  one in which military matters 
were merely an ingredient.
In the different circumstances of the later period, we might have expected a change in 
this respect. In England for example, the raids of the French and their Spanish allies 
on the south coast in the last decades of the fourteenth century, provoked some 
considerable refortification. Although this was partly carried out by seigneurial and 
civic powers, the Crown encouraged and sometimes sponsored such initiatives and 
indeed invested sizeable sums on strengthening some of its own castles in the 
vulnerable areas. How far this occurred in Cyprus has been followed in detail in the 
gazetteer entries. The works of Peter II and James I reflect some limited concern to 
improve the state of the island's fortifications, yet clearly just as much attention and 
expenditure was allocated to improving the Lusignans' residential facilities. With the 
exception of works carried out at Kyrenia, Lusignan fortifications created or
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developed after 1373-4 were unimpressive: they were few and did not usually resist 
successfully when attacked. The comparative lack of concern to enhance 
fortifications during a period of various foreign threats may be partly due to the 
attenuated resources of the Crown at this time but the overall explanation is not so 
simple. For one thing, we should note that where there were conspicuous efforts to 
create new fortifications and in this Sigouri is the principal example, the motive was 
to establish a base for offence rather than better defend a vulnerable key point. This 
incidentally reflects that generally in our period, castles and fortifications were built 
primarily to dominate and serve as bases for expansion and offence: ‘self-defence’ 
was a secondary consideration. In Lusignan Cyprus from 1373-4, this became even 
more the case because the nature of war came to be different. The attacks of the 
Genoese and the Mamluks were not only centred on taking key points -  as in 1191 
and 1228-33 but involved a deliberate policy of pillage and destruction aimed at 
exploitation and intimidation. Our narrative sources record that this led to skirmishing 
and ambushes with royalist troops when they could be deployed. In this context, the 
Lusignans’ castles and strong points were no longer the military focal points they had 
been in previous wars. Although, as we know, Paphos and Limassol especially, 
featured in these wars, their resistance or surrender came to be of secondary 
importance. When Janus accepted the risk of battle in 1426, it was not because of fear 
for his castles but rather because he had to halt the rape of his domain and the 
indictment of his regime that this constituted. For their part, the Genoese carried out 
works on the defences of Famagusta. How far these constituted a considerable 
enhancement of Lusignan work prior to 1373 is hard to say, but the repeated failure of 
the Lusignans to recapture it suggests that here at least, an ongoing threat of war 
resulted in a serious programme of maintenance and development. In this, an analogy 
may be made with the Hospitallers of Rhodes - another regime that derived its wealth 
and hence power from its maritime activities - which existed in apprehension of attack 
and so developed its defences accordingly.
It remains to consider the island’s fortifications in the civil war between James and 
Charlotte. Their respective war aims were similar to those who fought in 1191 and 
1228-33: the acquisition of key points and fortifications with as little damage to the 
island’s economic infrastructure as possible. This explains why the nature of the 
campaigns followed a similar pattern to that of the earlier wars in the island. Analogy
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with another civil war fought at this time, in another island -  England -  may be 
helpful. There the antagonists' aims were also to place their leader on the throne, yet 
here we find a fundamental difference in how war was directed, for in England, 
‘control of the royal castles was no longer the key to the throne’,70 and the civil wars 
were pursued primarily by field action. In England, frequently both sides actively 
sought a decisive engagement and at the same time were disinclined to stay within 
castles when opposing forces were close by, as at Ludlow in 1459 and Sandal in 1460. 
Bearing in mind that the English aristocracy actually possessed castles of their own, 
unlike their Cypriot counterparts, this makes for a curious paradox and hence it may 
be instructive to enquire as to the causes of this difference.
In England, it appears likely that the protagonists were often evenly matched, both 
sides possessing a hard core of troops that may have had some professional 
experience in France or on the Scottish Border. In Cyprus, there was no such 
pedigree of soldiering and probably no aristocratic military retinues worthy of the 
name.71 Consequently there were relatively few troops from within Cyprus that could 
be engaged in battle. In the civil war of the 1460s as in earlier times, warfare in 
Cyprus only occurred in fact because one side or another was able to bring in 
substantial numbers of troops from overseas: this gave advantage and is naturally a 
reason why field actions were rare: the weaker side avoided battle and sought refuge 
in Kyrenia. In the contemporaneous English civil war, it was occasionally the practice 
to harry and so damage the economic base of an enemy’s lands, these being often 
territorially compact entities. In Cyprus, such substantial landed estates appear to have 
been uncommon and their destruction in any case not a war aim. There was thus no 
point in provoking an enemy to take the field to protect a ‘lordship’, as was the case 
when King Janus felt obliged to confront the Mamluks at the battle of Khirokitia. 
Nevertheless, although such factors as these may have directed the nature of the two 
parallel wars of the early 1460s, it is legitimate to question how far the sophistication 
of the fortifications themselves may have been an influence.
70 .Brown and .Colvin, The History o f the King’s Works, 1, The Middle Ages, p. 240.
71 Edbury, Franks, pp. 73, 84,93.
72 Goodman, pp. 214-7.
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Apart from on the Scottish Border, English fortifications were not generally 
formidable in the second half of the fifteenth century and hence may have seemed 
insecure.73 As noted above, the same is generally true of Cyprus, for it is clear that in 
the sparring that occurred between James and Charlotte, all but one of the castles that 
we know were involved, appear to have changed hands with little or no resistance.
But the exception is significant for this was Kyrenia. As was certainly the case in the 
Genoese War of 1373-4 and quite probably the earlier wars mentioned above, this one 
fortification was altogether pivotal in deciding the ultimate result. Elsewhere, we have 
traced Kyrenia’s formidable defences. Clearly, they stood up well to bombardment by 
gunpowder artillery in 1460. By that time, this had come a considerable way from its 
introduction in western warfare in the early fourteenth century but it seems apparent 
that the guns brought to bear against it in 1460 were of mixed value. James' Mamluk 
allies appear to have deployed old fashioned, large, ponderous, slow firing bombards, 
as was usual for them in this period -  their cannon were inferior even to those of the 
Ottomans whose own ordnance was not as advanced as that of western European 
states.74 In the West, bombards were being superseded by smaller, more 
manoeuvrable and more rapid firing cannon from as early as the 1420s. James 
himself had at least one, more modem piece of ordnance: the serpentine that he 
deployed against Kyrenia in 1460. The serpentine was a medium sized cannon held on 
a wheeled carriage that was the most commonly used piece of artillery in the 
campaigns of Charles the Rash of Burgundy (1467-77) so in this, James was right up- 
to-date.75 He was in any case no doubt well acquainted with state of the art pieces 
through his various contacts with the Italian city-states, where gunpowder artillery 
was also at a more advanced stage of development than in Muslim territories. The 
Venetian overbuilding has obscured the traces of any particular, additional defences 
that Kyrenia may have been endowed with to combat this evolving weapon of assault 
but it is doubtful that anything was done beyond the likely creation of gunports, such 
as we can assume were added at Famagusta.76 Nevertheless, confidence in the
73 see e.g. Brown and Colvin, pp. 228-241; D.Renn, pp. 169-174.
74 Ayalon, passim; K. de Vries, Gunpowder Weapons at Constantinople, pp. 348-9, 352, 354-362.
75 K. de Vries, The Technology of Gunpowder Technology, pp. 292, 298; Norris, p. 124; Jones, pp. 
181-2; R. Smith and K. de Vries, Artillery o f the Dukes o f Burgundy, pp. 35,37.
76 On gunpowder artillery, see the articles by R.L.C. Jones, C.J. Rogers and M. Keen in (ed.) M.
Keen, Medieval Warfare; D. Grummitt, The Defence of Calais and the articles by K. de Vries 
collected in Guns and Men in Medieval Europe, 1200-1500 which are a mine of information, 
although certain of his conclusions are questionable. (See my review in The Ricardian, 15, (2005), 
pp. 152-5).
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castle’s strength encouraged Charlotte, as it had James before her -  in 1374 -  to allow 
her stronger enemy to approach without the apprehension of inevitable defeat. That 
Kyrenia was neither reduced by bombardment nor taken by assault is testimony to its 
strength. Charlotte’s and James’ appreciation of that helps explain why it was central 
to both their wars.
What emerges from this overview of the island’s fortifications in war? In general it is 
clear that they played a leading role in the conduct of most of the warfare in our 
period and that their occupation or loss influenced the outcomes of those wars. This 
was especially the case when war was directed at gaining possession of the land -  
which our castles and fortifications dominated. Where war was conversely directed at 
devastating the land, the island’s strong points were less important, particularly when 
their garrisons were too weak to intervene. Both positively and negatively then, the 
wars in Cyprus demonstrate the link between land and stronghold and hence serve as 
an almost inevitable reminder of the purpose of castles -  both as fortifications as well 
as in their other functions.
WALLED TOWNS, CAPTAINS AND CASTELLANS
At the beginning of his article on the Town Defences of the Crusader Kingdom of 
Jerusalem, published in 1995,77 Denys Pringle commented on the scant attention that 
had been paid to this category of fortifications on the Syrian mainland. As he noted, 
this has been in part due to the poverty of their remains. Until recently, the same was 
generally true of Cyprus. Enlart had provided a sound description of the remaining 
towers at Kyrenia but that was the extent of detailed study. In 2006 however, Nicolas 
Faucherre provided an attempt to disentangle the medieval elements of Famagusta’s 
wall from the Venetian ramparts.78 These two analyses apart, there has been no 
reasonably thorough study. The gazetteer entries in this present work include reviews 
of the Lusignan and Genoese works at Famagusta, the Lusignan work at Kyrenia and
77 Pringle, Town Defences, p. 69.
78 Enlart, pp. 422-3; Faucherre, L’Enceinte Urbaine de Famagouste, in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 307- 
50.
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Nicosia where almost nothing remains at all. The purpose of this section is to attempt 
an overview of quite why they were built, drawing appropriate comparisons.
We have already noted that Cyprus possessed no town walls that were in commission 
when the Richard of England established Frankish rule in 1191. Similarly we have 
seen that though Kyrenia may have had town walls by the end of the thirteenth 
century, it was not until the fourteenth century that the Lusignans created urban 
defences in Famagusta and in Nicosia. The construction of town walls was obviously 
a very substantial undertaking and not to be attempted without very good reason. 
Quite what those reasons were can partly to be detected in what we know of the 
enceintes themselves and in part from the circumstances of their construction.
Such an analysis reflects that in this, the rationale for urban fortifications in Cyprus 
was dissimilar to what had happened in Crusader mainland Syria. In Syria, although 
the Crusaders appear to have built only two urban enceintes de novo, they inherited a 
further 12 that were already in existence when they arrived. Their works, as 
summarised by Pringle, reflect that they were simply the consequence of military 
need.79 There, the very serious threat of external attack naturally justified such effort 
and expenditure. In Cyprus, however, circumstances were quite different.
The Lusignans took over a native, largely Greek, population, which was primarily 
agrarian and posed no real threat to the new regime. At this time, we can safely 
assume that Frankish urban development was slow at first and in line with this, 
fortifications were restricted, as we have seen, to a few casdes of the Crown and the 
military orders. Within a decade or so of the conquest of 1191, what fears there may 
have been of external threats, had dissipated. As a result, thirteenth-century Cyprus 
was peaceful. To some extent, this was because it remained a relative backwater in 
East-West trade and while Crusader Syria survived, this was bound to remain the 
case.
The fall of Acre in 1291 and the effective extinction of Kingdom of Jerusalem 
changed this. How far it is the case that it placed Cyprus in the front line militarily
79 Pringle, Town Defences - in particular pp. 76 and 78, repeated by D. Nicolle, Crusader Castles 
in the Holy Land, p. 42.
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and perhaps as a consequence a Muslim invasion became a greater possibility has 
been discussed above (p. 24). But this did not lead immediately to the construction of 
town walls around the island's premier cities. Instead initial efforts, at Famagusta, 
seem to have begun as long as 15 years later and by that time it must have been 
apparent that invasion, from Syria and Egypt at least, was far less likely. Nicosia’s 
walls were constructed even later and although we are not clear as to when Kyrenia’s 
walls were begun, there is nothing to suggest that they are to be connected to the fall 
of Acre. What then was the prime motivation behind the creation of these three 
enceintes?
The case has already been made that the principal reason behind the creation of town 
walls at Famagusta was a response to its emergence as a major entrepot.80 It is true 
that the walls provided for an element of security for the merchants who lived and did 
business there but as has been shown, the enceinte allowed for a considerable measure 
of royal control and at the same time symbolically reflected the importance, wealth 
and dignity of what became the Kingdom’s premier port and second city. Famagusta 
was the epitome of early fourteenth-century Lusignan wealth and power, and it was 
correspondingly appropriate to exploit and to celebrate it as such, both of which 
purposes could be facilitated by walls and gates. That it was felt necessary to wall 
those gates up when there may have been a threat of attack, perhaps suggests that they
O I
were not primarily designed for defence in the first place. Although plainly the walls 
show a Lusignan intention to render the town defensible, in all probability the walls of 
Famagusta should be seen principally as an expression of confidence and as a 
contribution and stimulus to its growing prosperity. Inasmuch as it was also now 
being developed as a naval base, the walls and associated works were also a major 
investment in the Kingdom’s aspirations for offensive, even expansionist activities. In 
sum, it would be wrong to attribute the building of Famagusta’s town walls primarily 
to an enduring invasion fear following the collapse of Crusader Syria.
The history of the construction of the town walls at Nicosia has been recounted in the 
Gazetteer below. Here it is enough to emphasise only that apart from the efforts made 
to strengthen the defences during the war of 1373-4, the pace of building was quite
80 see above. History, pp. 27-8.
81 Amadi, p. 335; A.H.S.Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 197.
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leisurely, which hardly reflects a sense of military need. Indeed, Nicosia’s 
proliferation of gates, which have been cited as symptomatic of the medieval 
enceinte’s weakness, in fact demonstrate the enceinte ’s main purpose: to provide the 
means to control and tax passage and to impress. If it was also meant to be an 
effective means of defence, it did not meet that challenge on either of the occasions 
(1373 and 1426) when put to the test. The Templar of Tyre’s allusion may imply that 
the town walls of Kyrenia already existed in the 1290s but we have no historical 
information as to when they were first built. What remains suggests that the circuit 
was of some strength. It is also still clear that the walls and towers were visually 
impressive. There at least, considerations of defensibility and symbolism may have 
been on a par. We might perhaps also consider briefly the ‘negative’ case of Limassol, 
where most of our evidence indicates that there was no town wall. In the thirteenth 
century, this was the island’s major port and the likeliest target of raiding and attack 
but not even Baibars’ abortive attempt of 1271 prompted any works.82 The major 
explanation must be that in the period of economic boom in the early fourteenth 
century when town walls were being built elsewhere in Cyprus, Limassol was in 
decline. Attacks on it by the Genoese and Mamluks in later periods only served to 
aggravate that decline; they did not prompt the Crown to build a defensive circuit.
Like most of medieval Europe, Cyprus was of course generally peaceful. Unlike 
Crusader Syria, warfare, or the likelihood of warfare, was not a permanent fact of life. 
The apparatus of town walls were commissioned in Cyprus for precisely the same 
reasons as those elsewhere. An excellent analogy for Famagusta in particular may be 
drawn with Alanya on the nearby Anatolian coast, where the Seljuk Sultan of Rum, 
‘Ala’ al-DTn Kay Qubadh I, a keen trader, had developed this major port with town 
walls, a citadel and dockyards, during his reign of 1219-1237. The Sultan’s works at 
Alanya were a clear statement of the strength of his regime and a reflection of his 
intention to expand his powers further.83 Comparison may also be made with England 
where its kings regarded themselves as overlords of all fortifications, as most 
certainly the Lusignans were in Cyprus bar those of the military orders. In England, 
the Crown encouraged towns to build walls through a variety of mainly indirect 
financial measures, all of which reflect a recognition of those towns’ buoyant
82 Templar of Tyre, § 377, p. 67; Baibars al-Mansouri, Arab Sources, p. 56; Hill, 2, p. 167.
83 T.S.R. Boase, p. 171. R. Mason, pp. 85-105 and plates xix-xxii.
G:\d Part II - Understanding the fortifications - T.doc
92
economies and an aspiration to develop them further. In particular, town gates were 
used principally to impress and as a means to exact tolls, provide quarters for officials 
and for judicial purposes including gaols. There they may sometimes also have 
marked the limits of an urban franchise or borough law, though such a function would 
seem improbable as a major reason for initial construction.84 In short, in England as 
in the rest of western Europe, kings and lords saw increasingly that wealth and hence 
power was conveniently to be had by encouraging the growth of towns and tapping 
into their prosperity. Where towns enjoyed significant measures of independence, as 
in the Low Countries, this naturally led to tension, and there, civic fortifications might 
be constructed by a town’s burgesses in apprehension of a predatory lord. In Cyprus 
however, matters were clear and the Lusignan kings had every reason to encourage 
and enhance the stature and economic infrastructure of their towns: walled, gated 
circuits were a characteristic of this.
It may be useful to note some ambiguity in quite what were seen as town walls. 
Although we have a number of references to the island’s town walls as such -  the 
occasion of their building and their role, at least so far as Nicosia is concerned, in 
military campaigns it is apparent that contemporaries did not always bother to 
distinguish between what now seem to be town walls and what constituted the outer 
defences of the castles with which they were associated. The town walls at Kyrenia 
were described as being elements of the castle, while the outer enceinte of the castle at 
St. Hilarion was described as its bonrg. That a bourg - per se - did not necessarily 
indicate a walled area, does not assist.85 A similar blurring of what were identified as 
castle and town fortifications can sometimes be found in eleventh and twelfth-century 
England.86 It leads to the conclusion that urban castles and town defences were more 
articulated than has been thought. Indeed, this may be less a vagary than a conscious 
appreciation that a town’s castle and its urban enceinte constituted an overall entity.
This certainly came to be reflected in the jurisdictions of those appointed to govern 
castle and town, if it was not always the case. Indeed it is worth looking at the officers 
appointed for local government functions both before and after the creation of urban
84 H. Turner, passim: O. Creighton & R. Higham, passim but particularly pp. 32, 37,165,168-71, 
181-2,249: Coulson, Battlements and Bourgeoisie, passim.
85 see Gazetteer entries for Kyrenia and Khirokitia.
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fortifications. Thus in the thirteenth century, unwalled Nicosia, Famagusta and 
Limassol were governed autonomously by their city councils, albeit under royal 
viscounts or baillis. Their primary responsibilities were to supervise the cours des 
bourgeois but they were also in charge of collecting urban rents and maintaining 
public order and defence. Curiously royal castellans had already been made 
responsible for the defence of other unwalled “towns”. 87 From the early fourteenth 
century when the town walls of Famagusta were taking shape, viscounts and baillis 
continued there, at Nicosia and Limassol and also at Paphos and Karpasia which were 
then without fortifications. Throughout this period, castellans were appointed. These 
were important posts and therefore granted only to those in favour and those who 
could be trusted. Accordingly, we can assume that appointment was in royal hands 
and that as John of Ibelin reported was the case in the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the 
1260s, delegated authority given to the Seneschal only in respect of appointing 
officers below the level of castellan and for arranging for the provisioning of 
castles.88
The respective seniority of bailli and castellan is unclear and it is equally unclear if 
the viscount or bailli exercised his duties and presided over his court from within the 
town’s castle where there was one, or not. That said, it would seem likely that money 
collected would be safeguarded in the castle at least. At any rate, by the early 1370s, 
at Famagusta, the posts of bailli and castellan appear to have merged, a development 
repeated at Kyrenia by the early fifteenth century. This arrangement seems to have 
continued throughout the rest of our period, for in the later fifteenth century, one 
officer was usually in charge of the defences of both castle and town exercising too 
the civil duties of the bailli. When a separate officer served as castellan, it is 
noteworthy, however, that he was subordinated to a captain who was in overall charge 
of castle and town.89 Two examples from G. Boustronios may serve to illustrate this 
hierarchy. The first records that one Ferrandetto, who had been castellan of 
Famagusta in November 1473, asserted how he had to obey the then captain, the 
Count of Tripoli. The incident Ferrandetto was recalling was the contentious matter of
86 Creighton and. Higham, p. 250.
*7 Richard, Le Peuplement, p. 161.
88 Hill, 2, p. 53; Edbury, Kingdom, p. 181-2; Edbury, John o f Ibelin, pp. 31,407-14.
89 Edbury, Kingdom, pp. 193-4; Richard in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 70; Otten-Froux in Vaivre and 
Plagnieux, p. 115.
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a murder in which he was thought to be implicated, so he would naturally stress his 
obedience to his captain to explain away his actions. Of course, had he not been thus 
the inferior of the captain, he could not have put this forward as his defence. 90 The 
second example relates to the arrangements made for the defence of Kyrenia by 
Charlotte and Louis at the end of September, 1460. They appointed Sor of Naves as 
captain charging him and his men to ‘patrol the circuit of the walls of Kerynia’, while 
one Brother Celli, a Hospitaller, was charged ‘to supervise within the citadel’.91
It appears then that it came to be appreciated that the important walled towns of the 
Kingdom warranted unified control. The combination of civil and military functions 
under a single command, mirrored the inseparability of town and castle in 
contemporary references to their respective fortifications.
It is now quite impossible to compile a comprehensive list of castle captains and 
castellans and such a list would in any event be of only marginal interest.
Boustronios’ chronicle frequently refers to the names and sometimes the official titles 
of those in command. The succession of changes that he records reflects both the 
royal sensitivity to the loyalty of those holding these important resources or 
alternatively the influence of the ascendant faction. At the same time, we see the 
evidence of the political instability that characterises the last decades of the Lusignan 
period. We also note the same names recurring, the personages generally being of 
some consequence and very often holding other senior positions as well, such as 
Nicholas Morabit, who was also sometime viscount.92
90 §§ 157 and 204, pp. 132-4 and 149-50.
91 §51, p. 96; Hill, 3, p. 563.
92 §§ 88, 102, 158-9, 168,201, pp. 112, 120, 134-5, 138, 149.
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PART III 
ARCHITECTURE
The architecture of the Crusader castles and fortifications of Cyprus was first studied 
in detail by the Frenchmen E.G. Rey in 1871 and C. Enlart in 1899. Their 
descriptions, especially the careful analyses of the latter, have remained the 
foundations of all subsequent studies, and though now inevitably superseded in many 
details they remain invaluable, especially in respect of architectural features since lost 
or compromised in subsequent restorations. George Jeffery similarly included military 
buildings in his gazette of 1918. None, however, provided any overarching 
commentary on the island’s military fortifications with regard to such matters as 
details of common designs among various sites, of parallels and so perhaps 
connections with other kingdoms and principalities and from that, evaluating their 
place in medieval military architecture. Perhaps as a result, in 1957, Robin Fedden felt 
able to write that ‘the Lusignans added nothing in Cyprus to the art of military 
fortification... . They left no great concentric castles like Krak... ’. 1
In the half century since then, a number of monographs on individual sites have added 
substantially to our knowledge and facilitate a reappraisal. A.H.S. Megaw’s booklets 
for the Department of Antiquities, especially that for Kyrenia in 1964 and more 
recently the articles on Saranda Kolones by Megaw and J. Rosser and finally those by 
J.B. de Vaivre, C. Corvisier and N. Faucherre, constitute excellent descriptions and 
include some historical context. These are all discussed, sometimes disputed, in the 
Gazetteer below. Yet it has remained the case that there is still no general discussion. 
Even Megaw’s short but useful contribution on Military Architecture in volume IV of 
the Wisconsin History of the Crusades in 1977 was really just a compressed 
Gazetteer. This section attempts to go some of the way to remedy this apparent 
deficiency. In doing so, we shall consider particular aspects of the island’s military 
buildings and we shall certainly draw attention to parallels elsewhere, from which 
inspiration may have been derived. How far we may go as to suggest that some 
developments coincided with those abroad and so imply that in Cyprus, advances in
1 See bibliography for Rey, Enlart and Jeffery. Fedden and Thomson, p. 109.
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architecture were wholly up-to-date remains to be seen. But in all of this, it will be 
very important to remember that as H. Kennedy wrote, ‘we shall probably understand 
more about the architecture of Crusader castles by investigating the needs and 
purposes of the builders and the threats they faced than by searching for outside 
influences.’ In this respect, it will be important to couple this section on Architecture 
with the sections in Part II of the thesis.2
THE BYZANTINE INHERITANCE
Siting and lay-out
The fortifications encountered by the Crusaders in 1191 were certainly not numerous 
as Fedden claimed.3 We can be certain of only six (Buffavento, Kantara, Kyrenia, 
Nicosia, Paphos, St. Hilarion), and less certain of a further two (Famagusta and 
Limassol). Of the certainties, Nicosia was wholly lost long ago, so nothing may be 
adduced except that it was inconsiderable and most likely merely the governor’s 
complex and thus rather a secure site than a fortified one. Buffavento, Kantara and St. 
Hilarion constitute a trinity in respect of the nature of their sites and likely 
provenance, while Kyrenia and Paphos may be simirlarly paired, indeed compared if 
the site now known as Saranda Kolones was Byzantine in origin.
With regard to their sites, both these groups were typical of Byzantine works 
elsewhere. So far as the first group is concerned, in Syria for example, the modest 
castle of Mount Silpius high above the city of Antioch gives a similar impression to 
Buffavento and Kantara as places of last resort and watch-stations. St. Hilarion is 
decidedly larger than its fellow mountain castles and may then have been built to 
shelter a local population during a period of tension. It has been noted that in the mid- 
Byzantine period, with the decline of Byzantine military power, populations gathered 
around fortified citadels usually perched on eminences, such as Ankara as rebuilt in 
the seventh to ninth centuries. Cyprus was effectively demilitarised between 688 and 
965, so St. Hilarion and the other two mountain castles are most likely rather later. In 
any event, such locations naturally conferred advantages, and consequently hill-top
2 See bibliography for the works of the various authors mentioned. Kennedy, p. 20.
3 Fedden and Thomson, p. 109.
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castles were also very much preferred in Cilician Armenia which began as a 
collection of independent baronies in the later eleventh century and where shortage of 
manpower and vulnerability to Muslim invasion made defensibility a major 
consideration. The similarity of Byzantine and Cilician Armenian hill-top castles is 
perhaps nowhere better illustrated than at Azgit in Anatolia inasmuch as it was once 
thought to have all the hallmarks of Byzantine work until proved conclusively to be 
Armenian. As the Armenians sometimes did in Anatolia and as the Latins sometimes 
did in Greece in the thirteenth century, in Cyprus the Crusaders took over the three 
Byzantine hill-top castles and added to them in varying degrees as their need arose. 
This is evident particularly at St. Hilarion where the Lusignans made extensive 
additions for residential purposes and rather differently at Kantara where the motive 
was more military.4
So far as the second group is concerned -  Kyrenia and Paphos -  both were situated on 
flat sites on the coast next to artificially sheltered harbours, and both were accordingly 
important in serving as guard-posts to lines of communication and supply from the 
sea. At Kyrenia the castle had the natural defences of being surrounded by sea-water 
on three sides, while Paphos -  if we include Saranda Kolones as initially Byzantine -  
was instead endowed with ditches that were partly rock-cut. In their general layout 
and extent, they were similar to each other and to Byzantine Korykos on the 
Anatolian coast. Korykos also utilised the natural defences of its position and where 
they were inadequate, it was given a rock-cut ditch. All three may have been 
developed in the Byzantine period at about the same time in the eleventh century. As 
such they were substantial works, being concentric at Korykos and possibly so, 
wholly or in part at the Cypriot sites.5
4 Fedden and Thomson, pp. 46-7; Foss, pp. 13-15; Edwards, pp. 65-72, 83-4; Kennedy, pp. 15-16; 
Lock, p. 178.
5 Lawrence, pp. 177-80; Edwards, pp. 161-7; Kennedy, pp. 16-17.
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Masonry
It is apparent that a variety of masonry types were used in fortifications datable to the 
mid-Byzantine period. A facing of irregular small stones -  little more than a cemented 
rubble as at St. Hilarion is typical. At Sayhun (Saone), where Byzantine work most 
likely originated in the period immediately after its capture in 975, the stonework is 
rather better though the blocks are considerably smaller than those used later at that 
site by the Crusaders. But we see too the use of larger blocks, ranging from the use of 
scavenged stones utilised from pre-existing structures as at Qal’at Sim’an dated to 979 
to the rather more carefully laid walls of Korykos, most recently attributed to 1081- 
1143. At Saranda Kolones, the blocks are certainly no larger than those at Korykos 
nor the workmanship of a better quality. It is also worth noting that in Cyprus, there 
seems to have been no shortage of stone available that could be cut into ashlar blocks: 
the Byzantine preference for rubble masonry in their mountain castles may have been 
simply a consequence of utilising material immediately available and so avoiding the 
difficulties of hauling cut blockwork up difficult slopes.
Identifying different types of mortar employed can assist in distinguishing between 
mid-Byzantine and Crusader work. At St. Hilarion and Buffavento, the Byzantine 
structures are bound with grey stone grit mortar which is recognisably different from 
the later Lusignan mortar.6 Still, mortar is vulnerable to erosion and easily lost. For 
example, there is now little evidence of pointing with mortar between blocks at Qal’at 
Sim’an and Korykos, and Saranda Kolones is also problematical in this respect.
Interestingly at both Saranda Kolones and at Korykos, use was made of ancient 
columns found on site or near-by by inserting them through the thickness of the walls 
as strengthening devices. Byzantine builders had been re-employing such columns in 
this way for centuries. For example, they can be seen in the wall of the east portico of 
the palaestra of Byzantine Constantia (Salamis) in Cyprus. Such a technique was not 
necessarily exclusively that of Byzantine builders, however, for it can be noted in 
Crusader works, such as their sea castle of Sidon and at Beirut. The Muslims also 
made use of old columns, as at Shaizar. In Cyprus it can be seen elsewhere, at
6 Metcalf, Byzantine Cyprus, p. 536.
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Kyrenia’s water-tower, which may be Byzantine or later, and probably at Kolossi 
which is more certainly Frankish. The use of antique columns as buttressing agents 
can also be noted in the impressive walls of Byzantine Ankara where there is a 
combination of types of masonry work: large, irregular blockwork on the lower 
courses of walls and towers, changing to smaller blocks banded with brickwork at the 
upper level. Ankara is dated to a period between the seventh and ninth centuries, but 
the use of alternate bands of brick and stone was a common feature of Byzantine work 
not utilised by the Franks and so assists in assigning builders. Brickwork can be 
traced at Buffavento and St. Hilarion and there are fragments at Kantara but these 
appear to be the only extant examples in Cyprus.7
It is worth stressing that it is not always straightforward to think we can distinguish 
easily between mid-Byzantine masonry where larger blocks are employed and the 
masonry favoured by the Crusaders. At its finest, Crusader masonry involves facings 
of large, regular stonework which are well jointed and there are certainly instances of 
this in Cyprus, but much Frankish work was not necessarily so well finished in the 
first place. Consequendy modem attempts to distinguish between mid-Byzantine and 
Crusader masonry work need to be guarded. From this, it is the more understandable 
that the external walls of a site such as Saranda Kolones may be subject to alternative 
interpretation as to their origins.
Quite naturally, the works of one period were sometimes adopted and enhanced by a 
successor. How far did this occur in the fortifications of Cyprus? It is recognised that 
this occurred at Kyrenia for instance. In particular the solid pentagonal bastions on the 
Byzantine outer, south wall, which are dated to the tenth century, have been described 
as having received an outer skin of superior masonry in the Crusader period on the 
basis of their external appearance. Given the difficulties in establishing hard and fast 
distinctions between mid-Byzantine large block masonry and Crusader masonry, if we 
accept this interpretation of Kyrenia’s southern Byzantine curtain, how certain can we 
then be in accepting Rosser’s assertion that the enceintes, especially the outer 
enceinte, at Saranda Kolones are Crusader through and through ?
7 Smail, p. 238 and plate vi(a): Fedden and Thomson, p. 50; Salamis, pp. 6-9; Lawrence, pp. 205, 
215-6,218-9,220-1 and plates 8,9,10, 13,14,16,17,18; Edwards, p. 165; Metcalf, Byzantine Cyprus, 
p.536.
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Mural Towers
Byzantine mural towers are noteworthy for their variety of design. Although the 
rectangular predominates, other types are common, and this is especially true of 
extant work in Cyprus. At St. Hilarion, the Byzantine walls include semi-circular 
towers that taper upwards, have loopholes on their upper levels and may have been 
partly open backed or given timber screens set in arched entries. They connect at wall 
walk level to the adjacent curtains. Entry points to these towers and through gates are 
typically via round-headed arches, as indeed is the case at Buffavento and through the 
inner (Byzantine) curtain at Kyrenia. The Byzantine towers at Buffavento, by 
contrast, were rectangular while at those at Kyrenia were more diverse. Those of the 
original enceinte were variously circular and oval, connected to the enceinte by 
narrow ‘throats’, while one was distinctly horse-shoe shaped. The later addition of the 
strong outer Byzantine curtain on the south side included solid beak or cut-water 
towers reminiscent though not identical with the cut-water towers on the outer 
enceinte of Saranda Kolones.
The mural towers of Saranda Kolones are extremely diverse as they include rounded, 
rectangular, polygonal and cut-water, prow or wedge shapes. This variety and the 
particular employment of cut-water towers are discussed in detail below (see Paphos) 
as an argument for a Byzantine origin for this castle.
Large, boldly projecting, D-shaped towers, or horse-shoe towers had been built by the 
Byzantines in earlier periods as at Pagnik Oreni on the Euphrates in the fourth century 
and at Ankara in the seventh to ninth centuries, but they are not common. The horse­
shoe tower on the inner southern enceinte at Kyrenia is small and probably no later 
than the seventh century. Large D-shaped horse-shoe towers were later commonly 
used by the Armenians in Cilicia however, and it is from them that we should 
probably see the inspiration for the notable towers of this type in Cyprus, at Kantara 
and Kyrenia.8
8 Fedden and Thomson, p. 49; Foss, pp. 17-18,36 and 145; Lawrence, pp. 174, 208,221 and 226; 
Pringle, Africa, pp. 152 and 157; Edwards, pp. 11 and 14; Kennedy, p. 18.
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Gates, Gate-towers and Sally Ports
The main entrances to the five extant Byzantine castles (if we include Saranda 
Kolones) of Cyprus would appear to fall into two possible groups that correspond 
with their two different types of siting and hence extent. The entrances to the 
mountain casdes were simple affairs, being merely sizeable arched entries in curtain 
walls. The entrance to the lower ward at Buffavento may have included a rectangular 
tower subsequently obscured in a Frankish elaboration while that at St. Hilarion may 
have had the benefit of a barbican, also subsequently modified in the Frankish period. 
The two casdes of Kyrenia and Saranda Kolones are, however, more problematical, 
inasmuch as the first has been wholly overbuilt by the Franks and the second is an 
aspect of the contentious issue of who first built that castle. The bent-entrance, 
rectangular gate-tower on the present inner west wall at Kyrenia may possibly have 
superseded a similar gate-tower of the Byzantines at this point, but this is mere 
speculation. Although Byzantine fortifications usually involved gatehouses with 
entrances that were not bent, occasionally Byzantine enceintes had been endowed 
with such devices and it is argued below that on the grounds of such a design, the 
entrance of this type on the outer enceinte at Saranda Kolones could be of Byzantine 
origin. We know that the Byzantines sometimes used portcullises as in their work at 
Ankara and indeed there is a trace for one in the inner gatehouse at Saranda Kolones. 
However, both that gate-house and its counterpart at Kyrenia possessed a chapel 
above, as was the case with the inner gate-house in twelfth-century Crusader Belvoir, 
so on the balance of probability, both inner, gate-houses at the two Cyprus castles 
were Crusader in origin too. Bent-entrance gate-houses constructed by the Franks in 
the Holy Land became rather more common in the thirteenth century as at Caesarea. 
The similarity of Byzantine and Frankish practices in this is replicated in the matter of 
concealed sally ports, for both made considerable use of this device. As noted below, 
those at Saranda Kolones have been compared with those at Frankish Belvoir and 
additional comparison could be made with Caesarea too. This has been cited as an 
argument for a Frankish origin for Saranda Kolones but its sally ports could just as 
easily have been Byzantine in conception.9
9 Deschamps, Les Entries des chateaux des croises, pp. 372; Creswell, p. 166, 174-9, 321; Fedden 
and Thomson, pp. 46 and 51; Foss, p. 37; Lawrence, pp. 173-4,207; Pringle, Town Defences, pp. 90- 
1; Pringle, Secular Buildings, pp. 43-5; Megaw, A Castle in Cyprus, p. 50; Mesqui, pp. 14-16; 
Mesqui with Faucherre, pp. 87-8.
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FRANKISH WORK
General
As is the case with regard to Crusader Syria-Palestine and Frankish Greece,10 we have 
no documentary evidence from Cyprus that provides information on such matters as 
how much money was spent on building programmes, what categories and how many 
personnel were employed, and how long such works took to complete. As we are also 
ignorant as to the total income of the Crown, which plainly fluctuated considerably 
during our period, it is impossible to gauge the extent to which the Lusignans ‘spent 
what we can assume was a significant proportion of their income on.. .keeping their 
castles in a state of readiness’, as Peter Edbury wrote.11 What is apparent, however, is 
that for long periods there was most likely little attention paid to any building works 
except the successively splendid arrangements of the palace works in Nicosia. This is 
perhaps negatively reflected in the desultory pace of creating its town walls through 
the fourteenth century and the emergency works which had to be put in hand in 1373 
only when danger threatened. Initiatives such as the flrst Lusignans’ efforts at Saranda 
Kolones, whatever they may have been, and later at Famagusta, were exceptional and 
should not be taken as the rule. That James I seems to have been among the foremost 
of his dynasty in building ‘castles’ at exactly the time when the revenues of the 
Crown must have been at their lowest ebb, implies perhaps that the proportion of 
royal expenditure on its fortifications was not always consistent with its income.
Siting
The Franks kept what they acquired from their predecessors and developed them to 
varying extents. Whatever circumstance first prompted the foundation of the 
mountain castles, however, had long since passed and it is likely therefore that the 
Lusignans had little military use for them except for those very few occasions when 
there was war within the island. No doubt therefore remote Buffavento and Kantara 
were largely unoccupied for much of the time. Their possible use as watching points 
or signal stations and as a gaol in the case of Buffavento would have been of meagre
10 Kennedy, p. 9; Lock, p. 173.
11 Edbury, Franks, p. 73.
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stimulus to warrant much expenditure on maintenance and improvement to the 
buildings. The apparent late fourteenth-century development of Kantara may well 
have been a re-commission of a then deserted castle in fact. The absence of references 
to that castle between 1233 and the reign of King James would suggest as much. By 
contrast, St Hilarion was heavily developed. This was not so much because it was 
situated to dominate the pass that was the shortest route between the capital and 
Kyrenia, since the bulk of Lusignan work was not in respect of its defences. Instead, it 
was developed as royal retreat, a kind of Balmoral even, though we have no written 
evidence to attest to the extent of its use as a Lusignan residence.12
The Byzantine 'castles1 at Paphos and Kyrenia were also retained and considerably 
improved. The possible castles at Limassol and Famagusta are more difficult to gauge 
however, as discussed below. There is no evidence that either was immediately 
fortified in the Lusignan period; we know only that there was a harbour tower at 
Famagusta by the time of the wars of 1228-33. All were clearly located in association 
with ports. Their rationale is discussed in 4Raison d'etre and functions1 (above) but 
here we may note additionally that Paphos was the first stopping point on the sea 
route from the West, along the island's south coast and beyond to the East, Limassol 
being an intermediate halt on the same route. The gradual reduction in importance of 
both as ports appears connected with the general neglect of their defences. In contrast, 
Famagusta's importance as an entrepot and naval base grew in the thirteenth century 
becoming hugely significant from about 1300 (see pp. 26-7 above) whereupon its 
defences were massively extended. Royal officials -  viscounts, baillis -  as well as 
castellans were based at these places, but the fact that they were also based at other 
locations that were not defended and indeed that there were long periods when it is 
clear that there was no castle in commission in Paphos and probably in Limassol too, 
suggests that castles were not always seen as essential for the discharge of local 
government functions.
As their capital, the Lusignans naturally developed a castle-palace in Nicosia where 
their Greek predecessors had possessed only a meagre fortification. But though they 
expended considerable effort there and on some of the other sites just mentioned that
12 Edbury, Franks, p. 75.
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had defences in the period before 1191, they founded very few new castles of their 
own. They were fortunate inasmuch as they did not need fortified bases to control 
their estates: the indigenous population which supported the island's economy and 
hence the Frankish regime was docile and required no strong hand to keep in check; 
indeed the Lusignans appear to have been sensible enough to appreciate this and to 
have refrained from over-exploiting this basic resource on which the prosperity of 
their kingdom depended.13 The only 'estate castle’ that may warrant such a name in 
fact is Akaki, and its foundation may be peculiar in that it seems to have been 
associated with the royal sequestration of that estate from a declared rebel. Kouklia 
was certainly another royal estate centre, located among the sugar plantations of the 
south-west, but it hardly merits the ascription of a fortification.
The siting, the assiette of the very few new castles of the Lusignans were of course 
wholly dictated by their intended purposes or raison d'etre. This is mainly covered in 
the section of that name above and in the gazetteer, but we can summarise here by 
noting that just as their purposes varied, so did their siting. La Cava was located on its 
plateau, surrounded by orchards and fountains, near the capital mainly to impress and 
as another royal playground to supplement St. Hilarion. Like Sigouri, discussed more 
fully below, Lamaka appears to have been developed as a result of the establishment 
of a hostile Genoese presence in Famagusta: there seems no evidence to link it with 
the increasingly important production of salt in that area. The castles and towers of 
the military orders were primarily estate centres or headquarter buildings so far as 
their structures in Limassol were concerned. Kolossi only appears to have become a 
serious fortification as late as the 1450s, centuries after it was founded. Gastria, 
however, seems to have been an exception. It does not appear to have been associated 
with any other Templar estates14 in the area and seems to have been well defended 
from its beginning. Its site was carefully chosen to take advantage of the lie of the 
land next to an inlet which was essential as the Templars’ private port in Cyprus 
opposite their base of Tortosa on the mainland.
13 Edbury, Franks, p. 69.
14 Edbury, Templars, p. 191, fh. 7.
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Lay-out, design and construction methods
Leaving aside mere towers built at the beginning of the Frankish period and where the 
lie of the land did not dictate the shape of the perimeter, the royal castles were 
generally quadrangular in lay-out with their residential quarters and service chambers 
ranged along the inside of their walls. The Franks inherited this arrangement from 
their Byzantine predecessors at Kyrenia and arguably Saranda Kolones. Certainly at 
the former they gradually developed the castle making its internal accommodation 
and service facilities increasingly integrated into the whole following the pattern in 
parts of contemporary western Europe that appears to have begun with Frederick IFs 
castles in Italy and Sicily in the 1230s and 1240s (Trani, Lagopesole, Catania, 
Maniace, Prato as developed).15 Famagusta Castle, built in the very early 1300s, is a 
leading example in Cyprus. Its internal, domestic arrangements are largely united with 
its defensive outer defences both being built, in the main, in one programme. In his 
description of Famagusta Castle, Corvisier made particular comparison with 
Enguerrand III de Coucy’s castle of Coucy le Chateau (Aisne) in respect of some 
details of its articulation but other castles in France built at this time might be better 
examples of quadrangular arrangements with comer towers and internal ranges 
increasingly integral with their outer, defensive shells, such as Villandraut and 
Roquetaillade near Mazeres, both in Gironde and both very early fourteenth century.16 
The use of donjons appears to have been restricted to the mountain castles, perhaps 
following the Byzantine tradition in this respect,17 but otherwise there appears to be 
consistency here.
Overbuilding in Venetian and Ottoman times has masked the exteriors of the more 
important medieval sites impeding an appreciation of how they may have been built 
but a number of putlog holes on the east side of Kolossi’s donjon suggests that some 
use was made of scaffolding that was arranged diagonally perhaps to support ramps 
that rose in zigzags from ground level.
15 Lfbal, pp. 73-6,79-80; Jones, p. 179; McLean, pp. 86-7, 108.
16 See e.g. Brown, English Castles, pp. 142-6; Libal, pp. 83- 4; Liddiard, pp. 59-64; Corvisier in 
Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 363 and Raison d’etre and functions (above).
17 Edwards, p. 31.
106
Mural Towers and the Armenian influence
The Franks were far more consistent in tower design than their Byzantine precursors. 
Where they added to the sites they inherited during the very early years of the 
Lusignan period, these followed the square or rectangular shape that had been 
dominant in western Europe. Consequently the north-west tower of Byzantine 
Kyrenia that they adapted and the additional towers they created on the enceinte of the 
upper ward at St. Hilarion were characteristic of what had been that norm. But 
already, the dominant design in western Europe was changing with the preference, 
from about the 1190s, for the cylindrical or D-shaped tower. In the West, this 
development is most spectacularly discernible in the towers of Richard I’s Chateau 
Gaillard and King John's and Henry Ill’s Dover, while in the East, for example, it has 
been noted that enceintes in the Principality of Antioch were endowed with great 
round towers at the end of the twelfth century. Their superiority has been frequently 
discussed, but of course the transition was never complete in either East or West. In 
Syria the hugely impressive walls of Chastel Pelerin and Caesarea include formidable 
rectangular towers that date from the thirteenth century while in the West there was a 
clear tendency to persevere with the rectangular in the castles of northern England 
right through the later medieval period.18 In Cyprus too there was no wholesale 
change at this time, for as late as the early fourteenth century at Famagusta Castle and 
the later fourteenth century at La Cava, tower design remained predicated on the 
rectangular: peppered with embrasures at the former but not so and consequently most 
unwarlike at the latter. Some sophistication was attempted with the creation of one or 
more polygonal towers on the town walls of Famagusta, possibly replicated later that 
century at Lamaka, although its polygonal “tower” may possibly have been the result 
of converting a pre-existing church. The more prominent of such towers were 
endowed with a substantial talus, as in the polygonal torre del Diamente at 
Famagusta. The use of a talus to strengthen the base of a tower seems to have been 
largely a Frankish contribution to military architecture.19 In Cyprus it was also 
subsequently applied to some of the D-shaped towers built a little later.
18 For Chateau Gaillard -  Brown, English Castles, p. 92 and Chateau Gaillard, esp. pp. 24 and 28. For 
Dover — Brown, Dover Castle, p. 14 and Coad, Dover Castle, p. 37. For the Principality of Antioch — 
Kennedy, p. 18, and in general, pp. 186-8 and Fedden and Thomson, pp. 48-9.
19 Fedden and Thomson, p. 50; Foss, p. 37.
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As noted above, these large D-shaped towers or horseshoe towers in Cyprus most 
likely date to the fourteenth century and appear to have their inspiration from Cilician 
Armenia rather than Western towers of the thirteenth century, as Faucherre suggested. 
The characteristics of Armenian military architecture and their influence on the 
Crusader buildings and indeed warfare in the Holy Land have been well observed 
already.20 Little note has been made, however, of the extent of Armenian influence on 
Cyprus. The Armenians were the Lusignans’ close neighbours and similarly governed 
a small Christian Kingdom beset by the increasingly powerful Muslim world. There 
were many connections between the two states. The two royal families intermarried, 
from which the Lusignans were able to assume the title of King of Armenia in 1368. 
There had long been Armenians resident in Cyprus -  Henry II appointed an Armenian 
corps as palace guards and consequently an 'Armenian Quarter" had developed in 
Nicosia, most likely adjacent to the palace-castle complex just north of the later,
*7 1Venetian Paphos Gate. Armenians formed a distinct unit of the royal army that 
fought for Janus at Khirokitia on 7 July 1426.22 As noted above, from 1360 to 1448, 
the Lusignans held a foothold in Cilician Armenia. This was Korykos, the second port 
of that country but the one nearest Cyprus. There, the Lusignans acquired both a land 
castle and a sea castle at which they maintained a garrison. The sea castle is 
particularly impressive and relevant to this study. The Armenians had endowed it with 
a number of towers, some being apsidal-horseshoe in shape, finished off with an 
ashlar facing. Indeed it is worth noting in passing, that the Lusignans added to 
Korykos itself, developing at least one of the castle’s towers.23
This style and fine workmanship can be seen repeated in Cyprus particularly at 
Kantara and Kyrenia. The large apsidal-horseshoe tower on Kantara’s main south-east 
enceinte and the splendid north-east tower at Kyrenia are of a sort that are very 
common in Cilician Armenia -  as at Yilan and Yeni Koy. The complex of the two 
storey chamber and tower of Kantara’s main north-east enceinte is reminiscent of the 
chamber-tower of Kiz that is similarly articulated on an angle of 45° with its east face
20 Fedden and Thomson, pp. 55-6; Kennedy, p. 18; Edwards, pp. 11,65-72; Faucherre in Vaivre and 
Plagnieux, p. 388.
21 Makhairas, § 433, p. 417; Boustronios, §§ 7 and 9, pp. 70 and 72; Hill, 2, p. 2; Grivaud and Schabel 
in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 92; Leventis, pp. 171,251.
22 Makhairas, § 681, p. 661.
23 Hill, 2, pp. 445-6; Muller-Weiner, p. 36; T.S.R. Boase (ed.), The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia, 
pp. 160, 163-4; Edwards, pp. 161-6; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 128.
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thrusting out forming a major element of that castle’s defences. The solid spur 
projecting from Kantara’s western group of apartments has parallels at Lampron and 
Vahga, while narrow eschaugettes, though not identical with those at Kantara, appear 
at Amuda and Anah§u. Indeed similar too to Kantara is the layout of the main curtain 
facing south-east at Tumlu, while the general plan of the whole of Kantara castle, with 
most of its chambers built against the enceinte, again not wholly continuous owing to 
the natural protection offered by the site, can be found at Tamrut.24
The difference in the embrasures in the first and second storeys within Kyrenia’s 
horseshoe tower suggests that it was not constructed in one programme but it may be 
that in its final form it dates from a similar period to the work at Kantara mentioned 
here. This may be the reign of James 1. As noted in the History, we know that he was 
responsible for building at a number of sites: he more than most would have 
appreciated the importance of Kyrenia and of course his reign was chiefly concerned 
with the presence of a hostile force based in Famagusta. Although Stephen of 
Lusignan is our earliest source who names Kantara specifically in this context, it may 
be that we can accept this statement. Of all the Lusignan kings, James was perhaps the 
most susceptible to ideas developed elsewhere that might have resulted in 
improvements to fortifications. He was interested in the arts and is said to have given
25grants to master craftsmen of Kyrenia, at least one of whom was an architect.
Gates and Gate-towers
As noted above, Kyrenia and Saranda Kolones possess bent-entrance gate-towers. The 
inner entrance at Kyrenia was certainly enhanced by the Franks whether or not they 
overbuilt a pre-existing gate-tower of a similar design, while the inner gate-tower at 
Saranda Kolones is also more likely to be Frankish. Both the large rectangular towers 
at La Cava constituted bent-entrance towers. The inspiration here appears likely to be 
from a combination of Byzantine and Cilician Armenian influences. It was just as 
common, however, for gates to open directly from the front face of towers 
(Buffavento and the Cava and Limassol gates on the town walls of Famagusta) or in
24 Edwards, pp. 58-60, 63-4, 157-61, 178, 238, 256, 263, 268-76.
25 Makhairas, § 620, p. 611; Lusignan, Description, f. 35.
26 Fedden and Thomson, p. 51; Edwards, p. 15.
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gates in curtains immediately next to towers (Famagusta castle and in its south town 
wall). As noted above, like the Byzantines before them, the Franks sometimes 
endowed their gates with portcullises. We have noted one in the inner gatehouse at 
Saranda Kolones and similarly the bent-entance gate-tower of Kyrenia possessed one. 
They were not common, however: Famagusta castle appears to have been endowed 
with one only in its first main entrance which was fairly quickly superseded and 
blocked up.
Archkres* Battlements and Machicolation
As on the Syrian mainland, in Cyprus the Franks adopted Byzantine and Armenian 
practices in the use of archeres but employed them more profusely, systematically 
and with experimentation of design. They were of varying length, some being simple 
slits while others had stirrup bases -  archeres a etrier -  positioned in series of 
connected arched embrasures or in simple niches in galleries. One, sometimes two 
levels of such lines of fire, set within the thickness of the walls below wall-walk level, 
can be traced in Kyrenia castle and in the town walls of Famagusta. Those at 
Famagusta are especially impressive: it has been estimated that there were as many as 
1,500 such firing positions clearly reflecting a huge focus by the Franks on this aspect 
of defence.27 The interplay of multi-layered curtain defence interspersed with 
projecting towers to provide flanking fire reflects best contemporary practice in the 
West exemplified at outstanding works such as Caernarvon.
Surviving parapets are rare but what we have shows the usual continuation of earlier 
practices such as can still be seen on the wall of the Byzantine outer ward at St. 
Hilarion but employed with greater sophistication. Thus the parapet on the north front 
of Kyrenia -  which incidentally replicates a lower parapet below, fossilised in a 
heightening of that wall -  constitutes narrow crenels and big merlons each containing 
carefully splayed slits. A similar arrangement obtained at later Kolossi and there it 
may be that there were the additional defences of shutters that could cover the crenels 
and perhaps even the means of constructing a removable hoarding.
27 Fedden and Thomson, pp. 50-1; Foss, p. 37; Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 319, 321, 326, 
333, 339, 342, 345.
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The Franks followed Byzantine practice in employing machicolation, but here again, 
examples in Cyprus are few. Later overbuilding at important sites, particularly 
Famagusta, permits no opinion as to its general use on curtains; there is none at 
Kyrenia castle although the west tower -  possibly one of a pair defending a gate, on 
the town wall still possesses the elaborate corbels for such a wall head defence around 
its entire perimeter.28 Fifteenth-century single box machicolations covering entrances 
below are extant at Kolossi and Pyla while the corbels for another cover the main 
entrance at St. Hilarion. The dating for this feature at St. Hilarion is contested and 
may be Byzantine in origin being embellished in the fifteenth century with the 
mouldings that are still visible.
Gunpowder Artillery Fortifications
As noted above, cannon are first recorded as used in Cyprus in 1408 during a 
Lusignan attempt to recapture Famagusta. Subsequent allusions to their use are also 
tracked above. From this it seems clear that in their later wars in Cyprus the 
Lusignans mainly used weapons obtained from abroad -  purchased or borrowed -  
principally from Venice. But there is nothing now to show that the Lusignans adapted 
their fortifications in the fifteenth century. The walls of the capital received negligible 
attention and although Venetian and Turkish overbuilding at Kyrenia, Lamaka,
Paphos and Limassol has obscured much, it is doubtful that any significant work was 
carried out. After 1426 the Lusignans were vassals to the Mamluk sultan so there was 
no threat from that quarter and though there was occasional skirmishing with the 
Genoese, a lack of resources likely precluded any building work of consequence at 
these principal sites. In contrast, in the 1450s the Hospitallers at least began work on 
an enclosing enceinte or mantlet at their commandery at Kolossi. These defences may 
have been prompted by the aggressive expansionism of the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet 
II but the works are of a very small scale and would not have been adequate had such 
a threat materialised. They are of interest nonetheless. The mantlet included a 
projecting wing equipped with inverted key-hole gunports in embrasures constructed 
to accommodate small cannon, arrangements very typical of early gunports elsewhere
28 Fedden and Thomson, p. 50; Foss, p. 37.
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as in England.29 Kolossi was also endowed with a small, stout, round tower that bears 
some comparison with similar towers built by the Hospitallers at this time as at 
Narangia on Kos.30 Quite possibly this tower at Kolossi was furnished with gunports 
too but the tower is ruined and any gunports it may have had are lost. The tower was 
in any case of such a size that it could have accommodated only the smallest artillery 
pieces. Still, this development was in keeping with what was happening elsewhere. 
Gun-towers or ‘roundels’ were now being built in the West, as at Threave, 
Kirkcudbright, Scotland (c. 1447), Querfurt, Germany (1461-79) and in the later 
fifteenth century, on a much grander scale in Italy (Ostia, Sarzana, Sarzanello, 
Senigalia, Vo 1 terra) presaging the massive Venetian ‘roundels’ on the north-west and 
south-east comers at Kyrenia.31
Elsewhere it is apparent that the Genoese enhanced the fortifications of Famagusta -  
indeed their need to maintain the town in a state of defence involved heavy 
expenditure.32 Their work is in its turn heavily obscured by the later Venetian building 
campaigns but the several references to iron and bronze bombards of various sizes 
located on ‘betresca’ (breteches\ brattices ?) mentioned in the Genoese massaria 
suggest that they ensured that their cannon had adequate platforms from which to 
operate, in this context betresca presumably being suitably strengthened bastions and 
platforms.33 But as the fifteenth century wore on, the diminishing value of Famagusta 
set against the high cost of its upkeep most likely militated against more substantial or 
revolutionary works. These were carried out subsequently by the Venetians 
commencing probably with the horse-shoe outwork in front of the Limassol Gate 
some time after 1474. In conclusion then, it is clear that little was done to modify the 
island’s fortifications to the developing threat of gunpowder artillery during the 
Lusignan period.34
29 Kenyon, pp. 205-40.
30 Spiteri, pp. 182-4.
31 Tabraham, pp. 12,21-24; Libal, pp, 33,158-9; Harris, pp. 50-78.
32 Otten-Froux in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 118.
33 Jones, p. 180; Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 319-339 and p. 345.
34 For further discussion on this and a bibliography, see ‘The Fortifications in War’, above and fiis 72, 
73 and 74.
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AKAKI
Akaki is approximately half-way between Nicosia to the east and Morphou Bay to the 
west. It is situated on the east side of the Potamos ton Akakiou which flows into the 
Bay past Morphou itself.
It was described merely as a casal in 1310 when in the possession of Balian of Ibelin, 
Prince of Galilee, Lord of Tiberias, Morphou and Akaki. That year, Balian, along with 
the other rebels, was arrested at Kormakiti upon Henry II*s resumption of power. 
Akaki may have then been taken into the king’s hands, for later, Makhairas recorded 
that ‘Akaki was built by King Henry*. The chronicler did not state specifically that 
what was built was a castle, but we may assume that planting a fortification in the 
heart of a prominent rebel’s landholding was a clear assertion of royal authority.1 The 
scant remains of Akaki appear to accord with such an origin.
It appears that Akaki remained in the royal demesne although we can not tell how far 
the king’s works there were used as a centre for estate management. It is mentioned as 
‘the court of Akaki’ with regard to January 1369, when Peter I spent a number of days 
there hunting.2 References to it in 1440, 1452 and 1468, reflect that it was similarly 
part of the Crown lands in those years.3 James II came here in 1470 to escape the 
plague that ‘lasted for two and half years’, returning to the capital only when the 
plague had passed.4 We are not told specifically that he used the castle, but we may 
speculate that he did. These several allusions to Akaki as a royal resort implies that it 
was once considerably more extensive than its present meagre ruins would suggest.
The extant remains are limited. All we have now is a cylindrical tower, 3.5 m wide 
internally, with walls 1.1m thick. It is constructed of large stone blocks, now 
unfortunately in poor shape. Externally, this shows evidence of slots for the 
scaffolding that presumably was employed in the tower’s construction. However, 
these present remains are very ruined, the side that must have accommodated the
1 Amadi, p. 384; Makhairas, § 597, p. 593; FI. Bustron, p. 238. For Balian's titles, Hill, 2, p. 218.
2 Makhairas, §261, pp. 241-3 and §266, pp. 247-9.
3 Richard, Chypre sous les Lusignans, pp. 147, 154.
4 Boustronios, §§ 92,94, pp. 114-5.
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entrance being lost to the course protruding above ground level. Elsewhere, the tower 
is extant to a height of 3.5 m. Within this surviving wall, there is on one side a square 
hole in the thickness of the wall at ground floor level, with two smaller holes at 
regular intervals, above it. On the other side of the interior of the surviving wall, the 
remains of a stair can be detected clinging to the wall, supported on two piers of 
appropriate height. From this, it seems that the tower must have had at least two 
floors, perhaps even three. Above this stair, there is a larger opening within the 
masonry for what must have been a small window.5
In overview, this tower is very small. If its arrangements were to accommodate a 
permanently resident corps, that corps could not have numbered more than two or 
three. In this respect, this cylindrical tower was on a different scale than its 
contemporaries elsewhere in Europe, such as on the Welsh Border or Savoy so in fact 
its size implies that it was not intended as a permanent place of abode. On balance, it 
seems unlikely that Akaki could have been merely an isolated watch-tower: its 
foundation circumstances, date, location and history argue against that. Consequently 
we may speculate that this tower was merely one element of a larger fortification now 
gone.
5 This description derives from site visits on 26 and 27 October 2005 and to a lesser extent from 
photographs held in the Photographic Dept, of the Cyprus Archaeological Museum.
Akaki 1
General view from the west of the tower showing at least two storeys.
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Akaki 2
Interior of tower. The remains of the stair built against the cylindrical wall is just
discernible.
1 1 6
ALAMINOS
Alaminos was a major fief located twenty-one kilometres south-west of Lamaka. 
During the reign of Henry II, it belonged to Philip of Ibelin, Seneschal of Cyprus. In 
1307 he was confined by Amaury to his residence at Alaminos and he was arrested 
there the following year. Given his loyalty to Henry II we can assume that he was 
confirmed in possession in 1310.1 Later that century, the fief was held by John, Prince 
of Antioch, the brother of Peter I.2 We do not know the location of the seigneurial 
residence, however, for the existing tower appears to date from after this period, 
perhaps from about the time of King James II’s grant of Alaminos to Giovanni 
Loredan, some time between 1464 and 1468.3 This is a small and unpretentious 
structure now on the periphery of Alaminos village. Like other small towers, it 
appears to have been manned by francomati (freemen) at times in James II’s reign.4 
Clearly it has benefited from conservation in recent years.
Enlart commented that it was ‘built throughout in a clumsy and irregular masonry of 
small stones, some of which appear to have been scarcely worked at all.’5 It is 
rectangular (6.75 x 4.7 m) and rises through three storeys to a height of 7.85 m. At 
ground floor level an entrance has been walled up but whether that entrance was 
original is impossible to say. There are no other openings at this level so it would 
seem likely that this was used for storage. The first and second storeys rested on 
planking laid on beams and it had a flat roof. Entry is invariably said to have been at 
first-floor level via a doorway (2.6 m above the ground) under a wooden lintel, but the 
doorway is too low to enter without stooping, so it may have been a hatch or window 
opening. This opening is at the bottom of a large groove that bisects this face of the 
tower: previous descriptions have supposed that this recess housed an extraordinarily 
long drawbridge operated from the roof and that the drawbridge must have connected 
with another structure for access that is now lost. There is no sign of any pivot holes
1 Templar o f  Tyre, §§ 663 and 699 [698], pp. 167, 181 where the date o f  the arrest is 1309; Am adi, 
p. 263; FI. Bustron, pp. 150, 158; Hill, 2, p. 218.
2 Richard, Chvpre sous les Lusignans, p. 66.
3 FI. Bustron, p. 420.
4 Enlart, p. 486.
5 op. cit. p. 485.
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at the base o f  the opening however, and given the very simple nature o f this small 
tower, it is very unlikely that such an elaborate drawbridge existed.
There are narrow, groove apertures in the walls on either side o f this first-floor 
opening and in the other sides o f this floor. These have been labelled as arrow-slits 
owing to their internal embrasures, but 1 have not been able to achieve entry to 
confirm their existence. Previous descriptions have recorded that the top storey has a 
round-headed window in one comer, and a fireplace on the adjacent side. There are 
now rectangular openings covered by wooden shutters similar to the first floor 
‘doorw ay’.6
6 for previous descriptions — Enlart, pp. 375, 485; Perbellini, 1973, p. 32; Vaivre in Vaivre and 
Plagnieux, p. 53. Site visits made October 2004  and October 2009.
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Alaminos I
Face with supposed ‘entry’ at First floor level at bottom of large groove bisecting the
face of the tower.
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Alaminos 2
Rear face of tower.
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THE CASTLES OF THE PENT AD AKTHILOS/BESPARM AK 
MOUNTAINS
The three mountain castles of Buffavento, Kantara and St. Hilarion constitute 
something of a trinity and are therefore dealt with together. Our several references to 
them in the various accounts of the invasion of 1191 show that they were Byzantine in 
origin and of some consequence as fortifications. However, quite when and why they 
were first commissioned in the Byzantine period is more difficult. Five different 
suggestions have been advanced. First, from 965 when the Empire recovered Cyprus 
from the Arabs; second, in the late eleventh century when the opposite Cilician coast 
was overrun by the Seljuks; third, in 1091 by Rhapsomates in his rebellion against 
Alexius I; fourth, after that revolt by the Eumathios Philokales (stratopedarch of 
Cypris 1091-4) on orders from Alexius I for greater control of the island; fifth, at the 
beginning of the twelfth century in reaction to the potential threat posed by the 
establishment of the first crusaders on the mainland.1
Recent scholars have commented that there is written evidence for the existence of 
these castles in the late eleventh century but some of these claims are based on 
doubtful interpretations. Thus a reference in Anna Comnena’s History (ultimately 
known as The Alexiad), to 1092, when Rhapsomates withdrew with his army to the 
hills opposite Kyrenia was taken by Nicolaou-Konnari to say that Rhapsomates 
occupied ‘a fortified position’ there. It is not clear, however, that Anna was so 
specific, and in any event, a fortified position does not necessarily indicate a castle.2 
Similarly Galatariotou took Anna Comnena to record that her father had ordered the 
construction of the three mountain castles to be carried out after the suppression of 
Rhapsomates’ revolt, but again, this can hardly be inferred from the text.3 We are 
probably on safer ground in relying on Goudeles who recorded that in 1186, when 
Constantinople attempted to reassert its control over Cyprus, Isaac took refuge ‘at a
1 H ill, 2, p. 21; A .H .S. M egaw , M ilitary Architecture, p. 204; Lawrence, p. 220; M etcalf, Byzantine 
Cyprus, pp. 528, 535-7 , 540.
2 The Alexiad, p. 273; N icolaou-K onnari, p. 50.
1 The Alexiad, p. 274; Galatariotou, p. 48.
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castle’ or ‘inside a castle’.4 Of course, this allusion does not specifically refer to any 
of the mountain castles, but as we know that Isaac did retreat to at least one of them in 
1191, it is highly likely that this is precisely what he did in 1186 as well. This was, 
however, only five years before the end of the Byzantine period and consequently is 
of limited help.
In general, their defences are not formidable, their altitude and rocky nature giving 
ample natural protection, precluding mining and on most sides greatly impeding the 
use of siege engines. Their locations entirely determined their layouts, which today 
are still sufficiently extant to be both impressive and exciting. In the words of Robin 
Fedden:
These castle-eyries, approached by paths that wind their precipitous way 
upward from anemones, oleanders, and fig-trees to juniper, scrub and rock, 
are among the most romantic fortifications in existence.5
BUFFAVENTO
Leonton; Leonne; Leon -  the Castle of the Lion -  Byzantine 
Bufferentum; Bufevent- Frankish 
[cf Buffavent castle in the mountains of Savoy)
Buffavento -  Italian
Buffavento is the highest and smallest of the three mountain castles. Standing among 
steep crags at 960 m., its layout was wholly determined by the terrain. It is completely 
inaccessible from the north, east and west, while the approach from the south is 
difficult. On this side, the buildings of the castle are at three levels.
LOWER OUTBUILDINGS. The lowest level constitutes a big cistern (2) and a now 
ruined building thought to have been a stable (1). The water tank is very similar to 
those at Kantara and St. Hilarion, and like the one at Kantara, its location beyond the 
perimeter of the castle proper, must have rendered it useless in the event of a closely 
pressed siege.
4 G oudeles, p. 150; Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 50.
5 Fedden and Thom son, pp. 113- 4.
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LOWER WARD. The lower ward is entered through a gate passage built within a 
rectangular tower (3). This tower, originally o f two storeys though the upper storey is 
now lost, appears to be mainly a Frankish structure. It is entered through a typical 
Frankish pointed arch (2.6 m high x 1.8m wide) with one pair of drawbar slots for the 
beam to hold fast the doors. The entry passage is 10.2 m long and has a groined cross 
vault. The rear of this entry tower terminates in a very large pointed arch which does 
not appear to have included provision for closing. The south wall of this tower, which 
runs on beyond its inner end to form the outer wall of this short section of the lower 
ward, is however, Byzantine. This is evinced by the bands of brick and mortar visible 
at its eastern end and by the shallow, solid wedged shape buttress in this curtain 
beyond the tower. Enlart recorded that this curtain once possessed a crenellated 
parapet but it is not clear if he saw this or assumed it. It screens a modem flight of 17 
steps that lead up to a right angle turn, from which further flights of steps procede 
northwards up the rock slope. To the left (west) is, first, a small, square, flat roofed 
building (4), (internally 3.5 x 3.65 m with a pointed barrel vault, gained through a 
narrow pointed arched entrance (1.8m high x 0.9 m wide). It has another, identical 
point of egress on its far (west) side that gave out to a short, exposed terrace. Above 
this building is a recess (7) and a small barrel-vaulted chamber (8) with draw-bar slots 
set within its entrance walls. Above that in turn is a much larger pointed barrel- 
vaulted building (9) (internally 6.05 x 7.95 m). This is entered through a pointed arch 
doorway (2.25 m high x 1.15 m wide). Internally its two transverse arches divided it 
into three bays, lit by large pointed arch windows in both the north and south walls. It 
had a barrel vaulted basement below. As noted, the architectural features of these 
buildings suggest that they are Frankish.
The structures to the right (east) of this lower ward main stair, are very ruined but 
seem to have been less substantial in any event. Here, another small chamber (5) 
similar to the one at (8) on the plan, lies below a larger set of rooms, which are of 
irregular shape -  to take advantage of what space the mountain side allowed. The 
western chamber (6) is 6.35 m long, separated by a cross wall, 0.7 m wide, from the 
larger eastern chamber (10) which is 7 m long. At its widest point, this room was 5.9 
m across. The scant remains of another structure (11) lie on the next rocky shelf 
above.
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Higher up the main stair, a side stairway branched off to the left (west) to an 
unvaulted, Byzantine structure (12) which was of two storeys and covered by a 
wooden roof. It was divided into three large chambers. Entry is into the largest of 
these (on the south-east) through a large, round headed arch (2.6m high by 1.5 m 
wide) set in a wall 0.9 m thick. This was a rectangular chamber. It had another similar 
arch, provided as a window, in its south-east side, above which was a further, smaller, 
round headed arched window. All these doors and windows are encased in layers of 
thin bricks alternating with mortar, in typical Byzantine style. Its roof was supported 
by a large wooden beam, in turn supported by a pillar in the middle of the room. The 
chamber to the west is semi-circular on its south, this being pierced by a round headed 
door opening. A second, similar door on this room’s west wall opens onto a terrace. 
Inside are the remains of a staircase which led up to the upper floor. The third room, 
with its long external side facing north-west, is now very ruined.
UPPER WARD. From the lower ward, the path snakes its way upwards for another 
25 m. to the upper level. The upper ward buildings are all of rectangular design. On 
the north, set on the cragside below the ward proper, is an outlying, buttressed 
structure that served as another cistern (18). This upper ward is Byzantine to the west, 
and Lusignan to the east. The Byzantine buildings range left (west) from the head of 
the stairway, and constitute a row of four interconnecting, almost square chambers, 
replete with pipes for collecting rainwater (13 to 16). These rooms diminished in size 
from east to west. The largest and best preserved -  that on the east (13) -  is internally 
6.5 x 5.7 m and is entered through an arch set in its east wall akin in style to the 
Byzantine building of the lower ward, this one measuring 1.9 m. high x 1 m. wide. 
Below are two chambers or cisterns accessed via a trapdoor in the floor. On its south 
side, where the crags drop steeply immediately below, its wall is 0.75 m thick. The 
chamber still retains its barrel vault intact. It has matching round headed arched 
windows set in larger embrasures on its south and north sides, and a doorway in its 
west side that corresponds exactly with the eastern entry. This western doorway 
passes through a dividing wall 0.6 m thick and was secured from within the second 
chamber. A little smaller than its eastern neighbour, this second room (14) is reported 
by the Department o f Antiquities guidebook as having one cellar or cistern beneath 
which -  if so -  must have been sealed over as an entry point is not now apparent. Like 
the two smaller rooms to the west (15 and 16), the second room has now lost its roof,
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but all three have similar arches to the first room and internally have putlog holes in 
their north and south walls, the irregular pattern of which suggest they were used for 
construction scaffolding. This four room range is clearly a contiguous unit of one 
period. So too, most likely, is the isolated tower (17) at the western extremity of this 
upper level. It is now extremely ruined, but possessed single openings in the centre of 
each of its sides, its entrance of course being on its east side. Internally it is 7.8 x 4 m 
with walls 1.5 m. thick. It is connected to the main series of rooms by the north facing 
curtain -  a wall 0.8 m. thick, featureless save for a single, crude, low arched opening 
mid-way along its length. Vestiges of a southern curtain enclosing this ‘corridor’ 
between the far western tower and the main block, can be traced, but it is impossible 
to say whether it was ever continuous between the two.
A somewhat different rectangular building (19) is located centrally in the upper ward. 
This long structure (internally 11.15 x 5.5 m) is perched on a rock about 2 m. high. It 
now appears to stand independently of other structures of the ward, but originally was 
probably connected to the range of five Byzantine chambers just mentioned, by the 
linking crenellated parapet that juts out to skirt the northern cliff edge, and to its 
neighbouring eastern building (21) by a short wall, described below. There is nothing 
now to say that this central tower was ever more than one storey high. It is entered at 
its short south-east end where the wall is at its thickest at 1.5 m. Just inside (right) is 
an arched recess (0.25 wide x 0.33 m deep). It had two square bays, was groin 
vaulted, and is pierced on its long south-west side by a Frankish round headed 
opening in each bay. The opening in the southern bay is certainly a window (1.5 m. 
high x 0.9 m. wide), while the larger aperture (2.15 m high x 1.3 m wide) in the north 
bay was seen by Enlart as a doorway. This is, however, unlikely. Its base is 26.5 cm 
above ground-level and there are no traces of any stair leading up to it. The existence 
of a corresponding window, 1.25 m wide on the chamber’s north-east face reinforces 
the view that this bay did not have its own entry point. Either way, it was certainly the 
superior room. It could be secured against the southern chamber judging by the 
position of the drawbar slots in the doorway set centrally in the interdividing partition. 
The Department of Antiquities Guidebook was no doubt right then, to represent this 
as a Lusignan addition to the castle at this level, but whether we can also agree that it 
served ‘as a little church’, perhaps remains uncertain. Indeed, a castle chapel, if there 
was one, has been placed elsewhere -  among the row of connecting chambers to the
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west, where Faucherre noted traces of paintings and a washbasin. However, such 
features are not, in fact, in situ.
The rectangular structure (21) (internally 11.9 x 5.9 m) located to the east is very 
close, being merely 2.7 m. away, and on ground only 1 m. lower. The abutting comers 
of the two towers show signs that a connecting wall may have spanned the gap (20), 
possibly including a narrow gate, judging by the slot in the east tower’s comer. Such a 
gate would, as at St. Hilarion and Kantara, have been for little more than the discharge 
of rubbish. Enlart, who did not distinguish between Byzantine and Lusignan work, 
noted that this was of a similar nature to the central tower, yet it was shown on the 
later Guidebook plan as Byzantine. Indeed, the two buildings are of comparable 
masonry, being similar to the Byzantine, in the use of small, irregular blocks, but 
different in the use of inferior mortar. The eastern building is very mined, standing 
now to a maximum height of 1.7 m. Its walls are 0.8 m. thick. It had two window 
openings on each of the long sides, one at the east end with an entry probably at the 
west end close to the central tower.
Although it is clear that the castle’s foundation predates the Lusignan period, the 
legend that it was built by a noble Cypriot lady seeking refuge from Bouchart’s 117 
Templars in 1191-2, serves to reflect a use to which it could be put. Apart from its 
small part in the wars begun by Richard I and Frederick II, references to it are mainly 
in relation to its use as a place of incarceration.6 It was dismantled by the Venetians, 
but partly restored during the period of British control.7
6 Enlart, pp. 437- 443; Jeffery, pp. 274- 5; Hill, 2, pp. 36, 266-8,433; (Ppoypion Boy&abento, passim: 
Muller-Weiner, p. 91; Perbellini (1973), p. 27; A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 205;
Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 100; Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 380-1. Site visits:
24 February 2007,9 April 2007 and 19 October 2009. Makhairas, § 258, p. 239, and 2, pp. 131,201- 
2, which note other names for the castle, shared with St. Hilarion and Kantara. For Buffhvento’s use 
as a prison, see for example Makhairas, §§ 258,611, pp. 239,603 and Enlart, p. 438.
7 FI. Bustron, p. 24; Lusignan, Description, f.35; Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 381.
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Buffavento 1
The two chambered building (19 on plan) at the highest point of the upper ward. The 
entrance was through its south-east short wall (on the right in this photograph). The 
window on the south-west side of the north-west chamber is clearly visible.
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Buffavento 2
West of the tower in the previous photograph (19 on plan) and at only a slightly lower 
level, is the first and largest (13 on plan) of the five chambers (13 to 17) likely to be
Byzantine.
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Buffavento 3
Lower Ward. View eastwards from the apex of the apse of the Byzantine building (12 
on plan). The two, roughly square buildings in the foreground (9 and 4 on plan) are 
the principal Frankish buildings on this level. Beyond lies the track that approached
the castle from the east.
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Buffavento 4
Lower ward from above. The three chambered Byzantine building (12 on plan) is 
centre. The larger of the two Frankish chambers (9 on plan) is to its east (left on
photograph).
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KANTARA
(Candare; Le Candaire - Frankish ; Kandak -  Arabic)
This is the easternmost of the three mountain castles. It is at a height of about 670 m., 
and is in visual contact with Buffavento and Famagusta. It constitutes one main ward, 
with an enceinte skirting the irregular perimeter of its outcrop, protected on its east 
side by a subsidiary ward or barbican.
Enlart’s description remains the most detailed, Jeffery’s and Papageorgiou’s 
Guidebook and most recently, Faucherre’s ‘Notes’, being merely overviews. 
However, Enlart was unable to visit much of the castle, so his analysis is of limited 
value with regard to its north and west sectors. As with Buffavento, it did not occur to 
him that Kantara had its origins in Byzantine times. Most modem commentators have 
remarked that although Kantara appears Byzantine in many respects, the castle seems 
to date in the main from the fourteenth century. As they have noted, (see discussion 
below) it may well be that James I strengthened it as a reaction to the Genoese 
occupation of Famagusta. Indeed, its various sets of chambers may have been 
constructed at that time in order to house troops. Although the main enceinte wall was 
no doubt from the earlier period, as is the case at Buffavento, on its south-east, that 
was remodelled into a complex defensive arrangement, which also is likely to be 
work of the later Lusignan period.
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The enceinte and its buildings
K A N T A R A  CASTLE
North, West and South
Kantara has similar characteristics with Buffavento: barrel and cross-vaulted 
chambers attached to the curtain, which for its most part constitutes the original 
Byzantine castle. Indeed fragments of brick can be traced in its northern perimeter 
(23) where it fronts a cistern (24). All these buildings appear to have had flat roofs, 
perhaps to facilitate water collection, which was especially important in this 
particularly dry part of the island. Leaving aside the interesting complex on the east 
side for the present, three separate series of such vaulted, square or rectangular 
chambers can be identified. They are all approximately 5 to 6 m. wide, some having 
holes in the roofs, perhaps to let out smoke. Those chambers no doubt served as 
accommodation.
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The first is a south-east range of four chambers. One of these (9) stands apart, its 
north-east comer abutting the south-west comer of the large apsidal tower (2) that 
dominates the entrance. It is similar to that main south-east tower with regard to its 
arched entry, the light above it and the arrangement for the internal floor: clearly both 
structures are contemporaneous. The remaining three chambers (10, 11 and 12) are 
built side by side, but do not interconnect. Their siting has the effect of thrusting out 
the line of the castle’s wall. The Department of Antiquities’ plan shows an outer wall 
(31) at the north-east end of this range that connected to the front or south-east end of 
the large apsidal tower guarding the main entrance. There is, however, no trace 
whatever of this on the ground. These three barrel vaulted rooms are also entered 
through pointed arches. They too have slots for an upper floor at the level where the 
vault springs, and each has a single arrow slit in its external wall. Attached to this 
range at its west end is a narrow, wedged shaped apartment (13) that served as a 
privy. Its internal passage slopes down to a pointed arch set low in the curtain.
Second, there is a western complex of five vaulted chambers (15 to 19), which also do 
not interconnect, but are entered via pointed arches. The northern rooms of this group 
were clearly designed to serve as cisterns. The southernmost (15) is rectangular like 
the rest, but has the protection of a solid horseshoe projection to its west, owing to 
which, exceptionally, it is half cross-vaulted. This chamber was equipped with a 
narrow, downward sloping corridor, leading to an exit (20) that, as with that in the 
upper ward at St. Hilarion, can only have been designed for the discharge of rubbish. 
Above this chamber, the horseshoe projection constitutes an open fighting gallery, 
with parapet and narrow wall walk that is continuous with that of the castle’s south 
curtain. Clearly it is of the same design and period as those comparable structures on 
the casde’s south-east front.
Third, two more roughly square chambers (21 and 22) were attached to the inside of 
the curtain on its north-west side. Within the craggy enceinte there are the remains of 
freestanding, now badly mined buildings, certainly some of which were cisterns.
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Standing at the highest point is an oblong structure (25), entered at its narrow south­
west end through a doorway 1.1m. wide. Internally, this tower was 3.1 m. x 9.15 m 
within walls 1.3 to 1.4 m. thick. It is now severely ruined, only its long south-east 
wall in part surviving to any height. This wall contained an ornate window; it shows 
that the chamber was vaulted, and possessed an upper storey. Whether the upper 
storey was roofed is hard to say. Immediately above the window, there is an archere, 
so this level may have been a simple open fighting platform. Enlart noted that this 
tower was of two storeys -  one of many reasons to find it hard to see why he should 
also have likened this to the small square towers of St. Hilarion’s upper enceinte. He 
speculated that two corbels (only one of which now remains) set at the level where the 
arch of the window springs, and two small grooves set on either side of the base of the 
exterior of the tower below the window, constituted evidence that this window was in 
fact a doorway with a small drawbridge. Enlart continued that this in turn led to some 
gangway that connected to the buildings attached to the southern section of the 
curtain. Jeffery and Faucherre repeated this as fact, but it is most unlikely. There 
would have been no point in endowing this building with such another entrance, and 
Enlart’s supposed point of egress from this 'doorway’ is in reality impossible owing 
to the rocky terrain. It seems more probable that the items that Enlart adduced as 
evidence for a pont levis, provided rather for some form of shutter necessary to close 
up the large window from the winds that are so noticeable at this high, exposed point. 
Furthermore, a tower with such an arrangement as Enlart envisaged is not paralleled 
in the other mountain castles. Although the masonry of this chamber-tower is superior 
to that of its counterpart tower in the centre of the upper ward at Buffavento, that 
apart, they appear to be of the same basic design and so of the same period.
East
As at Buffavento, a large, triple buttressed roughly square cistern lies outside all the 
defences (30). Its isolated location must have rendered it useless in time of close 
siege.
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Kantara is at its most intricate and impressive on its east, where the slope of the rock 
is a little less severe than elsewhere. It is still easy to discern that here at least, the 
exterior of the buildings were rendered and limewashed to give them a resplendent 
appearance. As at Buffavento, here was the principal entrance. This was a large - 3  m. 
wide, pointed arched gateway with well-made voussoirs (7), but at some point 
subsequent to Duthoit’s sketches of 1865, it was reduced in size to a mere rectangular 
entry (2.1m high x 1.25 m wide) by infilling with tightly packed masonry of a very 
inferior nature. The gateway is in the centre of the curtain, which ran off to the north 
and south to substantial towers. Save for one embrasure with a loophole towards its 
northern end, the curtain was defended only by its parapet. The south-east tower (2) is 
particularly substantial. Unusually, and as noted earlier, it is apsidal to the field, and 
in this at least, it is indeed comparable with the north-east tower at Kyrenia, as Jeffery 
noted. Internally, it consists of two cross vaults, with embrasures on each of its long 
sides with smaller openings above them. A similar small opening lies above the 
arched entrance. In between these two levels of apertures, are four larges slots for 
beams, so it is likely that there was a floor at this point. There are no particular 
grounds for stating that the lower chamber may have been a prison as has been 
suggested.
The complex at the north-east, which is set at an angle of 45° to the line of the curtain, 
is altogether more elaborate. It consists of three distinct stages, all of two storeys. At 
ground level, the first structure (26) was entered via a narrow doorway 1.1m. wide set 
between well made voussoirs; the upper storey is now too ruined to be clear as to its 
means of access. This structure was oblong in dimension, the upper level perhaps 
serving as a hall as Enlart thought, though its narrowness would suggest otherwise. 
Certainly, at both levels, it provided passage to the outer works. Two square openings, 
possibly originally with trapdoors, provided for direct access through the floor of the 
upper room to the room below. The lower storey is 2.8 m. wide and barrel vaulted. It 
has been described as a fighting gallery owing to its apertures on the exposed northern 
face, but these are not so much loops as regular rectangular windows with equally 
crude oblong openings above them, all set in deep embrasures. This oblong building 
was protected by and led out to a square tower (3). Its lower storey was covered with 
a cross-vault. Just below the springing of the vault, this has two rectangular openings
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similar to those in the adjoining oblong building, indicating a similar date of 
construction. Its upper storey, which also once possessed a cross-vault, is now 
roofless. It was protected by its own parapet with loopholes. Third, and finally, and 
proceeding on again from this square tower, the way led to the ultimate defence at this 
angle of the main enceinte• an especially elongated horseshoe projection, or 
eschaugette as Jeffery termed it (8), 1.4 m. wide. Access at both levels was through 
arched doorways (0.75 m wide) set in the south-east comer of the square tower where 
its wall is 1.65 m thick. The lower storey of this narrow horseshoe was barrel vaulted, 
possessed one rectangular opening in its roof, and was equipped with three 
embrasures closing in loops on both sides with one at its rounded end. Its upper 
storey was left open, and was crowned with a parapet, again enhanced with loopholes. 
This structure is purely military -  nothing other than a double banked fighting gallery. 
It is constructed of finely fitting masonry of a very high standard, though how far the 
restoration of 1914 improved upon the original work is hard to say. Its nose rests on a 
long, battered plinth (27) leading down to the level of the barbican.
On its south-east side, this barbican, or outer ward consisted of a wing wall that 
sprang from the apex of the main enceinte ’s eastern tower. A similar wing wall sprang 
from the base of the batter of the north-east horseshoe tower. Both wing walls ended 
in further eschaugette horseshoe projections (32 and 28), though in these two cases, of 
a single storey, and very narrow, being effectively mere corridors, that on the south 
(26) being 1 m. wide and only 1.9 m. high.. They had crenellated parapets and were 
equipped with loopholes -  one only in an embrasure at the apex of the southern 
horseshoe (26), but at least two set in its northern counterpart (28). Most likely they 
were unroofed and certainly were purely defensive in purpose. These projections 
thrust out aggressively. They are bound together by an outer wall (4), 1.2 m. thick, 
that decreases in height to a central entry point (1), 1.9 m. wide, with provision for 
both a portcullis as well as a door, as indicated by the groove and drawbar slots. The 
entrance stands between two square edifices (5 and 6) constructed on and in front of 
the wall. Attached to the inner side of this outer wall on the north side of the entry, is 
a narrow vaulted chamber (29) attained by means of a flight of five steps. This was 
entered through a pointed arch (2.2 m high x 1.1 m wide), while inside it, a large 
round headed arched opening provided access to the square tower protecting the 
northern flank of the gate (6). Once inside the gate, the visitor is channelled via a
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cheminement en chicane that prescribes a dog leg ascent to the gateway of the main 
enceinte. Perbellini described this whole outer ward arrangement as an rivellino 
fiancheggiato, which is of course anachronistic but it very adequately reflects the 
military nature of this eastern outer ward.1
1 Duthoit, pp. 43,202-3; Enlart, pp. 468-473; Jeffery, pp. 245-7; A. Papageorgiou, Kantara Castle, 
passim; Muller-Weiner, p. 85; Perbellini (1973), p. 29; A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 206; 
Molin,Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 100; Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 375-80. Site 
visits 22 February 2007 and 7 April 2007.
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Kantara 2
Kantara 1
South end of the east front. The large D-shaped tower (2 on plan) has a lesser outwork 
beneath it. This is a narrow hoprse-shoe shaped fighting platform (32 on plan).
Isolated tower (25 on plan) set on the highest point of the interior. The vaulting and 
windows on the east (right) are discernible.
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Kantara 3
Complex at the north end of the east curtain. The lie of the land dictated the 
articulation of the castle. This group of buildings is the most convoluted. A 
rectangular structure (26 on plan) ran out to the north-east at the north angle of the 
enceinte. It led to an approximately square tower (3 on plan) which in turn led to a 
prominent, narrow, horse-shoe fighting gallery (8 on plan) with three archeres on 
either side and one in its nose. All three structures possessed an upper storey, roofed 
except for that on the horse-shoe eschaugette. Lower down, a lesser horse-shoe 
defensive outwork (28 on plan) was created at the north end of the outer curtain on 
this east side, a feature paralleled (32 on plan) below the big D-shaped tower at the 
south end of this east front (2 on plan). A similar feature is found projecting from the 
castle’s west end. They are redolent of Armenian work in Cilicia.
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Kantara 4
North end of east, imnner enceinte -  interior of prominent, narrow horse-shoe, 
fighting gallery, with three archeres on either side and one set in its nose. There was 
provision for another storey above -  which was likely unroofed.
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Kantara 5
East side of castle. Entrance (1 on plan) through the lesser, outer wall with entrance 
through inner wall behind (7 on plan). The recent substantial reduction in the size of
that main entry can be seen.
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ST HILARION
(Didymus -  Greek; Dieu d’ Amour -  Frankish)
Before 1191 it was called Didymus (the Twins) from the twin peaks that crown this 
mountain. The Franks corrupted this to Dieu d ‘Amour. Its other name of St Hilarion 
derives from either the obscure saint of that name, or merely one who fled from the 
Arabs in the Holy Land and who most likely retired to the spot to live as a recluse. 
Megaw suggested that it subsequently evolved into a monastery and that its buildings 
were later exploited as the nucleus of the castle but the only evidence to support this 
appears to be the view that the church was too large to be a mere castle chapel. The 
castle was built on the uppermost slope of the mountainside at a height of 700 rising 
to 730 m., certainly located thus to command the road between Nicosia and Kyrenia.
It was still effective in war as recently as 1964 when a Turkish contingent took it and 
thereby dominated the Kyrenia Pass giving them a decided advantage in that sector. 
Even when the Greeks counter attacked and captured the surrounding hills, they could 
not capture the castle.
As we will see, the surviving architectural evidence may reflect the distinct functions 
of providing accommodation for major households and for a body of troops. It is 
however, too much a speculation to suggest, as Enlart and a number of observers 
have, that St. Hilarion served as a royal Summer retreat and refuge from outbreaks of 
the plague. There is no palpable evidence for this even though the remains of some of 
the domestic facilities reflect the intention to provide for a considerable standard of 
living.
Clearly the castle is Byzantine in origin and outline. Its fortifications date largely from 
then with some limited enhancements in the Lusignan period, mainly no doubt from 
the time of the wars with Frederick II, though in the Prince John Tower, there is 
evidence of later work on the defences. Modem commentators, particularly Enlart, 
Jeffery and Megaw, have attempted a dating for the more considerable buildings 
within the castle on architectural grounds. Their conclusions sometimes differ from 
each other. Thus for example, where Jeffery believed that both flat terraced roofs on 
timber and steeped pitched roofs were mere alternatives of a thirteenth-century date,
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Megaw assigned construction periods of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries 
respectively. Nor did they agree on the nature of those pitched roofs. Jeffery found no 
certain evidence that tiles had been used, whereas Megaw appeared to have taken this 
for granted. We can at least be sure that some buildings did have pitched roofs, for 
these are evinced by the remaining acutely pointed gables -  as in the middle ward hall 
and, according to Megaw at least, the upper ward living apartments. Similarly,
Megaw held that the barrel and cross-vaults, as in the undercroft of the upper ward 
apartments, were also indicative of a fourteenth-century build. He considered that the 
tower-donjon known as the Prince John Tower was also of this later period, and that 
this apart, there was no evidence of work on the defences from this later century.
How far such evidence for dating is reliable may be worth review. The weight given 
to the type of roof is especially interesting. No other Lusignan fortification possessed 
steep pitched roofs, so why should this in itself attest a fourteenth-century date? It has 
been noted that this style was a reaction to the rain and snow that would be 
experienced at this altitude, but then if so, why should the builders have not used this 
style earlier, or indeed, why should such a style not be found at Buffavento, which is 
considerably higher? Of course it may be that it was only by the fourteenth century 
that the Lusignans decided to carry out major works at St. Hilarion, which included 
creating steeply pitched roofs for their buildings, when they all but abandoned 
neighbouring Buffavento. If this were so, however, we would expect to see such roofs 
elsewhere, but they are unique to St. Hilarion and do not recur at other Lusignan 
castles. For example, they are not repeated at Kantara, which it is thought did see 
building activity in the fourteenth century, and where, we are told, there was a 
deliberate use of flat roofs to capture rainwater! Gable-ended roofs, however, have 
been identified in Byzantine buildings on Mount Troodos. Though this is not to 
suggest that our buildings at St. Hilarion are consequently Byzantine, the point is that 
such architectural ‘evidence* appears shaky. Similarly, how far can we say that types 
of vaulting used always inevitably pinpoint a particular period of construction? If the 
barrel and cross-vaults and sometimes even ribbed vaults, identified at the mountain 
castles, may indeed be taken to indicate a medieval, post Byzantine origin, quite when 
within our period is surely harder to say.
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S T  H I L A R I O N  C A S T L E
M i.H M rrA Q
BYZANTINE
INTERMEDIATE
ENTRANCE
Lower Ward or Bourg
There are three wards ascending the hillside. The Franks did little in the outer or 
lower ward or the bourg as it is sometimes called. With regard to the defences, 
previous commentators have agreed that at least the Franks constructed the small 
barbican (1), no doubt on the grounds that its entry has a Frankish pointed arch (2), 
(1.7 m. wide x 2.5 m. high) which appears to be original with its wall, not superseding 
an earlier Byzantine arch, as is the case with the main entrance. However, this 
barbican arch apart, there is nothing to distinguish the rubble masonry of the barbican 
from that of the wall of the main enceinte. Apart from its square comer tower (3), the 
barbican has two small semi-circular, open backed projections (4) in its longer, now 
ruined, southern wall, these having some affinity with the semi-circular towers on the 
main enceinte. Therefore, other than the entry arch, with its three pairs of drawbar 
slots, the barbican may well be Byzantine like the main wall.
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Certainly the Franks reduced the size of the main entrance within, as their lower arch 
shows (5). Above are the surviving corbels for a brattice, variously dated as Byzantine 
(Megaw) and later fifteenth century (Enlart and Jeffery), the latter on the grounds of 
the mouldings which can still be seen faintly. Enlart was convinced of his dating on 
this point, but it is hard to accept that James II would have bothered to add to the 
defences in this one small respect.
Its entrance apart, the ward is almost wholly Byzantine. This constitutes their original 
main entrance of a semi-circular arch (5) and thin curtain walls made of irregular, 
rubble masonry bound by a lime based mortar. The curtain had a wall walk behind a 
parapet. On its south and east, it followed a contour (7) but on it west, it ran straight 
uphill (6). The ward was not fully enclosed, as higher up, the gradient of the hillside 
rendered this unnecessary. The curtain's seven semi-circular towers occur at roughly 
regular intervals, mainly of 30 m. They are open-gorged, not being backed by solid 
masonry, although they may have had timber backs. The tower (8) beside the main 
entrance has been restored and consequently is now encased in masonry at its rear, 
with external entries for all three of its storeys -  which do not appear to interconnect. 
The other towers have not been ‘modernised’ however. They too are of three storeys 
and are entered through a single, wide doorway in an arch. The best preserved is that 
at the south-west comer (9). It is entered at ground level through a plain doorway, 
while both its upper floors are only partly open-gorged, having two round headed 
arches divided by a pier.
The towers taper upwards to embrasured parapets. The upper storeys are equipped 
with loopholes. In the tower at the south-west comer of the enceinte, the upper floors 
are reached by ramps, the first floor ramp connecting too with the wall walk. Perhaps 
these ramps were stairs when the castle was first built. The rooms within vary in size. 
Lawrence noted typical dimensions confirming Enlart’s findings that they were small, 
of little height and roofed in timber or with rough vaulting. My measurements confirm 
this: the restored tower by the main entrance has rooms that, internally, have a 
maximum width of 3.3 m. and a height merely of 1.85 m. The dimensions of the 
south-west tower’s rooms are similar (2.9 m by 1.9 m). Within this lower ward there 
are various buildings either adjoining the inside of the wall or freestanding. These are 
not especially important buildings: stables and cisterns have been identified; they may
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be those of a local community associated with service to the main castle — hence 
references to the bourg. Certainly the large building with its high and wide pointed 
arched entry in the south-west comer of the ward (10), now also heavily restored, 
appears to have been Frankish, but the remaining -  and lesser structures -  are very 
ruined and hence their dates not easily assigned.
Middle Ward
In the middle ward the gatehouse (11), church (12) and adjoining chambers are 
Byzantine in origin. This middle ward gatehouse shows how Frankish masons took 
the Byzantine shell and turned it into a cross-vaulted passage, originally closed by a 
drawbridge, but now ascended by five steps. Another chamber, which had a pointed 
barrel-vault, is built over the entry passage at a slightly oblique angle. The masonry of 
both storeys is of fine, square cut blocks. As Megaw observed, the church bears 
comparison with that at the Antiphonitis monastery near Ayios Amvrosios. It is now 
judged to date from no earlier than the reign of Alexius I. On its south side, its 
original round headed Byzantine entrance was partly filled in during the Frankish 
period, and replaced with a smaller pointed arched doorway.
North of the church and separated from it by a covered passageway is the hall, with 
cellars below (13). Possibly this may have been the hall of the Byzantine castle, 
becoming the centrepiece of the ward of the Lusignans. It is thought to have been 
rebuilt in the fourteenth century, and endowed with a steep wood and tile roof and a 
wooden floor that divided it from the cellars below. It has been restored in recent 
years. Servicing the hall, and attached at its east end is a building with three 
transverse arches now without its timber roof (14). Labelled by Megaw as the buttery, 
it has a hearth in one comer and two round arched windows. The room beyond (15) 
has a pointed barrel-vault with another similarly arched window, identified as the 
kitchen, while beyond again, and at a lower level are two chambers that served as 
privies and perhaps a steam room. Of a similar date to these structures, at the east end 
of the covered passageway and adjoining the buttery, is the ‘belvedere’ -  a cross- 
vaulted chamber built of fine masonry designed to provide splendid views from its 
large openings (16).
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West lies another rectangular edifice being a vaulted cellar below a living chamber 
(17) which had a pitched roof annexed to which was a small kitchen with a simple 
pointed barrel-vault (18) -  all thought by Megaw to be the castellan’s quarters, again 
dated by him to the fourteenth century. At the north-east comer of the ward is a 
structure (19) that was perhaps once four storeys (thus Megaw) but certainly three 
storeys high. Internally, this was supported by five transverse arches, of which traces 
of four remain. These imply a thirteenth-century date, and so perhaps endorse 
Megaw’s speculation that this building contained the royal apartments of that time 
before more luxurious ones were provided in the upper ward. Equally however, these 
could well have constituted an independent suite for some other household than the 
king’s, such as his heir’s or that of a visiting personage. Its location, high in the castle, 
but not at its top, would reflect such a level of status. Judging by the surviving eastern 
gable end, which is an addition later than the main building period, this block was 
provided with a steep pitch tiled roof only subsequent to its establishment.
Adjacent, to the west of this tower and also on the northern perimeter of the middle 
ward is a row of massive chambers that Megaw considered was fourteenth-century 
work, and which he visualised as barracks (20). This structure is of two storeys and is 
divided internally by partitions into three identical, interconnecting chambers. It is 
cross-vaulted and endowed with pointed-arched windows facing north towards the 
sea, with further pointed arched doorways in the internal two partitions. Adjacent is a 
structure that Megaw thought to be a kiln in which roof tiles were made. Megaw also 
labelled the gate (21) marking the exit from this ward, leading on up to the upper 
ward, as later Frankish work. Similarly ascribed to this period is the massive 
buttressed water tank (22) -  perhaps assigned for the irrigation of the gardens - and 
the short wing wall with a postern (23) which connects it with the vaulted barrack 
block at the east.
Upper Ward
The upper ward is reached after ascending a zig-zag path, created in 1904, the original 
means of ascent remaining unclear. This area was enclosed by a Byzantine wall of 
very rough masonry, 1.4 m. thick, evidence of which is found on the east side where a 
semi-circular tower (24) similar to those of the lower ward is placed a little north of
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the entrance (25). This entrance has a Frankish pointed arch set in it, 1.4 m. wide by 2 
m. high with slots for two drawbars. A stone staircase leads from the entrance into the 
tower and its associated rampart walk. A vestige of another weak Byzantine wall 
with a semi-circular tower can be found running east-west on the south side of the 
ward (26). Megaw suggested that an early Frankish improvement, prompted perhaps 
by the war of 1228-33, included strengthening this with the two square towers at 
either end. These two towers are very small. The tower to the east (27) survives to 
parapet height though appears to have been partly restored. It is of one storey and 
would have had a flat, timber roof at parapet level. Its size allows for one merlon and 
two embrasures only on each side. The entry is a plain, rectangular opening, 0.9 m. 
wide by 1.5 m. high. Enlart compared them to the isolated tower at the highest point 
of Kantara’s enceinte, though quite why is hard to see, for they are clearly different in 
several respects.
Here were the principal domestic buildings in the castle’s final layout if not before.
On the north-east side of the ward lay a kitchen complex (28), now extremely ruined, 
an even more ruined, large room being attached to the wall at the south-east side (29). 
A series of cisterns occupied the central part of the ward to the north, while on its 
west side were the royal apartments. These apartments, variously said to be thirteenth 
century (Enlart) and fourteenth century (Megaw) - are also now heavily ruined, but, as 
Enlart was able to show, they constituted an impressive structure. The whole edifice 
(30) lies on a north-east to south-west axis, is 25 m. long by 6 m. wide internally and 
was of three storeys. There was an irregularly shaped basement with a semi-circular 
barrel-vault, now largely blocked up by cave-ins. The ground floor was 7 m. high 
under a pointed barrel vault with four transverse arches supported on brackets. It 
appears that this ground floor may have had a loft, no doubt for storage, judging by 
the regular row of slots at the level where the vault springs from the wall. Lower rows 
of holes on the east wall may have provided for shelving. The unvaulted upper storey, 
a Great Hall with two small rooms at the extremities according to Enlart, or 
alternatively, as Megaw had it, a series of chambers, is impressive. This uppermost 
floor was reached at its north end from inside the ward by means of a flight of steps 
2.33 m wide carried on a flying buttress. At its top, the stair opened onto a wooden 
balcony that was probably covered and that ran along the length of the facade, into 
which entry could be gained through four doors under pointed-arches. The western
G:\k GAZETTEER ENTRY FOR ST. HILARION - T.doc
149
wall of the central, main chamber was furnished with three large traceried windows in 
the centre and two smaller ones at either end, only one of each now surviving. Both 
have stone seats set within their recesses as at later Kolossi. Another smaller traceried 
window survives in the attached small room at the south end. Three similar doors to 
those opening onto the balcony, opened from the lower vaulted room to the courtyard. 
A small door at courtyard level led down a narrow stair through the basement to an 
exit -  possibly for the discharge of rubbish. It was thought that the whole building 
was endowed with a steep pitched tiled roof, but there is no evidence for this now. At 
the north-west tip of the ward is a large if crude closet (31).
Separated from all wards is the isolated tower called Prince John’s Tower (32). This 
had a pointed barrel-vaulted roof, and was 2.25 m. wide internally. It has three 
surviving arrowslits on each of its long sides. On the south-west long side, a water 
pipe descended into a cistern that was set beneath the floor at the southern end of the 
tower. Entry to the tower was via a pointed arched doorway (1 m. wide by 2 m. high) 
furnished with a drawbar. The entry is set in a wall that sits obliquely to the body of 
the building. Clearly, this was dictated by the rocky eminence on which it was built, 
but in this respect, and indeed in the chamber’s narrowness, it is particularly 
reminiscent of the first element of the north-east complex of the main enceinte at 
Kantara. Both seem likely to be of the same period -  the fourteenth century -  as 
Megaw put forward for the Prince John Tower. It is worth emphasising, however, that 
it bears little comparison with the isolated tower at Kantara’s highest point, or those in 
Buffavento’s upper ward. Unlike those towers, at St. Hilarion it is clear that the 
builders’ intention was that it should have its own defensibility, independent and 
distinct from the surrounding castle.
Along with Buffavento and Kantara, St. Hilarion was also 'dismantled’ by the 
Venetians.1
1 Makhairas, § 552, p. 547; Lusignan, Description, f. 36; Enlart, pp. 34, 376, 379-80,428-41; 
Jeffery, pp. 263-8; Hill, 2, p. 399; A.H.S. Megaw, St. Hilarion Castle, passim; Muller-Weiner, 
p. 87; Fedden and Thomson, p. 116; Lawrence, pp. 220-1; A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, 
p. 205; Perbellini (1992), p. 7; Faucberre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 381-3; Vaivre in 
Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 46; Metcalf, Byzantine Cyprus, p. 537. Site visit -  22 February 2007.
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St Hilarion 1
Barbican (1 on plan) with Frankish pointed arched entrance (2 on plan).
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St Hilarion 2
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Entrance (5 on plan) through main lower ward curtain, showing Byzantine arch over 
later arch, with corbels above for a box machicolation.
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Sf Hilarion 3
Lower ward/bourg Byzantine cutain (6 on plan) with open backed semi-circular
towers.
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St Hilarion 4
Frankish arched entrance (25 on plan) in cente of east wall of upper ward.
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St Hilarion 5
The eastern, small Frankish tower (27 on plan) on the south curtain of the upper ward 
immediately above the Byzantine wall of the lower ward that climbs the slope (6 on 
plan). Beyond (centre) is the isolated ‘Prince John’s Tower’ (32 on plan).
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St Hilarion 6
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‘Prince John’s Tower’ (32 on plan) showing its west facing entrance and the angled 
disposition of the rectangular tower to take advantage of the terrain. The three arrow 
loops on the south-west face are clearly seen.
G:\k GAZETTEER ENTRY FOR ST. HILARION - T.doc
156
FAMAGUSTA 
(Greek -  Ammochostos)
As the second city of the Kingdom and its major trading centre and port, Famagusta 
was of particular importance in the Lusignan Kingdom. This is reflected in its 
extensive fortifications, which for the sake of convenience, we may divide into three 
areas of interest: harbour defences, castle, and town walls.
Venetian fortified corridor-breakwater from castle to port tower.
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Description of the harbour and its defences
It is important to appreciate that Famagusta's defences were extensive, inasmuch as 
they constituted not just town walls and castle, but also maritime defences that were 
built on and indeed exploited the natural features of its coastline. About 500 m out to 
sea, a succession of reefs and islets ran roughly parallel to the shore and so formed a 
natural breakwater. At its southern extremity, this connected to the mainland forming 
an obvious basin. This basin was effectively enclosed at its northern end by means of 
another breakwater that ran from one of the larger islets, called 'the Island of the 
Oxen', towards the shore adjacent to where the castle was located. Entry to this basin 
was through a 50 m gap in this northern breakwater close to (approximately 70 m) the 
circuit of the castle and town walls. At some point early in the Frankish period, this 
gap acquired a chain, which was in turn associated with structures constructed at 
either end, the outer one being called the ‘tower of the chain’(17). Enlart described 
this as first ‘cylindrical', but then acknowledged that it came to be pentagonal. It is 
certainly depicted as pentagonal in Gibellino’s engraving of 1571 but given that we 
can identify certain imprecisions in that representation of the defences, we cannot 
really be sure as to the shape of this tower. The chain was fixed to this tower and 
raised and lowered by a windlass located on the inner side of the gap, at the end of the 
70 m breakwater projecting from the shore by the castle. Possibly the terminus of that 
breakwater included a tower, but whether that was the original Lusignan tour du Port 
cannot be known. In the Venetian period, if not before, the breakwater was 
transformed into a fortified corridor terminating at the Venetian torre della Catena 
(tower of the chain). Severe restrictions on current access make it impossible to 
establish whether the present structure incorporates any pre-Venetian work; its 
general shape resembles that shown in Gibellino's engraving at any rate. Access to 
this Oporto intemoy was through a larger, Oporto esterno\ now called ‘Mandraki’ to 
the north. This was also protected from the sea by further islets and shoals, but there is 
no evidence that its mouth was also protected by a chain as Faucherre has 
speculated.1
1 Enlart, pp. 451,453; Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, pp. 522-3; Gertwagen, Harbours and facilities, 
p. 116. The (Island of the Oxen’ is mentioned by Makhairas, § 362, pp. 341-3. The ‘tower 
of the chain’ is mentioned by Makhairas, § 221, p. 203. See too Makhairas, 2, p. 125. Enlart, (p. 451) 
noted that a windlass was still in existence in 1860. A chain was discovered in 1903 (Jeffery, p. 159), 
and placed in Famagusta Museum The Gibellino engraving is discussed in Appendix II (below). 
Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 314 and 343.
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FAMAGUSTA CASTLE
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The remains of the medieval castle are heavily obscured by subsequent massive 
overbuilding and alterations by the Venetians, but enough remains to allow us a 
detailed understanding of its layout. It was first studied by Camille Enlart. His 
description was imperfect: his proposition that the tower mentioned in wars of 1231- 
2 was subsequently incorporated as the north-east comer tower of the early fourteenth 
century, was particularly misleading, and was followed by Jeffery, whose plan was 
however a considerable improvement on Enlart’s, and by Megaw. Both their 
descriptions were extremely brief.2
These have now been superseded by Corvisier’s careful study published in 2006 and 
the observations that follow are based on this and personal analyses undertaken in 
2007 and 2009.3 These show that the castle was a slightly irregular quadrangle, being
56.5 m long on its north side, and 34.5 on its west, reducing to 33 on its east and 54 
on its south as a result of the disalignment of the curtain connecting the north-east and 
south-east angles. The angles at the south-east (1) and south-west (2) comers of the 
quadrangle were covered by almost similar towers, projecting beyond the lines of 
their adjacent curtains on both their sides. That on the south-west (2) was covered by 
a ribbed cross vault above an intermediate wooden floor supported on large corbels 
thus creating an upper storey, while that on the south-east (1) also had a ribbed cross 
vault above two levels, though above that there was a further upper storey. Both were 
amply endowed with archeres. The south-west tower (2) is now preserved within the 
Venetian overbuild but has been less affected by later works than its south-east 
partner. It is almost square, being 9.25 m x 9.9 m externally and some 6 m square 
internally. It was entered at ground-floor level through a pointed arch made of regular 
shaped voussoirs, from the adjoining west range rather than from the courtyard.
There are archeres set in slightly pointed embrasures all constructed in large masonry: 
one on each storey on the north side and east side where those sides protrude beyond 
the curtain, while on the south and west sides there were single archeres on the upper 
storey, but pairs at ground level. One of those on the ground-floor within the west 
wall was converted by the Venetians as the entry to their tunnel to their south-west 
bastion. The south-east tower (1) had a similar system of archeres, certainly at ground
2 Enlart, pp. 450-2 with plan; Jeffery, p. 105 with plan on p. 104; Megaw, Military Architecture, pp. 
197-8.
3 Corvisier in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 351- 366; personal visits 22 June 2007,17 October 2009.
G:\l GAZETTEER ENTRY FOR FAMAGUSTA - T.doc
160
level and partly too at its first floor level. Like the south-west tower, it was originally 
entered from within from its adjoining east aisle rather than from the courtyard. It was 
substantially altered however, when the Venetians forced an entry doorway, 2.5 m 
wide, under a round headed arch through the south face. Above this was a large 
arched window, later partly filled in, while another window was set in the north wall 
on that storey where it was screened by the east curtain. That window was later 
wholly filled in.
These two towers, the southern curtain that they bound, and the the short, western 
curtain, were likely the first elements of the fourteenth century castle to be built. The 
north-west angle, by contrast, was covered by a larger tower (3) (7.8 m x 9 internally;
11.6 m x 12.5 externally), which was clasped onto the northern curtain, thereby 
entirely projecting from it, without any projection whatever beyond the castle’s west 
curtain, with which it was consequently flush. It too provided for two levels below a 
cross-ribbed vault, above which was an upper, third level. It was entered through 
doors opening into the castle secured by draw-bar as evinced by the slot-holes, under 
a large pointed arched doorway in its south wall which was 1.8 m thick. Like the 
southern towers, at its upper level below the vault, this tower had single archeres set 
in the walls of its three projecting sides. There may have initially been a pair on each 
side at ground level, but only those on the north side remain as on its east and west 
sides one of each pair of archeres appears to have been substituted by an entry 
passage, similar to that in its south wall. Extant draw-bar slots in the west doorway 
show that this opened into the tower. Most likely the doors in the east gate of the 
tower also opened internally. Whether these entrances were an original arrangement 
as Corvisier believed, or a later adaptation is difficult to say. The doorway in the 
tower’s west wall later served as the route from the castle into the gallery that led to 
the north-west Venetian bastion; that to the east was blocked by successive Venetian 
overbuildings. The north-east angle of the castle consisted of an altogether different 
arrangement -  owing to its relationship with the port. This was merely a large, cross 
ribbed vaulted chamber (4) that was separated by a thin cross wall through which a 
small doorway allowed for passage from the adjacent five bays of the northern range 
(5). It was otherwise similar to them: it was not a tower and did not project at all 
beyond the lines of the northern or eastern curtains. It had single archeres at first- 
floor level in its north and east sides. In its north wall is part of an arch 1.86 m above
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the ground that may have first been intended as a doorway but was never built. The 
Lusignans did create a gateway in this chamber’s east wall however. This was 1.73 m 
wide x 3.31 m high under a pointed arch - later reduced in height by the Venertians to 
2.15 m high. (10).
The castle is remarkable for the number of its gates and posterns. On its west, the 
curtain wall was pierced by a pointed arch gateway, defended by doors and a 
portcullis (6). This was located at that curtain’s northern end, between evenly spaced 
archeres at ground level - one to its north with a further five to its south. None of the 
other gate passages included a portcullis, suggesting perhaps that this was seen as the 
castle’s primary entrance, at least as first intended. Access to this gate from within the 
castle may have come to be impeded by the creation of a range of store-rooms against 
this curtain (7) and it seems likely that this was one reason why the gateway was 
superseded and blocked up, though the principal reason must have been the 
subsequent erection of the north-west tower. A wider passage way (8) was cut through 
the south curtain in the immediate lee of the square south-east tower, while another 
passage way (9) from within the castle was located under a wide, pointed-arch set in 
the inner wall of the vaulted chamber at the north-east comer of the castle (4).
Through the doorway (10) noted above, a 3 m wide walled gangway (11) open to the 
sky, led out to and partly formed the fortified jetty, permitting passage to the harbour. 
The gangway’s walls were largely incorporated into the town wall. Gangway and 
jetty divided the harbour to the south from the seashore to the north. Perhaps most 
interesting are the arrangements for entry and egress built into the north-west tower 
(3). As we saw, an arched doorway was provided in its south side -  from within the 
castle, but there were also similar doorways on its west and east sides, providing a 
means, as Corvisier deduced, for passage to and from the town and the seashore 
without needing access to and so compromising the security of the castle. In the final 
scheme of castle and town walls, it appears then that here at its apex, the north-west 
tower was aimed at controlling a three way communication system.
In fact, this north-west tower is somewhat problematical. Corvisier noted that the tops 
of the east and west entry arches rise above the lower level of the upper archeres 
within the vault covering the first two levels, from which he inferred that those upper 
archeres were serviced only by a removable floor -  presumably put in place merely in
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time of emergency. He stressed that the tower was at once a part of the castle and a 
part of the town wall, that wall running off obliquely from the tower’s north-west 
comer, the castle’s own northern curtain doubling up as town wall round to where it 
proceeded from the tower’s south-east comer. These arrangements that he accurately 
described only make sense however, if we allow for the fact that the castle’s design 
was modified as it was in the process of construction. Nothing else could allow for 
what would otherwise have been a duplication of entry points to the castle itself in 
this quadrant, and the somewhat awkward siting of this tower on the curtain and the 
interference of its east-west passageway with its upper fighting level. It seems 
probable then that the main, portcullised entry on the western curtain -  a part of an 
original plan, was rapidly replaced and hence sealed up, by the arrangement contained 
in the north-west tower, built either at the same time as, or in anticipation of the 
construction of the northern part of the town sea wall that abutted against it.
Thus, although the castle’s defensive arrangements were no doubt completed in a 
fairly short period under Amaury’s direction, it seems likely that the irregularities we 
can now discern were because the design changed and became more elaborate as the 
works were in progress. This explanation is certainly reflected in the northern curtain, 
where one or two archeres were blocked up by the creation of buttresses for the vaults 
of the lower storey of a later north range. The construction of that range, along with 
its eastern outlier that contained the route to the fortified jetty, probably brought about 
the disalignment of the east curtain noted above. Unlike the curtain walls on the north 
and west which were probably built earlier, we can not say with any certainty, as 
Corvisier claimed, that this eastern curtain included archeres on two levels, for it 
appears to have been modified -  no doubt rapidly after its first construction, as it was 
then screened by the creation of a parallel town wall, with its own row of archeres 
and a chemin de ronde, positioned some 5-7 m to the east. Now only one redundant 
archere, 1.6 m wide, is easily traced on the castle’s east curtain. Similarly, we can not 
be sure that the south curtain possessed two levels of archeres: the Venetian overbuild 
has obscured all arrangements there except for one archere at ground level that can 
still be traced at the bottom of a shaft left in their later rampart.
The castle’s domestic arrangements came to be centred on the north range. As we 
have seen, at ground floor level, this constituted a series of five large, spacious,
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unpartitioned cross ribbed vaulted bays (5), accessed by three pointed arched entances 
and one rectangular one at the east (sea) end of the range. Each bay was lit by slightly 
pointed arched windows higher up and above the entrances. Most likely these were 
assigned as storage areas. At its west end, this long chamber had a large pointed 
arched opening which was blocked in Ottoman times. As noted above, attached at the 
east end of this range was a sixth ribbed cross-vaulted chamber (4) which provided 
the passage to the harbour. Above the whole range was an upper storey, now greatly 
ruined, but it is possible to discern that this was the main hall (45 m x 7.6 m), and 
ornate enough to serve the purposes of the royal court as occasion required. The 
remaining stumps of a series of tri-lobed columns built against the long, internal sides 
of this range suggest that they would have supported a correspondingly elegant rib- 
vault. Although we cannot now deduce the window arrangements on the north, outer 
wall, there was one window (1.6 m wide) per bay on the inner, courtyard side. On this 
side too there was provision for a latrine while the surviving lower steps of a stairway 
shows that there was access either to a gallery or the roof above. Corvisier believed 
that such an upper gallery was continued down the length of the thick inner wall (12) 
that may have retained an eastern 'range*, but so little of that wall remains above 
ground level that this is mere speculation; his analogy with Coucy for this adds little 
of substance. Even the existence of an east range is problematical. At its north end, 
this east ‘range* was overlooked by one of the windows of the north hall. This led 
Corvisier to suppose that east range was either open, or roofed only at a lower level, 
which would seem to be an unsatisfactory arrangement. The stone stair ascending 
from north to south set against the internal side of the east curtain (13) would 
certainly have interfered with any arrangements for chambers aligned against this 
side. Furthermore, the south-east and north-east gate passages would have opened up 
directly into such a range. It seems most likely than that there were no buildings at all 
set against this side of the curtain and that the thick wall was intended principally to 
channel traffic from either gateway into the central court through the two doorways 
provided in its length. The arrangements of structures that may have been set against 
the west curtain are also difficult. Its two levels of archeres show there were two 
fighting levels as in the towers at either end. The need to have access to those two 
towers would have precluded the creation of a range of chambers at that lower level -  
most likely this was merely a storage area. A series of chambers could have been 
superimposed above. Any such upper level of chambers would have been quite
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secondary in importance -  there are no remains from which to infer vaulting of any 
kind. Between this possible western upper range and the north range lay the north­
west tower -  it certainly possessed an upper chamber at the same level. It does not, 
however, appear to have been connected with either range. The southern curtain is 
different again: it appears to have been backed by a 3 m wide gangway (14) which the 
Venetians later filled with earth. It can only have been a fighting gallery with no other 
function. Its inner wall joined the inner angles of the two southern comer towers.
In sum then, it appears likely that the southern and western portions of the castle were 
built first -  at that time to a regular plan and perhaps without the constraint of either a 
contemporaneously constructed town wall or one that was envisaged. This work was 
built on a virgin site and so did not have to adapt its pattern to accommodate earlier 
buildings. The northern quadrant, the north-west tower and north curtain, followed 
on. They were built in concert with or in anticipation of the creation of the contiguous 
town sea wall stretching to the north, and consequently this part of the works involved 
a first change from the original plan. Third came the internal ranges, most notably the 
substantial northern range -  ultimately of two storeys, each storey vaulted and 
comprising the main service and residential areas of the royal castle. The decision to 
create this led to the disalignment of the eastern curtain -  built at the same time, 
which, as we noted was in turn soon after succeeded by a separate outer wall 
belonging rather to the town’s enceinte. As we have seen, the final result is a rather 
deformed quadrangular castle that is unlikely to have been wholly the consequence of 
an initial plan and which therefore hardly displays the ‘remarquable homogeneite de 
conception* which Corvisier considered it had.
Given the existence of a royal palace in Famagusta, it seems unlikely that the 
Lusignans themselves used the castle except in times of crisis as in 1373. We do not 
know precisely when the palace was built, so it may have been at some point after the 
castle was created. Even so, it is doubtful if the latter was built with the intention that 
the royal family and court would be in regular occupation, for as we have seen4 they 
spent the vast amount of their time in the capital. Famagusta was of course hugely 
valuable in the Kingdom’s finances and its royal Captain an accordingly significant
4 See above in An Urban Aristocracy, p. 78.
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figure. His rank and dignity and the importance of his position warranted the high 
quality of specification we can detect in the castle’s upper northern range. It seems 
likely then that this was built to reflect and enhance the standing of the king’s man 
and through that, the image of the power of the kingdom.
Famagusta Castle 1
Ground level of the interior of the south-west tower (2 on plan). The archere on the 
outermost west side (centre in photograph) was converted to form the entrance to the 
tunnel to the later Venetian bastion lying beyond
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Famagusta Castle 2
Interior of west curtain -  south section: archeres on two levels.
Famagusta Castle 3
Interior of west curtain -  north section, including blocked up entrance (6 on plan)
with archeres on either side.
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Famagusta Castle 4
Large pointed arch entrance (9 on plan) leading from courtyard into north-east 
chamber (4 on plan). To its west (left) can be seen the end of the substantial wall that 
constituted the interior of the north end of the aisle (5 on plan) on this side of the
curtain.
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Famagusta Castle 5
Courtyard from the west curtain. The lowest courses of the west aisle (7 on plan) wall 
can be seen in the foreground. On the north (left) is the castle’s main domestic range 
consisting of a spacious five bayed storage area with four entrances at ground level 
and five window openings over these (5 on plan). Beyond is the separate, north-east 
chamber (4 on plan) which led to the fortified passage (10 and 11 on plan) projecting 
out to the harbour defences. Above this range lay the great hall.
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Famagusta Castle 6
Entrance in north-east chamber (4 on plan) leading into the passage (10 on plan) that 
proceeds to the harbour. Its reduction in size is very apparent.
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Description of the town walls
FAM AGUSTA T O W N  WALLS
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12
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Tornone S an  Luca (V)
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\
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Arsenal
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A rsen a le  (V)
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’ Turns R ocha(G ) 8  
Tornone del 
Pnuli/M urato/M oratto (V)
Tornone del Minto/Torre D iocare (V)
Porta  Limisso
Outline of likely co u rse  of the town 
w alls in the Lusignan period
T urns Ju d a ic e  <G) 5
Torre della  Z udecha  (V)
(G) G e n o e se  
(V) V enetian
Turns Sucii (G)
4  Torne del C am po S an to  (V)
Turns P aim ene (G)
Tornone dei A ndruzzt (V)
N
300m
As w ith the castle, the town walls have been massively overbuilt in the Venetian 
period and elements of them were modified by the Ottomans. Identifying earlier work, 
and beyond that, differentiating that work between the Lusignan and Genoese 
regimes, has not been easy. It is clear, however, that the Venetian enceinte that we 
see today generally followed the line of the first walls created by the Lusignans, but 
there are exceptions to this, certainly at the north-west corner and quite likely on the 
side facing the sea, where the water washed against the walls until the works of the 
1930s. Enlart and Jeffery found only few elements that antedated Venetian times. One
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such work was the the big, polygonal tower at the north-eastern comer (15) -  the 
Genoese turris Macelli, later the Venetian torre del Diamente, which Enlart ascribed 
to the Genoese. In the late 1930s however, by means of clearing away miscellaneous 
debris that had encumbered the fosse and some of the more important works, 
Mogabgab discerned that the Venetian bastions had generally been built around older 
towers. He made a particular study of the interior of the Venetian torrione del 
Priuli/Murato/Moratto (8) which I have used in the following description owing to 
the present prohibition on visiting this and most of the other towers. Mogabgab noted 
numerous archeres and some medieval gateways in the three landward sides, all 
blocked up in the subsequent thickening of the walls. Megaw added few substantial 
observations, following Mogabgab in attributing rather more pre-Venetian work to the 
Lusignans than to the Genoese as Enlart had done. But it was in Megaw’s time at the 
Department of Antiquities, that between 1960 and 1974, some of the Venetian 
terrepleins were cleared away from inside the wails, especially on the side facing the 
port. This enabled him to see that the Genoese turris Macelli, the later Venetian torre 
del Diamente (15) and the next tower facing the port, the Genoese turris Morfi, later 
the Venetian torre della Signoria/del Diavolo (16) -  both of two storeys -  and their 
interconnecting curtain preserved much early fourteenth-century work. For Megaw, 
the Genoese had added little that could be discerned beyond a few circular gunports 
inserted into earlier work.5
These brief commentaries have now been superseded by Nicolas Faucherre’s detailed 
contribution to L 'Art Gothique. This benefits inasmuch as Faucherre saw the interior 
of some of the towers, which has not been possible more recently. His work has also 
benefited from the researches of C. Otten-Froux with regard to the names ascribed to 
most of the towers by the Genoese and with regard to their armaments and garrison 
complements as reflected in the accounts for 1443 and 1447. As in the case of the 
castle, the observations that follow are based on these latest descriptions, elaborated 
and modified as a result of personal analysis.6
5 Enlart, p. 452; Jeffery, p. 106; Th. Mogabgab in RDAC, 1936, p. 103 and 1937-39, p. 185;A.H.S.
Megaw, Military Architecture, pp. 197-8. See too Muller-Weiner, p. 89 and Molin, Unbiown
Crusader Castles, p. 103.
6 Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 307-350 drawing on private communications from C. Otten- 
Froux ; Otten-Froux, Notes sur quelques monuments, p. 147. The Genoese accounts are contained in 
the Massaria -  the Registers o f the Massaria (Tr&sorerie) in the Archivio di Stato di Genova. A few 
pages were published by Iorga in the Revue de l’Orient Latin (see bibliography) but all are in the
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First however, it is worth noting that there are very few allusions before 1373 to 
indicate that the Lusignans gave names to all their towers, though what little we do 
know reflects that the Genoese tended to follow such names as existed. Thus, in May, 
1373, Genoese galleys were able to close with ‘the round tower of the Arsenal’ but 
were repelled by its Lusignan troops led by Sir John de Colie. Assuming this is one 
and the same as the Genoese turris Darsina, later Venetian torrione delVArsenale (2) 
which was located at the south-east comer of the enceinte, at the seaward end of the 
south wall, this reference is particularly interesting for it suggests that at that time, this 
inner part of the harbour could be utilised by vessels other than small, shallow draft 
types. It was subsequently severely damaged in the Turkish siege. We know too of a 
Sea Gate though precisely where is not clear. We have reference to the Cava Gate 
which appears to have been the gate for traffic with Nicosia. This -  the Genoese porta 
della Cava/turris Cave, later the Venetian torre del Carmeni, (11) was located at the 
north-west angle of the circuit. Finally of course there was the tower de la Chaine 
(17) already discussed.7
The circuit is very considerable, prescribing a length of 3,000 m. Proceeding 
clockwise from the castle, the first section of the wall along with the current Sea Gate, 
is, as Faucherre has put forward, in all probability entirely Venetian, superseding the 
earlier defences that had run up to 30 m behind. This is certainly suggested by the 
angles of the Lusignan wall where it was interrupted by the Venetian works, 
immediately south of the castle and where we can see it resumes 10 m past and so to 
the south-east of the current (Venetian) Sea Gate. Was the Lusignan Sea Gate located 
at this point or closer to the castle as Faucherre suggested, or alternatively was it in 
fact just the gate complex housed in the north-west tower of the castle described 
above? Otten-Froux assumed the Genoese porta maris was associated with their 
turris Comerchii (1) which she positioned on the site of the Venetian Sea Gate, but 
Faucherre’s analysis argues against a Genoese tower at that point. On the other hand,
process of being examined by Catherine Otten-Froux who comments on these records in Vaivre and
Plagnieux, p. 117 and who has very kindly provided the entry for 1442 (see Appendix I) in personal
correspondence.
Personal inspections of the city walls were made on 23 Feb. 2007 and 3 Oct. 2008.
7 For ‘the round tower of the Arsenal’, Makhairas, § 362, p. 341. For the Cava Gate, Makhairas, § 363,
p. 343. Jeffery, p. 103; Makhairas, 2, p. 153; Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 334.
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guarded passages from the inner port to the town must have been necessities. The 
castle's north-west tower-gate complex did not contribute to this need. In all 
likelihood therefore a major Lusignan-Genoese sea gate would have been set in their 
curtain south of the castle.
The removal of the Venetian terreplein has exposed the internal face of the curtain 
south of the Venetian Sea gate, revealing the Lusignan wall all along the very long 
stretch to the Arsenal Tower (2). The first part of this wall has a continuous line of 
corbels to support a chemin de ronde or gallery above -  so at first floor level. Above 
that, the wall rises through two levels, the first appearing to be of the same build while 
the upper section with its Venetian embrasures is much later. No doubt the Venetians 
walled up the archeres in this stretch of the wall, as these are not now discernible, 
raised its level and strengthened the external facing. In the centre of this section, twin 
flights of stairs converge at a landing high above two pointed arches now just 
appearing above ground level. Faucherre identified a possible postern at this point, but 
the twin arches suggest rather a double point of access from the port for the passage of 
goods into the town. South of this point, the line of the corbels is lost. Here there is a 
small vaulted chamber, one of several built against the inside of the walls, that 
Faucherre suggested could be Venetian powder magazines. South of a slight kink in 
the line of the wall, the row of corbels is again apparent. This is then interrupted by 
another pair of stairs converging on a landing above a pair of arches below: again 
quite possibly passage-ways to the inner port beyond. From there, the corbels still 
carry the inner elements of the first floor wall walk. Along this final section of the 
southern sea wall, the masonry of the three levels of the wall is all different. The 
lower level is the masonry of the original Lusignan build, while the level above is of 
much smaller blocks, and very distinct. Might this have been a Genoese contribution? 
The upper level is of considerably larger blocks and characteristically Venetian. A 
pair of ‘powder magazines' abut the wall, after which may be seen the remains of a 
wall adjoining the curtain at right angles. On either side of this remnant, the tops of 
embrasured archeres can be detected protruding above the ground -  one to the left 
(north) and two, at different heights to its right (south). These are adjacent to the 
present large, arched passage-way through the walls that marks the location of the 
Lusignan-Genoese entry to the Arsenal -  a dockyard within the walls for the repair of 
smaller vessels. The arch appears to have been constructed by the Venetians. In the
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crisis of 1570, they filled in the basin of the Arsenal and walled up the arch; it was 
only re-opened by the British in 1906. Whether the Lusignan-Genoese entry to this 
dockyard was quite undefended or through an earlier arch that supported the 
continuation of the enceinte is unknown. The dockyard may have had its own 
defended circuit.
At the south-east comer of the enceinte, the Lusignan round tower of the Arsenal (2) 
has been wholly superseded by its Venetian successor, itself then repaired and slightly 
modified by the Ottomans. The use of rusticated, bossed stone, similar to that used in 
in the torre del Diamente (15), in the exterior of the Venetian tower, perhaps implies 
that the earlier tower was demolished rather than absorbed in the later enlargement.
The land wall on the south of the city now shows three irregularly spaced interval 
towers. Between the Arsenal tower and the first of these, the Genoese turris Sucii, 
later the Venetian torre del Campo Santo (3), there seems to have been another tower 
in the Genoese period, called the turris Medii no trace of which remains. This first 
section of the curtain is clearly Lusignan in origin. Externally two levels of archeres 
are easily traced. At either end are similar, well made pointed arches preserved in the 
wall's facing, which might suggest that these were gates just large enough for 
pedestrians or riders, which were later walled up. It is uncertain, however, if these two 
gates were ever completed. Below the springers, the masonry appears to be 
uninterrupted, implying that the projected gateways may have been cancelled in the 
process of the construction of the curtain. Indeed, might these arches have been for 
passages that were wanted just for the construction of the curtain and that permanent 
passageways were never contemplated, as Faucherre suggested? This seems unlikely: 
the voussoirs of the arches are too well made, exact and fine for such a temporary 
purpose. Moreover, if these two arches were merely for construction traffic, one 
would expect to see such devices appear in other sections of the curtain, which they 
do not. Otten-Froux has noted a postem associated with the turris Sucii in the 
Genoese period which could very well have been on the site of the western of the two 
gates.9 Furthermore, it does appear that these possible gates caused some minor
8 Enlart, p. 453; Jeffery, p. 116; Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, p. 522; Gertwagen, Harbours and 
facilities, p. 116; History (above), p. 27.
9 Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 322.
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interruption in the sequence of the archeres. Internally it is possible to discern the 
gallery behind the lower level of archeres that led out from the turris Sucii. This does 
not, however, seem to be on the site of any Lusignan tower, so the arrangement for 
accessing the Lusignan gallery and chemin de ronde above must have been a later 
adaptation. The tower and upper part of the curtain were all strengthened in the 
Venetian period.
Faucherre noted that the archeres of the Lusignan curtain continued behind this 
tower. In his description, he confirmed the absence of any Lusignan tower. This is of 
especial interest for two reasons. First, the absence a tower here would have left this 
land wall with a very long stretch of curtain not screened by flanking fire. This gives 
rise to speculation as to just how serious its defensive role was. Second, in his later 
analysis, Faucherre speculated that there may in fact have been a tower here, and that 
it must have been detached, or al barrane. He formulated a similar view of the next 
two interval towers on the south land wall and of the first on the long west wall, and 
that all of these may date back to the early Lusignan programme of works in the early 
1300s. The evidence for this is unconvincing. Quite apart from Faucherre’s own, 
initial dismissal of a Lusignan tower here, his two arguments appear to be thin. One is 
that he believed the Venetian towers were cut into the rock and so might be on the site 
of earlier towers that antedated the Venetian work on the fosse. His principal 
argument, however, is that he considered that there may be signs of ‘saignees’ parallel 
to the curtains behind some of these towers, implying their separation. In respect of 
the first point, there is, of course, no reason why these Venetian towers could not have 
been sunk into the rock without necessarily following the configuration of pre­
existing towers or that such Venetian work, de novo, could not have preceded, or at 
least have anticipated, their work on the fosse. With regard to the second point, 
extremely close scrutiny in fact reveals no trace of saignees that may have run behind 
the towers -  certainly not from external inspection.
As Faucherre noted, military treatises from Byzantine times recognised the 
advantages of such towers and there are indeed examples of al barrane towers in 
Byzantine enceintes. These are rare in works constructed by Westerners, however, 
and if we exclude detached donjons, date from the period after the Lusignans built 
their town wall at Famagusta. In the Latin Levant, they seem to occur only in the
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walls of Rhodes, but not until, it is thought, the period 1421-37. It is then hard to 
credit that the Lusignans experimented with them at Famagusta for just some of their 
towers, having never adopted this type before in Cyprus, nor from what we can see, 
subsequently either.
The rest of this south curtain likely prescribed a similar profile: Faucherre recorded 
the continuation of the two levels of archeres within the Lusignan curtain under a 
Venetian heightening. There are two further interval towers superimposed on this 
south wall. These towers may be those for which we have names from the Genoese 
period, but like the torre del Campo Santo (3), they are Venetian constructions. These 
-  the Genoese turris Palmerie (4) and turris Judaice (5), later the Venetian torrione 
dei Andruzzi (4) and torre della Zudecha (5), both show reused bossed stonework in 
their upper external faces, possibly reflecting masonry taken from decommissioned 
Lusignan structures. The existence of such Lusignan towers is, however, far from 
certain, and the archeres in the intervening stretches of curtain not always that 
apparent. Thus for instance, only one level of archeres can now be detected in the 
curtain from the final tower (5) to the south-west angle Limassol Gate (6).
The Porta Limisso -  the Limassol Gate -  covered the vulnerable south-west angle of 
the enceinte (6). With its ravelin and cavalier, it is now a massive and complex series 
of structures obscuring Lusignan and Genoese work. If the Turin Plan and the Maina 
in Morea wooden model can be adduced as reference points in this instance, the initial 
tower was indeed octagonal as Faucherre discerned. He calculated this to be 27 m 
wide and containing a passage-way to deep embrasures on either flank, all behind a 
fosse cut into the rock. The passage-way was later filled with bossed masonry, likely 
taken from the initial tower itself, or other nearby Lusignan work, rendered redundant 
by the massive strengthening by the Venetians. It is unclear now whether this passage 
extended to include a gateway piercing the front of the tower as one assumes must 
have been the case; certainly there was a side stair leading to a postern in the adjacent 
curtain immediately to its left. Above this postem, corbels survive to show that it was 
covered by a brattice or a box machicolation.
Most interesting was the suggestion made by Mogabgab that the first ravelin -  a 
horse-shoe forework -  was a late fifteenth-century Lusignan addition. His evidence
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for this appears to be limited to his identification of the Lusignan arms on the face of 
the ravelin’s eastern gallery and those of the Kingdom of Jerusalem on the lintel of 
west gate.10 The last Lusignans were beset by severe financial difficulties so hardly 
likely to take on expensive building works. It is therefore more likely that the ravelin 
dates from the period 1474 to 1489, when the Venetians were in control of the island 
on behalf of their 'adopted daughter’ Queen Catherine Comaro and before their 
formal acquisition of the island in 1489. The Lusignan insignia would still have been 
current in that period. The 48 m wide ravelin is a very substantial work. It has two 
identical gates for both wheeled and pedestrian traffic set in its opposite flanks, all set 
on a scarp behind its own fosse, which in the event it seems was crossed by a bridge 
with pont-levis only on its left flank. Its accomplishment would have required very 
considerable resources. Only the Venetians possessed these. Under the future Doge, 
Mocenigo, they deployed their entire fleet to Cyprus in December 1473 and took 
possession of the fortifications in Catherine’s name. Mocenigo was himself based at 
Famagusta in early 1474.11
Elements of the original Lusignan wall with its towers can be discerned within parts 
of the long west facing side of the enceinte. The Venetians wholly rebuilt the wall 
between the Limassol Gate and the first tower -  the Venetian torrione del Minio or 
torre Diocare (7). Faucherre held that the lowest two courses of the extant stonework 
of this section were Lusignan survivors, but they are not satisfactorily distinguishable 
as such. Internally he was able to note the re-employment of some of redundant 
Lusignan stonework to create an access corridor to two casemates within the curtain -  
an observation I have not been able to verify. The tower itself appears to be part of the 
very early Venetian programme of works. It blocks a Lusignan archere in the curtain, 
and as noted above, based on this and the saignees that run parallel with the curtain on 
either side, Faucherre considered this to be on the site of a vanished al barrane 
Lusignan tower. There are no remains of such a tower, however, nor can his saignees 
in any way be said to lead behind the present structure. Interestingly, it is not at all 
clear that there was a tower here in the Genoese period for that matter: this is one of 
the few towers not mentioned in the Genoese accounts, while the Genoese name turris
10 For the plan and model, see Appendix II. For Mogabgab - RDAC, 1935, p. 21; RDAC, 1936, p. 103, 
RDAC, 1937-9, p. 174.
11 Joachim, pp. 104- 7; J. Richard in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 85-6.
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Rocha -  which Otten-Froux indicated might be either this or the neighbouring tower 
to the north -  has more certainly been applied to that second tower -  the Venetian 
torrione del Priuli/Murato/Moratto (8) -  by Faucherre. From the Limassol Gate, the 
wide fosse is endowed with the additional safeguard of substantial trench that follows 
the line of the west curtain, circling both these Venetian bastions. It is therefore most 
likely to be dated to that period.
Mogabgab was the first to note that this latter tower, bearing the name of Nicolao de 
Priolis and the year 1496, does however, preserve parts of an original Lusignan 
structure -  a thin parapet encased within the Venetian thickening and within -  two 
stairs on fourteenth-century styled corbels serving the original chemirt de ronde. 
Sections of the tower’s lower walls have been discerned, indicating that it was 
polygonal internally and likely externally as well. The Venetian torrione incorporated 
a postern on its right flank: perhaps this repeated a Lusignan arrangement.
About mid-way along this stretch of curtain to the next Venetian tower -  the torre del 
Pasqualigo or torrione Pulacazaro (10) -  there is a short interruption in the trench 
within the fosse. Here, it is just possible to make out the outline of what appears to 
have been a rectangular tower (9). This projects from the rock on which the curtain is 
built. Its only extant feature is a simple embrasure -  probably for a small cannon - 
located in its right (north) side covering the line of the continuation of the trench 
beyond. Excavation would perhaps elucidate its origin, but on the basis of what little 
we have, it was clearly pre-Venetian and possibly detached from the enceinte, though 
not necessarily al barrane. From this erstwhile tower, the Lusignan curtain, with two 
levels of archeres, survives to the next Venetian tower -  the torre del Pasqualigo or 
torrione Pulacazaro (10), which is another neither mentioned in the Genoese accounts 
nor showing any evidence of a pre-Venetian structure. As in the case of the torre 
Diocare (7), we cannot be certain then that there was a tower here before the Venetian 
period. Just outside, within the fosse, the trench circles this tower and carries on again 
parallel with the curtain, petering out about mid-way to the next tower.
This stretch of curtain, that which leads to the next tower, also preserves a row of 
archeres in its facing. So far as the tower itself is concerned, here we are on safer 
grounds in attesting Lusignan work, for this is the Cava Gate -  later the Genoese
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porta della Cava or turris Cave, then the Venetian torre del Carmeni or torrione San 
Luca (11). This constituted the original north-west angle of the enceinte. Faucherre 
had access to its interior, from which he deduced it to be another octagonal tower. 
Externally, he found traces of its original Lusignan ditch with the supports for the 
gate’s bridge across, but only the stone platforms for two possible supports can now 
be seen, and an early ditch is not apparent. The gate-tower was encased in another 
early Venetian semi-circular bastion which in turn came to be partly absorbed by the 
huge Martinengo Bastion which begins at this point of the curtain. From the gate- 
tower, the original curtain ran north to the Genoese turre Maruffi -  possibly the 
Venetian torrione del Muzzo12 or torre del Cavaler (12), which was removed when 
the Martinengo Bastion was constructed. As a result, there is nothing now to show 
what may have been here before the Venetian period, but the Genoese tower, at least, 
is mentioned in their massaria entries for 1443. The intervening stretch of the 
Lusignan enceinte, from the Cava Gate to the turre Maruffi (12), can be detected 
where it is levelled off by the entrance to the later Bastion and where it was later used 
as a base for the entrance to the cavalier del Carmini. At its upper level, the last 
portion of this Lusignan curtain retains three very closely arranged archeres in their 
embrasures, all masked externally by the Venetian overbuilding. Faucherre claimed to 
have located the medieval rock cut fosse, yet the mass of the Bastion appears to 
obscure any such earlier feature.
The short northern stretch of the enceinte -  from the turre M7rw$?/Martinengo 
Bastion to the sea -  zigzags to take advantage of the rock. The Lusignan curtain with 
a single row of archeres at ground level is occasionally apparent. There were two 
towers here: the western tower -  the Genoese turris de Guarco/Goarco, perhaps the 
later the Venetian torrione del Muzzo (13) was mentioned in the massaria for 1443, 
and again in 1447. Faucherre recorded traces of an early polygonal tower set back 1 m 
from the outer wall of the Venetian structure and reasonably took the view that it was 
incorporated into the Venetian tower in much the same way as was the polygonal 
torrione del Priuli (8) on the west curtain. The other tower on this north side -  named 
by the Genoese as the turris Mastici, becoming the Venetian torre Mastici (14), was 
also mentioned in 1443 and 1447 but is not now discernible.
12 Thus Faucherre who also has the Genoese turris de Guarco/Goarco on the northern enceinte with the 
same Venetian name, pp. 337-8.
GAl GAZETTEER ENTRY FOR FAMAGUSTA - T.doc
180
As noted above, the towers and curtain that run from this point -  the north-east comer 
of the enceinte -  along the sea front to the castle, have been exposed internally 
revealing much original Lusignan work. The comer tower -  the Genoese turris 
Macelli and Venetian torre del Diamente (15) -  is a very considerable medieval 
octagon about 34 m in diameter, standing on a pronounced talus. It was of two 
storeys, the lower faced with bossed masonry. Each side of its face is complemented 
with archeres -  two below and four in the upper storey. Internally it was entered 
through a large pointed arch, but within it was much modified in subsequent periods. 
Nonetheless it constitutes the most visually impressive remnant of the whole original 
town wall. It was equipped with a postern on its left flank, which was unblocked and 
rebuilt in 1937.13 The short stretch of curtain from here to the final tower included 
another double stair meeting at a landing, and here again there was a postern beneath 
this - set in one of three arches built into the wall -  an arrangement similar to those 
already noted in the sea wall south of the castle. On its right (south) the top of the 
embrasure for an archere protrudes above the remaining earthworks behind to show 
that this length of curtain was thus suitably defended at this ground level. The final 
tower of the enceinte -  the Genoese turris Morfi, then the Venetian torre della 
Signoria or torre del Diavolo (16) was another octagonal tower originating from the 
first Lusignan build, though here only of 14 m diameter. It too was of two storeys 
being vaulted chambers linked by a stair in the thickness of the wall. On its right 
(south) flank, the curtain springs off by more than 4 m behind the point where the 
curtain joins it on its left (north) side, creating a recessed kink that may have provided 
for a port gate. From there to the castle, the interior of the Lusignan wall is clearly 
visible, the Venetian wall being built against its front and rising above it. Though 
most of the internal Venetian earthen embankment was cleared away, a little remains 
so that the earlier wall is banked up to a depth of about 1 m. It shows that it was 
certainly of two levels, each with its own series of embrasured archeres and clearly 
identical with those of the castle. The lower ones remain mostly hidden by the 
remaining Venetian earth works but two can be seen inside the first of two block­
houses or ‘powder magazines’ built against the inside of the walls. The upper level 
possessed a lost chemin de ronde, though its corbels remain. Some of the archeres on
13 Mogabgab, RDAC, 1937-9, pp. 174,185.
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this level were adapted for firearms before being sealed and are then likely Genoese 
adaptataions. The Venetian wall that is clasped onto the front, rises to a third level: 
the corbels for its wall walk or gallery are distinctive. Whether a floor may have been 
slotted against the base of this final storey -  perhaps suggesting that the Lusignan wall 
also rose to its 4couronnement’ at this third level as Faucherre speculated, is open to 
question.
The second and smaller of the block-houses retains its original large arched entrance. 
It is not now possible to access the interior of this structure, but it is most likely in 
here that Faucherre located another postern in the curtain later blocked up by the 
Venetians. This is one of perhaps four or five points of access through the sea wall 
north of the castle that Faucherre originally detected (though he has subsequently 
reconsidered this number) and which constituted a major argument in his postulation 
that the Lusignan harbour was in fact on this side of the castle, rather than to the south 
where it has been traditionally placed. Part of this argument rests on his position that 
by contrast, there was only one sea gate to the south of the castle in the Lusignan 
period. We have already seen, however, that there were certainly two points of access 
here -  those being underneath two pairs of converging stairways, whether those stairs 
were later or not, and that if allowance is also made for a now vanished sea gate south 
of the castle discussed above, we have three in this area, all quite apart from the entry 
formed by the arsenal dockyard. Faucherre’s other three arguments adduced to 
support a northern Lusignan port are the defences of the sea wall there -  its two 
fighting levels and the impressive north-east tower, and finally the alignment of the 
castle so that the northern harbour could be overlooked from its great hall.
These too are unconvincing lines of thought: Faucherre himself located two fighting 
levels in the southern sea wall, and it is perfectly feasible that the lost Lusignan 
Arsenal Tower matched its north-east partner in substance. The diagonal positioning 
of the casde is of little relevance -  watch could be achieved of either side by those 
posted on the towers for that purpose. Indeed it is just as arguable that if the castle 
was aligned with a northern prospect in mind, it was simply to provide its aristocratic 
occupants with a splendid view -  a motive of design identifiable at both the middle 
and upper levels of St. Hilarion. The chained restriction on entry to the inner port and 
lack of evidence to support a parallel for the outer port, are further indications of the
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location of the nucleus of the port. Finally, Faucherre’s own acknowledgement that 
the town’s street pattern appears to have been least developed in its north-east 
quadrant, is further indication that business was focussed in the southern port.14
In his concluding analyses, Faucherre proposed a number of possibilities. Some of 
these -  being his vision of al barrane towers, his argument for a northern port, his 
interpretation of the purpose of the walled up gates on the southern land wall -  have 
been discussed above. But we are left with the challenge of the overarching question 
of just how far the Lusignan enceinte urbaine was a serious defensive measure. 
Faucherre was perhaps ambiguous in this matter. On the one hand, he noted the 
profusion of archeres in the curtains themselves, implying a considerable use of 
simple frontal defence. In this, he calculated there could have been as many as 1500 
archeres if vanished sections of the Lusignan enceinte could be assumed to resemble 
those sections we can still see. On the other hand, he suggested that there would have 
been sections where the curtain was relatively thinly protected by enfilading fire from 
projecting mural towers. We are not certain that in every case there were Lusignan 
towers where there are now Venetian bastions, nor of other possible Lusignan towers 
that may have existed elsewhere on the enceinte, so it is difficult to be clear as to their 
spacing. But if they were indeed largely where the Venetian bastions now exist, they 
would, in fact, have been perfectly capable of allowing archers to sweep nearly all 
sections of the adjacent curtains, given that bow-shot range was effective up to c. 150 
m. The towers were not nearly as closely grouped as, for example, the 
contemporaneous, first-rate town wall of Conway in Wales, where the towers are 
generally spaced at about 55 m intervals only, but Famagusta’s towers would have 
been adequate nonetheless. A more significant deficiency, however, may have lain in 
Famagusta’s several gates and posterns. The main gates of Limassol and Cava appear 
to have merely led from within single towers, further weakened, as Faucherre noted, 
by being located on the salients of the enceinte}5 Comparison with the town walls of 
Acre might also be instructive. Its double wall excited comment by Ludolph of 
Suchen who visited in 1336 or shortly after, but he had nothing to say of Famagusta’s 
walls.16
14 In Vaivre and Pagnieux, pp. 319,347 and p. 344.
15 In Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 345,347.
16 Ludolph of Suchem, trans in Stewart, pp. 41-2, 50-1,57 and in Cobham, pp. 19-20.
G:\l GAZETTEER ENTRY FOR FAMAGUSTA - T.doc
183
We have examined above (Part I - History and Part II -  Raison d'etre and functions) 
the new circumstances that prompted the Lusignans to develop the fortifications 
around the beginning of the fourteenth century, suggesting that major motives were 
to protect and control the new entrepot that had developed there, to stimulate further 
growth and to symbolise the success and affluence of the Lusignan kingdom. There is 
no real evidence that the fortifications were the direct result of fear of a Mamluk 
invasion following the fall of Acre in 1291, for the earliest reference we have to work 
in progress is from as late as 1308. As we have seen, a description of the enceinte 
itself, insofar as the Lusignan circuit can be discerned, shows that it certainly was a 
serious fortification, but that it was not just that. In this respect, the numerous entry- 
points particularly reflect the enceinte's rationale -  not merely a defensive circuit pure 
and simple, but fulfilling a more complex role and one in which military 
considerations could be compromised for other important purposes.
What is apparent is that the defences were augmented during the Genoese occupation. 
Aspects of what may have been their work that are still visible today have been noted 
above. The massaria mention numerous ‘betresca’ -  presumably a type of breteche or 
brattice, located on the curtains and their towers. Some were endowed with their own 
names and appear to have been sturdy enough to take cannon. Faucherre identified the 
sets of converging stairs on the sea wall with betresca at those points, although the 
stairs were clearly built at the same time as the Lusignan curtain.
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Famagusta town walls 1
Interior of Lusignan wall running south from Venetian sea gate. The continuous line 
of corbels to carry a chemin de ronde is clearly seen. The uppermost (second storey) 
level with its embrasures for cannon is likely Venetian, as is the whole of the external
facing of this sea wall.
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Famagusta town walls 2
Interior of Lusignan sea wall. This is the more southerly of two pairs of converging 
stairs that led to the original wall walk, covering twin arches quite likely used for 
passage to and from the port outside. (The arches are better seen in Famagusta town 
walls 3 -  next). The kink in the wall and beyond the top of the Venetian sea gate can
be seen to the north.
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Famagusta town walls 3
1 -v ** • ** ^  • ? § 3 L
Close up detail to show the tops of the arches just above present ground level 
underneath the second pair of stairs on the interior of the Lusignan sea wall.
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Fam agusta town walls 4
Detail of the interior of the southern stretch of the sea wall. The three different 
building periods are apparent. The original Lusignan work is at ground level and 
includes an arched embrasure/passage (?) that was blocked during that same period. 
Above a row of corbels or supports for a platform or chemin de rotide are clearly 
seen. The smaller masonry above might perhaps suggest a later building period 
altogether and it is tempting then to question if this is Genoese work. At the level of 
the second upper storey, the characteristically large blockwork of the Venetians is 
apparent along with a series of square holes to carry the beams for their parapet
platform.
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Famagusta town walls 5
The Venetian Arsenal Tower (2 on plan of town walls).
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Famagusta town walls 6
Detail of the exterior of the Arsenal tower showing occasional use of bossed masonry.
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Famagusta town walls 7
Lusignan south wall between Venetian bastions. The photograph shows one of two 
blocked arched passages in the wall between the Arsenal Tower and the turris Sitcii 
(Genoese)/ torre del Campo Santo (Venetian) (3 on plan). This is the western of the 
two. The two levels of archeres are also discernible.
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Famagusta tow n w alls 8
Interior of the turris Maccelli (Genoese)/torre del Diamente (Venetian) (15 on plan) 
showing its considerable pointed arched entrance.
Famagusta town walls 9
Interior of the wall between the turris Maccelli (Genoese)/torre del Diamente 
(Venetian) (15 on plan) and the turris Morfi (GenoesQ)/torre del Signoria (Venetian) 
(16 on plan) showing another pair of stairs rising over at least one blocked up, arched
passage leading to the sea.
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Famagusta town walls 10
Sea wall immediately to the south of the turris Morfi (Genoese)//orre del Sigttoria or 
torre del Diavolo (Venetian) ( 16 on plan). The offset in the line of the curtain can be 
seen leading from the tower on the left of the photograph. Three levels in the curtain 
can be seen, the lower two appearing to be of similar stonework. At the lowest level, 
we can see the tops of the impressive series of embrasure for archeres similar to those 
of the castle. Above is a row of corbels to support a chemin de ronde. The archeres 
above have been blocked or altered, perhaps in the Genoese period. The Venetians 
thickened the earlier wall by clasping their own sea wall onto its exterior. Internally, 
the photograph shows their distinctive row of corbels to carry their wall walk behind
the upper sorey that they built.
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The fortifications -  to 1308. Historical references and context.
Although nothing remains, there may perhaps have been some modest Byzantine 
fortification at the start of our period. The ltinerarium refers to Isaac Comnenus 
retreating to the castrum there in 1191 but he realized that it would not withstand a 
siege so rapidly moved on to Kantara. As noted above in the History, this reference is 
difficult, both because of what may, or may not be inferred from the use of this word 
and because no other source makes such an allusion.17 Even more difficult is the 
reliability Stephen of Lusignan’s attribution of the castle’s foundation of the castle to 
Guy of Lusignan.18 Bishop Wilbrand of Oldenburg saw Famagusta in 1211 and wrote 
that it was ‘civitas sita juxta mare, portum habens, non multum munita’.19 References 
to the ia  tour dou port’ -  ‘la tour de mer’ taken by the Imperialists in 1231 and then 
captured by the Ibelins in 1232, show that by that time at least, some element of 
fortification was in commission. Whether the Lusignans had adapted or perhaps 
merely adopted a Byzantine structure, or built de novo must depend on our acceptance 
of the ltinerarium. Whatever this structure was, there is no vestige of it within the 
later rectangular castle, so we have no certainty as to its exact site.
The Ibelin assault of 1232 is instructive: their forces landed on the rocky islands that 
formed the further side of the harbour, and from there, they used small boats to cross 
the shallows to reach the town which they quickly occupied, inducing the surrender of 
the tower. As Edbury noted, this implies that there were no town walls on the harbour 
front, a likelihood reinforced by the absence of any reference to such a wall in the 
boundaries of a grant of Henry I also in 1232. The nature of the Ibelins’ assault in 
1232 also led Edbury to consider that they could not bring their vessels directly to the 
town because of a chain across the harbour mouth. Indeed it may be that a chain was 
in existence by this date: certainly such a chain was in place from 1296 -  the date of 
the earliest reference that we have. The Ibelins’ route of attack may, however, have
17 Stubbs, ltinerarium, p. 199; Nicholson, pp. 191-2; Metcalf, Byzantine Cyprus, p. 557. See History, 
above, pp. 5, 57-8.
18 Chorograffia - Grivaud, f. 49a; Chorography -  Wallace, § 259, p. 67.
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been dictated by other factors: the tactic of surprise and the problem of bringing deep 
draught ships into a harbour where there was very little depth of water.20
Just as, most likely, there was no sea wall at this time, it seems very unlikely that in 
ths period, there were any town walls on the the other three sides either. The lack of 
any direct allusion to the construction of a wall on these landward sides in Amadi’s 
account of the works undertaken by Amaury in 1310 could mean, as Edbury 
suggested, that some wall already existed, but this need not have been the case. As 
was noted by Michel Balard, the absence of any references to town walls or town 
gates in the registers of the Genoese notary, Lambert of Sambuceto, who was based in 
the town from at least 1294 to 1307, suggests strongly that there was no wall, 
certainly on the harbour side, nor in all probability, elsewhere. The same judgement 
may be drawn from the absence of any allusion to fortifications in the Templar of 
Tyre’s commentary on Famagusta, as it may have been in the 1290s. In sum, it seems 
reasonable to infer that there was no town wall, or at any rate, a wall worthy of the 
name, until the time of the regime of Henry II*s brother, Amaury.21
The fortifications -1308 -  1489. Historical references and context.
In 1308, on the dissolution of the Temple, its slaves were sent to work on 
fortifications. In April, in response to a request issued in Henry’s name, Clement V 
granted indulgences to anyone assisting in the work.23 In 1310, Amaury was engaged 
in enlarging the castle (‘messe cura grande alia fabrica del castello’/ 'devoted much 
care to the making of the castle’) and in fortifying the area from the Sea Gate to the 
Tower of the Arsenal and peasants were commandeered from throughout the island to 
excavate the town ditch. This work was plainly substantial for in order to finance this,
19 Wilbrand, ed. Laurent, xxxii, p. 182; Wilbrand in Cobham, p. 14.
20 Novara, §§ 81 (177) and 90 (186), Melani, pp. 172-3 and 180-1; Amadi, p. 166; FI. Bustron, p. 93; 
Makhairas, 2, pp. 152- 3; Edbury, Famagusta, pp. 338- 9; Mol in, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 
102; Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, pp. 523-4; Gertwagen, Harbours and facilities, pp. 116-7.
21 Edbury, Famagusta, pp. 337-9; M. Balard, Famagouste, pp. 280,282; Molin, Unknown Crusader 
Castles, p. 102; see History, above, pp. 23-4. Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 308.
22 Amadi, p. 291; Hill, 2, pp. 15,236 ; A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 197 ; W. Muller- 
Weiner, p. 90.
23 Regestum Clementis Papae V ex Vaticanis archetypis, ed. Cura et studio monachorum Ordinis S. 
Benedicti, (Rome, 1885) annees II et III du pontificat, 3e annde, number 2736, p. 93 : [text given in 
Faucherre, Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 308, fii. 6]; Edbury, The Kingdom of Cyprus, p. 120; The 
Lusignan Kingdom, p. 234.
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along with connected work within Famagusta, Amaury raised 400,000 bezants 
through special taxes.24 This is, incidentally, our first intimation of the Arsenal itself 
(see above, p. 174).
In all probability then, construction of Famagusta’s castle and town walls was 
commenced in this period of Amaury’s regime of 1306-10 and not before. Regarding 
the town walls, as noted above, the stretch from the Sea Gate to the Arsenal Tower 
seems to have been commissioned as a particular piece of work and as Edbury 
speculated, perhaps the section from the Sea Gate to the Castle remained open at this 
time. If so, this section must have been completed very quickly afterwards. This in 
turn would have been extended in front of the castle, rendering its port facing 
archeres redundant. Similarly, the section beyond the castle to the present north-east 
comer of the walls, was most likely also completed at this stage, judging by the 
similarity of its archeres to those of the castle in particular. Whether these works were 
the final parts to be built, as Faucherre suggested, must remain speculation.
However, it does seem likely that the whole circuit of the town wall was completed 
before the end of Amaury’s governorship, as indeed Megaw believed, for we are told 
that on Amaury’s assassination in 1310, Famagusta declared for the King, walled up 
the city gates and demolished its drawbridges, presumably as a precaution against
7 7  —Amaury’s faction. There would have been little point in such measures had the 
circuit then remained incomplete. This also implies, perhaps, that without such 
emergency adaptations, the town walls as then built were an inadequate defence.
No doubt work on both the castle and the town walls continued after Henry II’s 
restoration, as may be reflected in Stephen of Lusignan’s attribution of Famagusta’s 
fortifications to that King, rather than his brother.28 Indeed, as at Nicosia, work likely 
continued at a leisurely pace during the reign of Hugh IV (1324-1359) before all was 
considered complete. This may be reflected in the writings of those who visited: the 
fortifications provoked no comment from James of Verona, who visited in 1335, nor
24 Amadi, pp. 326-7; FI. Bustron, p. 194; Edbury, Famagusta, p. 338; Faucherre in Vaivre and 
Plagnieux, p. 309.
25 Edbury, Famagusta, p. 339.
26 Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 309.
27 Amadi, p. 335; A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, pp. 197-8.
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from Ludoph of Suchem who visited in 1336 or very soon after, as noted above.29 It 
was not until the visit of an unknown Englishman in 1344 >5 that we have our first 
description of the fortifications:
firmly it is built and well founded on a firm rock. It has deep wide moats all 
about cut in the rock, high walls and towers of square cut stones, and built 
with the greatest art.30
These fourteenth-century works probably included a strengthening of the chain and its 
terminal towers. As noted above, in 1368, these defences may have deterred an attack 
by Moroccan galleys.31
In 1373, the King commanded the strengthening of the town walls, especially those of
i n
the Arsenal against the apparent threat from Genoa. Although we do not know 
what, if anything, was achieved, the defences were strong enough to withstand 
Genoese attempts to capture the city from the sea in May 1373 and their subsequent 
efforts until October. As we have seen, that month, they obtained control of the castle 
by a ruse, and most likely it was they, and not the Cypriots, who created ditches
i n
around the castle at this time, capturing the rest of the city as well. Towards the end 
of the year, the Genoese ordered a strengthening of the fortifications by heightening 
the walls in places, and arranging that sea water fill the new ditches to the castle.34 
Recurring attempts by the Lusignans to reacquire Famagusta must naturally have led 
the Genoese to continue to strengthen its defences. In particular, we noted the timber 
hoardings and towers that they created against the Lusignan-Venetian assault of 1378 
and it is clear that the Genoese also cleared away the burgi of 2000 hearths that had 
encroached upon the fortifications.35 We know too that the Genoese garrison was 
considerable: it may have been 500 at first, but was reported as around 700 when 
Nicolas of Martoni visited the town in 1394.36
28 see History, above, fh. 90
29 Jacques de Vtrone, pp. 177-8, and in trans. in Cobham, pp. 16-18; Ludolph of Suchem in trans. 
Stewart, pp. 41-2 and in Cobham, pp. 19-20.
30 ltinerarium Cuiusdam Anglici, p. 448; Western Pilgrims, p. 61. The quoted passage is from the
translation in Western Pilgrims. Molin, p. 103.
31 For the incident of 1368, Makhairas, §§ 221-2, pp. 203-5.
32 See History, above, p. 31, fit 100.
33 See History, above, pp. 34-5, and fits. 110 and 111.
34 See History, above, p. 37, and fit. 120.
35 See History, above, p. 44 and Nicolas de Martoni, p. 631, trans in Cobham, p. 24.
36 Nicolas de Martoni, p. 628; Makhairas, 2, p. 169; Hill, 2, p. 412.
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Martoni’s descriptions are a very useful commentary on the state of the fortifications 
at this time. He describes the castle as:
nearly all in the sea, except perhaps a fourth part on the city side, and there are 
fine ditches there constructed on either side which are filled with the sea 
water, and remain always full of the said water, making the said castle 
impregnable.37
Of the town walls, Martoni wrote:
The said city has finer walls than I have seen in any town,.... They were 
.. .high with broad alleys round them, and many high towers all round.38.. .in 
the city on the seaside is an arsenal, large and fine like that of Naples. 39
Continued Lusignan initiatives in the fifteenth century and in due course an 
apprehension of the threats from Egypt and Turkey presumably obliged the Genoese 
to maintain Famagusta’s defences in reasonable repair. As noted above, we have 
reference points in the Genoese financial records -  the massaria -  the double-entry 
accounts of the Genoese Treasurers -  for payments disbursed for various services -  
which survive in whole or in part for the years 1391/2, 1407, 1433, 1435, 1437/8, 
1442, 1443, 1447, 1448/9, 1456, 1457, 1458 and 1460/1. Unfortunately however, they 
are generally of limited value in relation to the fortifications. Occasionally, especially 
for 1447, they note the armaments and number of men allocated to a number of the 
towers -  information now used by Faucherre, but in general they are mainly payments 
to lists of soldiers and others for work done in one tower or another, the details of 
which are not usually given. In the main, expenditure was very small. Over and above 
what Faucherre has already gleaned from Otten-Froux, only the entries for two years 
appear worthy of comment.
The first is from 1407 from which we know that workmen were employed ‘ad turrim 
de Limisso’ that year. This is most likely the Famagusta tower/gate of that name, 
rather than a siege tower used by the Genoese against Limassol castle as has been
37 Nicolas de Martoni, p. 628, and Enlart, p. 448 for the original Latin. This translation is provided in 
Cobham, p. 22, repeated in Hill, 2,401 and Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 104.
38 Nicolas de Martoni, p. 628, and Enlart, p. 453 for the original Latin. This translation is provided in 
Cobham p. 22, repeated in Jeffery, p. 102 and AH.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 197.
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thought. This work was likely associated with Janus’ attack of 1407 or 8. On that 
occasion, both the Genoese and the Lusignans were equipped with cannon, and so it 
must be from about this time that we can date the primitive circular gunports that 
appeared to Megaw to be the only work in the extant remains he could definitely 
ascribe to the Genoese.
The second entry in the massaria comes from 1442 and is given as an appendix. That 
year, certain named individuals received payments for their work on the external parts 
of the gate and fosse of the Limassol ‘porta falsa ’ -  which was perhaps an outer 
element of the substantial Limassol Gate or a hidden postem close by.
Reimbursements were also allocated for making parts of bombards and their 
carriages. No doubt this was work prompted by the attack of December 1441. As with 
the works of 1407, it reflects that the Limassol Gate complex was seen as the key 
element in the town’s defences.40
The accounts make it clear that Genoese Famagusta was under the control of a 
Captain who exercised both civil and military powers. One of his senior officers was 
the chatelaine in charge of a garrison of 20 men stationed in the castle. Judicial 
functions were, however, exercised quite separately, the Captain’s officer in this being 
his ‘vicaire’ who presided in the old palais royal - which was where the Captain 
himself resided.41 It should be added perhaps that the Genoese did not in fact 
construct a fort called the ‘ Gripparia’ in 1441 to defend a secondary entry to the port, 
as was recently suggested. That proposition was based on a misinterpretation and can 
conveniently be dismissed 42
39 Nicolas de Martoni, p. 631, trans in Cobham, p. 24.
40 Jeffery, p. 106 and Otten-Froux, Notes sur quelques Monuments, p. 147. The precise meaning of 
porta falsa is unclear. It occurs in relation to the city walls of Acre as noted by Philip of Novara, 
(tme fauceposteme) in Melani, § 126 (222), p. 222.
41 C. Otten-Froux in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 117.
42 D. Nicolle, Crusader Castles of Cyprus..., p. 10. Gripariae are small cargo vessels and are 
mentioned in the accounts on several occasions. (Iorga, pp. 112,114,117,118) and see too Coureas, 
Economy, pp. 147,149,150,154. I am grateful to D. Nicolle for his note to me on this and to C. 
Otten-Froux for clarifying the matter.
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Eventually Famagusta was reincorporated into the Lusignan Kingdom in January 
1464 when its garrison capitulated under terms to James II. Though he took steps for 
its security against the type of ruse that had led to its loss in 1373, it is highly 
improbable that he carried out any work on the fortifications. It was left to the 
Venetians to elaborate its defences, commencing work as we have suggested, on the 
Limassol Gate in the 1470s, on the castle in 1492, the ‘Sea Gate’ in 1495, generally 
strengthening the towers and curtain and extending the fosse. These initial Venetians’ 
efforts were noted by visitors of the very early sixteenth century, such as the Norman 
Pierre Mesanges in 1507 and then Jacques le Saige in 1518. Le Saige noted especially 
that the town was ringed by ‘fosses lined with masonry’ implying that the ditches cut 
into the rock noted in 1344-45 had subsequently received the additional strengthening 
of being revetted -  work that may have been carried out at this time. Greater works 
continued, notably the Limassol Gate in 1544, but the defences were still found 
wanting judging by the critical report of Ascanio Savorgnano of 1562. Although its 
details relate to the fortifications as developed under the Venetians and so after our 
period, it is particularly interesting for its description of the curtains -  that they were 
too low, rising only seven paces and thus in places overlooked and hence dominated 
by the counterscarp. The report may have been excessively pessimistic as it was 
plainly aimed at prodding Venice into greater effort, but it might reflect a fundamental 
attribute of the enceinte inherited from our period. If so, it presents a very different 
picture from those given by our visitors in the fourteenth century. The Venetians 
pressed on with their labours, which came to a climax in the creation of the enormous 
Martinengo Bastion and the erection of a number of cavaliers. They also converted 
the moat around the castle to a ditch. Centuries later this was filled in by the British 
administration.43
43 Pierre Mesanges -  in Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagniex, p. 309; Le Saige - in Cobham, p. 58; 
Savorgnano -  in Faucherre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p.310; Jeffery, p. 105; Perbellini (1973), 
pp. 34, 37-8; (1988), pp. 21-3.
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Appendix I
Exerpt for the year 1442 from the Massaria, in the column DEBET.
Massaria comunis Ianue in Famagusta debet nobis pro Georgio Lolo, et sunt pro 
expensis factis...
Item, ea die (20 January 1442), pro dicto Georgio et sunt quos solvit magistro 
Iacop et aliis pro iomatis factis ad portam falsam Limisso ut aparet per unam 
apodisiam bullatam bis. XI kar. XII et pro Frediano pro uno corio pro 
faximenti dictam portam, in XXX, bis. XVIIII kar.XII44
- Item ea die pro dicto Georgio et sunt quos solvit Chiriaco de Bardi et 
Dominico Goastavino pro iomis III factis ad fossum prope portam Limisso in 
XXX, bis. VI kar. VI
- Item die XXX marcii pro Georgio Lolo et sunt quos solvit magistro Bernardo 
et sociis pro laborare cepos pro bombardis ut aparet per apodisiam unam bis. 
XII et quos solvit Georgio ferrario pro aptare ferros bombardarum bis. Ill kar. 
XII, in summa in XXXII, bis. XV kar. XD 45
- Item, ea die, pro Georgio Lolo et sunt quos solvit monsafer Ermeno pro tachis 
pro bombardis in XXXII, bis. XVII kar. XII46
44 Corio: corium, - ii (n) -  the outer or top surface or layer of a building, perhaps an earth rampart or a 
lime surface; (in XXX* refers to the page in the accounts where the corresponding entry is made in 
the column RECEPIMUS; bis. = besants; kar. = carats.
45 Cepos: caepa, - ae (0 or caepe, -is (f) -  in this context perhaps loopholes for the guns or possibly the 
platforms or carriages on which the guns were mounted. Ferros is most likely the iron used for 
making the bombards -  possibly those parts that bound them to their platforms.
46 Tachis: tachia -  fastening, clasp.
G:\l GAZETTEER ENTRY FOR FAMAGUSTA - T.doc
201
Appendix II
Early plans, engravings and models.
• Plan in the ms of Conrad Grunemberg, kept in Gotha, dated about 1480, 
depicting an idealised isometric projection.47
• A number of plans devised by the Venetians depicting various schemes by 
which the fortifications could be enhanced.48
• Plans in two unpublished mss -  one being in the Correr Museum of Venice 
and the other in the Archives of the State of Turin, the latter being reproduced 
by Faucherre. Both appear to be faithful depictions of the Venetian 
fortifications in their final form in 1570-1.49
• Two models made of painted wood kept in the Naval Historical Museum in 
Venice. One of these -  entitled ‘Fortezza di Famagusta, isola de Cipro’ is 
merely an illustration of another scheme to update the defences and is largely 
fantastical, but the other, wrongly entitled ‘Maina in Morea’ appears to be a 
faithful depiction of Famagusta in the 1550s, so preceding the final Venetian 
works which included the powerful Martinengo Bastion. Noteworthy aspects 
of this include the fosse before its enlargement with the then counterscarp 
encircling the UorrionV, an enceinte not then reinforced with embankments of 
earth piled up against the inside of the walls and the semi-circular shape of the 
Limassol Gate ravelin. Photographs of both are reproduced by Perbellini, and 
in Attar while ‘Maina in Morea’ is also reproduced by Faucherre.50
• Stephano Gibellino of Bressa’s engraving of the siege of 1570-1, reproduced 
by Enlart and Faucherre.51 This is the best depiction of the siege we have and 
of help in visualising the fortifications at that time. That said, elements of it
47 As noted by Faucherre, Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 313 and fit. 21.
48 A number have been collected in F. Frigerio, Un plan manuscript inedit du xvie siecle du port de 
Famagouste, Actes du I f  Congres international d ’etudes chypriotes (Nicosia, 1986), pp. 297-302 
and plates I to XI, noted by Faucherre, p. 313 and fn. 22.
49 Faucherre, fig. 2 on p. 311 and commentary on p. 313 and fns. 24 and 25.
50 Perbellini (1988), pp. 22 and 24 and fns. 34 and 39; Faucherre, fig. 3 on p. 311 and commentary on 
p. 313 and fn. 26; Attar, p. 104.
51 Enlart, Plan III and in Faucherre, pp. 112 and 113, commentary on p. 313.
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are clearly inaccurate: eg, the castle is shown as having a central tower and 
both its ditches and those of the town enceinte are shown as filled with water.
• Two other copper engravings of the siege. One was made in 1571 by
Balthasaw Jenichen, cartographer and map-dealer of Nuremberg and the the 
other in 1573 by Simon Pinargenti of Venice, reproduced in the European 
Cartography of Cyprus and in Cyprus Today.52
For modem attempts at diagramatic reconstructions, see footnote.53
52 With commentary in The European Cartography of Cyprus, pp. 60-3 and in Cyprus Today, 46, 
No. 2 (April-June 2008), pp. 14-15 where the captions are wrongly assigned.
53 Enlart’s Plan IV; in Cobham; Denham, p. 110; Perbellini (1988), p. 20, and (1992), p. 11; 
Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, p. 538, and most usefully, Otten-Froux, Notes sur quelques 
monuments, fig. 16 on p. 147 and Faucherre, fig. 4 on p. 315.
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The Templar castle is located 3 km south-west of the village of Gastria (Kalecik -  
Turkish) on the north side of Famagusta Bay. There is virtually nothing left of it, so 
even locating it is far from straightforward. Until the recent works of J-B de Vaivre, 
only Enlart had attempted a detailed description. Enlart’s comments are not wholly
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reconcilable with what little is now to be seen on the ground but as Vaivre pointed 
out, this may be largely because the landscape has changed in the century since Enlart 
wrote. In addition even more of Gastria’s fragmentary remains have been lost in that 
time. Enlart’s account therefore retains some value. Without a proper excavation there 
is very little that can be added to Vaivre’s careful studies of the site.1 In sum, this 
constituted a small fort (1) occupying the end of a low, narrowing ridge. The fort 
appears to have been rectangular -  at least on the two sides where it was separated 
from the ridge by its ditch (2) that was cut into the rock. That ditch is now the castle’s 
principal extant feature. Part of this ditch appears to have been lost since Enlart’s time 
as a result of dynamiting and consequently it is not possible now to be clear as to 
where the castle gate was located: the section of ditch that Enlart noted was 7.9 m 
wide narrowing to 4.5 m at the comer on its seaward side -  the point at which Enlart 
located his entrance -  is now lost. The ditch was, nonetheless, substantial. Its current 
remains show that it was 7.6 m wide on its long north-east side and 7.2 m wide on the 
south-east side, having a depth of 2 m on its internal face and 2.6 m on the 
counterscarp. Within the area encompassed by the ditch, all that can now be discerned 
are the broken traces of a wall running parallel to the long side of the ditch, a wall 
joining it at right angles from within the enceinte and a circular cistern located in the 
centre of the castle (3).
Enlart considered that the fort at Gastria appeared to be fairly typical of small 
Templar castles of its period in respect of its ditch and apparent lack of towers at the 
angles of the rectangular enceinte}  Comparison may perhaps be made with the 
remains of Qal’at ad-Damm roughly midway between Jerusalem and the Jordan.
There too its principal surviving feature is a rock cut ditch, entry over which seems to 
have been adjacent to a comer. Ranging from 4.5 to 6.0 m wide, its ditch is a little less 
than that at Gastria.3
‘ Enlart, pp. 474-5; Jeffery, p. 249; Thubron, p. 234; Vaivre (1998) passim: Vaivre in Vaivre and 
Plagnieux, pp. 368-374. Site visit -  6 April 2007.
2 Enlart, p. 475.
3 Pringle, Templar Castles, pp. 153-162.
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What should be emphasised, however, as both Vaivre and Enlart allowed, is that 
Templar Gastria was very likely more than merely a rectangular fort, but rather a 
more complex arrangement, of which the fort was a part. The fort dominated the 
landward approach to the peninsula which terminated at the seaward end in a rocky 
outcrop that is higher than the fort (4). Judging by the cut platforms on its summit, 
this outcrop was occupied at some point in the past, and it would seem odd if this 
natural vantage point was not at least an element in the Templar fortifications. The 
outcrop may have once been separated from the peninsula by a channel (5) cut across 
its width, but now filled in -  there are still signs of this to be seen on its south side. 
The fort, isthmus and outcrop all separated the watercourse to the north from the sea. 
This watercourse was Gastria’s harbour, and explains why the Templars established 
their base here.4 It has diminished greatly, not just from Enlart’s time to Vaivre’s 
report of 1998, but dramatically more so in the nine years since. Current plans to turn 
it into a marina, replete with hotels and even more apartments than those already 
creeping towards it from the north, will reintroduce water to this creek, but otherwise 
will change the landscape out of all recognition.
The castle is first mentioned in 1210 when the disgraced regent of Cyprus, Walter of 
Montbeliard, sought refuge with the Templars at Gastria.5 Gastria, though not the 
castle, is next mentioned with reference to the war of 1228-33, when, in 1229 the old 
Lord of Beirut landed here. The castle is referred to, however, in 1232, when, after 
their defeat at the Battle of Agridi, Frederick IPs supporters fled here, only to be 
refused entrance by the Templar garrison. They were subsequently found hiding in the 
castle ditch and arrested.6 In 1279, the castle was dismantled when Hugh III took 
action against the Templars.7 It is difficult to judge how completely it was damaged 
at this time or whether it was ever subsequently repaired: there are no further 
references to Gastria as a castle, so it is likely that this brought its life to an end. As 
with most other Templar properties, the site passed to the Hospitallers in 1308.8 
Henry II passed through Gastria en route to exile in Armenia in 1310.9
4 Claverie, L ’Ordre du Temple, (2005), 1, p. 325.
5 Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, pp. 191 fh. 7 and 192; Coureas, Latin Church, p. 125.
6 see History, above, fh. 70; Vaivre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 369.
7 Amadi, p. 214; FI. Bustron, p. 116; Coureas, Latin Church, p. 129.
8 FI. Bustron, p. 170.
9 Amadi, p. 323; FI. Bustron, p. 192; Enlart, p. 474; Hill, 2, p. 244.
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Gastria 1
Fosse (2 on plan) at the north-east angle, looking north-west (as in April 2007).
Gastria 2
Fosse at the north-east angle (2 on plan), looking south-east to the look out point (4 on 
plan) and the sea beyond (as in April 2007).
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KHIROKITIA and YERMASOYIA
Both Khirokitia and Yermasoyia were originally Templar properties which passed to 
the Hospitallers on the dissolution of the Order of the Temple. How far either was 
endowed with any fortifications is difficult to say. According to testimonies in the 
trial of the Templars on Cyprus, they had ‘fortified towers’ in both locations as well 
as at Limassol.1 As mere estate centres, with no greater importance to the Order, 
however, there would have been little cause for the Templars to build substantial 
military works, or later for the Hospitallers to add anything of consequence.
Khirokitia is seven kilometres inland and midway between Limassol and Lamaka. 
In both of his lists of the Templar properties transferred to the Hospital, FI. Bustron 
described Khirokitia as ‘il casal Chierochitia con la stantia sua in foggia di fortezza’ 
(‘the village of Khirokitia with its rooms in the shape of a fortress’) though elsewhere 
he calls it merely a casal. It was here that the Marshal of the Temple was imprisoned 
in 1308. It is described as having a tower, when, on the eve of the battle of 
Khirokitia in July, 1426, Janus ‘lodged in the tower of Khirokitia with the knights’.3 
Stephen of Lusignan added that there was a bourg here which had ‘un chasteau assez 
fort’, which was subsequently knocked down by the Mamluks after the battle and 
never rebuilt.4
The earliest description of its remains appears to be that of Louis de Mas Latrie in 
1846 when he recorded seeing three large chambers of two storeys with windows on 
each level, next to which was a pointed barrel-vaulted building. By the time of 
Enlart’s visit in 1896, most of this had disappeared, though he was able to note in 
addition that the barrel-vaulted building had a filled-in cellar, while some distance 
away lay the foundations of a rectangular building containing a well reached by a 
flight of 14 steps. All we now have though, as J-B de Vaivre has just noted, are a few 
lengths of wall, a cistern and the barrel-vaulted structure, which with a length of 11.4
1 Gilmour-Bryson, p. 16. See too Luttrell, p. 170 and Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, p. 192.
2 Amadi, p. 290; FI. Bustron, pp. 169,171,247.
3 Makhairas, § 675, p. 655. cf. Amadi, p.505 -  ‘la torre’.
4 Lusignan, Description, f. 35.
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m and a width, internally of 5.5 m and externally of 8.45 m, was clearly a 
considerable building in its own right.5
Yermasoyia lies some six to seven kilometres north-east of Limassol. It was acquired 
by the Templars by the middle of the thirteenth century.6 Most likely it was similar to 
Khirokitia. In his two lists, Bustron says ‘Geromassoia con la fortezza di quelloV 
‘Geromosia con la sua fortezza’.7 The Commander of the Temple was confined on
o
this casal in 1308. It is however, even more obscure than Khirokitia: the buildings 
were lost long ago; Enlart made no mention of the site, while Jeffery could find no 
certain trace of it. 9
5 Enlart, pp. 486-7 (with plan); Hill, 2„ p. 23; A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 206; 
J-B. de Vaivre in Vaivre andt Plagnieux, pp. 54,406-7.
6 Coureas, Latin Church, p. 125.
7 FI. Bustron, pp. 171, 247.
8 Amadi, p. 290; FI. Bustron, pp. 169-70.
9 Jeffery, p. 358.
G:\n GAZETTEER ENTRY FOR KHIROKITIA and YERMASOYIA - T.doc
209
KOLOSSI
We observed above (pp. 17-8) that references in the sources for the Ricardian conquest 
show there to have been no fortification in Kolossi in 1191. A charter of September, 
1210, in which King Hugh I conferred various estates on the Hospitallers, recognised 
inter alia their possession of the estate of Colos - ‘casale quod dicitur Colos’, which 
had already been given to them by one Garinus of Colos or Kolossi. The scant 
remains of the first ‘castle’ are consequently taken as dating from the thirteenth 
century and it is therefore generally taken to have been a Hospitaller foundation from 
its inception. Historians have noted, however, that both FI. Bustron and Stephen of 
Lusignan reported that the Templars held an estate and a castle here and that these 
passed into the hands of the Hospitallers in 1310. This immediately presents a 
difficulty, for it requires that we accept that both orders held considerable estates in 
this same area and that there were two thirteenth-century castles or towers in close 
proximity, of which only one happens to survive. Careful consideration of the 
evidence suggests, however, that there was no Templar base here.1
Although both orders may indeed have had fortified bases in Limassol, Kolossi was 
different, being the nucleus of agricultural estates rather than a principal town and 
port. It is improbable then that both orders were prominent in this same area.
Certainly it is clear that Kolossi was of considerable importance to the Hospitallers 
before they acquired the lands of the Temple -  whether these included estates in the 
Kolossi area or not. This is apparent from the arrangements that they made for the 
governance of their order after the evacuation of the mainland in 1291. Like the 
Templars, the Hospitallers established Limassol as their headquarters, but the 
Hospitallers’ command system was oddly bifurcated: while the grand commander’s 
jurisdiction appears to have been centred in Limassol itself -  and indeed in the general 
chapter in Limassol in November 1300 it was ruled that as long as the master and
1 FI. Bustron, pp. 171,247; Lusignan, Chorogrqffia -  Grivaud, ff. 17a-18; Chorography -  Wallace, 
§ 54, pp. 23-4; Enlart, p. 494; Coureas, Latin Church, pp. 123-4, 156-7. Hill, 2, p. 22 and Riley- 
Smith, pp. 218 fn. 2,432,505 both subscribed to Bustron’s and Lusignan’s record of a Templar 
castle and estate in Kolossi, though Hill admitted that it was difficult to accept that the rival orders 
could have had castles in the same place. Enlart was rather more sceptical, while Edbury, Templars 
in Cyprus, p. 197 n. 7 and Vaivre, Monuments, p. 76 (from Richard, Chypre sous les Lusignans, p.
111) are unconvinced that the Temple held anything here. Note too Claverie, L ’Ordre du Temple 
(2005), 1, pp. 322-3. Aristidou, Kolossi Castle, pp. 13-14, is very confused on the matter. Vaivre, 
Monuments, pp. 73-4, gives the text of the grant of 1210.
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convent was located in Cyprus, general-chapters were to be held in Limassol - his 
colleague, the commander of Cyprus, supervised elsewhere. This officer is of 
particular interest as he was initially stationed in Nicosia, but was then subsequently 
based in Kolossi. The move appears to have a been in 1302 as a result of a decision 
made in a chapter meeting in Limassol in 1301 that Kolossi should take the place of 
the manoir of Acre -  by which it became 4a special centre of supplies’. In such 
circumstances, it would be very surprising if the Hospitallers had not possessed a 
building of some consequence here at this time. As for the Templars, the only 
evidence that we have for an estate and castle at Kolossi are the references of Bustron 
and Lusignan. Of course they wrote over 250 years after the fall of the Templars, so 
their accuracy in this cannot necessarily be taken at face value. In sum, it appears 
most likely that Kolossi Castle and its associated estates were Hospitaller from the 
outset.2
Kolossi was the centre of an estate which was very profitable, primarily from the 
sugar cane industry and later from cotton. The first record we have that alludes to the 
production of sugar is from 1343 but quite likely this had already been in operation 
for some time before then.3 The vaulted chamber used for refining the sugar and the 
aqueduct, dated by a heraldic device to the 1360s and 1370s,4 which supplied the 
necessary water from the river Kouris still exist in a fairly good state of preservation 
to the south-east of the castle. Kolossi was therefore a potentially attractive target for 
raids, though the evidence for its actual involvement is difficult. Stephen of Lusignan 
commented that the Genoese found the castle too strong and that in 1426 the 
Mamluks similarly did not attempt to take it once they had lost the element of 
surprise. As noted elsewhere however, there are difficulties with this source, not the 
least of which is that it is unlikely that the castle was that strong at the time.5 Kolossi
2 Enlart, p. 494; Jeffery, p. 374; Riley-Smith, pp. 432-3; Coureas, Latin Church, p. 163; Vaivre, 
Monuments, p. 75.
3 Wartburg, The Antiquaries Journal, 81, pp. 328-9; Solomidou-Ieronymidou, p. 78.
4 Vaivre, Monuments, pp. 115-9,140; Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 419-20.
5 For the difficulties with this element of Lusignan’s accounts, see (above) Part II -  An Urban 
Aristocracy, pp. 80-1. Enlart, p. 494 thought the Commandery ‘ruined by the Genoese invasions of 
1373 and 1402’ but as noted by Luttrell, p. 171, there is no evidence for this. For the Genoese and the 
castle - see Lusignan, Chorograffia -  Grivaud, ff. 17a-18; Chorography -  Wallace, § 54, p. 24. For 
the 1426 raid - Lusignan, Description, p. 154b and Hill, 2, p. 477. Vaivre in Monuments, p. 76 and in 
Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 410.
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may have been targeted in a further raid of 1434.6 Its buildings certainly failed to 
impress Stephen of Gumpenberg who visited in February 1450. He wrote that ‘das 
Haus aber ist nicht gut’. It is significant that he did not identify it as a ‘castel’ -  the 
term he used for Paphos and Limassol, but merely as a house, and a poor one at that.7 
This impression of dilapidation is reinforced in a charter given at Rhodes and dated 22 
December 1452 which refers to an old tower (‘turris’) which had been used for 
storage and as a refuge, but which was cracked and in poor condition having been
o
burnt at some point by the ‘Saracens’. Perhaps the castle did indeed sustain damage 
in these raids of the first half of the fifteenth century but it is just as likely that its 
fabric had simply deteriorated. Either way, it was now that the Hospitallers decided 
on the construction of the present donjon and its outworks. Quite likely this initiative 
was stimulated in 1453 when Mehmet II and the Ottoman Turks captured 
Constantinople and raided Cyprus, though there is no record of Kolossi being 
involved.9 That said, even had the works envisaged in the 1450s been completed, it 
cannot have been hoped that they could maintain a resistance against such a potential 
opponent.
The donjon can be attributed to the 1450s on the basis of its architecture; inscriptions 
giving a date of 1464 noted by Enlart but now lost in the vigorous restoration of 1933; 
an armorial slab set on the exterior of the east wall but most importantly the charter of 
22 December 1452. This nominated Louis of Magnac as Grand Commander of 
Cyprus for life and set out in detail his obligations and prerogatives. It required him to 
repair Kolossi at his expense and turn it ‘in formam castri cum quatuor turribus et 
barbacana’. The towers were to be set at the four comers of the barbican, here 
indicating the curtain wall -  which was to encircle the ‘castle’ -  the donjon, within.
He was to ensure that the walls were not less than ten “palms” thick and was to
6 For the 1434 raid -  Hill, 3, pp. 515-6. Most recently, J. Richard in Vaivre et Plagnieux, p. 82 cited 
the Petite Chronique in respect of this raid, provoked by Hospitallers harbouring pirates preying on 
Mamluk shipping between Cyprus and the mainlands. The Chronique does not comment on this 
however.
7 in Grivaud, p. 67.
8 The Latin charter is given in full by Vaivre in Monuments, pp. 143-9, with a French translation on 
pp. 128-32. See too Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 421.
9 Petite Chronique, pp. 332-3,338; J. Richard in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 82; Vaivre in Monuments, 
pp. 133-4.
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implement future orders with regard to the height of the donjon and towers and the 
overall timescale for the completion of the works.10
As can now be seen, much of this work was carried out: the castrum itself being the
donjon and at least some of the ‘barbican’ or curtain with one of the comer towers,
perhaps two if we may take it that the old tower was re-commissioned and included in
the circuit. Clearly the resulting works had nothing to do with the defence of the
country but were rather merely for the security of a landowner and the storage of
estate produce. This may well be reflected in the term used by Hans-Bemard of
Eptingen who saw it when he passed through in 1460: it was probably this building
that he called a ‘schloss’.11 In the sixteenth century, Bustron described it as having
four vaulted solar chambers, a noble entrance gained via a drawbridge (‘ponte
levador’), a cistern and well. Both he and Stephen of Lusignan described it as ‘very
10strong for hand to hand fighting’. With its absence of provision for anything but 
small arms, it was certainly not designed with full scale warfare in mind.
Earlier commentaries
The survival of the fifteenth-century tower has prompted a number of descriptions of 
the castle and the adjacent sugar refinery. Enlart’s account is of value, being 
composed before the British restorations of the twentieth century, but he was also 
impeded in his appreciation because the site was then encumbered by farm buildings. 
Megaw directed the excavations of the mid-twentieth century, which inter alia, 
unearthed the south-west tower and its adjacent walls. He must have realised that 
these were contemporaneous with the donjon, yet appears to have refrained from 
assigning construction periods to anything outside the donjon apart from the well­
head within its semi-circular tower which he attributed to the first castle. Later Dr 
Aristidou commented that the first castle included Megaw’s well tower, the almost 
adjoining remains of the stone outer wall on this east side of the tower, ‘ruins... on 
the north-east comer of the forecourt... [and] the north-west comer circular tower.
10 Enlart, pp. 495,497-8; Jeffery, p. 375; Hill, 3, p. 1133; Vaivre, Monuments, pp. 94-5, 122-4, 133; 
Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 415-7,420-1.
11 in Grivaud, p. 73.
12 FI. Bustron, p. 25; Chorograffia -  Grivaud, f. 17a; Chorography -  Wallace, § 54, p. 24 -  whence 
the quotation
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However, it is plain that Aristidou’s east wall was in fact built either at the same time 
as or a little later than the fifteenth-century keep, while the comer circular tower is in 
fact at the south-west point of the complex and is plainly not at all part of the earlier 
castle. In short, her account is erroneous. Most recently however, J-B de Vaivre has 
published a substantial monograph, summarised in L ’Art Gothique. This is especially 
useful in facilitating an understanding of the site as it may have appeared originally, 
before the alterations that were made during the restoration work of the last century.13
Description.14 Buildings outwith the keep: ( i) the early ‘castle’ 
North-west angle, west wall, south-west angle.
Excavations carried out in 2004-6 on the west side of the keep have revealed a series 
of walls and chambers which appear to have been principally for agro-industrial 
purposes and were most likely associated with refining sugar. The profusion of 
pottery shards and the provision for ovens, perhaps to boil the sugar cane, are 
apparent. The ashlar facing of one internal wall suggests, however, that part of this 
range may have been allocated to an alternative use. Whether this complex of 
buildings was supplementary to, or superseded by, the more elaborate and 
sophisticated arrangements of the refinery to the east of the castle is difficult to say. 
What is clear, however, is that these various chambers straddle what may be the outer 
wall of the first ‘castle’ (1). If this was indeed an original outer wall, it was obviously 
made redundant in its adaptation within the agro-industrial complex. The wall ranges 
from 0.8 m to only 0.65 m thick and utilised a few ancient columns in places. It ran 
from a point almost adjacent to the north-west comer of the later donjon, where it may 
have constituted a simple right-angle turn with no tower, south to a point where it 
meets a cylindrical comer tower (2). This tower is clearly of the same construction as 
the later wall (3) on this side of the compound which lies to the south of the keep and 
just within the line of the 0.8 m earlier outer west wall: the tower is of similar 
masonry to and articulated with the later wall. Moreover, with walls of 1.2 m, it is 
noticeably thicker than the older, outer wall. Externally, this tower is 4.5 m in
13 Enlart, pp. 501-2; M egaw, Kolossi Castle, p. 5; Aristidou, Kolossi Castle, pp. 18-19; Vaivre in 
Monuments, pp. 73-155 and in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 410-422.
14 The following description has benefited considerably from site visits made in October 2004, October 
2005, September 2008 and October 2009 along with discussions with Dr. Marina Solom idou- 
Ieronymidou o f  the Department o f  Antiquities w ho led the excavations o f  2004-6 .
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diameter, and thus 2.1 m in diameter internally. It is therefore very small and stout -  
which would be unusual for, say, a thirteenth-century tower. It is not capable of being 
entered from within at ground floor level, so must have been accessed from above. In 
sum, it appears that this tower is part of the later, fifteenth-century fortification, and 
was intended as a small bastion, possibly a gun-tower although its small size would 
have made the use of artillery difficult. Quite likely, the original castle wall turned a 
simple right-angle bend here at the south west, again with no angle tower.
South, east and north walls
The walls of the first ‘castle’ on these sides have yet to be excavated, but it is possible 
to trace their size and course at certain points (see plan). On the south side, a stretch 
of wall 65 cm to 80 cm thick, which turns the south-east angle and then, after a break, 
reappears for a few metres on the east side of the complex (4), is of comparable 
dimensions to the old outer west wall just described. Again, there is no trace of an 
angle-tower. As per Megaw, it is likely that the well tower (5) on this east side of the 
later keep is part of this earlier castle: the masonry of its enveloping semi-circular 
wall is similar to that of the other earlier walls already described. However, unusually 
its walls are 1.2 m thick, and its articulation with the rest of the early east wall is 
unclear. At 9.3 m in diameter it is of considerable size. Within the tower there remains 
a six step stair to a small platform probably used to access the well. Evidence for the 
early ‘castle’ wall on the north side is fragmentary at best. A discontinuous wall (6) 
lying outside the later fifteenth-century keep, may form the outer boundary of the first 
fortification, but its relationship with the wall of the north-west angle is unresolved.
The southern courtyard compound
South of the keep, the courtyard is divided into four approximately equal rectangular 
areas (7). To their west lies a larger chamber (8), its arches indicating a function other 
than merely storage or manufacture.
It seems likely that some of these courtyard buildings were elements of the earlier 
‘castle’. The two pointed arches (9) which constitute a screen across the southern
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section of the west chamber are especially reminiscent of those at Kouklia, and 
indicative of a thirteenth or fourteenth-century date. The spandrel between the arches 
contains two stones with shallow cut in squares inset that may have once been 
decorated and might help suggest a date of construction. Judging by the holes for 
beams in the west wall, there was plainly an upper floor here.
Vaivre, on the other hand, envisaged all these works as aspects of the building 
programme of the 1450s. In particular, he alluded to a fragment of a frame of a 
fireplace or window located there, which has a braided design which resembles a style 
in use in Rhodes at the end of the fifteenth century. That could of course be merely an 
addition to pre-existing structures.15
In sum, the thin walls and the absence of mural towers apart from the thickish wall 
skirting the well, cast doubt on Kolossi’s real claim to status as a fortification prior to 
the fifteenth-century work. It would seem likely then that for most of our period, 
Kolossi was merely a rectangular compound used as an estate centre and from the 
beginning of the fourteenth century, a supply depot. In this, it bears comparison with 
the royal manor of Kouklia to the east.
Buildings outwith the keep: (ii) the outworks of the fifteenth-century castle
The outer wall of the fifteenth-century castle is most obvious on the east side (10). 
Here, in its northern section, it stands for a length of 23 m, 3.6 m outside the line of 
the keep. It is 1.1 m thick and built with a finely chiselled and fitted ashlar facing that 
is of a piece with the main keep-tower itself. In Enlart’s time, some of its merlons 
survived. This wall includes a much restored arch with holes for chains or wires for a 
drawbridge (11) which is not unlike that of the keep itself, thrown over a narrow ditch 
(2.7 m wide x 1.2 m deep). Just to the south of this gateway, the wall is pierced by an 
inverted keyhole gun-port with an embrasure which splays internally, underneath 
which is a box hole (gun-port 1). To the north of the gateway, this new wall forms a 
rectangular spur in that it projects north and beyond, by 5 m, the line of the north face 
of the main keep. It then joins that north face of the keep through two right angles.
15 in Monuments, p. 110 and fig. 29 on p. 111; Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 417.
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The result is a protective north-east projecting mantlet with gun-ports covering its 
three sides. Minor differences between gun-port 1 and these northern gun-ports 
(numbers 2-5) may imply an updating of design as work progressed and that this 
northern, projecting section of the new wall was the last to be built of what we may 
now see.
Any southern half of this later eastern outer wall is not extant and its relationship with 
the well tower and earlier wall is complex. It appears to end where it abuts the well 
tower’s thick, apsidal protective wall (14). As already noted, it is likely that the tower 
was incorporated into the fifteenth-century defensive circuit.
The fifteenth-century arrangements on the north side of the keep are difficult to 
elucidate. High up, the tower has latrines, implying that when built, there were no 
adjoining, lean-to buildings on this side lower down. Yet this north face of the keep 
has a series of five putlog holes 2.5 m above ground-level which could have been for 
joists to support the roofs for lean-to buildings. Such lean-to buildings would, 
however, have neutralised the field of fire from gun-port number 5. In contrast, the 
diagonal pattern of the putlog holes in the keep’s east face is such as to suggest that 
those were for beams to support ramps used when constructing the building.
As we have seen, on its west side, the earlier courtyard compound appears to have 
been enclosed by a thin wall (1) on a line just outside the later, fifteenth-century wall 
(3) which, judging by its external masonry and thickness (1.6 m), was interpolated 
about the same time as the main keep was built. The south-west tower (2), screening 
the postern entrance immediately to its north (12), all suggestive of this period, 
endows this later enclosing wall with a far greater sense of fortification than that 
implied in its earlier counterpart.
On the south side, this later wall, again 1.6 m thick runs off from the south-west tower 
for approximately 7.4 m. After that, discernible from a change in the masonry, the 
wall which now constitutes the south and south-east quadrant of the courtyard was 
constructed in the restoration of the last century.16 On the east side, it includes a low
16 as shown in a poor photograph taken in 1937 before restoration work began. Vaivre, Monuments,
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arched doorway (13) replicating the fifteenth-century entry protected by its 
drawbridge (11) adjacent to the keep’s east face. There is nothing to say that this 
follows the line of a medieval wall of any date.
The fifteenth-century keep
Due to its excellent state of preservation, modem descriptions of the fifteenth-century 
keep are perfectly adequate, though the stated orientation of the chambers is 
sometimes at odds with their actual alignment. Until Vaivre’s careful works, Enlart’s 
record was the most detailed and of additional value as he saw it before certain 
restoration work was carried out in 1933. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to include
17here a short overview of its principal features.
The tower has three main storeys and is almost square, being 17 m x 17.35, and 18.6 
m high. The walls are 2.4 m thick at ground-floor level.18 The lowest storey 
constituted three inter-connecting barrel-vaulted storage chambers of equal 
dimensions arranged in a north-south row (A,B,C). Each has a tiny window at both 
ends, more for ventilation than light. Below two of these chambers there are cisterns 
cut into the rock. Originally, this basement level was accessible internally from the 
first-floor via a trapdoor through the basement’s roof; at some point subsequent to 
Enlart’s visit, a stair appears to have been added in the south-east comer. Direct 
access to this basement from outside was achieved through a doorway immediately 
below the main entry at first floor level but it appears likely that this lower entry may 
not have been an original part of the fifteenth-century building.
pp. 109,112-3; Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 418-9.
17 Enlart, pp. 495-502; Jeffery, pp. 373-4; Hill, 3, pp. 1132-3; Muller-W einer, p. 91; Fedden and 
Thomson, pp. 111-2; M egaw, Kolossi Castle, passim., M egaw, Military Architecture, p. 206; 
Aristidou, Kolossi Castle, passim. Vaivre, Monuments, pp. 78-107; Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 4 1 0 -  
17.
18 A s most recently surveyed by Vaivre in Monuments, pp.78-82 and in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 410.
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The principal entrance was at first floor level, by means of a ramp or staircase, and 
then over a drawbridge as recorded by Bustron. At some point, the original 
drawbridge was superseded by a flying arch,19 but in 1933 that was taken down and a 
drawbridge reinstated, its wires using the original pulleys set on either side of the 
lintel above the doorway. This doorway has a round-headed arch and is 3 m high and 
1.5 m wide set in a recess designed to accommodate the closed drawbridge. The first- 
floor constitutes two vaulted chambers of equal dimensions on a north-south axis (D 
and E), divided by a wall through which there are two round-headed doorways. Both
19 As can be seen on the drawing published by Rey in his work o f 1871, reproduced in Vaivre, 
Monuments, fig. 18 on p. 98.
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chambers are lit by windows, most of which include two stone benches facing each 
other across their windows’ recesses. The western of these chambers has a large 
fireplace set in the west wall. It has been taken to indicate that this chamber was used 
as a kitchen, though the design of the fireplace is such as to suggest that its original 
purpose may not have been merely for such a simple function. Next to it is an alcove 
which contained latrines. The internal walls of both chambers were most likely 
decorated with murals, judging by the remnants of a fresco on the south wall of the 
eastern chamber.
This first-floor storey connected with the top floor, where the external walls are 2 m 
thick, and beyond it the battlemented roof by means of a spiral stairway in the 
thickness of the wall in the south-east comer of the tower. Like the first-floor, the 
upper floor consisted of two vaulted chambers of similar size (F and G) (13.5 m x 6 
m), though in this case on an east-west axis, as with the basement. Like its first-floor 
counterpart, this storey’s dividing wall (0.8 m thick) is pierced at both ends by 
doorways. Both chambers have fireplaces, set back to back in the centre of the 
dividing wall, that of the north chamber being the more ornate. This north chamber 
had a latrine set in its north wall: it appears to have projected beyond the exterior of 
the tower judging by the remains of the corbels visible from the outside. It seems 
likely therefore that this was the private chamber of the grand commander or his 
deputy. Access from the stairway lay across the southern chamber which would 
therefore have functioned as an antechamber or reception area. Both chambers had 
four windows -  all endowed with side seats set within the walls. In both first-floor 
and upper floors, there are joist holes for beams for wooden floors at the springing of 
the vaults, attesting the existence of attics or garrets at these levels. These would have 
been lit by the little windows set high in the end walls.
The battlemented roof terrace has benefited from considerable attention in the 1933 
restoration, though certain features appear to have been lost in the process. Enlart 
noted five or six crenels on each side with arrow slits in the merlons and rings set in 
their sides as hinges for shutters to close the embrasures. Though he made no mention 
of them, there is now a series of corbels just below papapet level, which if original 
indicate a facility for creating a hoarding. In Enlart’s day, the crenellated parapet did 
not extend to the four comers of the tower as is now the case: we have pictoral images
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made before 1933 that show the parapet as it was when Enlart visisted Kolossi.20 He 
thought that these comers may have been equipped with rectangular platforms or 
turrets, as was certainly so at the south-east comer which housed the stair-head. The 
remains of broken masonry in the south-west and north-west angles might indeed 
suggest some erstwhile superstructures at these points. Other features have also been 
lost, including what Enlart identified as a channel set on the west of the terrace to 
collect rainwater which was fed into the basement cisterns. On the south side, placed 
immediately above the first-floor and basement entry, is a five slot box- 
machicolation, supported on six triple quarter-round corbels, while on the north side 
of the roof platform, is a simple, two slot box supported on three corbels, apparently 
constituting a latrine arrangement.
20 The first appear to be lost drawings by Edmond Duthoit in 1862 used by Rey in his 1871 work 
(reproduced in Vaivre in Monuments, fig. 18 on p. 98) and Enlart’s photographs of 1896 
(reproduced in Vaivre in Monuments, figs. 19-25 on pp. 100-105). Vaivre in Monuments, p. 77-8; 
Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 416-7. See too the pen and ink drawing from 1926 in Severis, p. 226 and 
Hill, 2, plate 3. This feature is also apparent on postage stamps of King George V.
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Kolossi 1
General view of the castle from the south-west. The outer compound wall on the west 
and the western portion of the south wall are part of the programme of works of the 
early 1450s. The eastern portion of the south wall dates from the restoration work of 
the 1930s intended to re-enclose the area.
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Kolossi 2
General view of the keep and compound wall of the early 1450s from the south-west. 
The earlier wall (1 on plan) located outside the fifteenth-century compound wall on 
the west can be seen in the foreground. Columns, most likely brought to the site to 
serve as a means of strengthening these earlier walls, may also be noted.
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Kolossi 3
Close up of south (entry) face of fifteenth-century keep showing first floor entry and
ornate box machicolation.
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Kolossi 4
Aerial view of apsidal tower and well (5 on plan) lying outside the east wall of the
modem rectangular compound wall.
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Kolossi 5
Internal view of embrasure with narrow sighting slit and gun-port below in the 
fifteenth-century wall on the east side of the keep.
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Kolossi 6
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Kolossi 7
External view of gun-port.
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Kolossi 8
Entry with drawbridge (11 on plan) in the fifteenth-century wall on the east side of the
keep
230
Kolossi 9
Profile of fifteenth-century wall (10 on plan) on the east side of the keep at its 
junction with the earlier apsidal tower (5 on plan) containing a well. In the 
foreground, the base of an early, less substantial wall (4 on plan) can be traced 
following a line a little to the west. Within that (on the left of the photograph) the 
present compound wall dates from the restorations of the 1930s.
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Kolossi 10
Looking towards the south-western comer of the compound lying south of the keep. 
The four chambers (7 on plan) lying east-west can be discerned, beyond which is the 
large western chamber (8 on plan) with its joist holes in the south wall. The postern 
gate (12 on plan) lies tucked behind the two-bay screen wall (9 on plan).
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Kolossi 11
Screen formed by two pointed arches (9 on plan) in south-west comer of compound.
Kolossi 12
Spandrel between the two arches of the screen (9 on plan) showing two stones each
with a shallow square inset.
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K olossi 13
Cylindrical tower (2 on plan) at south-west angle of fifteenth-century compound wall.
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Kolossi 14
View of earlier ‘castle’ wall (1 on plan) as now excavated, lying beyond the west wall 
(3 on plan) of the fifteenth-century compound.
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Kolossi 16
Excavations underway in October 2005 on the west side of the keep. The continuous 
wall running north-south (1 on plan) being possibly the outer wall of the first ‘castle’
is clearly seen.
235
Kolossi 15
Detail of the junction of the outer, early wall (1 on plan) with the fifteenth-century 
cylindrical tower (2 on plan) on its north side. They are clearly not articulated and 
built at different times, the tower being of a piece with the later, thicker wall lying
behind (3 on plan).
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Kolossi 17
Aerial view of the northern part of the excavated area west of the keep
(September 2008).
Kolossi 18
Aerial view of the southern part of the excavated area west of the keep
(September 2008).
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KOUKLIA 
(Chateau de Couvoucle)
This was not a fortification but rather a manorial complex, the purpose and function 
of which was primarily economic. It was built over part of the remains of ancient 
PalaiPaphos as a centre for the administration of royal estates in the south-west. In 
this area, the royal casalia of Kouklia, Emba, Lemba, Anogyra, Phoinikas and 
Akhelia were especially important for their sugar plantations. The remains of sugar 
mills and refineries can be found close to the manor building -  located immediately 
adjacent on the site of PalaiPaphos itself and a little further away, to the south beneath 
the slope of the hill at Kouklia Stavros. Very little of the refinery buildings on the 
main site survives, but the ‘factory* structures at Kouklia Stavros are better preserved. 
Kouklia Stavros has been dated by pottery evidence to the end of the thirteenth 
century. It was partly remodelled in the fourteenth and continued in working order 
until about 1600, by which time the sugar production industry had been totally 
superseded by the growing of cotton. A 95m long stretch of the aqueduct bringing the 
water necessary to provide power for the mills there, has also survived. Taken 
together with the remains of the mills and refineries of the Hospitallers at Kolossi and 
those of the Comaro family at Episkopi, along with written sources and iconographic 
information, it has been possible to deduce in detail the complex processes involved 
in the production of the sugar.1
There are few historical references that can be adduced. The narrative sources all 
record that it suffered the depredations of the Mamluks during their raid of 1424 and 
it is possible that it was damaged further in the subsequent raids of the following
Ky
years, although it is not specified in this respect by the chroniclers. Shortly after 
these traumas, the Crown farmed out this lucrative element of the royal demesne: in 
1440 Angelo Michiel of Venice contracted for the exploitation of sugar and cotton
1 Hill, 3, p. 816; Wartburg in The Antiquaries Journal, 63, pp. 298-314, esp. pp. 299 and
307; 81, pp. 305-335, esp. pp. 305,7 and 9 and in Palaipaphos, pp. 89-105; Coureas, Economy, 
pp. 111-2; Solomidou-Ieronymidou, pp. 64-5, 71.
2 for the raid of 1424 - Makhairas, § 652, p. 635; Strambaldi, pp. 268-9; Amadi, p. 500; FI.
Bustron, p. 357. For the raids of 1425 and 1426 that may have affected Kouklia, although it is not 
specifically mentioned, see for example Makhairas, §. 659, p. 637 for 1425 and § 689, p. 669 for 
1426, and in general, Hill, 2, pp. 470-4,477,482.
G:\p GAZETTEER ENTRY FOR KOUKLIA - T.doc
239
here at Kouklia, while in the 1460s another lease was negotiated with the Martini 
family.3 ‘Ein Schloss genannt Casucchia’ as recorded by the Duke of Saxe in 1461, 
may be Kouklia; in any event he added nothing to this brief reference.4
Lusignan Kouklia appears to have constituted a quadrangular complex arranged 
around a central courtyard. Built of well-dressed limestone blocks, its architecture 
suggests that it was constructed at some point in the thirteenth century. When Enlart 
visited it at the end of the nineteenth century, he found only the east and south sides 
worthy of comment, and indeed what remains from the Lusignan period are merely 
these two ranges and perhaps parts of the gatehouse, all incorporated into later, 
Turkish buildings. The gatehouse as now constituted is of little defensive merit. It has 
an upper storey gained internally via a straight stairway from the courtyard through a 
narrow arch. The long, main passage through the gateway itself has four shallow 
pointed arches, with a centrally located doorway opening inwards. Much of this is 
modem however, being part of the extensive restoration works carried out on the 
whole site in the early twentieth century. Indeed before this restoration there can have 
been very little of the gateway left at all, for Enlart made no allusion to it whatever.5
Today the southern range (3) consists of an arcade of seven bays. This is a modem 
restoration of the original Lusignan work based on the remains of two arches found at 
the time of the twentieth-century restoration. Given the likelihood that the ground 
level of the courtyard was lower in Lusignan times, this restored range appears to 
have been constructed at a somewhat higher level than its original predecessor. Enlart 
and then Maier volunteered that this may have been damaged and rebuilt after 
Mamluk attack(s) of 1425/1426 (Enlart) or 1426 (Maier). Although it is certainly 
possible that these raids involved Kouklia, as we have noted, we have only certain 
evidence for 1424 and that raid was very much on a small scale. It is just as likely that 
this south range fell into ruin over the passage of time, perhaps as a consequence of 
the decline of the sugar industry. Another pointed arch of the same style at the south - 
west comer of the courtyard, still visible today, supported a ramp leading to the upper 
storey of the complex (4). This supporting arch is now sunk mainly below courtyard
3 Hill, 3, p. 628; Perbellini, 1973, pp. 48-9.
4 in Grivaud, p. 77.
5 Enlart, p. 504; Jeffery, p. 397; Maier in Palaipaphos, p. 56 has ‘parts of the gate tower’ as medieval.
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level and consequently at a level lower than the adjacent (restored) arches of the south 
range: it is to be supposed that its function explains this arrangement, although the 
probable lower level of the courtyard in Lusignan times would have left this original 
arch largely above ground.
KOUKLIA MANOR 
HOUSE
(showing the south & east ranges only)
0 20m
The principal medieval remains are in the east range. The original medieval masonry 
is easily identified owing to its weathering, but its ashlar facing is still very fine. At 
the north end of the lower storey of this range is a room with a pointed barrel vault 4.5 
m. wide (1), which Enlart considered had been built subsequently to the main ground 
floor chamber. This main chamber (2) has been called ‘one of the finest surviving 
monuments of Frankish profane architecture in the island’. 6 Measuring 27.3 by 6.8 
m. and rising to a height of 5.7 m., it is divided into four cross-vaulted bays, the thrust 
of the vaults being taken by buttresses on the outer east wall. It is lighted by narrow 
windows on the external face and one at the south end. The corbels, keystones and 
small roof bosses are the only decorative features in what is otherwise an
6 Maier in Palaipaphos, p. 56.
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unpretentious building. Maier calls it a hall and certainly it is handsomely built 
enough to serve as such in a royal manor. The vaulted bays would perhaps have been 
unnecessary had this been merely to serve as an undercroft storage facility, but clearly 
it could have served in either this capacity or as a hall. Access to this lower storey was 
via a ramp that descended into a porch with a pointed arch; the ramp has now been 
superseded by a short flight of steps (5). As noted above, it appears likely that the 
level of the courtyard was lower in the medieval period, and that consequently this 
east range was not below ground level to the extent it is today, [see illustrations]
A second ramp leading from the courtyard to the upper storey survives. It terminates 
on top of the porch to the lower storey. When Enlart saw this upper storey, it was 
partly collapsed: the roof beams were supported by posts and struts in the centre. 
Maier also noted that its flat roof was supported by massive beams; he remarked that 
it comprised one spacious room with rectangular windows, all on the same 
dimensions as the hall/undercroft below. This upper chamber is, in its present 
incarnation, very much a twentieth-century rebuild. However, adjacent on its north 
side but at a slightly lower level - at the point where the ascending ramp doubles back 
on itself, is another chamber, which is clearly medieval. It is divided internally by a 
short arcade supported on one central column that runs north/south in the centre of the 
room, its two arches being similar in style with those in the south range. It may well 
be that this served a chapel. Interestingly, this chamber with its two arched arcade 
contains mosaic work, no doubt transplanted from ancient PalaiPaphos.7
7 in general, this account of Kouklia is based on Enlart, pp. 504-5; Maier in Palaipaphos, pp. 56-9, 
and personal observation made in October 2004. Neither Enlart nor Maier makes reference to the 
apparent change in the level of the courtyard, though see the Blue Guide, p. 107.
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Kouklia 1
South-west comer of courtyard. On the east side, an arch supported a ramp (4 on plan) 
leading to the upper storey. The westernmost arch of the restored south range can be
seen at a higher level.
Kouklia 2
East range of two storeys, the lower being 1 and 2 on plan. The modem stairs down (5
on plan) supersedes an earlier ramp.
G:\p GAZETTEER ENTRY FOR KOUKLIA - T.doc
Kouklia 3
Modern flight of steps (5 on plan) replacing earlier ramp, leading to main ground 
floor chamber of east range (2 on plan).
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KYRENIA
Introduction. A walled town before the Frankish occupation?
As was more certainly the case with Paphos, a walled town may have existed in early 
times, at least in the 4th century BC. Like Paphos too, there was a castle here in the 
Byzantine period which may have had its origins in the mid-seventh century when the 
Arabs first raided the island. Whether town walls were re-commissioned at the same 
time is hard to say. The most recent work on the subject implies archaeological 
evidence for an enceinte dating from the time of the first Arab raid -  that of 649, but 
this is unreliable, not least because elsewhere it is conceded that the inhabitants then 
promptly abandoned the town and that, in any event, any such wall does ‘not seem to 
have survived the second Arab raid of 653’. Previous commentators who took the 
view that there was a Byzantine town wall of any date have adduced inadequate 
historical evidence. Thus, although it may well be that the ‘Emperor’ Isaac sent his 
wife and daughter to Kyrenia on Richard I’s invasion of 1191 because he deemed it 
the strongest place on the island, this can not be taken to reflect anything other than 
that its castle was the most secure. Similarly the observation made by Wilbrand of 
Oldenburg in 1211, who certainly must have seen the town and castle much as they 
were when the Franks arrived twenty years earlier, has been translated as indicating 
that the town had walls, when strictly speaking, he did not specify this.1
Historical references
Apart from Wilbrand’s comment, allusions to the fortifications occur principally on 
those occasions when possession of Kyrenia was pivotal in determining the outcome 
of wars and are related in the History, above. Such references in the chronicles 
provide us with next to no detail. The Templar of Tyre related that Kyrenia was 
fortified and had a walled town. Quite when he wrote this was discussed above (pp.
1 For the recent suggestion o f  a town wall in 649-653, see Balandier, pp. 267-270. In general, 
Lawrence, p. 201, Nicolaou-Konnari, pp. 50-1; M egaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 1; M olin, Unknown 
Crusader Castles, p. 98; Edbury, Kingdom, p. 14. For Wilbrand o f  Oldenburg, see History, above, p. 
11.
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29-30) and from this it is arguable that Kyrenia’s town walls were created before 
those of Famagusta. Westerners, who commented on other Cypriot castles, tended not 
to travel to Kyrenia; their routes to and from their homes took them to the south coast 
rather than the north. Its history in war shows however, that it was a first rate 
fortification. Indeed, for some of our period, it was most likely the island’s only one. 
This was certainly the view of Francesco Suriano of Venice in 1484 at the very end of 
that time.2
Description of the Castle
The description set out in Megaw’s Kyrenia Castle, modified in certain details by his 
later articles, has remained the fullest to date. Faucherre’s short note o f2006 
supplements this in a few aspects. Though much of the Crusader Castle remains, 
much too has been obscured as a result of the later, massive Venetian overbuilding, 
making some interpretations of detail uncertain.
The Byzantine Castle
The Byzantine castle occupied most of a peninsula that juts out into the sea. It thus 
had the benefits of water defences and communications from the start. It was roughly 
square in shape, about 80.5 m. (264 feet) square,4 with its entrance probably on the 
site of the later Frankish one in the west wall. Its curtains were of varying thickness: 
0.8 m on its north side; 2.55 m on its south (inner) side. We know from Wilbrand that 
the castle possessed towers and most likely there were towers at all four comers. 
Certainly those at the north-west (35) and south-west (13) are discernible. The north­
west tower is slightly oval, of two storeys and with walls on average 1.3 m thick. That 
at the south-west is more circular. Both are hollow and project from the enceinte to 
which they connect by narrow throats. In this respect they are different from the later 
Byzantine towers at St. Hilarion. The ruins of towers lying outside the Venetian- 
Frankish east curtain (38 and 40) have been alternatively assigned as Byzantine and as
2 In Cobham, p. 49.
3 Faucherre, Cerines, in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 384-90. N ote too Vaivre in the same, p. 44. Site 
visits made on 11 April 2007 and 1 7 ,1 8 ,2 2  June 2007.
4 Thus M egaw, M ilitiy Architecture, p. 200. Faucherre, Cerines, in Vaivre and Plagnieux p. 385 has 
75m square.
246
Frankish -  part of an east bay outwork that they created.5 A subsequent phase of 
Byzantine building appears to include the horse-shoe tower (23) and adjacent wall on 
the south-east side of the curtain. Beyond the south curtain, connected with it by a 
short cross wall from the horse-shoe tower, is a much more substantial outer 
Byzantine wall with solid pentagonal spurs. In separate articles published in the same 
year, Megaw ascribed this strong defensive wall to the reign of Heraclius (610-641), 
and the reign of Basil I (867-886). But as it most probably post-dates the inner curtain 
and horse-shoe tower and as Cyprus was effectively demilitarised between the treaty 
of 688 and Byzantium’s recovery of the island in 965, it seems more likely that it was 
built later -  in the later tenth century.6
A round headed arch set with irregularly shaped voussoirs provided for passage 
through the inner Byzantine south curtain into its south ward formed by the strong 
outer wall. An identical arch, later reduced by the Venetians and used by them as their 
access to their tunnel leading to the basement level of their great south-west bastion 
(17), is set in the short west wall of this outer Byzantine ward. A third doorway, this 
one being oval in shape, led to a passage that penetrated the southern wall of the outer 
ward (16). Most likely these last two were both posterns.
Beyond the north-west tower was a chapel (3), later known as St. George of the 
Donjon, thought to be twelfth century. Megaw ultimately suggested that this north­
west tower and chapel were enclosed in an outer wall that ran the length of the castle 
on its west side, thereby forming an outer west ward. If this were so, then Kyrenia 
was endowed with double walls on two sides before the Franks ever arrived.
However, we have no archaeological evidence for such an outer west wall in this 
period.
5 M egaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 13; Faucherre, op. cit., p. 385.
6 Foss, pp. 133-6,143-4; M egaw, Betwixt Greeks and Saracens, p. 513; Le fortificazioni bizantine, p. 
210; Military Architecture, p. 200; Lawrence, p. 215; Metcalf, Byzantine Cyprus, p. 470.
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KYRENIA CASTLE
1 E n trance p a s s a g e
2 G uardroom
3 B yzantine C hape l
4 North W est Tower
5 W est W ard (north end)
6 W est W ard (cen tre)
7 G ate -H ouse  (chape l over)
8 U ndercroft with 2 up p er s to rey s
9  To W est R an g e  (upper sto reys)
10 Early Frankish U ndercroft
11 To G ate -H o u se  (m iddle storey)
12 V aulted Cell with u p p er storey
13 S ou th  W est Tow er (Byzantine)
14 W est W ard, S o u th  End (V enetian 
gun cham ber)
15 S ou th  W est B astion
16 S ou th  W ard & F rankish  gatew ay
17 To S ou th  W est B astion 
(low er level)
18 To S ou th  Fighting G allery
19 V enetian G allery
20  S ou th  E a st Tower
21 G a te  to  E a st Outw ork
22 G un C h am b er (site  of F rankish  
tow er)
23  H o rse sh o e  Tower
24  W ater Tank
25  E ast Fighting G allery
26  North R a n g e  (foundations)
27  North E a st Tower
28  North E a s t S ta irc a se
29  C h am b er with reco n s tru c ted  floor
30  North W est S ta irc a s e
31 U ndercroft
32  P o ste rn  G a te
3 3  S ite  of F rank ish  P o ste rn
34
35
36
37  S o u th  Ditch
38 B a s e  of W ater Tow er
3 9  s ite  of E a s t outw ork
40  tow er
41 outw ork
42  forebuilding
B yzan tin e  C a stle
Frankish recon stru ction s  
an d  ad d ition s
V enetian  recon stru ction s  
an d  ad d ition s
Forebuilding
Inner N orth W est Tower
W est Ditch l C _
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The Frankish Castle 
Overview
The Franks developed this very considerably. Using fine ashlar masonry, they 
replaced the Byzantine curtains on the north and east. Remains of the Byzantine wall 
on the north show that the Frankish wall simply followed the same line. On the east 
however, this is less certain:- Faucherre suggested that the trace of a curtain wall lying 
some 12 m. outside the line of the later Frankish-Venetian one, along with the ruins of 
the tower (40) mentioned above, may possibly be the superseded Byzantine east 
front.7 However, it would be odd if on that side the Franks were content to lose space 
by building within the Byzantine line while on the south, they constructed a curtain 
beyond the Byzantine perimeter thereby creating a third line with intervening wards 
on that side. Whether the Franks inherited and strengthened an outer Byzantine wall 
on the west, or instead were the first to build such an outer west wall, is not certain, as 
the massive Venetian works have obscured earlier fortifications on this side.8 At the 
north-east comer, they developed a two storey horse-shoe tower (27), while at the 
north-west angle they enhanced the Byzantine tower as more fully discussed below.
A forework was clasped on to the front of the west half of the north curtain 
(32,33,34), and an outwork (39) created at the south-east angle provided further 
masonry fortifications. Whether the Franks enhanced the outermost line of defences 
by developing the “castle harbour” on the west is impossible to say. Either way, 
Kyrenia constituted by far and away the Franks’ most important fortress, on which 
they focussed their greatest attention. A little work is early thirteenth century, perhaps 
of around the time of the wars of 1228-1233 or shortly after, but most is later. 
Comparing Kyrenia’s north-east tower and its archeres set in galleries within the 
thickness of the curtains with corresponding examples in France, Faucherre suggested 
that these defensive works date to the second half of the thirteenth century.9 It would 
seem just as likely however, that they were even later, either copying earlier French
7 Faucherre, op. cit., p. 385.
8 M egaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 6; Military Architecture p.202.
9 Faucherre, op. cit., pp. 38 8 ,3 9 0 .
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examples, or borrowing, certainly in the case of the north-east tower, from Cilician 
Armenia. The fall of the mainland Crusader state in 1291 may have stimulated some 
building campaign, but we should be guarded on this. Under Prince James, it 
successfully withstood numerous assaults in the Genoese siege of 1374. When he later 
became King and returned to Cyprus in 1385, James initiated building work at a 
number of sites and so it is likely he who commissioned some of the domestic 
structures set against Kyrenia’s west wall that have been identified as fourteenth 
century work. Though the Venetians drastically reshaped and strengthened the castle, 
draining its harbour and turning it into a ditch, enough of the medieval fabric remains 
from which to gauge its impressiveness.10
North -  West angle and salient, West wall and entrance
The upper storey of the north-west tower was an early Frankish improvement, but the 
whole tower was gradually transformed by a series of additions into a substantial 
rectangular structure projecting slighdy obliquely from the line of the curtain. Clearly 
it commanded the entrance on the west wall and was a conspicuous feature of the 
medieval castle. North of this developed tower, and therefore covering both it and the 
Byzantine chapel from the sea, is a salient wall now terminated by the great Venetian 
north-west circular bastion. The problem as to whether this north wall of the salient 
obscures earlier Byzantine work corresponds with the uncertainty as to the existence 
of an enclosing outer Byzantine wall on the west side. What may be said with some 
certainty, however, is that this salient wall was at least developed by the Franks.
Higher up, its eastern portion consists of the smaller facing blocks used by the Franks 
on the contiguous projecting northern curtain to the east. Each of these sections of 
wall possesses a similar archere, set in low embrasures reinforced with lintels below 
their pointed arches. The embrasure of that in the salient is more recessed owing to its 
thicker wall and is slightly wider (1.48 deep v. 1.15 m wide) than its eastern 
neighbour (1.26 m v. 0.93 m). Internally, a simple cross wall (west wall of 34) 
separated the projecting northern curtain from the salient, but the two archeres show 
that these works are contemporaneous. The facing blocks are decidedly larger on the 
lower portion of the eastern salient and throughout upon its western face. In
10 Jeffery, p. 315; M egaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 3; M egaw, M ilitary Architecture, p. 206.
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dimension these are almost, though not quite, similar to those used in the Venetian 
north-west roundel They are not, however, joined in the same way as the Venetian 
work. A surviving three corbelled brattice at parapet level, below which is a very 
small embrasure, helps argue that these western portions of the salient are also 
Frankish work, being likely of a slightly later date than the initial work on the eastern 
part of the salient.
Whatever its origin, the outer west wall would have run from this north-west salient 
screening the entire length of the original Byzantine west curtain. We can at least 
discern the Frankish entrance (7) built into this inner, Byzantine wall. This proceeds 
through a pointed arch, 2.5 m wide with provision for one gate and a portcullis 
behind, through a simple bent or L-shaped pointed barrel vaulted entrance - 11.4 m to 
the turn and a further 8.1 m thence into the courtyard within. All is constructed in 
massive masonry of varying dimensions, up to .68 m in depth, and similar to the 
blockwork used in the town walls at their south-west angle. Megaw took this to 
indicate a fourteenth-century date, but we can not be certain. Above this entrance was 
the chamber for operating the portcullis, while above that again was the castle chapel, 
lit by large, pointed arched windows to the front. Only here is there much left of the 
uppermost storey of the Frankish west range.
South of the gateway, the Lusignans created a series of chambers against the exterior 
of this innermost curtain. These are in two sections. The first is of two storeys 
constituting a single chamber at each level (12), its lower level gained from a short 
flight of stairs up from the courtyard. The more extensive range further south (8) was 
of three storeys however. The lowest level, accessed from the courtyard via doorways 
made in the Byzantine curtain is a pointed barrel vaulted undercroft of three bays, 
used most likely for storage purposes. Its western, outer walls had shafts that were 
most likely for ventilation, rather than being arrow slits as Faucherre thought. At its 
southern end, there is a doorway set within a large, pointed arch. Underneath this 
level lay the oubliettes that had much use in the Lusignan period, the castle being a 
principal state prison. Above, the slightly pointed vaulted middle storey, consisting of 
four bays, was lit by simple rectangular windows. This was entered through a large 
pointed arched doorway in turn gained from an external stone stairway (9) that 
ascended from the courtyard. This continued up to the now ruined upper storey,
|
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consisting of three rooms. Through the intervening chamber (12), this series of 
chambers connected directly with the chapel (7), but additionally, it was furnished 
with a stone gallery corbelled onto the inner wall, providing an alternative means of 
passage that by-passed the chapel. The whole range is constructed of the same large 
blocks as the gatehouse, so appears to be of one build. The doorway and windows on 
the outer (western) wall, suggest that, from the outset, this was screened by an outer 
wall. Megaw assigned this range to the thirteenth century on the basis of the corbels 
that supported the transverse arches of the middle storey -  an interpretation that 
conflicts with his dating of the gatehouse. In any event, it is apparent that the outer 
west wall must have been built early in the Frankish period, if not before. North of the 
gateway, against the inside of the Byzantine west wall, there are traces of a large 
upper chamber of the fourteenth century, supported by elaborate corbels, over an 
earlier long and lofty undercroft of three bays (10).
The west ward (5 and 6) between the two curtains extended from the north from the 
salient to the south-west comer of the castle at which point a wide gateway (16) 
provided access to the segmented gap between the outer Byzantine wall and beyond 
that again the Frankish curtain on the south, thus providing one route to the latter’s 
fighting gallery.11
South-West angle, South wall, and South-East angle
No trace has been found of any tower at the south-west or south-east comers of the 
Frankish curtain. Previous commentators have remarked that it is astonishing to 
imagine that the Lusignans omitted to create angle towers at such important points, 
especially here on the side most vulnerable to attack. But Kyrenia would not have 
been unique in such an apparent deficiency. For example, there were no towers at the 
angles of the enceinte of the greatest Crusader Castle of mainland Greece -  Chlemutzi 
(Castel Tomese/Clairmont), whose lords, the Villehardouins were, like the Lusignans, 
another powerful French dynasty. In Cyprus itself, reference to Famagusta Castle is 
instructive: its north-east angle has no tower, perhaps because of the additional 
defence it had from an outwork leading to the port. Kyrenia’s south-east angle was
11 Hill, 2, pp. 266-8; 433; Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, pp. 2-3, 5-6; M egaw, Militrary Architecture, 
pp. 200-3; Faucherre in Vaivre and Pagnieux, p. 387.
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similarly associated with fortified outworks centred on a harbour. Such archaeological
evidence as we have for Kyrenia appears inconclusive and previous commentators are
not in agreement. Megaw decided against any tower at the south-west angle, but
10inferred one at the south-east. Faucherre recently drew attention to a sizeable 
doorway located at the south-west (14) and the gateway at the south-east (21) as 
being indicative of towers at both angles.13 This is not, however, altogether 
convincing. In order to reach the south-west doorway in question, one must first 
proceed through a small rectangular doorway (13) cut into the west side of the inner 
Byzantine enceinte, where its south-west tower was located. Within this entry, there is 
a high, narrow, barrel vaulted chamber, from the southern end of which a lower, 
barrel vaulted tunnel zigzags down into the middle level of the Venetian bastion. 
Faucherre’s doorway is roughly halfway down this tunnel at a point where it doubles 
back upon itself (14). This series of tunnels is quite likely be Venetian work, 
complementing their second tunnel leading to the basement of their bastion running 
down from the modified Byzantine arch (17) mentioned above. As we will see, the 
original Venetian work at this south -  west angle apparently involved no tower and it 
seems likely that their work merely followed the lines of what was there before. So far 
as the south-east angle is concerned, the large pointed arch (21) set in the curtain at 
the southern end of the east wall is certainly Frankish in origin. It was later reduced in 
size by the Venetians. Its location is however, considerably to the north of the 
Frankish south-east angle, making it more likely to be an avenue to the outwork, as 
suggested by the Johns/Last plan. With regard to the historical evidence, we should 
note that Silvestor Minio’s description of 1529 talks of three towers only -  an old, 
rebuilt one towards the north above the sea, and two strong towers on the west and 
east. Hill quite reasonably considered these to represent the Lusignan north -  east 
tower and the new Venetian circular bastions of the north -  west and south -  east 
angles. These two ‘roundels’ are undoubtedly early enough in style to have been built 
by 1529 and certainly the Venetians started work at Kyrenia quite soon after they 
acquired control of the island -  expenditure began as early as 1504. The date of 1544 
that is inscribed on the back of the west curtain no doubt indicates when that part of
12 Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, pp. 7 ,1 3 .
13 Faucherre, op. cit., p. 387.
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the newly converted fortress was at least substantially complete.14
Whether or not they omitted to create towers at the two south angles, in the fourteenth 
century the Franks did however construct an outer curtain, thus creating a third line of 
defence on this side. As with the ward created on the west, this new work created a 
narrow area or lice on the south and indeed this appears to have been segmented in 
turn in that the Lusignans enhanced where necessary the outer angles of the Byzantine 
pentagonal buttresses so that they abutted the internal face of the new Frankish 
curtain. This new Frankish wall was equipped with at least one vaulted fighting 
gallery, discernible at ground level as a series of semi-pointed, arched embrasures, 
open at that time to the south ward. These are akin to those in the upper storey of the 
north-east tower.
South-east Outwork, East wall, North-east angle, North wall and North wall 
forebuilding.
As noted above, north of the south -  east angle, a gate (21) in the east curtain led to 
what may have been a small outwork. It is now difficult to be clear as to its exact 
extent and origin. Remains of a wall running from the Venetian cross wall blocking 
the eastern entry to the south ditch (37), to the ruined tower (38) on the shore may be 
elements of a southern portion of such an outwork or possibly part of an original 
Byzantine curtain that Faucherre discerned was located 12 m outside the line of the 
Frankish east curtain. Megaw believed that the outwork’s southern boundary 
consisted of ‘a stout curtain wall pierced by a postem gate’15 that linked the ruined 
tower to the castle’s main south-east angle. It is not possible though, to verify this 
arrangement from the remains on the ground and it takes no account of the remnants 
of the wall running to the south. The tower’s position in relation to the line of the 
outer Byzantine south curtain suggests that it was probably not an element of their 
works and is then to be associated with the Lusignan period. This ‘water’ tower is 
particularly complex (see plan). As at Saranda Kolones, horizontally laid columns 
from classical times were used to reinforce its walls, but as at the Paphos site, this
14 Mariti, p. 51; Enlart, pp. 422-3; Jeffery, pp. 307 ,312 ; Hill, 3, pp. 850-1; M egaw, Kyrenia Castle, 
passim; M egaw, Military Architecture, pp. 200-2; Perbellini, (1988), pp. 17-19; A. B oase, p. 104.
15 A.H.S. M egaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 13.
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does not determine whether this was Frankish or Byzantine. Clearly it made provision 
for small vessels to dock, no doubt for the transfer of supplies from larger vessels that 
could not easily pass the reef into this eastern bay.
Kyrenia 
Harbour Water Tower at 
South East Angle
38Rebate for door
Ventian 
south east 
bastion
Columns
15m
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From this water tower, the outwork’s circuit probably looped back to connect with a 
second tower (40) -  this being the one described by Megaw as a Frankish tower 
projecting from the east curtain. The remains of this tower do not permit an 
understanding of its shape, but at ground level, its mass of mixed masonry shows that 
it was solid. At 5.3 m wide, it was not inconsiderable. It is located immediately below 
the point where the line of the main curtain is offset as a result of Venetian 
overbuilding. Just here, is a Venetian gun port (22) set obliquely and high in the wall 
that appears to have utilised an earlier Frankish doorway. Quite likely this doorway 
was associated with the large south-east gateway still visible on the internal side of 
the main curtain (21). Most probably it connected to the interval tower (40), which 
suggests that this had an upper storey, and thence to the outwork.
On this east side, the Franks wholly replaced the Byzantine curtain. The new Frankish 
wall was endowed with one fighting gallery (25), or at least a series of casemates 
terminating in arrow slits, subsequently filled in with Venetian masonry. Indeed the 
southern third of this east wall was completely overbuilt by the Venetians. This 
overbuilding ends in the offset mentioned above, north from which point, the lower 
third of the rest of this Lusignan curtain has also been overbuilt, most likely also 
during the Venetian period. This is reflected in the size of the facing blocks, the 
Venetian masonry being considerably larger than the Frankish blocks, evident above 
and pierced by a series of surviving arrow slits.
Towards its north end, this east, main curtain contains a blocked up arch, which may 
have been a postern, especially as just north of it there are the crude remnants of 
another outlying work (41), this being 1.55 m wide, and so likely a screening wall that 
ran down to the east bay. Within the curtain, a range of buildings were constructed 
that ran parallel to the wall, but were not connected with it. The southernmost 
structures, now collapsed, were of a different period to those to the north. These latter 
are now the main, surviving domestic chambers of the Frankish castle. As with those 
on the west, these are of three storeys, with cisterns in the lower storey of one bay, the 
middle storey being at courtyard level, and separated from the lofty upper storey by 
wooden flooring, access to which was gained by an external wooden gallery 
overlooking the courtyard. Similar, albeit smaller chambers, correspondingly ran 
along the inside of the northern curtain (26 and 31).
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The north-east tower (27) is an impressive horseshoe, 12 m. wide, projecting 14 m. 
from the main enceinte. It has a substantial glacis. The first stage of this plinth is 2 m 
high above ground level, and is faced with 6 courses of varying shaped blocks, 
ranging from 0.22 m, though usually nearer 0.33 m deep, to up to 0.5 long. The 
second stage carries on the glacis for a further 18 courses. The tower is of one build 
with its two wing walls that run a little way along the connecting curtains. The lower 
level of the tower connected with the erstwhile fighting galleries of both these 
curtains and so would seem to have been built at the same time. The tower provided 
for three fighting levels, being a lower and upper floor both with loopholes, and a 
third on the roof. The 11 loop-holes of the lower storey are set in simple V shaped 
embrasures, whereas the five in the upper internal storey open are set in semi-pointed 
arched recesses (1.85 m wide x 2.5 m high) and thus appear a development beyond 
the more simple ones in the lower chamber. Most of these archeres a etrier were sited 
so as to alternate from one level to another;16 and they provide the means for an 
especially aggressive defence. The upper storey and roof levels were attained via 
stairs from the otherwise separated east range of domestic quarters, this reflecting the 
connection between the military and domestic elements of the medieval castle.
Like the curtain on the east side, the northern curtain entirely replaced its Byzantine 
predecessor. Owing to the destruction caused by the building of cells within this wall 
by the British, it is difficult to be certain now whether the two rows of loopholes 
visible from the exterior reflected two successive mural galleries below parapet level, 
or if one succeeded the other as the wall was heightened. It is possible to infer that 
one of these galleries was vaulted and open backed, being supported on square pillars, 
providing a fighting platform 6 m. high. This northern curtain was certainly 
heightened on one occasion, though most likely not two occasions as Megaw held.17 It 
is worth noting that the parapet superseded in the final heightening was of an identical 
arrangement to its successor: big merlons endowed with V shaped embrasures 
narrowing to loopholes and narrow crenels, this implying perhaps only a short lapse 
of time between the initial building and its raising. Whether both may be confidently
16 Faucherre, p. 388.
17 Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 11; Faucherre, p. 387.
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attributed to the thirteenth century however, is perhaps not altogether clear.18 The 
alternative suggestion that the final heightening may post date the Genoese naval 
attacks in 137419 is of course speculation but remains a possibility.
Towards its western end, the north Frankish curtain wall prescribed a right-angled 
turn so as to join the enhanced north-west tower. The resulting projection provided for 
access to the foreshore. This passage led from within the castle through a small gate 
(at 34) in the original Byzantine curtain which was retained from here west to the 
tower (35). The passage then prescribed a right angle turn to a postern gate (32). As 
Megaw observed, at some point, the Franks elaborated this by creating a much longer 
forebuilding (42) beyond their own northern curtain, which extended the fortified 
avenue of approach to this northern entry point. As he noted, this forebuilding appears 
to have been roughly similar in length to the early Frankish undercroft (31) located
onopposite -  on the inside of the curtain. Its terminal postern is at 33 on the diagram. 
Although the forebuilding is now lost, it is possible to infer its overall dimensions 
through a study of the exterior of the main wall. Unlike the eastern half of the north 
curtain, the western portion had no archeres, reflecting that it was screened from the 
beginning of the Frankish period. Two rectangular doorways (the western one being 
set in a high, pointed arch) are located in this part of the main curtain, set at the level 
of the fighting gallery to the east -  created out of the superseded first battlemented 
wall walk. This reflects that the forebuilding possessed an upper story, accessed 
directly from within the enceinte, built only when the main curtain wall was raised to 
its later, present height. The eastern doorway is directly underneath two corbels of a 
brattice and above what Megaw discerned as a portcullis slot, now filled in. This 
suggests that these defensive arrangements were superseded and augmented by a 
further, short extension of the forebuilding. At ground level at least, the forebuilding 
was divided into two sections by a cross wall, now appearing as a mere buttress. The 
whole forebuilding was probably demolished as part of the Venetians’
‘improvements’. They were content to seal up the truncated remains with a small
18 Thus Enlart, p. 425 and fig. 367; Faucherre, p. 387 and fig. 4.
19 Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 11.
20 Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 11.
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rectangular doorway placed in what became the outer wall (32). However, this still 
provided for a right angled approach to the entrance in the curtain behind.21
Kyrenia Castle 1
South curtain. In this excavated portion (west section -  16 on plan), the solid 
Byzantine prow shaped buttresses of their outer wall can be seen almost abutting the 
Frankish wall with its arcade of large embrasures visible at ground level.
21 Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 11; Perbellini, (1973), p. 30; (1988), p. 19; Megaw, Miltary 
Architecture, pp. 200-3; Faucherre, p. 387.
259
Kyrenia Castle 2
Large Frankish gate-way (21 on plan) opening from inside the east curtain. It led to 
the south-east outwork and may have connected with the first floor level doorway (22 
on plan) that also served the outwork. It was blocked by the Venetians. Their tunnel 
leading south-east to the lower level of their great south-east bastion can be seen at
ground level.
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Kyrenia Castle 3
Eastern enceinte. This photograph shows the ‘kink’ in the line of the wall, being 
Venetian overbuilding to the south (left) but with the medieval wall still showing its 
archeres in the lower half of the north (right) section. Behind the trees (centre) is the 
Venetian gunport utilising a Frankish doorway (22 on plan) set at first storey level. 
This very likely led out to the interval tower -  the remains of which appear as a mass 
of solid masonry (centre foreground -  40 on plan) -  and which likely articulated with 
and as part of the south-east outwork that included the water tower (39 and 38 on
plan) to the south.
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Kyrenia Castle 4
Water tower (38 on plan). A prominent part of the outwork at the south-east angle, 
this provided a dock for small vessels approaching via the east bay. The use of ancient
columns can be seen.
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Kyrenia Castle 5
Horseshoe shaped north-east tower (27 on plan). The tower has a considerable glacis. 
There are two storeys above ground level, each with archeres that reflect that those on 
the upper floor are later. The tower has its own wing walls on either side. The parapet 
was modified by the Venetians but provided a third fighting platform in the Lusignan
period.
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Kyrenia Castle 6
North Curtain. The east (left) portion of the curtain shows two levels of archeres 
below the parapet level which is endowed with further archeres in the merlons. The 
west (right) portion was screened in the Lusignan period by an extensive forebuilding, 
accessed at its upper level by the doorways now left stranded in the wall. The 
forebuilding was probably extended on at least one occasion. The remains of a cross 
wall within the forebuilding can be detected at ground level beneath the west (right) 
of the two doorways. The forebuilding was demolished by the Venetians.
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Kyrenia Castle 7
Frankish rectangular right-angled entrance (7 on plan) through the inner west curtain. 
The coats of arms above the entrance arch were relocated here in the early twentieth
century.
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Frankish Town Walls
There is now little to be seen of the walled town or bourg, which was ranged to the 
west of the castle. The remains of three Frankish towers have been traced and 
variously described. That at the south-west angle (A) is circular, being 20 m in 
circumference and faced with massive bonded masonry (0.5 m in depth x 0.8 to 0.95 
m in length), its upper courses being eti bossage. Internally it constituted one large 
chamber with a dome, now with an opening in the centre. It was enclosed at the rear 
from where it was entered through a door, the drawbar slots for which may be seen, 
covered by a relieving arch. Attached to its east side was a structure that Enlart 
speculated contained a stair to link the wall walk of the curtain to the roof of the 
tower. This tower protruded significantly beyond the curtain which ran away east 
towards the south-west comer of the castle, and north (where it is 1.6 m thick) to the 
mouth of the harbour. The masonry of the surviving elements of this curtain attached 
to the tower is similar, making it appear that they are of the same period.
The west ami of the town wall ran north through a second surviving tower (B). 
Externally it was semi-circular, and tapered outwards at its base. Internally, it 
consisted of two rectangular chambers one above the other, each with narrow 
rectangular windows. The chambers’ domed roofs have collapsed, but surviving 
corbels show that the tower once carried machicolations. This particular feature 
suggests a late fourteenth or fifteenth-century date, but may of course be an 
elaboration of a tower from earlier in the Frankish period. Previous commentators 
have associated this tower with a west gate: indeed both Jeffery and Megaw believed 
it to be one of a pair of towers serving this purpose. A small part of the medieval wall 
can be noted at the point at its north-west comer near the sea. Here there is still a 
squared off plinth on which a church now stands (C).
The third surviving tower is the smallest. It is located at the south-west comer of the 
old harbour at an angle of the wall where its attached fragments of curtain show that it 
ran off north on one side and east, towards the castle, on the other (D). The tower is 
circular and possesses two round headed windows that appear to be original. It stands 
on a plinth standing to a height of 1.8 m from the ground, and consists of ashlar 
blocks 0.36 m deep of varying length but up to about 0.45. It is then to be 
distinguished from the larger towers to the west and south-west. 22
Finally, stretches of the town wall survive on the harbour’s side where it approaches 
the castle. This is in two sections. First is a length of 2.8 m, this section being a plinth 
about 5 m in depth above the ground, and consisting of different blockwork from an 
adjoining longer section 13.6 m long, running on towards the castle. The latter section 
had a large building constructed against its harbour side, its narrow end (3.4 m) 
showing it to have been vaulted and likely to have been a warehouse
22 Enlart, pp. 422-3 and figs 365 and 366; Jeffery, p. 316. The depiction on the Attar map of 1542 
shows no wall whatever on the harbour side. Attar, p. 90.
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Kyrenia town walls 1
Large round tower (A on plan) at south-west angle of the enceinte. The bossed 
stonework of the upper half is clearly distinguishable from the well faced masonry 
below, where the blocks used are considerably larger.
Kyrenia town walls 2
D-shaped tower (B on plan) on the town’s west wall, possibly one of a pair protecting 
an entrance between. The elaborate corbels for machicolation are apparent, suggesting 
a late fourteenth or fifteenth-century date for this elaboration.
268
Outer defences -  harbours; ditches; reef
Quite clearly, the masonry defences of the Frankish castle and town were complex 
and sophisticated. The excellent plan of the castle produced by Megaw and included 
above (with additions), which was based largely on the results of a survey carried out 
in 1948 by C.N. Johns and J.S. Last, is not however matched by any wholly 
satisfactory plan of the overall castle -  harbours -  town complex. Enlart’s plan was 
naturally based on the remains apparent to him on his visit over a hundred years ago, 
but as these were greatly altered in the Venetian period, it was difficult for him to be 
clear as to the features that preceded that time. Thus his plan made no allowance for a 
possible castle harbour, showing instead a dry ditch on the west side as well as outside 
the south curtain; it shows nothing of the outworks outwith the east curtain and needs 
developing in respect of its trace of the town wall and artificial reef. Unfortunately 
Jeffery did not attempt such a plan in spite of his obvious knowledge and enthusiasm. 
Enlart’s plan has been simply reproduced ever since, with the exceptions of those 
produced in 1947 by Newman and in 1992 by Perbellini. The latter is mainly of 
interest for its plot of the reef but otherwise adds nothing. Newman’s is imperfect but 
it has the merit of being quite carefully checked against what was then extant and 
emphasises, most importantly, a castle harbour. The plan of the town walls included 
above is based on Newman’s sketch. The question of whether there was a castle 
harbour as distinct from merely a dry ditch on the west side of the castle is of some 
importance for this would have considerably enhanced the castle’s defensibility. In 
spite of his plan showing a dry ditch here on the west side of the castle, Enlart 
observed that there ‘was a broad moat into which seawater flows’. This note appears 
to have been ignored by Megaw and most other later writers who postulated the 
existence of merely a dry ditch here, as well as on the south side of the castle. 
Interestingly too, the depiction on Attar’s map of 1542 shows the sea as coming up to 
this side of the castle. So if instead we accept Newman’s clear view based on his 
assessment of the remains, it seems likely that Enlart’s ‘broad moat’ may well have 
been once a castle harbour, separating castle from town and quite distinct from that of 
the town harbour.23
23 Attar, p. 90; Enlart, pp. 423-4; Newman, pp. 6-7 with sketch and plan; Muller-Weiner, p. 87; 
Perbellini (1973), p. 17; (1992), p. 7; Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, passim-, Megaw, Military 
Architecture, pp. 199-203; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 97.
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Access to this harbour would have been through a narrow throat at its head, over 
which there ,may have been some arrangement constituting part of the causeway that 
led up to the castle’s main entrance -  as later modified and used by the Venetians as 
their entry into their fortress. Such a castle harbour must have opened into the mouth 
of the main, town harbour inside the point where the short mole ran out to the solid 
structure that held the heavy iron chain in place at this, its east end. That mole appears 
to have carried its own wall judging by the surviving fragment attached to the solid 
structure. This chain across the mouth of the main harbour was raised and lowered as 
required at its west end in a tower that formed the north end of the town wall. Jeffery 
recorded how, in 1913, he was allowed to convert this chain tower into ‘an office and 
boatshed for the Customs officers -  with the especial object of preserving the ancient 
landmark.’ 24
If such a castle harbour did indeed exist, rather than just a dry ditch, then the castle 
benefited from the close protection of water on three of its four sides. To the north, it 
was further protected by an artificial reef that ran from beyond its north-west tower, 
parallel to the north curtain, and extending well to the east of the north-east tower.
This reef has now been largely overbuilt by a modem pier in a refashioning of the 
yacht harbour that took place in the later twentieth century, but its extent and scale is 
discernible from aerial photographs taken before this development. The reef had the 
dual purpose of creating a barrier against direct approach from the open sea to the 
north, effectively creating a canal in front of the north curtain and also largely 
enclosing the bay on the east side of the castle. Entry to this east bay was only through 
a single, narrow opening, thereby creating another small, separate harbour, 
simultaneously providing some measure of protection for the castle from sea attack on 
this eastern flank. The fortified outwork that connected this anchorage with the castle 
proper facilitated the receipt of materiel in time of need.
Clearly the most exposed side of the castle was that facing south. Quite probably its 
ditch, which likely ran continuously with a ditch lying outside the southern span of 
the town wall, was always dry, as previous commentators have remarked. It had no
24 Jeffery, pp. 307, 317; Perbellini (1973), p. 16; (1988), p.19.
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revetment on its outer side where it faced open country, which encourages this view. 
However, set against this, it is still possible to discern that the adjacent rocky bay at 
its eastern end was cut at some point in the past, perhaps to allow for the entry of sea 
water into this ditch. Any such channel for water was however, sealed off by the 
Venetians whose cross wall shuts off the south ditch from this eastern bay. The castle 
does not appear to have been overlooked on this side, as held by Perbellini, though no 
doubt this was the side that was the target of most assaults.25
Officers in charge; castle and town
We have some references, mainly from later times, to the names and positions of 
officers in command of the castle. From these it is apparent that, like Famagusta,
Kyrenia was under the command of a Captain, sometimes known as Chief, who held 
overall control of the town and castle. This ‘Chief and Castellan of the Castle and the 
Bourg’ sometimes delegated the Castellan’s duties, but generally jurisdiction over 
town and castle appears to have remained vested in the one senior officer. As 
Castellan, It is most likely that his offices and chambers were located in the classical 
position controlling the main gateway on the west -  ‘ante portam castri, videlicet in 
banco domini castellani’.
Clearly the reference to the bourg of Kyrenia refers to its walled town. Its relationship 
with the castle, so far as contemporaries were concerned, is perhaps reflected in other 
phrases used to describe both. Makhairas, for instance, refers variously to an ‘inner 
castle’, an ‘upper castle’, and a ‘lower castle’. This also appears to be the same 
perspective we may infer from references to the bourg at St. Hilarion, which there 
must relate to its sprawling lower ward.27
25 Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, p. 13; Perbellini (1973), p. 16; Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 200.
26 See above -  Part II, Walled towns, captains and castellans, pp. 92-3.
27 Makhairas, §§ 425 and 462, pp. 405 and 447; Enlart, p. 428.
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LA CAVA
Leondari Vouno [Lion Mountain] 
modern -  Liontarovounos; Aronas of Athalassa
La Cava was built on the top of a hill plateau shaped roughly like a figure of eight, 
which rises some 50 to 60 m above the plain. It is an ancient site inasmuch as it is 
said to have been a centre of rule before the establishment of Ledra -  the precursor of 
Nicosia. The Lusignans occupied and at least partly fortified the site in the aftermath 
of the disastrous war with Genoa. What they created was first and foremost a chateau 
de plaisance but it must also have been a symbolical gesture to celebrate the 
endurance of their mle and its connection with inherited tradition. The site may well 
have been selected for its defensibility but it is just as likely that it was to promote the 
castle’s prominence as a symbol of power and lordship.1 From there it would have 
been possible to monitor traffic on a one-time road from Nicosia to Lamaka which ran 
below. If that purpose was a reason for constructing La Cava and given that it 
appears that the fortification at Lamaka was begun at the same time, it may be 
possible to denote here the elements of an overall royal strategy. At best, however, 
such a rationale for La Cava must have been secondary. Its medieval name is 
supposed to be derived from an especially large, square cistern, cut into the plateau’s 
north side, one of several that were sunk into the its rocky surface.2 Today, it is 
garrisoned by the National Guard and known as Aronas of Athalassa or 
Liontarovounos and is not to be confused with its neighbouring sister plateau, simply 
called Aronas, occupied by Turkish troops across the nearby Attila line.3
The site has attracted scant attention by modem scholars. Enlart appears to have 
overlooked it. Jeffery gave a reasonable description of the remains, but by his time,
La Cava was much mined, having been exploited as a quarry from about 1870. Later 
writers made little or no comment. Of these, only Perbellini attempted any detail. He
1 On which see Creighton, p. 35.
2 Jeffery, p. 207; Makhairas, 2, p. 199.
3 I am grateful to Mr Adonis Taliodoros o f  the Press and Information O ffice for this information and 
for securing access for me on two separate occasions as noted below, fn. 13.
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identified three elements: the castle associated with which were gardens, water butts, 
cisterns and a ‘noble courtyard’; a ditch; and a protected agricultural area.4
Makhairas recorded that it was Peter II who began work here, while Amadi, FI. 
Bustron and Stephen of Lusignan noted that it was built by James I just after 1385.5 
Either way, it is noteworthy that like Sigouri, La Cava’s foundation appears to post­
date the Genoese occupation of Famagusta and consequently is to be identified with 
that development.
Certainly James appears to have added to it if he did not initiate it. In his list of 
James’ works, Amadi wrote that James ‘fece la gentilissima stantia, zardin et vigna de 
la Cava’ implying clearly that such work was not of a military nature.6 This image of 
La Cava being more of a palatial, country retreat than a fortification, is borne out by 
the words of Luchino dal Campo, the chancellor of Nicolo III d’Este, Duke of Ferrara, 
who visited King Janus there in 1412. Luchino and his master encountered the king, at 
play with his courtiers, in
a palace with a garden and you can’t see anything more beautiful, with many 
fountains; and between the fountains there is one that comes out from an 
orange tree. The water goes so high that it can reach the branches (of the 
orange tree) and in this garden many beautiful kinds of fruit grow. They went 
further and they entered in the courtyard of the house and there the king took 
off some clothes until he wore only a giupone.(tunic).7
Similarly, Count Gabriele Capodilista of Padua, who visited in 1458, observed that 
there was a variety of fruits growing at La Cava, associated with which were some 
very considerable wells. These orchards must however, have been on the fertile 
ground below the rocky plateau on which the castle-palace was built.8
4 Jeffery, pp. 206-8; Hill, 2, p. 446; Perbellini (1973), p. 51 and aerial photograph on p. 49; M egaw, 
Military Architecture, p. 204; M olin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 105. As Jeffery noted
(p. 207), the plateau top was very rocky with negligible top soil, so any agricultural area must have 
been on land at the foot o f  the plateau. Makhairas, 2, p. 199.
5 Makhairas, § 597, p. 593 and Dawkins’ note in Makhairas, 2, p. 199; Amadi, p. 495; FI. Bustron, 
p. 352; Lusignan, Description, f. 36; Hill, 2, p. 430; Grivaud, p. 43.
6 Amadi, p. 495.
7 in Grivaud, p. 43.
8 in Cobham, p. 36; see fh. 4  above particularly Makhairas, 2, p. 199.
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Stephen of Lusignan tells us that there was a convent of Franciscan sisters in La 
Cava’s gardens. This may have had its origins in a church that dated back to the early 
fourteenth century, though in any event, the nunnery certainly antedated the castle- 
palace. This is an interesting parallel to the comparable arrangement in Nicosia where 
it appears that the location of the castle-palace complex there was also influenced by a 
pre-existing Dominican establishment and was deliberately built in association with it. 
Stephen reported that La Cava was damaged by the Mamluks after the battle of 
Khirokitia in 1426 but his narrative of events of those raids may not be wholly 
reliable as we have seen elsewhere.9 It played no recorded part in the civil war of the 
1460s. Along with other lesser fortifications, it appears to have been demolished by 
the Venetians. Later, the larger of the two towers was used by the Turks as a powder 
magazine, and as noted, it was only from the later nineteenth century that it was used 
as a convenient source of stone.10
LA CAVA
1
^ Platform 0 .4 5  high 9  8 0
P a s s a g e  cut into 
leve lled  rock
9 Lusignan, Description, f. 36; Leventis, p. 277. See the discussion on Episkopi in ‘An Urban 
Aristocracy’, above.
10 Jeffery, p. 208; Leventis, p. 279.
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The castle’s layout was naturally influenced by its site. As Jeffery recorded, the 
plateau was difficult to ascend, except at its southern tip. Its present meagre ruins are 
located in the centre of the plateau, across the narrowest point of the figure eight, 
these being primarily two massive, rectangular towers linked by a curtain wall some 
24.5 m in length and 3.77 m wide. The western tower is slightly the larger, but both 
towers were built of the finest masonry of a large size. Each possessed comparable 
entrances from outside, these being set at the re-entrant angles and consequently they 
faced each other beyond the line of the connecting curtain. Similarly both possessed 
entrances on their inner sides, these being located somewhat off centre and close to 
the external entry points, thus creating short routes from beyond this defensive, 
towered screen to the inner compound. The tower to the west is the better preserved. 
On its south, it survives to a height of 5.25 m along much of its length of 25.3 m. Its 
walls are 3.17 m thick except for its internal (north) side where this increases to 4.9 m 
to accommodate the first, broad treads of a mural stair, which turns a right angle to 
climb above the entrance from the field. It is still possible to identify the “chase” that 
Jeffery commented upon, being the slot for the heavy beam that would have slid 
behind this entrance’s wooden doors. The rebates for these doors appear to have 
enjoyed some restoration in 1969. The entrance passage itself -  being 2.47 m wide -  
has a floor platform that is now 0.45 m above ground level. Both outside and inside 
this tower, the medieval masons levelled the natural rock to provide even platforms 
and on the outside they cut a channel to create a passage. The tower’s internal walls 
were faced with tightly fitted large blocks over a rubble core. They are of varying 
dimensions, being up to 0.65 m deep, now surviving to a height of eight courses. 
Externally there is now but one surviving course of sizeable bossed masonry. Its 
facing blocks are very large: 0.8 m deep and of varying lengths up to 1.2 m. Above 
this, lesser facing blocks survive to a further height of 1.65 m after which the rubble 
core is exposed. Inside one wall of this tower, Jeffery was able to discern the remains 
of a vaulted hall, but this is now hard to distinguish.
The connected east tower was similarly constructed with thick walls and massive 
bossed masonry, at least on the face of its lowest courses. Its inner wall is 3.93 m 
thick: most likely it carried a stair like its twin -  but it is now too ruined to confirm
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this -  the tower survives only to a height of 1.42 m (on its west side). At 3 m wide, its 
inner entrance was a little wider than that of its western neighbour at 2.6 m.
Within the ‘castle’, are the signs of various lost walls, some of which could relate to 
the houses whose foundations were observed by Jeffery. One such wall runs roughly 
parallel to the north wall of the east tower; while set obliquely to the line of the north 
wall of the west tower and the interconnecting curtain are the remains of a rectangular 
building, the bottom of which was over a metre below ground level. Whether the 
enceinte of La Cava ever enclosed all these buildings with curtain walls to constitute a 
quadrangle, as at contemporary Sigouri, is hard to say. Recently, Nicolle took this to 
be the case but they are not similar, La Cava’s two towers being three times the size 
of the larger of the two traced at Sigouri.11 The only visible suggestion of a wall on 
any other side than our east-west one, is the stump of a wall running only a few 
metres north from the west tower, as shown on the plan.
In front of the wall, on its south side, there was a deep fosse, partly filled up in 
Jeffery’s day and wholly filled up today. This arrangement of fosse and wall divided 
the neck joining the north and south parts of the plateau.
The castle’s location would have enabled communication by beacon with Nicosia, 
about four miles to the north-west, and beyond to Buffavento in the northern 
mountains. Clearly then, La Cava was both a self-contained country estate and a 
handy retreat from which contact could be maintained easily with the outside world. 
Indisputably, it had a degree of defensibility that was greatly enhanced by its setting 
on the plateau, but the luxury of entrances to both of the towers, the fact that the 
towers and curtain do not extend right across the neck of the plateau to sever it 
completely into two portions and the apparent absence of a perimeter wall around the 
occupied area -  on the northern part of the plateau -  suggest that security was not a 
prime consideration. Although as we have seen, the towers appear to have been 
vaulted, there is no cause to suppose that there may have been provision to house 
artillery on now lost upper floors. Probably then, we should see the fortification of La 
Cava as a grand front designed perhaps to impress visitors before they passed within
11 D. N icolle, Crusader Castles in Cyprus, p. 21.
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to the centrepiece of the palace proper. As others have observed, militarily this was 
old fashioned, yet its conspicuous bulk must have created an impact. But as we noted 
above, what really impressed visitors were not the fortifications, but rather the 
orchards, gardens and water features, partly fed no doubt, by means of the medieval 
aqueduct lying to the north-west coming from the direction of the river Pedias that ran 
through Nicosia.12
La Cava 1
Exterior of west tower from the south
12 Cyprus Archaeological Museum, Photographic Dept., noting a restoration of 1969 after which its 
photographic records were taken. Site visits to La Cava on 31 Oct. 2006 and 21 June 2007, and to 
the aqueduct on 31 Oct. 2006.
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La Cava 2
Interior of west tower (west end).
La Cava 3
Interior of west tower looking east. The entrance from within the tower north into the 
castle’s interior is centre left. On the right is the east entrance from outside. There, 
note the restored (?) masonry with the rebate for the door. This photograph was taken 
in October 2006 -  by June 2007 (see La Cava 4) half of that work had gone.
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Main entrance to west tower, showing drawbar slot and remains of rebate for door. 
This photograph was taken in June 2007 -  compare with La Cava 3 above from
October 2006.
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La Cava 5
I
Steps in north-east angle of west tower.
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La Cava 6
West tower and central wall, showing main entrance to the tower on its east side.
La Cava 7
The east tower is in the foreground. Its entrance from the south is seen here in its west 
wall. Passage from the tower to the interior of the complex can be seen through the 
tower’s north side (right foreground). Beyond, the connecting wall runs away to the
better preserved west tower.
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La Cava 8__________
West tower and the central wall connecting to the east tower.
La Cava 9
Part of aqueduct that may have provided the water supply to La Cava from the
Nicosia area.
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LARNAKA 
(Alike; Haliki; Salines; Salina; La Scala)
After the Genoese capture of Famagusta, Lamaka acquired importance as an 
alternative port in the south-eastern half of the Lusignans’ kingdom, so it appears 
likely that it was first fortified during the ensuing fifty years. James I ‘fece assai case 
et portal dentro a la torre de San Lazaro’ (‘made many houses and portals inside the 
tower of St Lazarus’) which is most likely an allusion to a tower here, given 
Lamaka’s connections with that saint.1 There is a reference to ‘the lodging of the 
tower’ in respect of the Mamluk attack of 1425.2 Whether the tower in question may 
be associated with the Lusignan works within the present fort must remain open to 
debate. Oddly perhaps, there is no reference to a tower or castle in the narratives of 
visitors to the island in the Middle Ages, from which we can at least infer that it was 
indeed built late in our period and that it was not substantial enough to be especially 
remarkable.
The fortification has attracted almost no attention from modem scholars. Enlart, 
Jeffery and Megaw did not attempt descriptions and only very recently has Corvisier 
provided a study.3 His observation that, like Limassol, the fort that we see today was 
created out of the shell of a church, is interesting and worth considering.
As at Limassol, the remains of Lusignan work are now heavily encased in the artillery 
fortifications constructed by subsequent regimes, commencing with those of the 
Venetians.4 Like Limassol, it was located on the sea front, though unlike Limassol, it 
retains its place there now, reflecting still a fundamental reason for its foundation.
The principal factor supporting Corvisier’s view that the fort was first a church, is the 
vaulted projection that resembles an apse (2), which is set centrally on the east (sea)
1 Amadi, p. 495.
2 Makhairas, § 657, p. 635; ‘la stantia della torre de Salines’ (Amadi, p. 501); ‘la stanza de la 
torre de Salines’ ( FI. Bustron, p. 358). Noted by Perbellini, (1973), p. 33.
3 Corvisier, in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 391-4.
4 Lusignan, Description, f. 23.
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side. Externally, this was a five sided polygon. Corvisier noted that there are two 
polygonal towers on the northern part of Famagusta’s enceinte which are clearly not 
ecclesiastical in origin, but he thought that at Lamaka the positioning of the ‘apse’ in 
relation to the rest of the fort and its symmetry suggested that it may have first been 
built as the high altar end of a structure later converted for military use. Such an 
interpretation requires that the church lay with its length on an east-west axis and 
indeed Corvisier seemed to think this the case. There is some evidence for this. The 
foundations of parallel walls (7) may have been the longer north side of such a 
church: with an inner wall 0.8 m thick and an outer wall 2.0 m thick lying 3.5 m apart 
and connected by cross-walls 0.8 m thick, we may have an aisle of a Byzantine 
basilica. At a later date, however, no doubt when the building was established as a 
fortification, the overall plan was arranged so that its length lay on its north-south 
axis. On the west (landward) side, there is evidence of two inner walls standing within 
the current outer wall. Both are now merely of one course showing at ground level.
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The outer of these is very thick (3), (2.06 m.) while the inner (4) ranges from 0.8m to 
0.85 m wide. Was the inner wall the first perimeter of our fort and the outer a later 
strengthening either in the Lusignan period or subsequently? This inner wall ran from 
the current southern outer wall of the fort, northwards, prescribing a slight kink at 
approximately its mid-way point, for 41.86 m where it turned east on a right-angle 
(5). This long inner wall is 30.11 m. from the east (sea) wall, and so provides the 
length of what would have been the shorter north and south walls. These then are 
what appear to be the basic dimensions of the Lusignan rectangular fort.
This east (sea) side of the fort is the most heavily developed, yet we can trace some of 
the medieval work still. Internally, the ‘apse’ is half round and some 12 m. in its 
hemi-cylindrical diameter. Externally it measures 17 m. in diameter and, as noted 
earlier, it was polygonal to the field, prescribing its arc through five roughly equal 
sides, as may be seen from the surviving portion that protrudes through the artillery 
platform above. At that upper level, which is now somewhat higher than its medieval 
predecessor, we can see that the rubble wall of the apse was well finished with facing 
blocks. Whether it was left unroofed here, to serve as an open parapet, as Corvisier 
has suggested, is hard to say. Below, within the vault, each side was pierced by 
openings that he identified as archeres rather than lights. His further identification of 
these as being stylistically Muslim work of the thirteenth century and comparable 
with those on one of the curtains at Kyrenia, is especially problematical. While it may 
perhaps be that Muslim characteristics of military architecture were adopted, that is as 
far as we can go. It is improbable that Muslim masons were involved and even more 
unlikely that any such work could be thirteenth century, given the total lack of 
historical evidence for any fortification in Lamaka as early as then. In this, it is 
notable that we may make a similar criticism of Corvisier’s dating of the building of 
the extant harbour fort at Paphos. There we have far more written evidence to infer a 
later date. It seems likely then that the Lusignan work at Lamaka is considerably later. 
Hinging onto the apse, at the upper level on the later artillery platform, it is also 
possible to discern the surviving top of the southern portion of the straight east wall 
(1), measuring 1.33 m. wide.
This whole eastern aspect of the fort was massively strengthened, mainly under 
Ottoman rule, to deal with the exigencies of gunpowder artillery warfare. All was
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built out to the seaward in the interests of presenting solid, impenetrable bulk. This 
work included the blocking up of a wide spiral stair (6), which narrows to 1.7 m wide 
at its top,5 which emerged onto parapet level -  only the upper steps now surviving to 
reflect a superseded arrangement for defence on this coastal side. The fort’s present 
walls on the other three sides appear to be post medieval. It is likely that the wall on 
south followed and contains its medieval precursor, those to the west and north lying 
beyond the likely line of the original building, as intimated above.6
5 Corvisier, in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 393-4.
6 This description is mainly the result of site visits of 27 Oct. 2005, 8 May 2006 and 15 October 
2009.
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Lamaka 1
V  .
East (seaward) wall showing main Venetian and Ottoman artillery block incorporating 
and masking the medieval pentagonal work on this side (2 on plan).
Lamaka 2
Interior of apse (2 on plan) from the Venetian ramp leading to terrace above.
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L am aka 3
Uppermost level of the medieval pentagonal work, protruding above the surface of the
later artillery platform.
Lam aka 4
South end of the pentagonal work and adjoining wall (1 on plan). The raised walkway 
and sentinel turret on the south (left on the photograph) is later -  Venetian/Ottoman
work.
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LIMASSOL
(Lemesos [Frankish]; Nimona, Nimocium [Latin]; Nemesos [Byzantine])
In the early part of our period, Limassol was the centre of a diocese and the island’s 
main port. Even after it was superseded in this respect around 1300, the town 
continued to prosper in the early decades of the fourteenth century. But from that 
time, it went into decline being particularly afflicted by earthquakes, as was the case 
with Paphos. Ludolf of Suchen (Sudheim) in Westphalia, who visited Limassol at 
some point between 1336 and 1341, wrote that it was ‘now laid waste by constant 
earthquakes’. Later Francesco Suriano of Venice who visited the town in 1484 wrote 
that it was ‘entirely destroyed and overthrown by wars and earthquakes’. Dietrich of 
Schachten similarly wrote of earthquake damage after his visit of 1491.1 Earthquakes 
are clearly the major explanation for the loss of most of the town’s medieval 
buildings. When Enlart visited it in the later nineteenth century, he considered that the 
castle we see today was the only surviving medieval monument. Although this is not 
altogether the case, plainly much has been destroyed. Gone now are the buildings of 
the diocese, of the parochial clergy, of various religious orders and perhaps the 
dwellings of those who served in the households of the urban nobility. Similarly the 
buildings of the military orders have vanished, though as we will see, it may be that 
the castle’s core is the solitary vestige of their works. This surviving and much altered 
castle was originally set close to a beach, probably much as the fortification at 
Lamaka still is. Land reclamation on Limassol’s sea-front has given it the appearance 
of being a little inland. In its day, it was flanked by the river Garyllis, which no doubt 
formed a protective screen on at least one side, but that too has changed when the 
river altered course to the west in the sixteenth century.3
A study of the fortifications of Limassol is complicated by a number of other factors. 
First, it is not at all clear what existed on the eve of the Ricardian conquest of 1191.
1 Oliver of Paderbom (ed. Hoogweg), ch. 86, p. 279 and (ed. Peters), ch. 86, p. 136; Hill, 2, p. 87 for 
the particularly bad earthquake of 1222; Ludolf of Suchen in Cobham, p. 19; Francesco Suriano in 
Cobham, p. 48; Dietrich of Schachten in Grivaud, p. 133.
2 Enlart, p. 490; Richard, Chypre sons les Lusignans, pp. 64,67,73.
3 Steffan of Gumpenberg in Grivaud, p. 66; G. der Parthog, p. 96, and see map in Richard, p. 71.
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Second, we have few historical reference points. Third, on occasion it is not possible 
to be sure of the structure that these references relate to -  for, as will be shown, it is 
most likely that, like Acre and some Italian cities at this time, there were several 
fortified structures in the harbour-town during the period. Indeed, this is reflected in 
the diary notes of Ludolf of Suchen when he recorded that ‘many ... palaces and 
castles are seen there.’ 4 Historians have overlooked this and have tended to a view 
that we are looking at merely one fortification with different periods of development. 
They have identified this with the present ‘Limassol Castle’ and attempted to 
reconcile the time lines of its architectural features with our scanty literary evidence.
A brief summary of these earlier attempts to describe the evolution of the ‘Lusignan’ 
castle is perhaps helpful background.
Precis of modern accounts
Camille Enlart’s detailed description and interpretation of the present castle’s building 
sequence appears to have been predicated on this assumption that there was only a 
single fortification. He identified an initial thirteenth-century phase in which a 
rectangular keep was constructed -  the older, south-west tower of the present castle 
(1) -  and that it then constituted a ground floor and an upper storey, connected by a 
spiral stairway (2) which continued up to roof level. In his view, this was later 
modified by turning the two floors into one and endowing the resulting single 
chamber with a vaulted ceiling supported by a central column and columns set in the 
sides and comers of the walls. Although he compared this work with that carried out 
at St Nicholas’ cathedral in Famagusta, which dates from 1311, he considered that 
this second phase could be much later, most likely being ‘the restoration carried out 
by James I ‘, or even fifteenth-century work. Enlart continued that the lower range (3) 
attached to north-east side of this keep was originally a hall or a chapel added at some 
point after the keep had been completed and that this range in turn was modified, 
again probably by James I, into two long parallel buildings, each of two storeys, 
enclosing a narrow courtyard, bound at its farther, north-east end, by a curtain wall. 
Enlart went on to comment that the Venetians removed the central column of the 
keep’s single chamber, added an additional, pointed barrel-vaulted floor above and
4 in Cobham, p. 19.
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constructed a wholly new rectangular tower attached to the north-east end of the two 
storey range.5
George Jeffery stressed that the early keep was likely but part of an altogether larger 
structure and he considered that it had a very close resemblance with the early 
fourteenth-century citadel at Famagusta. Like Enlart, he knew of a chronicle reference 
to work by King James I, but he did not follow Enlart in ascribing particular work to 
that King’s reign: indeed he saw the two storey range as constructed in the sixteenth 
century, when the whole complex was encased in 3 m thick walls against the 
exigencies of gunpowder artillery warfare.6
Sir George Hill followed Enlart in his description of the castle in the thirteenth 
century. Like Enlart, Hill knew that in 1228 Frederick II had used a castle in Limassol 
as a prison, but unlike Enlart, he speculated that we might attribute this thirteenth- 
century work to that particular time.7 Perbellini8 in turn followed Hill, and Kristian 
Molin too followed in the same mould -  that the present castle’s ‘oldest remaining 
parts ... consists of a square two-storey keep ... and appears to date from the early 
crusader period’. 9 Enlart had merely noted Stephen of Lusignan’s assertion that a 
Limassol castle had been built by Guy of Lusignan in or around 1193, ‘pource que 
c’estoit le lieu en Cypre plus proche de la Terre-saincte’, but Molin appears to have 
taken this reference at face value in his argument that the first Lusignan created a 
simple tower here, as he held Guy also did at Paphos, Famagusta and Nicosia.10
In his 1977 summary of the island’s military architecture, Megaw found that the 
history and development of fortification in Limassol was not as straightforward as 
these authors believed. His view was that it was not possible to say whether the castle 
of 1228 was an old Byzantine structure or a new Frankish building. Based on his 
reading of Enlart, he recognised the existence of a Templar fortification in the town 
and speculated that our castle of 1228 ‘seems to have passed to the Templars, only to
5 Enlart, pp. 488-494.
6 Jeffery, pp. 368-9.
7 Hill, 2, pp. 15-16.
8 Perbellini, 1973, pp. 45-6.
9 Molin, Clermont, p. 192.
10 Enlart, p. 488; Lusignan, Description, f. 123; Molin, Clermont, p. 192; Unknown Crusader Castles, 
p. 124, and see History, above, p. 12.
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revert to the crown on their suppression’. Megaw believed that this castle was 
destroyed in a Genoese attack on the town in 1373, no doubt to accommodate 
references we have to the construction of a new castle by both James I and Janus. This 
new castle, Megaw wrote, was constructed in the shell of a Templar or Hospitaller 
thirteenth-century church; its western bay being converted into a ‘keep’ ‘of three or 
more floors’. He believed that its upper parts were destroyed in the Mamluk attack of 
1425, the rest being preserved in the later thick encasing wall built, as he considered, 
by the Turks.11
All these commentaries have now been superseded by the detailed architectural study 
undertaken by Christian Corvisier and Nicolas Faucherre, published in 2000, and 
subsequently summarised in 2006.12 Their investigations uncovered a more complex 
building history for the structure currently called Limassol Castle than had hitherto 
been appreciated. A brief summary of their work is provided here.
11 Megaw, Military Architecture, pp. 198-9; Vaivre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 54.
12 Corvisier and Faucherre, Une Chapelle Tempi iere; Corvisier, Le Chateau de Limassol, in Vaivre 
and Plagnieux, pp. 395-399. See too Vaivre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 54-5 with reference to J. 
Last’s detailed set of plans that Corvisier and Faucherre did not see.
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LIMASSOL
FIRST FLOOR
GROUND FLOOR
15m
|  Phase 1 (13th century)
Phase 2 (End of the13th century to the beginning of the 14th century?) 
Phase 3 (End of the14th century?)
|  Phase 4 (15th century?)
Phase 5 (End of the 16th century?)
■ Phase 6 (Beginning of the 17th century?)
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They identified that in origin, it was a church or chapel of the first third of the 
thirteenth century, externally measuring 38 m long and 14.3 m wide with walls about 
2 m thick. It consisted of three sections or bays and terminated at its north-east end 
with a flattened chevet or apse. They noted that this chapel bears comparison with the 
chapels within the Hospitaller castles at Margat and Crac des Chevaliers and with the 
chapel in the Templar castle of Tortosa, which is of the same length, has similar 
sections or bays, a flattened chevet and no external buttressing. In a second building 
campaign, dated to the second half of the thirteenth century, a dividing wall was 
constructed that separated the section or bay at the south-west end of the building.
This section was transformed into a two storey reduit or tower (1). Its upper storey, 
reached by means of a spiral stair (2) at its south-west comer, was equipped with five 
archeres -  which Corvisier and Faucherre noted bear comparison with those in the 
Templar castle of Tortosa, the chamber and archeres generally being also comparable 
with those in the comer towers of Famagusta castle, built a little after 1300. The 
remaining two sections of the building (3) may have continued in use as a chapel or 
church, but equally may have fallen out of use and gradually become mined.
Corvisier and Faucherre’s third phase of building work was mainly the transformation 
of the tower into one storey by the insertion of columns and the creation of its vault of 
pointed arches in four quarters as noted by our earlier observers. As we mentioned 
earlier, Enlart had felt that, on balance, this building programme was late fourteenth- 
century work: a conclusion endorsed by Corvisier and Faucherre inasmuch as it bears 
comparison with the royal donjon of Vincennes built by Charles V when dauphin.
Like Megaw, they assumed that the Genoese attack on the town in 1373 involved 
substantial damage to the castle, including perhaps the collapse of at least a part of the 
vault supporting the tower’s upper storey and that therefore this is the new work 
carried out by King James I as reported in the Strambaldi variant of Makhairas’ 
chronicle. One difficulty here however, which Corvisier and Faucherre concede, is 
that this interpretation of the building work rendered the upper-storey archeres 
redundant and resulted in a structure that was admittedly more robust but was poorly 
equipped with defensive devices. If this building phase was a response to Genoese 
vandalism, it is odd that the modifications resulted in such a passive fortification.
This work on the tower at the south-west end of the complex was followed, perhaps 
not until the fifteenth century, by converting the disused remaining portion of the
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building into a two storey range which was assigned to storage functions, although its 
roof carried a defensible wall walk gained through the tower’s spiral stair. The close 
similarity of this range’s chambers with those on the ground floor at mid-fifteenth- 
century Kolossi, noted earlier by Enlart, may give some indication of the time of 
construction. Unlike Enlart however, Corvisier and Faucherre did not consider the 
creation of prison cells in this range to be an aspect of Lusignan fourteenth-century 
work, but rather a feature created when the complex was turned into the artillery 
fortress that it appears as today. They viewed this not as a Venetian initiative, the 
Venetians having dismantled the castle after 1538, but rather a Turkish work, built 
very early in their occupation of the island.
Corvisier and Faucherre’s work is a formidable piece of architectural analysis and 
their proffered conclusions provocative. The hypothesis that they present ‘a la 
sagacite des historiens’ is that the castle, of which this chapel formed a part, was built
by the Templars, that it came into the hands of the Crown on the suppression of the
1 ^Order in 1308, and that a sizeable royal castle must have existed elsewhere.
However, there are difficulties with this interpretation. First, although they 
acknowledged that the early thirteenth-century three-bayed chapel had affinities with 
Hospitaller chapels in Syria, as well as with Templar Tortosa, they did not extend 
such a comparative study to other chapels. Such a study shows what difficult ground 
this is on which to adduce a provenance. No comparison was drawn, for example, 
with two small churches in Famagusta which Enlart theorised belonged to the two 
Orders. Like the present Limassol ‘castle’ in its first stage, both consist of a single 
nave with an apse, and like Limassol, the older and larger constitutes three bays.
Enlart took this to be Templar, but this was merely his speculation, long since 
repudiated. The other, which Enlart dated to the fourteenth century and assigned to 
the Hospitallers -  reasonably so in this case to judge by the St. John’s Cross on both 
the lintel over the entrance and that carved on the exterior of its south wall - was ‘built 
on the lines of a tower’.14 Clearly both are similar to Limassol in such basic 
characteristics but there are also dissimilarities, for example in the more pronounced 
apses of the Famagusta buildings and in the larger church’s buttresses and its fine
13 see especially pp. 347 and 370.
14 Enlart, pp. 290-3. See too Otten-Froux, Famagouste, pp. 147; 149-52; Edbury, Famagusta, 
p. 345; Luttrell, p. 170.
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ribbed cross-vaults. Even if we could be certain who built the older chapel in 
Famagusta, however, this in itself would not tell us positively that they also built the 
chapel at Limassol. Similarly, no comparison was drawn with the Crusader chapel in 
Sahyun -  which interestingly is of approximately similar dimensions (internally 29.85 
x 9 compared to Limassol’s 32.8 x 10.15), having four bays and an apse.15 Crusader 
Sahyun’s chapel must of course be twelfth century and so slightly earlier than the core 
of the present castle at Limassol. However, the point inferred here is that while it 
seems clear that the inspiration for Latin church architecture in thirteenth-century 
Cyprus came from Latin Syria, stylistically, it appears difficult to sustain the 
argument that Limassol’s origins are incontestably of the military orders. Corvisier’s 
own analogy of Limassol’s tall windows to those in the abbey church at Bellapais is 
another example of a detail that argues against an exclusive match with Templar 
architectural characteristics. In general, Pringle’s recent survey of Crusader Castle 
chapels reinforces this reluctance to accept Corvisier and Faucherre’s hypothesis. In 
particular, Pringle has shown that Templar and for that matter Hospitaller chapels, 
frequently varied in style and location within a castle. 16 The absence of absolute 
consistency in building castle chapels surely detracts significantly from the weight of 
the argument above adduced for a Templar origin for Limassol.
A possible further difficulty with Corvisier and Faucherre’s interpretation of the 
physical evidence relates to two features of the range lying to the north-east of what 
became the main tower. On its north side, immediately adjacent to the present 
entrance to the castle (4), the surviving half of an attractively moulded pointed arch 
supported by a decorated capital is preserved in a subsequent wall. The remaining half 
of a smaller round arch with a different moulding also supported by a decorated 
capital showing through a later wall is easily seen in the south of the range (5). Both 
were most likely constructed as parts of a church or chapel so it is pertinent to infer a 
date for their construction. Corvisier and Faucherre appear to consider them to be 
early thirteenth century and therefore integral elements of their first building phase 
but the arch on the north side (4) at least may well be later. If so, this would suggest 
that the two remaining bays of the original three bay chapel not only continued in use, 
but were enhanced, thus emphasising the ecclesiastical nature of the overall structure,
15 See the ground plan in Pringle, The Chapels in the Byzantine Castle of Sahyun, p. 107.
16 Pringle, Castle Chapels in the Frankish East, pp. 27-33.
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as against a military one. Corvisier and Faucherre’s argument for a Templar origin for 
the castle on historical evidence is similarly impossible to prove or disprove. It is to 
this that we now turn.
Historical references and the historical context 1191 - 1489
We have only slight evidence for any Byzantine fortification in Limassol. There 
appears to be no direct allusion to any military work there prior to the sources that 
deal with Richard I’s invasion.17 Similarly, there is no information that any effort 
which Isaac Comnenus made to improve the port’s defences against King Richard had 
anything to do with a castle; indeed his initiatives in this respect seem to have been
1 ftlimited to simple barricades. As noted in the History, we do have two references to 
a castle on the occasion of Richard’s attack, one of which is of no value taken by 
itself. Nevertheless, on historical grounds alone, it would be surprising if there had 
been no castle or fort there, given that Limassol was plainly a conspicuously 
important port and staging post on the sea lane that hugged the island’s southern 
shore.19 Even so, any Byzantine fortification was clearly of little significance. It 
appears likely that King Richard had designated Limassol as his invasion point in his 
probable plan to capture Cyprus; he would hardly have done this had Limassol been 
as well fortified as, for example, Kyrenia may have been.20
We do not know whether the chapel in Limassol in which Richard of England married 
Berengaria of Navarre was in a castle.21 Similarly, it is not possible either to accept or 
reject Stephen of Lusignan’s late sixteenth-century report that Guy ‘y bastit un 
chasteau’, in 1193. If this occurred, it must have been a structure quite distinct from 
the present ‘castle’ and hence lost.23 As noted in the History, Wilbrand of Oldenburg 
visited the port in 1211 and reported that it was ‘non multum munita’, which does not 
encourage a view that the Lusignans had indeed achieved much by then.24
17 see for example, Galatariotou, p. 50.
18 above, History, pp. 2-3 for the ltinerarium and Richard of Devizes.
19 see for example,. Saewulf, p. 61 and Pryor’s introduction on pp. 47-8.
20 Gillingham, Richard /, p. 145,
21 Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 51.
22 Lusignan, Description, f.123.
23 as evinced by Corvisier’s and Faucherre’s interpretation above.
24 see above, History, p. 12.
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Our next reference to a fortification is from Philip of Novara in relation to the arrival 
the Emperor, Frederick II in Limassol in 1228. Philip recorded that Frederick himself 
stayed at a manor near the town but that he imprisoned his hostages in ‘la tour de
^  c
l’Ospitau, quy estoit forte et plus pres de sa navie’. This appears to be good 
evidence that the Hospitallers had created a ‘strong house’ in or very near the port by 
this time. Certainly they had earlier acquired houses, streets and a garden in Limassol 
by grant of Hugh I in September, 1210, this making Limassol their main base on the 
island.26
One assumes that Frederick simply commandeered the Tower against the 
Hospitallers’ wishes, for both they and the Templars sided with the Ibelins in the 
ensuing wars.27 Given the likelihood that the Templars obtained most of their lands, 
including their property in Limassol, just after 1191, no doubt as a consequence of 
their ceding the island to Guy of Lusignan,28 it is most probable that a Templar 
‘strong house’ had also been created in Limassol by 1228. Although we cannot be 
certain, it appears likely that Limassol also became the Templars’ main base in 
Cyprus at this early point in the thirteenth century.29
Yet although it would have been wholly natural for the two Orders to have maintained 
structures of some note, it is reasonably clear that none of these that may have existed 
in this initial part of our period could have been extensive. Neither the Hospitallers 
nor the Templars are likely to have maintained a substantial military establishment in 
Cyprus prior to 1291.30 Their interests in developing fortifications were focused 
wholly on the mainland, Cyprus being principally a source of revenue to support that 
enterprise. In general, it appears that both Orders were on good terms with the 
Lusignans in this earlier part of the century and it may be that in consequence, the 
King considered the defences of the town adequately catered for. At any rate, it is 
noteworthy that there is no allusion to any fortifications in Limassol in a number of 
commentaries that date from later in the thirteenth century. Thus, it has recently been 
noted that there is a conspicuous absence of any mention of a castle in a Venetian
25 Novara, § 34 (130), Melani, p. 96; and following Novara -  Florio Bustron, p. 69.
26 Riley-Smith. p. 505; Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, p. 191, fn. 7; Coureas, Latin Church, pp. 156-7.
27 Riley-Smith, p. 165; Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, p. 192; Coureas, Latin Church, pp. 158-9.
28 Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, pp. 191, fn. 7 and 195.
29 Gilmour-Bryson, pp 15-16; 57.
30 Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, p. 192.
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memorandum of 1243/4 concerning Limassol.31 Similarly there are no references to 
any fortifications in the sources that deal with Louis DC’s expedition of 1248-9 when 
he used Limassol as his primary base for his crusading activities. He landed here on 
27 September 1248 and stayed near the town -  in ‘Camenoriaqui’, or ‘Kamevoriak 
proper Nicocium’ arranging for the storage of his wine and grain ‘in the middle of the 
fields, close to the shore’. Louis stayed on the island over the winter, ultimately 
leaving, again from Limassol, on 20 May 1249. Likewise in a description of the 
island’s principal towns and fortifications later in the century, the Templar of Tyre 
refers to Limassol but not to any fortification it possessed.33
To what extent, if at all, was any Templar ‘house’ in Limassol affected by the dispute 
that arose with the Crown in 1275? We know that in 1279, Hugh III ordered the 
confiscation of all Templar estates on the island and the destruction of their fortresses. 
Most of our sources for this add that accordingly, the Limassol ‘house’ was indeed 
razed, but it is not necessarily the case that this in fact took place: in Henry II’s 
instructions to his ambassadors at the papal curia concerning his complaints against 
the Templars, it was noted that, though the fortresses had indeed been razed, the 
‘houses’ had remained untouched.35
Just how long the Templars remained in disfavour and their estates sequestrated, has 
been a matter of debate,36 but it would appear that they regained their property at 
some point between the accession of Henry II in 1285 and the withdrawal from Acre 
in 1291.37 This is reflected in Templar trial testimonies to Templar gatherings and a 
Templar house in Limassol in 1291 and 1304,38 and elsewhere.39 Templar, and for 
that matter, Hospitaller relations with the Crown, could not have been helped by the
31 Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 51.
32 Joinville, pp. 197-200; Templar of Tyre, §§ 261-3, p. 21; Rothelin Continuation, pp. 67, 69, 90; 
Richard, Chypre sous les Lusignans, p. 79, fn. 10; Duby, passim.
33 Templar of Tyre, § 514, p. 119.
34 Templar of Tyre § 401, p. 75; Annales de Terre Sainte, pp. 456-7; FI. Bustron, p. 116; Edbury in 
Templars in Cyprus, p. 193, Luttrell, p. 169, and Richard, p. 67. Amadi, p. 214 omits reference to 
Limassol in this respect.
35 Coureas, Latin Church, pp. 129-30.
36 Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, p. 193; Coureas, Latin Church, pp. 129-30; Claverie, L’Ordre du 
Temple (1998), pp. 506-7.
37 Claverie, L’Ordre du Temple (1998), pp. 506-7.
38 Gilmour-Bryson, p. 16; Coureas, Latin Church, p. 132; Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, p. 193.
39 Nicosia 1291; Khirokitia; Famagusta. -  Coureas, Latin Church, pp. 131-2; Edbury, Templars in 
Cyprus, p. 193.
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arrival in Cyprus of many more personnel of the Orders on their flight from Acre in 
1291 and it may be that as a result, some tension remained between the Templars and 
to a lesser extent the Hospitallers, with the King, right up until Amaury’s take-over in 
1306.40 Quite probably as a result, Henry II would have attempted to preclude any 
initiative of the Orders to strengthen their bases in Limassol, while on the other hand, 
the Templars especially may now have felt the need to possess a defensible structure 
more than before.
The evacuation from the mainland in 1291 had considerable significance for 
Limassol, the two Orders’ principal bases on the island becoming their international 
headquarters. In 1291 the Templars located their Convent here and in 1292 the 
Hospitallers followed suit.41 Similarly the Teutonic Knights and the Order of St. 
Thomas the Martyr of Canterbury established their main bases here.42 Mention has 
been made of sizeable Templar gatherings in Limassol at this time - if they had not 
created a fortified building earlier in our period, it would seem likely that one may 
have been built at this point, for the trial testimonies of the Templars suggest that one 
was in existence by the time of their suppression at the beginning of the fourteenth 
century.43 Set against this, the narrative sources do not suggest that this could -  even 
now -  have been primarily military in nature. In writing of the Templars’ suppression 
in Cyprus in 1308, both Amadi and Bustron refer to it variously as casa, mason and 
monaster io, and as we shall see, it is only Bustron who, in his introductory description 
of the island -  talks of a castellum.44 For their part, the Hospitallers do not seem to 
have extended whatever fortification they possessed -  rather they built a new hospital 
for pilgrims in the town in 1296 and we know that in 1304 they were engaged in 
efforts to enlarge this base 45
Other ‘evidence’ of Templar or Hospitaller military work at this period immediately 
after 1291 is unreliable. The report of a visitor to Cyprus in the 1480s, that the two
40 Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, p. 193-4; Coureas, Latin Church, pp. 135- 8; Gilmour-Bryson, pp. 
16-17.
41 for the Templars -  see reference in fn. 29 above; for the Hospitallers -  Riley-Smith, p. 198 and 
Coureas, Latin Church, p. 163. Ludolph von Suchem, trans. in Stewart, p. 40 and in Cobham, p. 19; 
Luttrell, p. 169.
42 Richard, p. 69.
43 For the trial testimonies -  Gilmour-Bryson, p. 16; nb too -  Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, p.192.
44 Amadi, pp. 287-9; FI. Bustron, pp. 24,167-70.
45 Riley-Smith, pp. 205, 505.
299
300
Orders, along with the Teutonic Knights, all took part in fortifying the town, is -  on 
balance -  too suspect to be taken at face value.46 The grave slab to a Hospitaller of 
Margat now housed in the castle quite likely dates from about this time and 
interestingly it carries a depiction of a castle with three towers with crenellations 
standing on a small battered plinth. Of course neither its presence in the castle, nor its 
engraving necessarily imply that our present castle was Hospitaller or then appeared 
as such 47
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Engraving on the grave slab to a Hospitaller of Margat now housed in the castle.
46 Felix Faber, in Cobham, pp. 45-6, more fully discussed below.
47 See sketch.
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However the relationship of King Henry n  and the Templars and Hospitallers may 
have developed after 1291, and whatever stimuli the Orders had to enlarge their 
buildings -  and for King Henry to restrain them -  all was changed by Amaury’s 
putsch in 1306. Still, there is no evidence that the struggle between the King and his 
brother involved either Order to such an extent that they may have looked to 
commission the construction of fortifications in Limassol or elsewhere. Although the 
Templars at least helped Amaury’s party in intimidating the King to stay shut up in 
his palace in Nicosia early in 1308, that apart, the two Orders appear to have done 
little more than to have helped in mediation between Henry II and his brothers. Of 
course, it is more likely that Amaury’s subsequent manoeuvrings that commenced in 
May, 1308 first to arrest the Templars and confiscate their property moving through to 
the opening of the formal hearings against them in 1310, prompted the Order to 
strengthen its bases, especially its headquarters in Limassol, but there is no evidence 
for this, which is significant given the good coverage for this period provided by 
Amadi.48
Shortly afterwards, the Temple was dissolved and its properties and estates 
confiscated, most if not all being given to the Hospitallers. Corvisier and Faucherre 
pointed to a very considerable stock of armour and weapons that was found in 
Limassol and suggested that this must have been housed in a castle of some 
consequence 49 But what happened to this Templar establishment in Limassol? Was it 
taken into the possession of the Lusignans and later adapted by them, evolving into 
the building we see today, as Corvisier and Faucherre suggest, or did it instead pass to 
the Hospitallers and subsequently disappear, the ‘castle’ we see today being instead 
derived from a different origin, such as the Hospitaller tower of 1228?
The view that a Templar structure became Limassol’s royal castle is derived from the 
one solitary reference made by Florio Bustron, noted earlier, via Camille Enlart.50 
Corvisier and Faucherre’s argument depends so heavily on this single reference that it 
is worth analysing it in detail. Enlart took Bustron to say that the castle had been
48 Riley-Smith, p. 215; Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, pp. 193-4; Edbury, The Suppression o f  the 
Templars, pp. 29-33; Gilmour-Bryson, pp. 16-17; Coureas, Latin Church, pp. 135 -  8.
49 Corvisier and Faucherre, p. 371 citing A. Demurger, Vie et Mort de Vordre du Temple, (Paris, Seuil, 
1989), p. 192.
50 FI. Bustron, p. 24; Enlart, p. 488.
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seized by the Crown in 1308; what Bustron says is that ‘A Limiso era un’ castello di 
Templieri, fatto con grande ingegno, et artificio, cosa fortissima; et dopo distrutti li 
cavalieri di quella religion, rimase il castello al publico, ... Bustron held office under 
the Venetians, so it is probably the case that he used the word ‘publico’ here in the 
sense of ‘state’, or for our purposes ‘the Crown’. Elsewhere, Bustron provides 
detailed lists of Templar properties, including ‘castles’, in Cyprus that passed to the 
Hospitallers.51 Many of these properties appear to have been estates or manors in the 
Limassol area, but there is no mention in this list of a Limassol castle. On this basis, 
Enlart’s interpretation of Bustron does not seem unreasonable. There are however 
reasons to be careful about accepting this.
First, as a source, Bustron is rather late for our purposes here. Second, as we have 
noted, he is inconsistent in his own references to what the Templars held in Limassol. 
Third, his two lists (of 1307 and 1313) of Templar properties taken over by the 
Hospitallers conflate properties already owned by the Hospitallers,52 so there is a 
simple issue of his reliability. Fourth, the absence of a comparable statement in his 
principal known and extant source, Amadi, makes the dependability of this statement 
even more debatable. Fifth, we know from a papal grant that by 1319 the Templar 
‘domum de Nimocia ’ in Limassol had passed to the Hospitallers, and it may be 
questionable whether the Templars could have held this as well as a castle.53 It is also 
worth noting that if the Crown did obtain a Templar Limassol castle at this time, it 
must have done so either in defiance or with the special permission of the Vatican, as 
in 1312 and 1313, Pope Clement V ordered that all Templar property apart from that 
in the Iberian peninsula should be granted to the Hospital. By comparing known 
Hospitaller estates and property in the thirteenth with their holdings in the fourteenth 
centuries, it is clear that the Hospital was indeed the principal beneficiary of the 
suppression of the Temple. Indeed, so far as we know, only one Templar estate -  
Psimolophou -  definitely was assigned elsewhere. Still, could a Templar castle in 
Limassol have been an exception?54
51 op. cit. pp. 170-1, 246-7.
52 Edbury, Templars in Cyprus, p.191, fii. 7; Coureas, Latin Church, p. 125; Claverie, L ’Ordre du 
Temple (2005), pp. 322-3.
53 Grant o f  Pope John XXII to Maurice de Pagnac, Preceptor General o f  the Hospital, 1 March 1319, 
in Richard, Chypre, pp. 115-7.
54 FI. Bustron, p. 170; Riley-Smith, p. 217; Gilmour-Bryson, pp. 17 ,246-7; Edbury, Templars in 
Cyprus, p. 191; Edbury, The Suppression o f  the Templars, p. 37.
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Given the problems with Bustron’s statement as recited above, we have to allow for 
the possibility that there was no Templar castellum as such and that, as Luttrell 
speculated, Bustron knew of a Templar chapel encased in a later castle built by others, 
and mistakenly took this to be evidence of a Templar castle.55 Ultimately, we do not 
have clear evidence either to contradict or totally accept Florio Bustron’s statement. 
Would the King have now wanted or needed a castle in Limassol? If we assume that 
the Lusignans had hitherto been content to leave the defensive capacities of Limassol 
to the military orders, we might speculate as to whether there was now cause to 
change this policy. In this it is helpful to bear in mind that the Hospitallers captured 
the island of Rhodes in 1307, taking the city perhaps a little later and in 1309 
transferred their headquarters there, thus effectively downgrading the importance of 
Limassol.56 The Hospitaller Commandery of Cyprus became centred at Kolossi, so 
their establishment at Limassol must have lessened quite substantially. In the 
circumstances, it seems unlikely that the Hospitallers would have found any 
additional fortification in Limassol of much value for their own use and accordingly 
they may have farmed it out or come to some arrangement with the King.
In sum, it is plain that at least one of the ‘towers’ or ‘strong houses’ of the two 
military orders has wholly disappeared. There were certainly other such buildings in 
Limassol that have also vanished, one being a ‘Genoese tower’, which must have 
stood on land granted to them in 1218. In 1293/4 this was attacked by a force of 25 
Venetian galleys that ‘knocked down the crenellations’. That force then went on to 
destroy the Genoese loggia in Limassol which appears to have been a separate 
building.57 Ludolph of Suchem wrote of the ‘palaces and castles’ of both the Templars 
and Hospitallers and ‘other nobles and burghers.. .still seen to this day’ on his visit in 
1336 or shortly after.58 But apart from Stephen of Lusignan’s uncorroborated 
statement, we have no evidence of a distinct royal castle in Limassol in the thirteenth 
century; ultimately Corvisier’s and Faucherre’s assertion to the contrary is 
speculation. Their architectural analysis does support the view, however, that the
55 Luttrell, p. 169. See too Richard p. 67.
56 Riley-Smith, pp. 215-6 ,332 .
57 Templar o f  Tyre, § 538, p. 132; Mas Latrie, 2, pp. 39 ,51 -5 ; Hill, 2 ,2 0 8 ; Edbury, Cyprus and 
Genoa, p. 112.
58 Ludolph von Suchem, trans. in Stewart, p. 40  and in Cobham, p. 19.
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royal castle of the later medieval period was an adaptation of an earlier building 
which was perhaps, though not necessarily, of one of the military orders.
Apart from Ludolph of Suchem’s imprecise allusion (above), we have no historical 
material that attests the existence or ownership for any castle or fortification in 
Limassol from the time of the suppression of the Templars and the grant of their 
estates to the Hospital of 1312, until the recurring wars with Genoa much later in the 
fourteenth century. Thus for instance, an unknown Englishman who visited Cyprus in 
1344 was struck by the fortifications of Famagusta, but of Limassol could only write 
of its wine, bread and charming inhabitants.59 Indeed, towards the beginning of the 
century, it appears that the Crown itself acknowledged that the harbour was without 
defences.60 Limassol does not appear to have shared the economic boom enjoyed by 
Famagusta that generated the development of the castle and city walls at that port. 
However, like Famagusta and the rest of Cyprus, from about the 1340s, Limassol’s 
prosperity went into marked decline. With the passing of the military orders, it seems 
that there was simply no stimulus to invest in lordly residences and symbolic or actual 
fortifications.
Full-scale war with Genoa erupted in 1373. One of the Genoese’ first assaults was 
concentrated on Limassol, which they pillaged and sacked. They freed a number of 
prisoners who had been detained in the town and it may be this that has led some 
scholars to conclude that this attack involved the capture of the castle. It has been 
further inferred that the Genoese must have then slighted the castle, as it later became 
one of the sites which were fortified or refortified at the instigation of James I. The 
Genoese attack of 1373 may not, however, have had any impact on a castle in 
Limassol; indeed on historical grounds alone, we have no evidence that one was even 
in commission at the time. Both Makhairas and Florio Bustron report that Limassol 
was sacked but neither makes any reference to a castle. Given that both chroniclers 
make a point of doing exactly this with regard to the successful Genoese assault on 
the fortifications of Paphos -  the next episode in the Genoese razzia -  it is reasonable
59 Itinerarium Cuiusdam Anglici, p. 446; Western Pilgrims, p. 58.
60 MasLatrie, pp. 170-1.
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to consider that any Limassol fortification in 1373 was inconspicuous at best and 
played no part in what occurred.61
The narrative sources that cover the last quarter of the fourteenth century contain 
various information on building work at various locations carried out by King James I 
whose personal reign commenced in 1385 upon his return to Cyprus from detention in 
Genoa. Although some of this work was purely for domestic purposes, most of it 
involved the creation of new fortifications or repair of old fortifications as a reaction 
to the Genoese who had, by this time, established their own territory based on 
Famagusta. Limassol is not specifically mentioned in the list of these buildings 
recorded by Amadi, or his follower, FI. Bustron, but it is mentioned in the Strambaldi 
variant of Makhairas’ chronicle. This specifies ‘il castello de Limisso, qual fece 
fabricar re Zac.’62 Taken literally, this comment suggests that King James had 
Limassol Castle built de novo but it is unlikely that there was any major work. On the 
one hand, he may have had cause to establish a royal castle here for the loss of 
Famagusta and the threat posed by the Genoese meant that the Lusignans had need to 
develop an alternative defended coastal commercial outlet. However, continued
fkXeconomic decay and urban depopulation were serious problems. Limassol itself was 
particularly affected: it was described by the Lord of Anglure (Marne) as ‘for the most 
part uninhabited.. .destroyed by the Genoese’ when he stayed there briefly in 1395.64 
We may doubt then whether King James considered that investing in major works at 
Limassol was an efficient use of his resources, especially bearing in mind that these 
were seriously attenuated in any event because of the heavy financial indemnities 
imposed on him by the Genoese. It may well be then that James’ work was of a 
limited nature. In any event, he would surely have concentrated expenditure purely on 
fortification work. If this is so, it is not altogether easy to equate this work with the 
development identified in Corvisier’s and Faucherre’s third building period of the 
extant castle.65
61 Makhairas, § 377, pp. 357-9; FI. Bustron, pp. 300-1; Enlart, p. 488.
62 Amadi’s list is on p. 495; FI. Bustron’s on p. 352; Strambaldi, p. 277.
63 see above, History, pp. 55-6.
64 in Cobham, p. 28.
65 op. cit. pp. 366-7.
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Apparently this castle did not impress Makhairas when describing its part in the war 
with Genoa in 1408: 66
(And the castle was weak, because it was not prepared for war.
And as soon as the garrison saw them,) they made a promise to hand over 
the castle after two months.67
It was during this war with Genoa that gunpowder artillery was first employed in the 
island and to assist in their attempt on Limassol, the Genoese had ‘un gran pezzo 
d’artiglieria’ 68 transported from Famagusta. In the event, the King’s forces acted 
with celerity and with the aid of a Venetian named Carlo Zeno, the Seneschal of 
Cyprus led a force to the castle’s relief and overwhelmed the Genoese, inflicting a 
number of casualties on them, capturing the artillery piece and taking eighty 
prisoners. Howbeit, peace seems to have been quickly restored. 69
The town and castle were prominent targets in the Mamluk attacks of 1424-6. As we 
noted above (p. 47), in September 1424, they attacked the town where they were 
opposed by forces under Philip Provosto and Philip Picquigny. After what seems to 
have been a brief fight, the Cypriot forces withdrew into the castle from which they 
mounted a resistance. The Mamluk force was, however, too small to entertain the 
possibility of attacking the castle and harried by a small squadron of vessels led by 
Thomas Provosto, they moved off west to plunder Kouklia.70
Upon the approach of the much larger Mamluk force in August 1425, the Cypriots in 
Limassol led by the balio (Amadi) or castellano (Bustron) - Stephen of Vicenza -  
again withdrew into the castle. We are told that a number of Muslim slaves who had 
worked on the castle either defected to the Mamluks -  or were ransomed by them -  
and that these slaves pointed out a weak spot in a wall where a window had been 
poorly blocked up with earth and stone. The Mamluks trained a bombard -  ‘una
66 for this date, see History, fn. 151 above. The sources are Makhairas, § 635, p. 621; Amadi p. 498; 
and FI. Bustron, p. 355.
67 Makhairas, § 635, p. 621. See above, History, p. 29, fn 95 above and Dawkins, Makhairas, 2, pp. 18 
- 22.
68 Amadi, p. 498; FI. Bustron, p. 355.
69 Makhairas,§ 635, p. 621; Amadi, p. 498; FI. Bustron, p. 355.
70 Makhairas, § 651-2, pp. 631-3; Amadi, p. 500; FI. Bustron, pp. 356-7; Petite Chronique, pp. 324, 
337; Khalil Ibn Shahin al-Zahiri and Salih B.Yahya, Arab Sources, pp. 96 ,1 0 3 ; Ziada, 1, pp. 93-4; 
Hill, 2, p. 470; Edbury, The Lusignan Kingdom, p. 225.
306
307
bombarda’ (Amadi) -  ‘un pezzo d’arteglieria’ (Bustron) against this weak spot, 
effecting a breach, through which their forces effected an entry, killing Vicenza and 
his men.71
The Mamluk reprisals of 1424 and 1425 were not campaigns of conquest, but rather 
raids to pillage and lay waste. It is likely then that the Mamluks took the opportunity 
to damage the castle while it was in their hands and indeed the Arab sources record 
that ‘the upper part of the castle’ was destroyed.72 In any event, it must have been 
abundantly clear to King Janus that the next Mamluk attack would similarly focus on 
Limassol and the southern littoral; although Limassol was clearly decayed, we may 
imagine that wholesale evacuation was not an alternative. It was paramount that the 
King could be seen to be able to defend his Kingdom, as his efforts against the 
Mamluks in 1426 attest. In the circumstances, it may well be that there were hurried 
attempts to refortify the castle after the Mamluks had left in 1425. This is reflected in 
Arab sources that comment that on landing by Limassol on 1 July, 1426, the Mamluks 
were surprised to see that the castle had been thoroughly repaired and given a new 
moat. Such repairs may also be reflected in Makhairas’ comment that the Mamluks 
‘attacked the castle of Lemeso, which had been built by King Janus’. 73 In 1426, 
however, the Mamluks had determined on subjugating the Kingdom: their forces that 
year were consequently very considerable and no doubt in consequence, the castle fell 
in no more than a couple of days -  on 3 July -  ‘con facilita’, apparently by simple 
escalade. Once again, as seems likely, it appears that they may have damaged the 
castle during the few days that they retained it. Arab sources comment that it was 
slighted, although Stephen of Lusignan’s assertion that they completely destroyed it is 
plainly an exaggeration.74
71 Makhairas, §§ 657 ,6 5 9 , pp. 635-7; Strambaldi variant o f  Makhairas, p. 270; Amadi, p. 501; FI. 
Bustron, p. 358; Khalil Ibn Shahin al-Zahiri, Salih B.Yahya, al-Maqrizi and Ibn Sayyid Hasan al- 
Roumi, Arab Sources, pp. 9 7 ,1 0 6 ,1 2 2 ,1 2 8 ; Enlart, p. 488; Ziada, 1, p. 97.
72 Salih B. Yahya, Arab Sources, p. 106, followed by Hill, 2, p. 473 and M egaw, Military 
Architecture, p. 199.
73 Makhairas, § 672, p. 653; Ziada, 1, p. 100. H il l , 2, p. 477.
74 Makhairas, §§ 672-674, pp. 653-5; Amadi, pp. 504-5; FI. Bustron, pp. 361-2; Petite Chronique, pp. 
325, 337; Chronica Byzantina Breviora, in Boustronios, p. 249; Lusignan, Description, f. 155; 
Chorograffia -  Grivaud, f. 59 a; Chorography -  Wallace, §§ 341-2, p. 200; Salih B.Yahya, Ibn 
Sayyid Hasan al-Roumi, Arab Sources, pp. 108,129; Ziada, 1, p. 101; Hill, 2, p. 477 and fns. 1 and 
2 .
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In May, 1452, the castle was captured by a ruse by a Genoese force led by one 
Damiano Lomellini. This force could not have been large as it was transported by a 
single vessel only, but the castle itself was poorly guarded and the Lusignan ‘garrison’ 
was evidently easily persuaded to give it up. The administration in Famagusta took 
over responsibility for the Genoese establishment in their new acquisition, drawing up 
“statutes” for its maintenance and its garrisoning by a force of 25 soldiers led by a 
Captain. Damiano Lomellini himself became the first Captain and appears to have 
remained in charge until 1455 after which appointments seem to have been made for 
periods of a year at a time. As was the case with the Captaincy of Famagusta, to 
which the Captaincy of Limassol was subordinated, this office constituted two roles, 
being the military responsibility of chatelain and the civil one of consul. The soldiers, 
on the other hand, served for three months at a time only, reflecting the need to rotate 
this garrison that needed to be vigilant against a likely Lusignan attempt to retake the 
castle.
The Genoese records also provide detailed information on the names of members of 
the garrison, how much they were paid, (and it is notable that their rate was slightly 
higher than that of the Genoese in the Famagusta garrison), the offices that some 
performed, such as a sub castellanus, a barber, cook, drummer, firearms specialist, a 
‘sarbatanerms\ a page for the Captain, and so on. In addition we know something of 
the cost of food for the garrison and for the upkeep of the Captain’s two horses. In 
sum, it is clear that all was a considerable expense for the Republic, but that it 
considered this worthwhile, providing a bargaining tool to make the King pay his 
debts. It appears to have remained in Genoese hands at least until 1460-1, perhaps 
even later, for there is no reference to Limassol Castle in the context of the civil war 
of 1460-64, possibly implying it was in ‘neutral’ hands at that time.75
The regulations set out within these ‘statutes’ reflect a natural preoccupation with 
security and it would be surprising therefore if the Genoese omitted to maintain at 
least the fabric of the fortifications, though we have no information to that effect. 
Unlike Famagusta however, they do not seem to have regarded their tenure of 
Limassol as permanent, so it seems unlikely that they would commit to any notable
75 Otten-Froux, Limassol, passim.
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building work. Certainly the fortifications that the Venetians inherited were not 
considered to be of any value to them in the sixteenth century.76
The diary notes of visitors provide mixed evidence of the state of the castle. On his 
visit in 1449-50, Steffan of Gumpenberg noted that ‘der Konig hat gar ein schon 
Castel da gebauwet, das ligt in einer schonen begend, und hat die eine Seiten das 
Meer, damach ein schon Gebirg mit Weinwachss.’ 77 His description of the castle as 
beautiful or pretty is perhaps unhelpful but certainly does not convey any impression 
of strength. A similar view may be derived from the words of Pierre Barbatre, who 
passed through Limassol in 1480: he noted ‘seullement ung petit chasteau’, which like 
the rest of the town, had been ‘destruitte et arrazee par les Infideles’.78 As we saw 
above, in 1484, Francesco Suriano of Venice also remarked on the ruinous state of the
79town.
More interesting however are the words of Felix Faber, a Dominican friar from Ulm 
who also visited Cyprus in the early 1480s. Although he found the place to be in 
ruins, he recorded his belief that the Templar, Hospitaller and Teutonic Orders had 
earlier taken 'possession of it, and fortified it with walls and towers, especially the 
port, near which they built a very strong castle, facing the sea on one side.’ Faber’s 
testimony is suspect in a number of respects of course -  for one thing it was written a 
long time after such a concentrated building programme could have been expected to 
occur. It ascribes a role to the Teutonic Order which seems hardly credible, and third, 
Faber is in error in stating that the Orders’migration to Cyprus was the consequence 
of Saladin’s capture of Jerusalem.80 It is of possible value, however, in confirming the 
location of the castle by the sea and in its reference to the existence of a number of 
towers. This point is most interesting as it strengthens the view that there were indeed 
several towers in Limassol of which our much altered surviving castle was just one. 
Whether Faber’s words also convey his belief that Limassol had been a walled town is
76 as above, History, pp. 43 -6 ,5 7 .
77 in Grivaud, p. 66.
78 in Grivaud, p. 98.
79 in Cobham, p. 48.
80 in Cobham, pp. 45-6 - taken from C.D. Hassler’s 3 vol. edition o f  1843-1849. Felix added his 
description o f  Cypriot monuments to the end o f  his work. This element was omitted in A . Stewart’s 
translation for the Library o f  the Palestine Pilgrim s’ Text Society, 7 to 10, (London, 1893) -
The Wanderings of Felix Fabri (circa 1480 -1483 A.D.).
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difficult to say. The complete absence of either archaeological or historical evidence 
for a town wall makes this improbable. Indeed, Pierre Barbatre had specified that 
there was no urban enceinte. Even so, it has to be accepted that Limassol is much built 
over: if we accept that there were indeed other towers that have now vanished, there is 
an argument that town walls may similarly have now gone from sight. Limassol is in 
fact depicted as having a circular wall with rectangular towers on a copper engraving 
produced in Paris in 1629. Unfortunately, the engraving is problematical in a number
01
of respects and so is not to be taken wholly at face value.
Subsequent visitors wrote similarly of former grandeur and later decay. In 1491, 
Dietrich of Schachten (see above) noted that the castle had been strong but was partly
Qfy
destroyed by an earthquake which had wrecked much of the whole town. In 1494, 
Pietro Casola noted of Limassol that he had not encountered ‘a more arid place5, and 
that the castle ‘which is guarded by a soldier.... must have been a fine strong place; 
nevertheless it is also tumbling down, and nothing is being done to repair it. What 
little remains standing is a noble sight5.83 In contrast, Jacques le Saige considered the 
castle ‘pretty strong5 when he saw it in 1518. His further comment that Limassol had 
once been a large walled town left in ruin by the English attack of 1191 is of interest 
merely for his perception of what Limassol may once have been.84 The Venetians 
appear to have given it little attention. Writing in 1532, Denis Possot observed that the 
castle was ‘destroyed5 but inhabited by a castellan. We know too from Possot, that it
Of
then still retained its fosse which contained no water. In 1538 or 1539, a Turkish 
raiding party landed and though it was staffed only by the castellan and his wife and 
daughters, the Turks took it only with some difficulty. Once the Turks had left, the 
Venetian proveditor, Francesco Bragadin, commanded that it be destroyed. According 
to Bustron, carrying out this work cost so much money that with the same amount of 
expenditure, or perhaps less, the Venetians could instead have made it impregnable. 
The Attar map of 1542, however, still depicted a castle with two towers by the shore. 
Further earthquakes which occurred later in the century, in 1567 and 1568, can hardly 
have encouraged the Venetians to do anything at Limassol in their final review of the
81 The European Cartography o f  Cyprus, p. 44.
82 in Grivaud, p. 133.
83 in Grivaud, pp. 146-7.
84 in Cobham, p. 56.
85 in Cobham, p. 66.
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island’s defences. As put forward by Corvisier and Faucherre, it was then most likely 
the Turks who created the artillery fort we see in Limassol today.
In the study presented above, I have dealt first with descriptions of the existing castle 
and then proceeded to consider the historical context, discussing the references that 
we have. For the period to 1312, we have a multiplicity of potentially defensible sites 
and very sketchy historical material, so it is difficult to reconcile the building phases 
set out in the latest and fullest description, that of Corvisier and Faucherre, with our 
sources. As we have noted, however, comparison with the architectural characteristics 
of buildings elsewhere, both on the mainland and within Cyprus itself, may be 
instructive. From the reign of James I (1382-1398) references become rather more 
common and it becomes more viable to attempt to align these with the suggested 
building history of our extant castle. The passing of the military orders and the 
conflict with Genoa do of course make it much more likely that from James’ time, if 
not before, there was just one, a royal, fortification in Limassol, and that this is the 
building bequeathed to us today, as modified by the Turks.
Limassol 1
General view of the developed artillery fort from the south-east.
86 Attar, pp. 46, 89; FI. Bustron, p. 24; in Cobham, p. 61; Enlart, p. 489; Hill, 3, p. 863; Corvisier and 
Faucherre, p. 368.
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Limassol 2
Latrine brattice at roof level on the post medieval outer casing on the fort’s south-west
side.
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Limassol 3
Partially blocked in pointed arch (4 on plan) within present entrance to the castle.
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NICOSIA
( Lefkosia [Greek])
CASTLE and PALACE
By the mid twelfth century, Nicosia was undoubtedly established as the capital of 
Byzantine Cyprus. Here Crusaders inherited a Byzantine castle that was clearly very 
weak, most likely the governor’s secured complex rather than a fortification. 
Rhapsomates made no attempt to defend Nicosia in 10921 and similarly, Isaac 
Comnenus did not elect to make a stand in the castle mentioned in the Itinerarium 
when confronted by King Richard’s invasion in 1191. The Templars withdrew to 
this Byzantine castle in the 1192 uprising, but concluded that it was indefensible.3 
Lusignan made alternative observations. In the Chorogrqffia he commented that after 
the Templars had left, ‘the Cypriots,.. .destroyed the entire castle which was never 
rebuilt. We have only the ruins of it. In the castle there is a small chapel dedicated to 
the Virgin of the Castle, which is in Greek Castegliotissa.’ 4 This comment appears to 
have been taken at face value by Enlart and Jeffery and from them Hill and Megaw. 
They believed that Lusignan’s chapel, dedicated to St. Clair, was never heard of again 
after his mention of it.5 In his Description, Lusignan remarked rather differently that 
it was the Templars themselves who destroyed the castle and that this had stood by ‘a 
small market’ on which site the chapel called Castegliotissa was subsequently built.6 
Either way, Lusignan’s assertions conflict with the information provided by the near 
contemporary Continuation that Guy strengthened the castle, which means that work 
of some sort was quickly carried out since Guy died in 1194.7 Its precise location 
remains uncertain. Grivaud and Schabel took one comment by FI. Bustron that a 
‘castello’ was by the ‘piazza d’abasso’ and Lusignan’s ‘small market’ and suggested 
that the castle was located in the eastern area of the city near the later Venetian 
Caraffa Bastion and where the river Pedieos had its outflow before it was diverted. It
1 Alexiad, p. 273; Metcalf, Byzantine Cyprus, p. 528.
2 Stubbs, Itinerarium, p. 194; Nicholson, p. 188 and see too above, History, p. 4.
3 See History, above, fn. 11.
4 Lusignan, Chorograffia -  Grivaud, ff. 14a, 48a and 49a; Lusignan, Chorography -  Wallace, §§
39,247 and 256, pp. 20,65 and 66.
5 Enlart, p. 387; Jeffery, p. 20; Hill, 2, p. 14; A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 196.
6 Lusignan, Description, ff. 31 -2.
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is not clear, however, that Bustron was necessarily referring to this first castle at this 
point. At all events, it was no doubt in a central location, as Bustron remarked 
elsewhere.8 As to the Castegliotissa, the name at least did in fact survive, although not 
necessarily, in relation to the site of the old castle chapel. It came to be applied to a 
vaulted structure used as an arms depot by the Turks. In Mas Latrie’s time this 
consisted of several floors which included a great hall and a basement reached by a 
stair. Only the hall (26 m x 11.5 m) now remains, south-east of the Venetian Paphos 
Gate. This has been identified as part of the Lusignan palaces of the thirteenth to 
fifteenth centuries in this area .9
This first Lusignan castle was not used as a royal residence. From the beginning of 
our period, the Lusignans lodged elsewhere in Nicosia. This is confirmed by Wilbrand 
of Oldenburg who was in Nicosia in 1211/1212. He commented that the town had no 
fortifications, but observed that a new castle had been recently built, ( \ .  .nullam 
habens munitionem. In qua nunc temporis forte castrum elaboratum.’) and that 
separately there existed a court (‘curia’) and a palace (‘palacinium’).10 Whether this 
was a rebuilding as Enlart thought, a new castle as Hill thought,11 or rather simply a 
continuation of the work carried out in the early 1190s, is unclear. The site remains 
unidentified.
In 1217, Castellum Nicossie featured on the seal of King Hugh I (1204-218). Its 
details of three round, crenellated towers, the largest being the central one at the base 
of which is a round arched door, is similar to other such contemporary depictions, 
such as that given on the grave slab of the ‘Hospitaller of Margat’ now at Limassol 
Castle, and must be taken as purely conventional. Another seal of 1217, of the Regent 
Alice, shows a similar structure though without a central tower.12 Enlart ascribed FI. 
Bustron’s allusion to the castle in the centre of the town, mentioned above, to this 
time rather than at the beginning of our period. But as a source, Bustron is of course
7 See History, fn. 37.
8 FI. Bustron, pp. 26 and 463-4; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 93; Leventis, p. 11.
9 Vaivre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 43; Leventis, p. 177 and photographs on pp. 74,76,78 and 80.
10 Wilbrand ed. Laurent, xxviii, p. 181, and in Cobham, p. 14. See too Hill, 2, pp. 14; A.H.S. Megaw, 
Military Architecture, p. 196; Molin, Clermont, p. 193; Perbellini, (1973), p. 50; (1988), p. 33; 
Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 95 fn. 61; Makhairas, § 158, p. 143; Leventis, p. 
13.
11 Enlart, p. 387; Hill, 2, p. 14.
12 Enlart, p. 387; Jeffery, p. 21; Hill, 2, p. 14; Leventis, pp. 9 and 147.
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very late and it is not at all clear then that he could have been certain of the history 
and location of an early castle or indeed successive castles if Wilbrand’s report is 
taken literally.13
The separation of castle from royal residence noted by Wilbrand appears to have been 
maintained for a hundred years. We hear nothing of any castle in the sense of a 
fortification from the reign of Hugh I until the second reign of Henry II. A new palace 
appears to have been developed during the thirteenth century as allusions to aspects of 
it from the narrative sources that record the events of 1306-10 reflect that it was well 
established by this time. Quite probably Henry II himself had it enhanced to reflect 
his own prestige. His successor, Hugh IV (1324-1359), is said to have improved it in 
turn.14 At some point, the palace came to be connected with a Dominican convent by 
a covered bridge built over the stream that ran round the palace. This arrangement of 
palace and convent was a conspicuous feature of Peter n ’s building programme, as 
most likely developed by James I, which superseded this earlier palace. Certain details 
of the layout of this earlier palace can be gleaned from incidents recorded in the 
narrative sources, and indeed were catalogued diligently by Enlart. More recently 
Leventis has also provided a detailed description, though he preferred to think these 
thirteenth and fourteenth-century works were merely embellishments of the original 
palace dating back to the Byzantine period. For their part Grivaud and Schabel have 
attempted a description too, but they appear not to have distinguished between these 
works and the grander works of Peter II and afterwards.15
Yet until at least the restoration of Henry II in 1310, this complex appears to have 
been very poorly protected by fortifications -  if it was at all. In the squabbling of the 
years of Amaury’s usurpation from 1306, neither of the rival royal brothers had the 
asset of a defensible structure in which to base themselves. We are told that the castle 
gates did not yet exist when, in 1306, Henry II secretly entered the palace by ‘the gate 
of the bath’ -  referring to a gate in the palace building itself. In 1308, Amaury merely
13 FI. Bustron, p. 26; Enlart, p. 387.
14 FI. Bustron, p. 258; Enlart, p. 391.
15 Amadi, pp. 249,252-3,265,311,312,318,322,386, 388; Makhairas § 51, pp. 49-51; Enlart, pp.
77,391 -  2,394; Hill, 2, p. 27; Coureas, Latin Church, pp. 211-2; Leventis, pp. 147-161; Grivaud 
and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 95-7.
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had to occupy a house opposite the palace’s gates to maintain the King under house 
arrest. Perhaps not surprisingly, Henry II appears to have decided to remedy this 
deficiency, for it must have been after his re-establishment on the throne that it was 
reported that he ‘began the castle wall’. Most likely this new construction was to 
transform the palace into a citadel, although we should not exclude the possibility that 
the two were unconnected.16 It was presumably to this ‘castle’ that Queen Alice 
withdrew in December 1373.17
As noted in the History, in 1368 Peter I commissioned the building of a moated tower 
called the Margarita Tower constructed quite close to the citadel. This was intended to 
be of two storeys -  a prison below and above, an arrangement to serve as a 
banqueting hall and chapel. It had thick walls and stairs, either within the thickness of 
its walls or set against its internal sides. Outside, it was protected by a deep moat. We 
have more than one description of it, and these differ significantly only in their 
indications as to whether the structure was completed. Makhairas describes it thus:
he ordered a tower to be built, and in the upper part he built a church, which 
was called Misericordia, and below the surface of the ground it was a prison, 
which he called Margarita. And this he finished, and it was very strong, and he 
wished to put a moat outside it. And he intended to invite a great gathering, as 
soon as the moat was finished, and all the great lords and barons to assemble 
for a banquet, and then to shut up his brothers in the tower and a number of his 
knights of whom he was afraid. 8
As it transpired, Peter’s plot miscarried, but work on excavating the moat continued, 
for we are told that Henry de Giblet’s son, James, was put
in irons, and sent... to dig in the moat at the Margarita,... with the labourers 
who were working there.
16 Makhairas, § 41, p. 43; § 61, p. 57; Amadi, p. 253, Hill, 2, pp. 225-242; Leventis, p. 167. See 
History, fn. 96 and Hill, 2, p. 14; A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 196; Molin, Unknown 
Crusader Castles, p. 102; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 95.
17 Makhairas, § 395, p. 375. See too Grivaud and Schabel, p. 93.
18 Makhairas, § 260, p. 241 and Dawkins in Makhairas, 2, pp. 131-2. Strambaldi variant, p. 102; 
Amadi, pp. 422, 510; FI. Bustron, pp. 26,271,367; Enlart, p. 388; A.H.S. Megaw, Military 
Architecture, p. 196; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 104; Richard, Livre des 
Remembrances de la Secrete, doc. 175; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 94-5; 
Leventis, pp. 165,209.
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The excavation of the moat is also mentioned in another source, this being a narrative 
poem in French written by William of Machaut at some point between 1369 and the 
poet’s death in 1377. William was almost entirely dependent on the reports of fellow 
Champenois and other westerners who had been to Cyprus or on Peter’s crusading 
expeditions, but in this matter he says much the same as Makhairas, Amadi and FI. 
Bustron. His account of the rigours of digging out the moat and the suffering of James 
de Giblet is graphic:
.. ..Here he had many slaves 
labouring in deep ditches all day long, 
digging up earth, bringing it load by load 
up on their backs. Here must the young man come, 
ordered the king, and dig and carry earth 
day after day; no one must interfere, 
on pain of strictest penalties, or stop 
him bringing loads of earth up on his back; 
he must dig there all day and never rest. 20
These and other eqully arbitrary acts merely served to intensify the opposition to King 
Peter, and indeed we may take it that the Margarita Tower was seen as both a symbol 
and an instrument of his uncompromising policy. Any ongoing work was most likely 
brought to an abrupt halt by his assassination in 1369.21
In 1376 or 1380,22 Peter II began a new castle complex, a ‘citadella’,in Nicosia. First, 
Peter’s father’s Margarita tower and various other buildings including the courts of 
the Count of Jaffa and of the Patifeli family, were demolished, their material being 
used in the new works. ‘And wherever there were walls in the town which were of no 
use, they pulled them down and carried off the stones with carts and wagons and 
horses.’ Next, Genoese prisoners ‘with irons on their feet... were set to dig the 
foundations.’ These foundation stones were blessed by Archbishop Berenger and then 
laid. John de Brie, Turcopilier, and Sir Renier de Scolar were assigned to oversee the 
work, which was put under the direction of the ‘master workmen Thadok Favla and
19 Makhairas, § 265, p. 247. See too Amadi, p. 423 and FI. Bustron, p. 272.
20 Guillaume de Machaut, pp. 8-11,181.
21 Makhairas, § 280, pp. 265-9 for the murder of the King. Enlart, p. 389; Molin, Unknown 
Crusader Castles, pp. 119,278.
22 Makhairas, § 594, p. 591 and the Strambaldi variant, p. 250 for 1376; Amadi, p. 490 and FI. 
Bustron, p. 349 for 1380.
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his brother’. The building work was financed by a ‘voluntary tax’ on the burgesses 
and other citizens and vigorously pursued. Plainly, this was a much more significant 
structure than any of its predecessors in Nicosia. It spread out to incorporate a then 
existing royal court, named the ‘Houses of the Counts’ -  the ‘Kountiatika’ -  most 
likely the castle-palace complex developed between the 1240s and 1350s mentioned 
above and the St. Paraskevi Gate, which may have been modified as a result. The new 
complex was built ‘as it seems in ten months. And King James did a little and King 
Janus a little’.23
The allusion to the St. Paraskevi Gate may perhaps locate this complex on the south­
west side of the city, close to the later Venetian Paphos Gate, and hence in some 
proximity to the site on which Enlart located the thirteenth-century complex. Outside 
the Paphos Gate, a short stretch of wall with a projecting rectangular tower was found, 
and this possibly is a vestige of Peter II’s work. It has been suggested that possibly the 
river Pedias was diverted at this time to provide the additional defence of a water 
channel outside this developed part of the city’s curtain, but if so this could only have 
happened after the Genoese prisoners had completed their excavations which, as we 
will see, was not until the 1380s. It is not clear how far the new complex of works had 
progressed during Peter II’s reign. Some modem writers have claimed that the full 
suite of royal apartments was completed while others have suggested otherwise. The 
sources allow for ambiguity but as Leventis suggested, it is likely that the outer 
enclosure was completed, while the elaborate structures within remained 
unfinished.24
In any event, it is clear that in fact work continued beyond the initial ten months 
campaign and that all was completed during the reign of James I. It is difficult to say 
whether James merely added the finishing touches, or commissioned rather more 
substantial works, as Stephen of Lusignan would have us believe in his claim that it 
was James who created the complete complex. Still, the castle-palace-citadel appears 
to have been completed in his reign. One of James’s first acts was to free the Genoese
23 Makhairas, §§ 594-7, pp. 591-3, and see too Makhairas, § 87, p. 79; the Strambaldi variant, pp. 250- 
land 35; Amadi, p. 490; FI. Bustron, p. 349; Hill, 2,429; Leventis, p. 177. The quotations are from 
Makhairas, except ‘citadella’, which is the word used by Amadi and FI. Bustron.
24 Makhairas, Amadi and FI. Bustron -  see above fn. 23. Jeffery, pp. 99-100; Dawkins in Makhairas, 2, 
p. 198; Hill, 2, pp. 430,445-6; Perbellini (1973) p. 51; A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p.196;
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prisoners ‘from their fetters and from their labour in the moat’.25 According to 
Amadi, FI. Bustron and Lusignan, James created a church where Peter I’s Margarita 
Tower had existed and this was called, after the Tower’s chapel, the Misericordia, 
which James adorned with a ‘bel vergier intomo’. In all likelihood, this was on the 
south-east side of the new citadel.
Lusignan’s description of the finished works on the main site is of value. He records 
a ‘vast structure’ of a ‘strong and beautiful citadel’ with water in the moats and two 
drawbridges. It enclosed the ‘Royal Palace’ or ‘court’, St. Dominic’s friary which, as 
noted earlier, linked with the royal chambers and which contained the royal 
‘sepulchre’ and the residence of the Patriarch of Jerusalem, arranged with two 
cloisters replete with various fruit trees. This description of the castle-court is 
comparable with the observations of Nicolas of Martoni, who saw it in 1395 towards 
the end of James I’s reign. He described a courtyard surrounding a fountain which 
Nicosia’s citizens accessed freely, many fine apartments, a large arcaded hall 
incorporating a columned, ornamented throne area, and a ‘king’s room’ only the door 
of which seems to have afforded a measure of privacy. In fact Nicolas calls this palace 
a ‘hospitium’. Clearly he was impressed. Interestingly, his description reflects that 
what he saw was first and foremost a palace rather than a fortification. On the other 
hand, he compared this ‘citadella’ with the ‘castrum novum de Neapoli’ created by 
Charles I of Anjou between 1279 and 1282, which was perfectly defensible.27 Further 
details of the palace may be gleaned from the commentary of Luchino dal Campo on 
his visit with his master, the Duke of Ferrara, in 1412.28
The damage perpetrated by the Mamluks in 1426 had a radical effect, though we have 
conflicting evidence as to what Janus did as a consequence of this damage. Hence, 
regardless of any repairs he had carried out on the court buildings and its residential 
facilities, it does appear that the King felt obliged to move out to the premises of a
Grivaud, p. 174; Leventis, p. 177; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 95.
25 Makhairas, §600, p. 595.
26 Amadi, p. 495; FI. Bustron, p. 352; Lusignan, Description, ff. 31, 32, 153; Chorogrqffia -  Grivaud, 
ff. 15 and 59a; Chorography -  Wallace, §§ 39 and 338, pp. 20-1 and 80; Hill, 2, pp. 430,445-6. 
See too fhs. 18 and 24 above and Leventis, p. 179.
27 Nicolas de Martoni, p. 634 and in Cobham, p. 26. See too Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and 
Plagnieux, pp. 96-7.
28 In Grivaud, pp. 42-3. See too Leventis, p. 187.
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'j aknight where his new ‘court’ was established. This separation of the fortified citadel 
and the structures housing normal day-to-day royal administration and 
accommodation is reflected in a number of episodes reported in the narrative sources. 
The Catalan Pero Tafur -  who arrived in the city at some point in the late 1430s - 
recounted how John II fled from his rebellious subjects ‘to a fortress on the edge of 
the city, called the Citadel, and there they surrounded him,... ’.30 Not long after, in 
1450, the German Stephen of Gumpenburg remarked on an impressive ‘Konigs 
Castel’ with walls and strong gates containing a ‘monastery’ that was ‘oben in der 
Statt’, - ‘above/up in the city’, but what he saw was merely the shell of the citadel.31 
References from the last decades of the Lusignan period reveal even more clearly that 
court and castle were then quite separate. In 1456 for example, Charlotte and her new 
husband, John of Coimbra of Portugal, took up residence in the ‘casa de Ugo della 
Baume, cavalier’ and not the citadel. In 1458, John II, Helen Paleologus and Charlotte 
withdrew to the castle to survive the coup attempted by James the Bastard. Shortly 
after, on the occasion of her coronation, Queen Charlotte proceeded from the castle to 
St. Sophia ‘to the court where her father had been: and these houses belonged to Sir 
Richard de la Baume.’32 Later, towards the end of 1460 when James II had to retire to 
Nicosia, he quartered his Egyptian allies in the castle and elsewhere, while he and his 
immediate entourage occupied the royal court.33
The great works of Peter II and James I were never reoccupied. The last Lusignans, 
James n and Catherine Comaro resided in Famagusta after its recapture in 1464. 
Catherine re-established the royal court in Nicosia in 1476 although whether in the 
Baume residence or a new location is not altogether clear.34 The earthquake of 1480 
caused some damage in the city, and certainly the castle-convent as described by 
Felix Faber who visited in the early 1480s shows clearly that the interior of the castle 
was ruined and uninhabitable, only the convent and outer castle walls being intact. 
Faber’s account is especially illuminating in recording that the ‘castle’ constituted
29 Amadi, p. 512; Makhairas, § 694, p. 673 and § 702, p. 679; Boustronios, § 1, p. 67 and § 19, p. 79; 
FI. Bustron, p. 373; Enlart, pp. 388,391; Hill, 2, p. 496, fh. 2.
30 in Cobham, p. 33
31 in Grivaud, p. 65
32 Boustronios, § 26, p. 83; FI. Bustron, pp. 349,373,379,386-7.
33 Boustronios, § 58, p. 99; Leventis, pp. 239-43.
34 FI. Bustron, pp. 373,453; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 98; Attar, pp. 46,94; 
Leventis, pp. 243,255.
35 Francesco Suriano of Venice in Cobham, p. 48.
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both the former royal residences and the Dominican convent -  which possessed two 
cloisters with marble pillars and the royal tombhouse - all enclosed in ‘lofty’ and 
‘very high and stout’ walls surrounded by the river and accessed by a stone, arched 
bridge. By his time, the friars were in exclusive possession of the whole site, and only 
they were permitted to build there. Clearly, the royal court continued to lie 
elsewhere. Jacques le Saige visited Nicosia in 1518. He was struck by its decay from 
former splendour and in particular observed that it ‘has two very strong castles’.37 
Presumably he merely formed this impression from the external appearance of the 
citadel. The Venetians razed all this as part of their refortification programme,38 and 
in consequence only fragments have been identified.
It is clear that such works in Nicosia as we have been able to trace above were a 
natural consequence of successive kings’ attention to the facilities and -  to a lesser 
extent -  the defences -  of their capital. It is perhaps an important point to make: that 
this is where the Lusignan kings lived for much of their time. Indeed, there is no 
evidence to support the claims made by some modem writers that, apart from the 
period 1464-76, the Lusignans necessarily spent considerable periods elsewhere, such 
as at St. Hilarion, or that in particular, James I preferred to stay at Kyrenia. Indeed, 
James is not untypical in being conspicuously resident in Nicosia: Nicolas of Martoni 
noted in 1395 that the king lived in Nicosia for most of the time39 and the lord of 
Anglure, who also visited in 1395, recorded similarly that:
... in this city the King of Cyprus dwells more than any town or fortress in the
40country.
36 Felix Faber in Cobham, pp. 43-4, taken from C. D. Hassler’s 3 vol edition of 1843-49. Felix 
added his description of Cypriot monuments at the end of his work. This element was omitted in 
the translation by A. Stewart for the Library of the Palestine Pligrims’ Text Society, 7 to 10, 
(London, 1893), The Wanderings of Felix Fabri (circa 1480 -  1483 AD).
37 in Cobham, p. 59.
38 Hill, 3, p. 811; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 95.
39 Nicolas de Martoni, pp. 634-5 and in Cobham, p. 26.
40 in Cobham, p. 29.
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CITY WALLS
There is no evidence for the existence of any town walls in Byzantine times or during 
the earlier Lusignan period.41 We noted above that Wilbrand of Oldenburg recorded 
as much and indeed there is no intimation in any of our sources to infer one before the 
reign of Henry II or even Hugh IV.
There seem to have been no city walls during the difficult period of Amaury’s 
usurpation (1306-1310), when the contesting factions instead had resort to setting up 
gates in the streets. Possibly there was some initial Lusignan work after 1310 by 
Henry II as he developed the ‘castle’, but if so, this must have been negligible, for 
during the early years of the next king, Hugh IV (1324-1359), it was reported that 
‘in the town not much of the fortifying wall was as yet built, and they were building 
it.’42 Peter I is also reported as having commenced the building of the walls 43 In all 
likelihood, this was rather a renewal of an otherwise desultory campaign. In any 
event, we have an allusion to works in the ditches and on the enceinte in an ordinance 
given on 16 January 1362.44 Some intimation of their state on the eve of the Genoese’ 
first attack on the island may be derived from Makhairas’ comment: they were then 
‘very strong but they were low’, so various emergency works were instituted by the 
Lusignans. The walls were built up with earth and stones, a ditch created and 133 
platforms constructed for archers to supplement the towers 45 As noted in the History 
(above), if so many platforms were constructed about 175-210 feet apart as FI.
Bustron recorded, the circuit of the walls would have been almost 5 miles long and 
consequently a considerable work indeed. 46 Later, the Genoese in turn strengthened a 
part of the wall which they used as a base from which to dominate the rest of the
41 A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 196; Perbellini (1973), p. 50; Edbury, Kingdom, p. 14.
42 Makhairas, § 41, p. 43, § 76, p. 71, § 76, p. 71. See too Hill, 2, p.257; Megaw,Military 
Architecture, p. 196; Leventis, p. 167.
43 FI. Bustron, p. 26, from which, Perbellini (1973), pp. 50-1; AH.S. Megaw, Military 
Architecture, p. 196; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 104; Leventis, p. 167.
44 “Bans et ordonnances” in RHC-Lois, 2, no. xxxiii, p. 378 as cited by Grivaud and Schabel in 
Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 93.
45 Makhairas, §§ 383-4, p. 363.
46 FI. Bustron, pp. 294-5.
47 Makhairas, § 424, p. 405; Dawkins in Makhairas, 2, p. 164; FI. Bustron, p. 312.
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Makhairas records that at this time:
there were two main gates that opened in the walls.. the gate of Saint 
Paraskevi and the gate of Saint Andrew. 48
In his record of the sparring with the Genoese, he added that there was another gate -  
the Market or Lower Gate, and he referred also to the Upper Gate, which has been 
identified as an alternative name for the St. Paraskevi Gate. The Market (Lower) Gate 
was associated with towers and mention is made of a tower of St. Andrew so it is 
likely that these three principal gates were all protected by adjacent towers.49 Our 
other narrative sources also refer to the Market Gate and the tower of St. Andrew and 
mention a St. Veneranda gate -  in fact the Saint Paraskevi Gate by another name and 
a gate of the tax - which may well be one and the same as the Market (Lower) Gate.50 
We also know of a ‘tower of Trakhona’ in this period, and later, in 1426 of ‘the tower 
of the Arsenal’ used as a prison for a Mamluk envoy though there appears to be no 
certainty that either was associated with a gate as Grivaud and Schabel appeared to 
believe.51 ‘La tour de Sainte Verredi’, no doubt Veneranda, is mentioned in 1468.52
Various attemps have been made to assign locations to these gates and towers, but 
even if we could be confident that their names remained the same in our period, which 
as already noted, does not seem to have necessarily been the case, we need to be 
careful. Such attempts are fraught with difficulty. Thus, in 1457 and 1458 we learn of 
a possible Gate of the Armenian quarter. If, as has been generally believed, the 
Armenians were quartered near the royal palace-castle complex which had been built 
near the Paraskevi Gate, this may have been another gate close by. It has been 
suggested, however, that the Armenian quarter was on the east side of the city and 
that these references to a gate of that name are in fact a confusion.53 Grivaud and 
Schabel recently proposed that the Arsenal tower and the St. Andrew tower controlled
48 Makhairas, § 395, pp. 373-5.
49 Makhairas, § 408, p. 387, § 424, p. 405, § 432, pp. 415-6, § 433, p. 417, § 434, p.419, §§ 436-8, pp. 
421-3, § 510, p. 501, § 623, p. 611 and § 692, p. 669.
50 Amadi, p. 469; Strambaldi variant of Makhairas, pp. 165,178,179,181,250; FI. Bustron, pp. 308, 
312,313; Leventis, pp. 169 and 173.
51 For the tower of Trakhona - Makhairas, § 510, p. 501 and Dawkins in Makhairas, 2, p. 181; Amadi, 
p. 468; FI. Bustron, p. 326; Leventis, p. 171. For the tower of the Arsenal -  Makhairas, § 677, p. 
657; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 94.
52 J. Richard, Le Livre des Remembrances de la Secrete, doc. 175 on p. 93 and note 8 on p. 185; 
Leventis, p. 173 (the gate of ‘Santa Veneranda’).
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the passage of the river where it entered the city and where it had its outflow. Leventis 
too located the St. Andrew tower by an outflow of the river, but there appears to be no 
evidence for this. It does seem likely, however, that the Market (Lower) and St. 
Andrew Gates and Towers were on the eastern portion of the enceinte on the basis 
that this is where the markets were concentrated and the part of the circuit that the 
Genoese would have first encountered in 1373 and which of course they too fortified. 
That the St. Paraskevi (Upper/Veneranda) Gate was on the western side appears likely 
from its alternative name reflecting it was where the river entered the city and from 
various references to it being used by James in his movements between Nicosia and 
Kyrenia in late 1373. As we saw, it came to be associated with the great palace-citadel 
begun by Peter II and continued in use after the establishment of that new complex 
still serving as the city’s principal gate on the west. The Trakhona tower very likely 
lay on the north-west of the circuit facing the community of that name.54
James I is credited with enhancing the city’s town walls,55 but in all likelihood they 
continued to need further development and we have no certain information that 
anything further was done after his reign in the Lusignan period. Clearly the walls 
were in poor shape in 1451 when Pope Nicholas V urged John II to complete them 
and issued an appeal to all Christian powers for money and troops to defend the 
island. Money raised from the sale of indulgences in western Europe was specifically 
allocated by the papal authorities for work on Nicosia’s town walls, but little of these 
funds ever reached Cyprus.56 The apparent ease with which James the Bastard scaled 
the walls during his adventures in 1457 and 1458 have been taken by one observer at 
least to imply that the walls were porous and falling down.57 In 1460 they were 
described as crumbling and useless for defence.58 Indeed until almost the end of the 
Venetian period, there were regular entreaties that the walls be repaired.59
53 FI. Bustron, pp. 376 and 390. See too Leventis, pp. 171,251.
54 Enlart, p. 390; Dawkins in Makhairas, 2, pp. 164 and 167; Leventis, pp. 145 and 169,171,173; 
Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 94 and their fn. 49; Keshishian’s plan (p. 69) 
located the Market Gate on one of the river’s outflows. See History, above, fhs. 114,116-18 and 
141 for the sources and Makhairas § 623, p. 611; Stambaldi variant, p. 260.
55 Amadi, p. 495; FI. Bustron, pp. 26,352; Lusignan, Description, f. 32; Enlart, p 389; Perbellini 
(1973), pp. 50-1; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, pp. 104-5.
56 Hill, 3, pp. 523-5; Joachim in Caterina Comoro, p. 52; Leventis, p. 251.
57 Leventis, pp. 251-3.
58 Duke Otto von der Pfalz, in Jeffery, p. 22.
59 Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 94.
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Sixteenth-century commentators produced varying observations of the state of the 
enceinte. Pierre Mesenge wrote in 1507 that ‘.. .the surrounding walls are still wholly 
entire as though newly made; and I think I never saw so fine a wall or in so perfect a 
state’: a view apparently shared by another Frenchman, Charles de la Riviere, who 
visited the same year. But as Hill remarked, such comments may have misjudged 
matters, for certainly in 1529, Minio described the walls as old and weak.60 They are 
generally said to have been roughly a circle with round interval towers, a ditch and 
with no less than eight gates. Establishing the number of gates has importance as this 
reflects the purpose of the enceinte. We saw above that we appear to have clear 
references to only three. This, and Lusignan’s reference to three gates in his 
Chorography, persuaded Leventis to conclude that there was no more than this 
number. Yet this is hardly credible given the considerable length of the circuit and 
that when it was first under construction in the decades before 1373, it was more a 
reflection of royal and civic prosperity when there was no real external threat. It is far 
more likely that all eight were in existence from the beginning but that two or three 
were sufficiently prominent to feature in the narratives that we have.
The walls were still standing in 1553 when John Locke remarked that they were ‘not 
strong’, and 1562 when the Venetian, Ascanio Savorgnan reported on them. By the 
standards of that later period, they were considered obsolete. Indeed, Ascanio 
considered matters so bad that he advised that it would be better not to attempt to 
refortify Nicosia at all. Nevertheless, his elder brother Julius (Giulio) was sent in 1567 
to build the new Venetian defences. He and Francesco Barbaro spent eight to ten 
months constructing a wholly new, three mile long circular enceinte of earthen 
ramparts and bastions revetted in stone within the circuit of the old walls. These and 
other older structures were utilised as a quarry and cleared away to create a clear field 
of fire for defending artillery housed in the new fortification although it was never 
completed. As a result, nothing now remains of the Lusignan city wall and even its 
trace and extent is uncertain. It was certainly longer than the Venetian circuit -  
Minio’s description of 1529 and Savorgnan’s report talk of a little over four miles,
60 For Mesange - Enlart, p. 389 and Hill, 3, p. 809, and see fn in History, fn. 184, above.
For de la Riviere, Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 94 citing Bibliotheque 
Municipale de Rouen, ms. 1118 (u 100).
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and so are in approximate agreement with what we inferred from the descriptions 
given of the works of 1373.61
APPENDIX
Cartographic evidence
There is little cartographic evidence to draw upon. Three depictions showing Nicosia 
with its pre-Venetian walls can be mentioned:
• that of Henricus Germanus of 1490 showing ‘numerous round towers’; 62
• a drawing by Leonida Attar of 1542 depicting a four ‘miglia’ circular enceinte 
with big, round towers;63
• an anonymous map in circulation in Venice or Rome in 1562 showing the 
walls as prescribing a wedge shape and having rectangular towers.64
61 Lusignan, Chorograffia -  Grivaud, f. 15; Lusignan, Chorography -  Wallace, § 39, p. 20;
Leventis, pp. 175,315. For John Locke, Cobham, p. 71. For Savorgnan’s report -  Bibliotheque 
Nationale de France, ms. ital. 831, ff. 22-3 -  Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 94, 
Leventis, p. 317 and Hill, 3, p. 844. In general, Enlart, pp. 389-90; Jeffery, pp. 22,26-9; Hill, 2, pp. 
13,27, and 3„ pp. 811, 844-6; A.H.S. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 196; Perbellini, (1988), p. 
35.
62 In The History and Cartography of Nicosia, (The Leventis Municipal Museum, Nicosia, 1989), 
p. 20 referred to in Leventis, p. 251, fit. 266.
63 Attar, p. 94; Grivaud and Schabel in Vaivre et Plagnieux, p. 94.
64 European Cartography, pp. 42-3.
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PAPHOS
The early fortifications of Paphos and historical references to 1222
Paphos has a very long history of settlement and fortification. City walls were first 
erected in the eighth century B.C. in the Archaic period at its original site. This lay ten 
miles along the coast to the east, and is now known as Kouklia, or Palaepaphos. New 
or Nea Paphos -  the site of present Paphos -  was founded about 320 B.C. and it is 
assumed that its extensive city walls and breakwaters were begun about then.1 These 
defences appear to have received some subsequent maintenance, at least where they 
constituted a sea wall. Quite possibly the threat posed by the rapid growth of Islam in 
the mid-seventh century prompted some such maintenance. Be that as it may, in 649 
or 653, the inhabitants are reported as having manned these ancient walls in 
attempting to resist AbuT-Awar’s incursion, though to no avail. Under the terms of a 
treaty of 688 between Justinian II and Abd al-Malik, it was agreed that Cyprus was to 
be administered jointly by the Byzantine Empire and the Umayyad Caliphate: thus it 
effectively became a neutral, buffer zone straddling the border of two spheres of 
interest. Megaw suggested that possibly Paphos became the headquarters of the Emir 
who represented the Sultan during this period of truce with Constantinople; certainly 
Paphos remained effectively an Arab port until its recovery for the Byzantine Empire 
during the reign of Nicephorus Phocas in 965.2
The relevance to this present study of these events of the seventh century lies in their 
possible association with the scant remains of a defensive wall with a comer tower, 
located to block the landward approach to the harbour. Megaw, who drew attention to 
this defensive line which, in its greatest possible arc, enclosed a much smaller area 
than the older walls of the third century B.C., ascribed the origin of these either to a 
Byzantine attempt to withstand the expected Arab attack that came in 649 or 653, or 
to a defensive work created by the Arabs themselves during what he supposed was
1 Maier, Old Paphos (Kouklia), p. 9; Maier, Palaipaphos (Kouklia), p. 22; Nea Paphos, pp. 3, 16 and 
fig. 3; Megaw, Reflections, p. 136 and fig. 1.
2 Megaw, Reflections, pp. 143,145,147; Megaw, Betwixt Greeks and Saracens, p. 514; Metcalf,
Coins from Saranda Kolones, pp. 205,208,224; Metcalf, Byzantine Cyprus, p. 284.
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their subsequent thirty year occupation. It now appears clear, however, that there is no 
evidence to imply that the Arabs did garrison the town expelling its Christain 
inhabitants and that in any case, a seventh-century date for this trace of wall remains 
far from clear. Indeed, ‘a distinctly later date’ has recently been preferred by Metcalf. 
The treaty of 688 included a ban on the building of fortifications. Admittedly, this 
could perhaps imply a recognition of their prior existence, but if they did not and if 
this detail of the treaty was observed, then there is an argument that the wall would 
not have been built during that long ensuing period of Arab-Byzantine co-operation 
and that consequently it is much later. Megaw made two further suggestions as to the 
uses to which these walls were put in later times. The first was that these works also 
constituted the fortification referred to in the twelfth century, while the second was 
that, at its western extremity, the surviving elements may have been utilised by 
James I as a substructure for his ‘citadella’ of 1391 (see below). Both these thoughts 
have been dismissed by von Wartburg in an article published in 1996, and it is indeed 
the case that there is only slight evidence for the first claim and none at all for the 
second.3
The evidence for an twelfth-century use of the defensive wall in question appears to 
rest on the third of the four historical references we have that either refer to, or may 
imply a fortification in Paphos during the twelfth century. In his Panegyric, St. 
Neophytos mentions a church of the Virgin Limeniotissa (‘of the Harbour’) situated 
inside a fortification, and that this church was destroyed by an earthquake which may 
be dated to about 1160.4 The remains of this church have been excavated and Megaw 
implied that it may go back to the fifth century.5 Its location does indeed place it 
within the line of Megaw’s wall, so it may be that this wall is indeed that of 
Neophytos’ fortification, but conclusive proof remains lacking.
That Neophytos’ reference alludes to a church within a fortification implies at least 
that the latter must have included a curtain wall of some sort, but our other three 
allusions in the twelfth century add little except to confirm the existence of a
3 Megaw, Reflections, pp. 144-5 ,149-150 and fig. 2; Betwixt Greeks and Saracens, pp. 508, 514-5  
and fig. 11; Wartburg, p. 136, fn 52; M etcalf Byzantine Cyprus, pp. 285-7.
4 Galatariotou, citing Neophytos, Panegyric, pp. 16 ,211; M egaw, Reflections, p. 147, and fn. 34; 
Nicolaou-Konnari p. 51 and fn. 56.
5 Megaw, Reflections, p. 140.
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fortification. The first of these references does not even specifically mention a 
fortification at all. This is a record made by a certain Icelandic Abbot or Bishop 
Nicholas of Thingeyrar as he travelled through Paphos some time around 1150-3 on 
his return from pilgrimage. He noted the existence of a garrison of Voeringjar, or 
Varangians, in Paphos. Earlier commentators have assumed that such a force must 
have been housed in a castle, but we can not necessarily ascribe such an interpretation 
to this reference taken in isolation, for, as with references in the sources to Isaac’s 
‘garrisoning’ of Limassol against Richard I in 1191, a fortification need not be 
involved.6 However, our remaining allusions lead to the conclusion that this view is 
not unreasonable. Apart from Neophytus’ reference discussed above, elsewhere he 
recorded that in 1159, while in Paphos, he was mistaken for an escaped prisoner, 
arrested and imprisoned for a day and a night in the ‘phrourion’ of Paphos.7 
Phrourion is a classical Greek word taken to indicate a watch post, garrisoned fort, or 
citadel. No doubt this was the same structure as the subject of the final reference that 
we have for a fortification in Paphos in the twelfth century: this is the allusion by the
Yorkshire clerk, Roger of Howden, in his reworked chronicle, to the ‘castellum’ of
£
‘Baffes’ in his list of castles taken by Richard I in 1191. Taken together, these four 
references provide convincing historical evidence that some sort of fortification 
existed in Paphos at the end of the twelfth century. Quite what that may have been, 
and by the same token, what may have superseded it, is a matter of considerable 
archaeological interest dealt with below. However, before reviewing this, it may be 
helpful to continue with the historical evidence for fortification at Paphos to the point 
in time when we enter a long period when no references are made at all.
After Roger of Howden’s reference to a castellum, and until 1373, after which 
references become rather more common, our only references to anything of a possible
6 The Itinerary of Abbot Nikolas (AM 194 ,8  vo), Kr. Kalund, ed., Alfroedi islenzk (Copenhagen, 
1908), pp. 20.31- 23.21, cited by B. Z. Kedar and Chr. Westergard-Nielsen, pp. 1 97 ,203 . See
too Galatariotou, p. 49, fii. 40; Megaw, Reflections, p. 147 and fn. 32; Cadei, pp. 131-142, and p. 
141, en 7, citing Antiquites russes d ’apr&s les monuments des Islandais II, (Copenhagen, 1852), p. 
408. Cadei takes this reference to be ‘a garrison room’.
7 Galatariotou, citing Neophytos, Typikon, 76. 19-26; Nicolaou-Konnari, p. 51 and fn. 56; Cadei, p. 
141, en. 8, citing F.E. Warren, The “Ritual Ordinance " ofNeophitos, Archaeologia: or, 
M iscellaneous tracts relating to Antiquity, 47, (1882), p. 12; Megaw, Reflections, p. 147 and fn.
33.
8 Chronica, 3, p. 111, as noted above in History, p. 5. Baffo is an alternative name for N ew  Paphos 
(Makhairas, 2, p. 216).
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military nature in Paphos come first from the diary of Wilbrand, Count of Oldenburg 
and Bishop of Utrecht, who visited Cyprus in 1211; second from another German 
cleric, Oliver of Paderbom, in relation to the earthquake of 1222; and finally a passing 
note by Ludolf, a priest of the church of Sudheim, or Suchen, in Westphalia of a visit 
made between 1336 and 1341 that a castle had ‘once’ existed. Let us look at each of 
these references in turn.
In the History (above pp. 11-12), it was shown that Wilbrand’s comments on Cypriot 
fortifications are both instructive and difficult. His reference for Paphos -  ‘ Ab hoc 
monte uidimus P a p h o s . t h a t  he could see it from where he was on a neighbouring 
height, - ‘et est civitas parua, in qua hodie monstratur turris ilia’: that Paphos was a 
small town where the same tower was shown .. .on which Venus was worshipped by 
her lovers, - is problematical. In the first place, it seems most unlikely that he saw the 
tower at all: his own testimony implies that he did not visit the town and in spite of 
what he wrote, he could not in fact have even seen it from where he was at 
Stavrovouni.9 Second, Wilbrand’s use of the word ‘turns’ is striking, for it is not a 
word that he uses in reference to anything else in Cyprus. Its employment here, in 
relation to a building that hearsay associated with pagan practices of earlier times, 
suggests that Wilbrand was simply repeating some general tradition about an ancient 
structure of some kind. In sum then, there is little evidence here to adduce the 
existence of a fortification at all.
Our next allusion is from the Historia Damiatina, written by Oliver of Paderbom. He 
had been a teacher in the cathedral school of Cologne but had joined the Fifth Crusade 
in 1216 and wrote up his chronicle between 1217 and 1222.10 He wrote:
Anno gratie millesimo ducentesimo vigesimo secundo mense Maio factus est 
terre motus magnus in Cypro, Lymocio, Nicossia aliisque locis eiusdem 
insule, presertim in Papho in tantum, ut civitas cum castro penitus 
subverteretur, hominess promiscui sexus, qui in ea reperti sunt tempore 
commotionis, communiter exstincti, portus siccatus, ubi postmodum aque sive 
fontes eruperunt.11
9 Wilbrand, book I, ch. xxxi, (ed. Laurent), p. 182; Wilbrand, in Cobham, p. 14. Wartburg, p. 132, fn. 
23 and p. 134, &. 36.
10 Oliver o f  Paderbom (ed. Peters), p. xx.
11 Oliver o f  Paderbom (ed. Hoogweg), ch. 86, p. 279.
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In the year of grace 1222 in the month of May it happened that there was a 
great earthquake on Cyprus, in Limassol, Nicosia, and other places of that 
island, especially in Paphos, to such a degree that the city was completely 
destroyed along with the fort; human beings of both sexes who were there at 
the time of the earthquake were completely lost; the harbour was dried up, 
where afterwards waters or fountains burst forth. 12
As with Wilbrand’s reference to Paphos, Oliver’s comment has been questioned on 
the basis that he was not an eye witness of this earthquake of May 1222, inasmuch 
that he was back in Cologne by 16 February. Von Wartburg exploited this in her 
argument that the 1222 earthquake was merely one of many -  we know of others in 
about 1160, in 1204, 1267/8,1303 and on subsequent occasions -  so in her view, the 
earthquake of 1222 was not particularly exceptional. She enlarged that, like other 
writers before and after, Oliver may have merely embellished his narrative of this 
earthquake with formulae culled from early visitors’ books or pilgrims’ guides that 
had recorded earlier earthquakes, and that, in conclusion, we should not accept 
Oliver’s testimony that the 1222 earthquake necessarily wrecked the castle, or that 
any damage it did suffer went unrepaired.13
As John Rosser has said however, Oliver’s testimony is not to be dismissed.14 Unlike 
Wilbrand and his allusion to Paphos, Oliver did not actually claim that he witnessed 
the earthquake himself. As one who had been on crusade, it is quite likely that he had 
acquired a number of contacts who may in fact have been able to report first hand 
information to him of events in the eastern Mediterranean in the months immediately 
after Oliver’s return to the West. Furthermore, although Oliver’s account of the 
earthquake is the only one to mention the castle, other annalists recorded the 
particular effects of the earthquake on Paphos. These include both chroniclers with 
particular interests in Cyprus or the Latin East and western chroniclers who had no 
special interest in the island. The first group constitute Philip of Novara, who 
recorded that ‘en cel an fu le grant crole en Chipre, quy abaty Bafe’15 and the author
12 Oliver o f  Paderbom (ed. Peters), ch. 86, p. 136.
13 Wartburg, pp. 131-4; Megaw, Reflections, p. 147; Edbury, The Kingdom, pp. 13-14.
14 Rosser, Archaeological and Literary Evidence, pp. 45-7.
15 Novara, § 10 (106), Melani, p. 70; copied by Amadi, p. 115.
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of the Annales de Terre Sainte, who wrote of ie  c[r]osle qui abati Bauffe en Cipre’.16 
That the earthquake was most likely particularly severe is suggested by its mention in 
the second group. These include another German, Caesarius of Heisterbach who 
mentions its effects as far away as Italy. He seems to have heard directly from Oliver 
that the earthquake had destroyed a church somewhere on the island while the bishop 
was saying mass and that Paphos was especially affected: ‘tot turres, tot aedificia 
corruerunt’.17
After Oliver’s reference to the castle, there is an absence of references to any 
fortifications in Paphos continuing throughout the thirteenth century. Such negative 
evidence has its value, and can best be noted here. In Philip of Novara’s account of 
the wars between his masters, the Ibelins, and the German Emperor, Frederick II, he 
makes no mention of any castle in Paphos. As noted in the gazetteer entry for 
Limassol, Frederick established his headquarters there upon his arrival in 1228, not 
Paphos as might have been expected as the port nearest the West. In the two wars that 
followed in the years to 1233, the possession of castles was of considerable 
importance and Philip provides detailed narratives of some of the sieges involved, but 
there is not even a passing allusion to Paphos in this struggle.
Similarly in 1248, St Louis made Limassol his base, not Paphos, and when, at this 
time, the ‘Empress of Constantinople’ landed in Paphos on a mission to seek the 
French King’s help, she was promptly conveyed to Limassol.18 If there had been a 
castle in Paphos that was still intact and in use, it is very difficult indeed to explain 
quite why it did not feature in these various events. Finally, the Templar of Tyre’s 
description of Cyprus (see above) which notes the island’s towns and fortifications, 
correspondingly reflects that at the end of the thirteenth century or the beginning of 
the fourteenth century, Paphos was not deemed to be fortified.
In the early fourteenth century, in 1312 and 1316, Paphos suffered from piratical 
Genoese raids, but our chronicle sources make no mention of any fortification then in
16 Annales de Terre Sainte, p. 437b.
17 Caesarius, pp. 251-2; For other references in other western chronicles, see Rosser,
Archaeological and Literary Evidence, pp. 45-6  and fins. 37 and 39. A  further allusion to the 
earthquake is found in Matthew Paris, 4, p. 346. (Until 1235, M atthew’s Chronica is Roger o f  
Wendover’s chronicle with Matthew’s additions).
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use.19 James of Verona visited the island in 1335. He too was troubled by pirates, 
and visited Paphos but made no mention of any castle there.20 This impression of the 
absence of defences is confirmed by the notes made by a Westphalian priest -  Ludolf 
of Suchen -  who visited the island some time between 1336 and 1341. He commented 
that the town was ‘well nigh destroyed by frequent earthquakes’ and like Wilbrand 
before him, recorded a fortification that had been a place of worship of Venus. Unlike 
Wilbrand’s testimony however, Ludolf remarks of this castle only that it ‘once stood’. 
21 In 1344, an unknown Englishman visited Paphos, and like James of Verona, he too 
made no mention whatever of any fortifications then in commission.22
Accordingly, we have no literary evidence that unequivocally attests the existence of 
any fortification in use in Paphos from 1222 until there are references made in relation 
to the war with Genoa in 1373. This dearth of information has made the inferences 
that can be drawn from archaeological investigation all the more controversial, and 
consequently inexact, but it is to these that we must now turn.
Saranda Kolones
Only a little inland from the shore, at the western end of the area that had been 
enclosed by the ancient city walls, are the truncated remains of the castle now known 
as Saranda Kolones -  the forty columns -  being a reference to the utilisation in its 
building of the classical columns that had been found on site. Once thought to be an 
ancient temple dedicated to the cult of Aphrodite, and later a Byzantine castle, the site 
was investigated in a series of excavations led principally by Megaw, from 1957 to 
1983. Megaw and his colleague, John Rosser wrote up their findings and 
interpretations in a number of articles and reports. For the reasons set out below, they 
pronounced that this castle should in fact be attributed to the early Lusignan period 
and beyond that, that it was the Order of St. John -  the Hospitallers who had
18 Joinville, pp. 197-9.
19 Amadi, pp. 393-4; 398; FI. Bustron, pp. 245-6 ,249-50 .
20 Jacques de Verone, p. 176, and in Cobham, p. 16.
21 L. von Suchen, in trans. Stewart, pp. 38-9 and in Cobham, p. 18.
22 Itinerarium Cuiusdam Anglici, in Biblioteca. . ., p. 446 and Western Pilgrims, p. 58.
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constructed and occupied it. Although the final report of the excavations has yet to 
appear, it is clear that their final view will remain as such.
Megaw’s and Rosser’s excavations identified the remains of a ‘tower of crusader 
masonry and a connected wall... a walled encampment with a watchtower’ (P on 
plan), which antedated the larger structure of Saranda Kolones that they wrote was 
built very soon afterwards. At one comer of this tower, they found a denier of Guy of 
Lusignan. This coinage is said to have remained in circulation until 1205, as Guy’s 
brother and successor did not issue any in his own name. No doubt it was then that it 
was officially withdrawn.24 The presence of the coin could then be helpful in 
suggesting that the tower was no later than the coin’s withdrawal. However, how 
certain we may be on this is difficult: for all we know, this coinage may have retained 
its value in circulation. In any case, the presence of the coin can not, of course, tell us 
when the tower was first in commission. Megaw’s and Rosser’s view was that this 
‘watchtower’ was very shortly superseded by the much more formidable fortress now 
visible today. Although already described by Rosser and Megaw, this gazetteer would 
be incomplete without at least some summary of this site, but this will in any case be 
of help in following subsequent points of debate as to its builders that arise from its 
structure and design.
23 Megaw, Excavations at ‘Saranda Kolones’, Paphos, in RDAC, (1971), pp. 117-46; Supplementary 
Excavations... in DOP, (1972), pp. 321-42; Saranda Kolones, 1981, in RDAC, (1982), pp. 210-16; 
Rosser, Excavations... 1981-1983 in DOP, (1985), pp. 81-97. Subsequent articles focus more on  
hypotheses as to likely builders and affinities with other castles. These are Rosser, Crusader 
Castles, in Archaeology, 39, (1986), pp. 41-7; Rosser, The Lusignan Castle, in SIMA, (1987), pp. 
185-98; M egaw, A  Castle in Cyprus, in Fighting for the Faith, (1994), pp. 42-51 and Rosser, W ho  
Built ‘Saranda K olones’? (forthcoming). See too M egaw and Rosser, A  W atchtower.... in RDAC 
(2002), pp. 319-34. Full references to all are provided in the Bibliography.
24 Megaw, A  Castle in Cyprus, p. 45; M egaw and Rosser, A  Watchtower, pp. 319-334; Aristodou, 
Pafos Castle, p. 23; Metcalf, Coins from Saranda Kolones, p. 225.
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Description of Saranda Kolones 25
The castle had two wards, one inside the other. The inner ward is 35m x 37m with a 
projecting, rectangular tower at each comer ( J, K, L and N) and in the centre of the 
east side a D-shaped one containing a right-angle entrance (M). This inner gateway 
retains traces of portcullis grooves and behind them, provision for double doors, in 
both its flank and internal walls. There were loopholes set low in the walls of this 
inner ward. This ward was surrounded by an outer one roughly pentagonal in shape, 
some 75 m across. The outer ward’s walls are about 3 m thick, and had rounded or 
polygonal comer towers and rectangular or cut-water/prow or wedge shaped interval 
towers (A, B, C, D, E, G and H). On the east side lay the entrance -  a particularly 
imposing rectangular tower containing another right-angle arrangement (F). The floor 
of this gate-tower is set at a slight slope to give the effect of a ramp, (see photograph). 
This was reached on its south side by a broad, timber bridge supported by two arcades 
spanning the surrounding ditch -  in part rock-cut and elsewhere defined by a masonry 
counterscarp. A stair leads down from the wall walk, through the thickness of the 
wall, into a ground-level chamber within this gate-tower.
Accommodation was arranged in two storeys round the four sides of the open inner 
court. Megaw’s excavations identified stables with a saddlery in the east and south­
west ranges (the line of stone troughs running the length of the inside of the eastern 
inner curtain is very apparent); a forge in the south range; a mill room at the north­
east comer and a bakehouse containing an oven in the north range. These services 
were housed within a continuous ring of vaulting, suitably partitioned. The vaulting 
was supported by nine massive pillars which were linked by thin walls closing the 
spaces between them, uniformly around the four sides of the inner court, a space 
being left for the entrance on the east side. Three of the four comer pillars each 
contained a pair of latrines, the chutes of which could be flushed into a drainage 
system routed out of the castle underneath the east ditch. On the south-west comer of
25 This description derives principally from those given by M egaw, A  Castle in Cyprus, pp. 42-5  and 
Rosser, Crusader Castles, p. 45 and from personal site visits in October 2004 and October 2005.
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this inner courtyard, two arches have been reinstated, and here too it is especially easy 
to see the springings of the vaults that encircled the quadrangle. From within the 
vaulted range at this south-west comer, a straight stair runs below the inner curtain 
into what is now a chamber partly filled with wreckage.
Above this lower level of the inner ward, Megaw identified a mezzanine level at 
points, in particular a possible small chamber containing a steam bath above the 
bakehouse. The upper storey appeared to repeat the general scheme of the lower in 
that it is vaulted, though it rose to a greater height, and had a flat terraced roof.
Megaw found a further six latrines immediately above those below, but in the main, 
the site is so mined that there is little to say about this level other than that the chapel 
was in the upper storey of the gatetower. This upper level was reached by two stone 
stairs on the north and south sides of the court; a further external stair has been 
inferred leading from the upper floor to the roof terrace. This terrace included an 
arrangement for collecting rainwater.
Of the outer ward, Megaw identified some accommodation built against the inner face 
of the outer wall -  one row containing three comer fireplaces. He noted that the floors 
of the outer ward towers were a little below the level of the outer ward, apart from the 
outer gatetower and the north-west comer tower which had basements. In the latter 
the lower floor retains embrasures which allow for enfilading cover of the outer 
curtain. A further embrasure, set at the level of the outer ward, was found in the 
curtain wall itself near the northern pentagonal tower, suggesting that there may have 
been ample provision of these devices. Finally, he discerned, from the arrangement in 
the north curtain on either side of the central tower that the upper storeys of the towers 
and the interconnecting wall walks were reached by steps in the thickness of the wall.
The profusion of sally ports is a particular feature of Saranda Kolones. Megaw 
counted as many as eight of these, their actual or planned points of egress in the outer 
wall being indicated on the diagram. The design of these is varied and some are 
ingenious, though some are not: they are such a prominent and aggressively minded 
facet of the castle as to warrant particular attention. Beginning with the west wall, 
there are two (numbers 1 and 2 on the plan) between the north-west and west central 
towers (towers A and C on the plan). The southern of these two (number 2) begins its
G:\v GAZETTEER ENTRY FOR PAPHOS - T.doc 338
339
exit from the castle immediately south of the modem entry ramp, and utilises the rock, 
in that it descends into this, in its lower stage. Sally ports 3, and 4 lead out directly 
from towers (D and E), that at the south-west angle being much the better preserved. 
They are simpler, leading out from the side of the towers to emerge close to and next 
to the adjacent curtain. Sally port 5, set in the angle formed between the north wall of 
the outer gatehouse and its adjacent curtain to the north, is different again. Here, its 
course can be traced descending directly from the wall of the outer ward to 
approximately half way down the wall, whereupon it spirals in on itself, ultimately 
opening externally, about two courses below ditch level, emerging very obliquely and 
hard against the curtain wall. This port would have been particularly hard to see by an 
attacking force. A similar arrangement obtains in respect of sally port 7 in that a stair 
leads down to ground level, then twists outwards within the central, wedge shaped 
tower of this northern curtain, opening out into the ditch, as usual, just where it meets 
the curtain. In both this case, and in that of sally port 5, the final openings are 
sufficiently extant to see that they were kept deliberately so small that it would have 
been necessary to crouch or crawl to achieve passage. In the case of sally port 7, there 
are two pairs of slot holes, one pair just below lintel level, for bars to hold in place the 
small door or hatch, that must have been in place. Numbers 6 and 8 were never 
finished. Both descend west to east down the side of the north curtain, but their exits 
remain incomplete: 6 runs down into the flank of the north-east multangular tower, 
but does not emerge from it, while 8 seems to have been intended as a counterpart to 7 
but its exit too was never accomplished. As will be recounted below, the castle 
remained incomplete in several other important respects.
Megaw and Rosser supported their view that Saranda Kolones was very early 
Crusader work, and indeed beyond that the work of the Hospitallers, on a number of 
grounds. These constitute the design of the castle, its historical context, what may be 
adduced from ceramic and numismatic evidence and their probes into the foundation 
trenches taken in the early 1980s. We shall review these arguments, and from that, 
show that at the very least there are both arguments for and against their attribution.
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Saranda Kolones 1
Cut-water tower (C on plan) and postern, as altered, on west outer enceinte.
Saranda Kolones 2
Cut-water tower (C on plan) from the south-west. 
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Saranda Kolones 3
Outer, bent-entrance, rectangular gatehouse (F on plan).
Saranda Kolones 4
Row of stone troughs utilising ancient columns in the stables within the south-east
quadrant of the inner enceinte.
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Saranda Kolones 5
Inner bent-entrance, apsidal gatehouse (M on plan).
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Saranda Kolones 6
Portcullis groove on inner gatehouse (M on plan).
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Design and Architectural Affinities of Saranda Kolones
The case for a Crusader origin: comparisons with Belvoir
As with most castles, it is not difficult to identify similarities between Saranda 
Kolones and other structures. In particular, it bears a striking resemblance in several 
aspects of design and architecture to the larger Belvoir in eastern Galilee. Belvoir was 
built by the Hospitallers between 1168 and 1187. It was lost in 1189 after an eighteen 
month siege. John Rosser first suggested that Saranda Kolones was influenced by a 
Hospitaller style of construction.26 Shortly afterwards, Thomas Biller’s careful study 
of Belvoir,27 revealed more detail that aided close comparison and this persuaded 
Peter Megaw to urge too that Saranda Kolones was also a Hospitaller foundation. In 
support of this, both he and Rosser have pointed out that Saranda Kolones follows the 
regular concentric layout of Belvoir; that in both, the inner wards comprise a 
continuous ring of vaulting, divided by partitions, certainly on the ground floor and 
probably also on the upper. As they pointed out, both sites have an inner gatetower 
containing a right angle entrance, each of which has a chapel on the upper floor which 
contained comparable capitals. Both castles have accommodation set against the outer 
curtain wall. Both have a number of sally ports issuing into the ditch beyond the outer 
wall (three in Belvoir; five in Paphos with a further three planned but then abandoned) 
and both have single posterns leading out from their west outer curtains to bridges 
over the ditch (the bridge being built at Belvoir and intended at Saranda Kolones). 
Biller led Megaw to consider that it was likely that the architect at Paphos was one 
with direct knowledge of Belvoir and that he may well have known of its efficient 
defence in 1189, not that this necessarily makes either the architect or the castle at
Paphos Hospitaller. Megaw admitted that there are also some dissimilarities between
•  28the designs of the two castles, but he gave these negligible attention.
26 Rosser, Crusader Castles, p. 47; Rosser, The Lusignan Castle, p. 187 and later, Rosser, 
Archaeological and Literary Evidence, p. 41.
27 T. Biller, Die Johanniterburg Belvoir.
28 Megaw, A  Castle in Cyprus, pp. 48-50; Rosser, Crusader Castles, p. 47; Vaivre in Vaivre and 
Plagnieux, pp. 54-5; Rosser, (forthcoming).
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Dissimilarities with Belvoir
These dissimilarities are in fact considerable, and should not be dismissed as ‘minor’ 
as Rosser did in 1986. First, and as just noted, there is a considerable difference in 
size. The Paphos castle would then have been capable of accommodating a 
proportionally smaller establishment. Second, the sites are somewhat different.
Belvoir was built at the top of the high western escarpment that drops steeply down 
to, and overlooks the Jordan valley so on one side at least its position is naturally 
defensibile. Saranda Kolones on the other hand is a few hundred metres only from the 
shore line on ground that is only very slightly higher: there is not much in the way of 
utilising a defensible site here. The third matter is the shape of the towers at Saranda 
Kolones. Those on the outer enceinte are remarkable both in that they are varied, and 
that they include two that are wedged shaped -  the towers at Belvoir by contrast are of 
a regular, rectangular design. As A. Boas recently noted, on its inner enceinte, the 
comer towers of Saranda Kolones are rectangular and occupy a fairly large part of the 
outer bailey, whereas those at Belvoir are more or less square and do not extend more 
than the thickness of their walls along the curtain walls or into the outer bailey.30 
Fourth, the location and type of the gateways are different in a number of respects. At 
Saranda Kolones, the gatehouse of the inner ward is situated immediately behind that 
of the outer ward, both of which are in the centre of their respective curtain walls on 
the east side. At Belvoir, the gatehouse of the inner ward is located in the centre of the 
west curtain wall, well away from the principal gateway arrangement through the 
outer curtain, which is on the other side of the castle. The route into this outer 
gateway at Belvoir is channelled between the outer curtain wall and a further, parallel 
wall beyond, so as to form a barbican: this is quite different from what can be seen in 
the Paphos castle. Moreover, this outer gateway at Belvoir is positioned at a comer of 
the rectangular enceinte -  not in the centre of the east wall as at Saranda Kolones. The 
single postem gates on their west outer curtains also do not follow a similar 
arrangement: that at Saranda Kolones runs out from the side of a mural tower, 
whereas the postem at Belvoir is mid-way through a stretch of the curtain wall.
Fifth, the masonry work at Belvoir is, in general terms, of a superior quality: it is 
freed throughout in well cut and well fitted ashlar, while at Saranda Kolones, the
29 Rosser, Crusader Castles, p. 47.
30 & Boas, Archaeology of the Military Orders, pp. 124-5.
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excavations have revealed both sections of wall with well laid, large facing blocks, 
but also courses of masonry similarly well laid but of uneven, unshaped coarse 
masonry, though this may be merely the consequence of the site remaining 
incomplete. Unlike Saranda Kolones which is limestone throughout, the main material 
used at Belvoir is basalt, with limestone imported and used only for groins, doorways 
and so forth. Sixth, an extremely prominent feature of Belvoir’s design is the 
considerable batter of the outer enceinte’s walls. This is not replicated at Saranda 
Kolones, where there is only some slight scarping of the rock on which the towers and 
walls sit. One consequence of this is that the points of egress from the posterns into 
the ditch are better concealed at Belvoir (see photograph -  Belvoir l)  than was possible 
at Saranda Kolones.
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Belvoir 1
Belvoir. Note the substantial batter of the outer enceinte providing for concealment of
sally ports.
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B elvoir 2
Belvoir. The batter of the curtain and towers is well illustrated here. In this, it has 
more in common with, for example, Louis IX’s Caesarea (below) than with Saranda
Kolones.
Caesarea
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Lesser differences relate to the vaulted chambers round the inner enceinte', at Saranda 
Kolones they were groin-vaulted and supported on pillars rather than barrel vaulted as 
at Belvoir. The large barrel vaulted chambers arranged around the inside of Belvoir’s 
outer enceinte are similarly not replicated at the Paphos site where these sets of rooms 
are much less substantial. Other, minor differences have also been noted, including 
the locations of the forge and bathhouse (outer ward at Belvoir; inner at Saranda 
Kolones) and the impressive latrine system at Saranda Kolones which Belvoir 
lacks.31
Comparisons with other Crusader works
Belvoir is not the only castle that has been compared with Saranda Kolones. Cadei32 
pointed to La Feve (Old French)/ Castrum Fabe/Fabbarum (Latin)/al -  Fula (Arabic) 
in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, and to Casale Doc (Da’uk) and Somaleria Templi (El- 
Sumairiya/As-Sumairiya), both near to Acre. All three were Templar. La Feve was 
mid-way in size between Belvoir and Saranda Kolones. First mentioned in 1172, it 
seems to have been at least partly dismantled after the Muslim conquest of 1187. 
Unfortunately, it is very ruinous and needs proper excavation before comparative 
conclusions can be drawn, but on the basis of what can be said of it, this analogy is 
not very helpful. It consisted of a sub-rectangular structure measuring about 80 to 90 
m north-south and 110 to 120 m east-west, and it seems likely that as at Belvoir, this 
enclosure would have had a series of barrel-vaulted chambers constructed against its 
inner face. It is uncertain if there were any projecting towers, and similarly it is 
unclear whether there was a donjon. The suggestion has been made that there may 
have been a number of posterns, but this is not certain either. It may be that there was 
an outer curtain, but the evidence for this, being a reference to an outer wall seen in 
1928, is imprecise, for this could have been either an outer curtain or the counterscarp 
of the ditch, the trace of which is also not entirely clear. Where extant, the ditch has 
been measured to be 34 m wide, and the speculation is that it may once have been
31 A  Boas, Archaeology o f the Military Orders, pp. 125, 163.
32 Cadei, p. 139.
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rectilinear to conform with the general plan of the structure.33 There is not much here 
to substantiate Cadei’s opinion.
Though the case for seeing La Feve as of the same genre as has been argued of 
Belvoir and Saranda Kolones must remain unestablished pending further 
investigation, at least La Feve was clearly a castle per se, for the same can not 
necessarily be said of Cadei’s other two examples. Cadei’s view that as-Sumairiya 
and Da’uk appear to be quadrangular structures; that Da’uk may be contemporaneous 
with Saranda Kolones; that Sumairiya’s enceinte has massive square comer buildings, 
and that both are associated with agricultural 'annexes’, do not in themselves establish 
that these were fortifications. Indeed, it is more likely that they were merely estate 
centres, and consequently should be discarded as possible parallels for Saranda 
Kolones.34
Denys Pringle35 has recently likened Saranda Kolones and Belvoir with Daron (Dair 
al-Balah), a royal castle built south-west of Gaza between the 1160s and 1191 and as 
yet known to us only from documentary sources. Pringle pointed out that by 1191, 
Daron may well have become a concentric arrangement, and in this respect bears 
comparison with Belvoir and Saranda Kolones in being another case where we appear 
to have an instance of an early Crusader castle constituting two lines of defence, 
replete with towers, and arranged on a roughly quadrangular pattern, one line 
concentrically within the other. There are difficulties of analogy here too however, for 
Daron was not planned to be concentric from the outset, as Belvoir appears to have 
been, while the contention that Saranda Kolones itself was planned as a concentric 
castle from its inception awaits final proof, depending as it must on knowing who 
constructed it and in what stages. Furthermore, even if it is accepted that Saranda 
Kolones was built de novo as a concentric casde, and thus acquires an important 
similarity with Belvoir that distinguishes it from the many sites that came to be 
concentric by addition, this in itself does not necessarily mean that it was Crusader.
33 B.Z. Kedar and D. Pringle, La Feve, pp. 164-179. The relevant part of the article is pp. 166 and 
174-7.
34 See too D. Pringle, Secular Buildings, nos. 85, 96,207, 208, pp. 47,49, 96.
35 R.P. Harper and D. Pringle, Belmont Castle, p. 197. For Daron, see William o f Tyre, 2, p. 373 and 
Pringle’s introduction to T.E.Lawrence, Crusader Castles, pp. xxxv-xxxvi.
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The apparent affinity of Saranda Kolones with Belvoir helped persuade some to 
interpret the architecture at Paphos as designed for a conventual routine, thus 
facilitating the ascription of the castle, in Megaw’s view, to the Hospitallers, and as 
we shall see, in Cadei’s view, to the Templars. We should be wary of too much 
enthusiasm for this convenience, for as Pringle has pointed out, ‘no significant 
differences are discernible between the twelfth century castles of the military orders 
and those of secular lords, except perhaps for the prominence given to a chapel in the 
former.’ 36
It will be seen from the foregoing that recent attempts to identify architectural 
parallels for Saranda Kolones have concentrated exclusively on a Crusader origin of 
some sort, the possibility that the castle might have had a Byzantine provenance now 
being dismissed. On architectural grounds at any rate, this need not be so.
Architectural affinities with Byzantine fortifications
We pointed out a number of dissimilarities between Saranda Kolones and Belvoir, 
and we can now follow the aspects of those dissimilarities to identify analogous 
features of our Cypriot castle with Byzantine fortifications.
First, with regard to site, there is an immediate comparison to be made within the 
island itself, at Kyrenia. It is a coastal castle, which like Paphos is in a location that 
was of some importance in Byzantine times. They were both logical places in which 
to erect fortifications as being obvious ports for communication with the capital of the 
Empire. By contrast, there was no such compunction for the Byzantines to 
commission anything similar in Famagusta because it lay on the east coast, well away 
from the obvious sea lanes to Constantinople. In this respect, it is hardly surprising 
then that nothing comparable to Paphos and Kyrenia has been unearthed there. Such 
an explanation for the creation of a castle in Paphos appears more persuasive than 
Megaw’s argument that it was built there by the Lusignans, or their agents, the
36 D. Pringle in Belmont Castle, p. 215.
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military orders, because Paphos was a natural point for the disembarkation of an 
invasion fleet that Constantinople might send in order to take the island.
Second, with regard to shape and size, we may make further comparison with 
Kyrenia. In its original form, this was similar in being a rectangular enclosure 
encompassing an area not especially different from Saranda Kolones. Megaw 
calculated that Kyrenia’s inner Byzantine enceinte amounted to 80.5 m. (264 feet)
^7square which is not that different from the area enclosed at Saranda Kolones, the 
statistics for which were given above. It is also worth noting that at Kyrenia, it may be 
that when the Franks took over the castle, they may have reduced its area a little by 
building inside the line of the Byzantine east curtain, just as at Saranda Kolones 
where they may have concentrated their works on a lesser area, being first their 
‘watchtower’ and second the inner enceinte. The comparison of Saranda Kolones with 
Byzantine Kyrenia may be strengthened by comparing them with early Crusader 
works elsewhere on the island, for what little we know of these tells us that neither the 
Lusignans nor the military orders created anything comparable. In respect of the 
military orders, the recent excavations at Kolossi have emphasised that it does not 
bear comparison with Saranda Kolones. Looking at the other military order castle 
thought to date from the very beginning of the crusader period -  Gastria -  there 
appears no comparison with Saranda Kolones whatever. It is surely an argument 
against either a Hospitaller or Templar origin for Saranda Kolones to consider that at 
Kolossi and Gastria the orders created structures that as fortifications were very 
considerably inferior.
Both in site, shape and area enclosed, we may make comparison with another 
Byzantine castle. This is the land castle of Korykos, which is quite close to Cyprus on 
the southern shore of Anatolia. Like both Kyrenia and Saranda Kolones, it is not 
merely coastal, but also rectangular except for a stretch where allowance has to be 
made for its site, and although it is larger than Saranda Kolones and Kyrenia in 
respect of its enclosed area, the difference in the size of the enclosed area is not 
significant.38
37 Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 200.
38 Boase, CiUcian Kingdom, p. 160; Edwards, pp. 161-7; Muller-Weiner, pp. 79-80.
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The third dissimilarity with Belvoir noted above is the matter of the variety of towers 
that feature on the outer enceinte at Saranda Kolones. This is especially interesting. 
Byzantine fortifications frequently included rectangular towers, circular or drum 
towers, pentagonal and wedge shaped -  or cut-water towers, in the same castles or 
town walls. ‘[T]he articulation of the curtain wall with rectangular, polygonal prow 
shapes, and round towers was a regular and principal part of Byzantine fortification’ 
as Foss wrote.39 For Lawrence, this was ‘accepted ... Byzantine tradition’, and alone 
satisfied him that Saranda Kolones’ ‘master mason was a Greek’.40 There are good 
examples of such varied forms as at Amasya in northern Turkey -  a site with a long 
and complex building history -  but dated by Foss to the Middle Byzantine period, 
which we may take as the ninth to eleventh centuries. At Amasya, some of the towers 
have a sharp batter, and some are open at their interior gorges. Another Byzantine 
fortification that bears some resemblance is Lopadium, built around 1130, being 
rectangular in shape, and with a variety of differently shaped towers, which are at 
about 35 to 40 metre intervals. Lopadium however has its differences from Paphos, 
being bigger and in the frequently found Byzantine tendency to use brick, so its value 
as a comparison is limited.41 Of course earlier Byzantine works, including most 
spectacularly the Theodosian walls of Constantinople (fifth century), those of Antioch 
and the lesser known Byzantine fortifications in North Africa (sixth century) also 
involved some variety in the design of tower shapes. The twelfth-century towers of 
the Blachemae area of Constantinople are a particularly diverse group. Although the 
rectangular form tended to be the most common, the other designs were numerous.
By contrast, the fortifications created by the Crusaders and those built in western 
Europe reflect a much greater preference for uniformity in tower design. This is not 
to say that one can not find any instance where there is some variety in the shapes of 
towers built by the Latins. Denys Pringle has shown that the remains of the walls and 
towers of Ascalon are largely those as constructed by Richard I in 1192, and they 
include one triangular bastion and one apsidal tower. However, the remaining towers 
at Ascalon are rectangular which was very much the Latins’ then preferred shape. As 
noted above, about this time mural towers with rounded faces began to supersede the 
rectangular as the preferred design for the fortifications of the Franks in both the Holy
39 Foss, p. 36.
40 Lawrence, p. 226.
41 Foss, pp. 17-18, 145.
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Land and in the west. The transition was never complete in either area, but the point is 
that Latin and western tower design appears to have been far more consistent and in 
this quite dissimilar to the Byzantine approach.43
The two wedge or cut-water towers on the outer enceinte at Saranda Kolones are 
particularly important in considering the origin of the castle. Such towers are very 
rare in western European or Latin fortifications. The bastion at Ascalon is different, 
both inasmuch as it is solid, and in that it is triangular, and so unlike the Paphos 
towers that we might describe as hexagonal without their two rear sides. The 
Crusader tower on Safita’s inner enceinte has an obtuse angle that distinguishes it 
from the towers at Saranda Kolones where the sides of the front point are at a regular 
45 degrees to each other. There are a few examples in the West that do bear 
comparison -  two on the walls of the rectangular castle of Prato in Tuscany (see plan),
42 Pringle, Africa, pp. 152, 157; Lawrence, p. 221.
43 Pringle, Ascalon, p. 139 (fig. 4), p. 140 (table I), p. 141; Pringle, Secular Buildings, p. 21. For a 
useful summary of the relative merits of rectangular v. round faced towers: Fedden and Thomson, 
pp. 48-9. For observations on the transition to round faced towers: Kennedy, pp. 186-8. See too 
Part IE, Architecture, above, pp. 105-6.
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two on the outer en ce in te  at Gisors in the Vexin (see photograph below - Gisors), the 
gate of Saint-Jean de Provins in the lie de France, and at Chateau-Thierry on the river 
Marne. Alternative dates have been put forward for these cut-water towers, but it 
seems likely that all are early thirteenth century,44 and therefore likely to draw their 
inspiration from the East, where they had been in use for centuries. These ‘to u rs  en
44 Foss (p. 31) dated the Gisors towers as early as the reign of Henry I; for Toussaint (p. 35) they were 
built by Henry II, but Enlart (Francaise, p. 616) is more likely to have been nearer the mark in 
ascribing them to Philippe-Auguste. With regard to Prato, Foss (p. 31) appreciated that the castle was 
created in the late twelfth century, but it is now clear that after it became the ‘Castello dell’
Imperatore’, it was enlarged in the early thirteenth century, these works including the cut-water towers. 
Gotze, pp. 74-5 and fig. 102; McLean, pp. 86 and 108 and plan on p. 87; Fedden and Thomson, p. 49.
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eperon a pans coupes' as Enlart called them,4^  are quite distinct from other prow 
shaped towers that can be found in the west -  variously described as a bee, en bee, en 
eperon -  that were constructed about the time of the putative date for an very early 
Crusader Saranda Kolones. Such alternative forms include the tapered donjons at 
Chateau Gail lard, La Roche-Guyon, both in the Vexin, Issoudun in Berry and 
Ortenbourg in Lorraine; the prow fronted Norfolk towers and those of the 
FitzWilliam gateway at Dover; and the almond shaped -  ‘tours en amande’ -  towers 
of Loches, Le Coudray-Salbart and Parthenay in Poitou, datable to 1202 to 1227.46 
It is not unlikely that the Lusignan family circle would have known of this latest 
technique in tower building in the hinterland of their original caput in Poitou. Either 
way, it is noteworthy that there was no common influence in Lusignan tower design 
in Cyprus and Poitou: there are no almond-shaped towers in the former and no cut­
water shaped towers in the latter. Gisors
45 Enlart, Francaise, pp. 514-5, and see his plate 21 for Chateau-Thierry.
46 Cumow, pp. 42-62; M.-P. Baudry, pp. 57, 159 -171; 215-228.
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On the other hand, cut-water towers had been an established feature of Byzantine 
fortification for centuries. Some time ago. Denys Pringle pointed out that the De Re 
Strategica had advocated the value of this type of tower: 47 indeed, this treatise -  most 
likely from the sixth century, recommended their use in preference to any other.48 
They were quite common in Byzantine citadels and town walls. This was stressed by 
Foss, for whom this type of tower was ‘a hallmark of Byzantine military architecture’, 
and indeed he appears to have considered Saranda Kolones to have been Byzantine on 
this basis alone.49 Outside Cyprus, Byzantine cut-water towers may be traced at 
Thessalonika in Greece, Amasya, Niksar, Attalia, Alanya, probably Toprak 
(Toprakkale/Til Hamdoun) and most spectacularly at Ankara -  all in Asia Minor; at 
Resafeh in Syria, at Cerasus on the Pontic coast (Heraclea Pontica/Eregli); at Durazzo 
(Dyrrachium) in Albania, Zvecan/Sphentzanion in Kosovo; Ribnica in Montenegro; 
and Mavrokastron/Cetatea Alba. The cut-water towers at these locations date from 
various periods, commencing with those at Durazzo which are attributed to 
Anastasius I (491-518), through to those at Ankara which have been dated to the 
period from 630 to the ninth century, Resafeh also thought to be ninth century, and 
beyond that time, to the end of the eleventh century at Zvecan, to the twelfth century 
at Toprak and finally the period immediately after the fall of Constantinople in 1204 
at Cerasus. The tall, stout, open-backed, wedge-shaped towers of the citadel and city 
walls of Thessalonika may be even later.50 At Sayhun (Saone) there are comparable 
towers which date from the Byzantine occupation of this site, that is from its 
acquisition by John Tzimisces in 975 to its loss in 1106 to 8. There, cut-water and 
rectangular towers alternate on the innermost and thickest (up to 3 m.) of the three 
Byzantine walls at the eastern end of their castle. The cut-water towers are solid to 
rampart level, unlike those at Ankara which were solid only in their lower parts, and 
in this feature, are comparable to the three cut-water towers on the Byzantine, outer 
south wall at Kyrenia. A further cut-water projection at Sayhun can be traced in the 
middle of the west wall of the Byzantine keep, the comers of which also resemble a 
cut-water or primitive angular bastion form. Ninth to tenth-century Byzantine towers 
with cut-water faces were also identified at Butrint in Albania. Although this is now
47 Pringle, Africa, p. 157.
48 The Anonymous Byzantine Treatise, pp. 2-3, 35, and fig. 1 on p. 136.
49 Foss, pp. 20, 30-1, 36,216 (fig. 30).
50 Foss, pp. 30-1; A. W. Lawrence, pp. 187,204-6, (fig. 12 and plate 16); pp. 220,222-3; Pringle, 
Africa, p. 157; P. Harrison, pp. 18-19; Eptapirgio, p. 23; Edwards, pp. 244-7; Metcalf, Byzantine
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disputed, it does appear that we can accept that in a subsequent buiding period, 
thought to be late thirteenth or fourteenth century, a further cut-water tower was 
added, this being open-backed, of irregular design and partly reusing old blocks. The 
compex history of the site at that time renders a Byzantine (Despotate of Epirus) 
origin unconfirmed, but it is most likely.51
The towers at Kyrenia are of considerable importance in considering the origin of 
those at Paphos. Excavations superintended by Megaw himself and others, identified 
the Kyrenia cut-water towers as built during the last phase of Byzantine occupation, a 
dating endorsed by Lawrence.52 Although the two cut-water towers at Paphos do not 
appear to have been built as solid structures, the analogy with Kyrenia might suggest 
a tenth-century origin for them.
So far as gate-towers are concerned, it may help to distinguish between the two types 
used at Saranda Kolones -  the rectangular tower with its flank, bent-entance design of 
the outer enceinte, and the apsidal tower with a flank, bent-entrance design of the 
inner enceinte. The use of two different designs may imply different building periods. 
Bent-entrance gatehouses were occasionally employed in Byzantine works, certainly 
from the ninth century and also in Muslim works of the ‘ Abbasid period, but less so 
by the first Crusaders. There are twelfth-century Frankish examples at Sayhun 
(Saone) and Belvoir of course but the Crusaders appear to have adopted such 
gatehouses rather more in the thirteenth century. This was quite likely the result of 
what was leamt in the east, for bent-entrance gatehouses are extremely unusual in 
western European military architecture.53 D.J. Cathcart King emphasised as much 
when he drew attention to the horseshoe gate-tower at Pembroke (see photograph -  
Pembroke and plans of the Pembroke gate-tower and the inner gate-tower at Saranda 
Kolones).
Cyprus, p. 470.
51 Lawrence, pp. 205; 218-9; Smail, p. 238 and plate vi (a); Boase, Castles and Churches, p. 49; 
Pringle, The Chapels in the Byzantine Castle of Sahyun, p. 106; for the trace of Sahyun’s keep and 
Byzantine walls, see plan in P. Deschamps, Les Chateaux des Croisds, 3, album and Pringle,
loc. cit\ Karaiskaj, pp. 71-2,122 and plate 48; Hodges, Bowden and Lako, pp. 23-4,126, 138,141 
and fig. 8.24.
52 See Gazetteer entry for Kyrenia, and Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 200; Lawrence, p. 215.
53 P. Deschamps, Les Entries des chateaux croises, p. 372; Creswell, pp. 157,166,174-9, 321;
Smail, p. 242; Foss, pp. 7,12; King, Chateau-Gaillard, p. 164; Mesqui, pp. 14-16; Mesqui and 
Faucherre, pp. 87-8.
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Pembroke
PEM B R O K E CASTLE SA RA N D A  K O  1 .0 .NTS. CYPRUS
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Like the inner gatehouse at Saranda Kolones, this is a bent-entrance apsidal tower that 
opens from a doorway set in its flank. A similar gatehouse occurs at Caldicot, and 
comparisons may be made with the ‘open’ towers at Tenby. These are places that 
were either owned by or probably influenced by William the Marshal (d. 1219), who 
had spent two years in Palestine attached to the Templars. As King noted, it appears 
reasonable to believe that William was impressed by such towers that he saw there 
and so built the Pembroke gate-tower to a similar design, at the very end of the 
twelfth century.54 Interestingly, there is a difference however, in that these 
gatehouses of south Wales had no provision for portcullises, unlike the inner 
gatehouse at Paphos (see photograph). But these western gatehouses are exceptional 
and the point is of course that the inspiration for them seems to have come from the 
east. Elsewhere in Cyprus itself, there is the later Frankish rectangular bent-entrance 
tower of the west, inner wall at Kyrenia, but we cannot exclude the possibility that 
that follows the configuration of a pre-existing Byzantine arrangement. It is difficult 
to know whether the different types of gatehouses at Saranda Kolones reflect different 
building periods or merely the policy of two different master masons who were 
employed at the same time. The inner gatehouse chapel with its capitals argues that it 
is probably Frankish in origin but there is less certainty with regard to the outer 
gatehouse. The problem is exacerbated in that at some point the outer gatehouse 
suffered especially at the hands of those seeking a convenient source of readily 
shaped stone.55 This general ambiguity, however, may be of value in reaching an 
overall verdict on who built the castle.
Attempts to distinguish Byzantine from Latin or Frankish structures on the basis of 
masonry alone are of some help, but have their limitations. We can say that, unlike 
Byzantine work, Crusader work did not utilise brick or banded masonry, and that 
there was a greater effort to use larger facing blocks. Both however, generally 
employed the mortared rubble wall, that is - a concreted amalgam, as the core of their 
walls.56 The tenth-century Byzantine wall and towers at Sahyun mentioned above
54 King, Chateau-Gaillard, pp. 164-5; King, Arch. Cambrensis, pp. 40-1; CSG Journal, No. 22, p.
89.
55 The particular robbing of the outer gatehouse's stonework is a point made by Dr. John Hayes in 
correspondence, August, 2007.
56 Foss, passim.
4T-.
k
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are, for example, of such a composition - being constructed of rubble concrete with a 
facing of small stone blocks. But although Byzantine masonry of this period was 
not of the standard of -  say -  the fifth-century Theodosian walls at Constantinople, it 
could, nonetheless, be of a certain quality and thus reasonably well faced, as in the 
Blachemae walls of Manuel Comnenus (1143-1180) at Constantinople,58 and as at 
Korykos, at which the facing was facilitated by utilising material from the ruins of the 
much earlier structures on the site. The sections of the walling at Saranda Kolones 
that we noted appear not to be so well faced may be merely a reflection of its 
incomplete state. That both Byzantine and Crusader fortifications sometimes contain 
material from previous buildings nearby, particularly columns from classical 
structures, is hardly surprising, but it is an obvious example of common practices.
One aspect of the masonry that is worth noting relates to masons' marks. These are in 
Greek letters and are found on stones that are scattered all over the site. This could be 
material the Franks re-employed on a castle they built de novo, or alternatively it 
could be material fallen from a castle or other building that had been commenced 
earlier and which was developed by the Franks. Either way, the marks cannot be taken 
to indicate that Saranda Kolones was Frankish from its outset.59
Comparison with the Byzantine land castle at Korykos
We commenced this review of the affinities of Saranda Kolones by a critical 
examination of comparisons that have been made with Belvoir and elsewhere in 
Palestine. It is perhaps appropriate then to conclude the review by offering an 
alternative site for comparison. In this respect, we have already made a number of 
allusions to both Kyrenia and to Korykos, both in general siting, in size and layout, 
and in the case of Kyrenia, to its tenth-century cut-water towers. Interestingly, 
Korykos provides for an even greater comparison with Paphos than Kyrenia. As at the 
Cypriot castle, there is some variety in tower shapes: they are mainly rectangular 
towers, but there are two that have cut-water projections on their outer faces. These 
projections are solid: effectively they are spurs reinforcing rectangular towers, so they
57 Smail, p. 238 and plate vi (a); Pringle, The Chapels in the Byzantine Castle of Sahyun, p. 106.
58 Turnbull, pp. 8,29-30.
59 Correspondence with Dr. John Hayes, August 2007 and April 2009.
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are not identical with those at Saranda Kolones. We may, however, infer some affinity 
in their respective designs. Korykos is similar to Saranda Kolones inasmuch as it 
consists of two enceintes, the outer being drawn tightly round the inner, no doubt so 
that the higher inner walls would allow for fire over and beyond the top of the outer 
circuit. The Korykos land castle is the only fully concentric castle in Cilicia, but it is 
concentric nonetheless, and here we should acknowledge the long tradition within 
Roman-Byzantine fortification of multiple lines of defence, already most prominently 
evident in Constantinople itself. There is then no scope in claiming Saranda Kolones 
as Crusader merely because it has a concentric arrangement of walling. Furthermore, 
like Saranda Kolones in places, the towers sit on rock that is slightly scarped to the 
base of the similarly rock-cut ditch. Its blocks of masonry are larger than at Saranda 
Kolones, but as we saw at both the builders of the castles used columns from the ruins 
of pre-existing classical buildings on the sites to help give solidity and cohesion in 
their construction works. There is perhaps some debate vis a vis the dating of this land 
castle, but it is generally thought to have been instigated by Alexius I (1081-1118) 
with additions by his successor, John (1118-1143). Quite likely their work constituted 
a reconstruction of much earlier work that may be dated to the fifth century. 60 The 
point is of course that it is Byzantine.
In conclusion to this architectural analysis, it appears reasonable to assert that one 
cannot ascribe a Crusader provenance to Saranda Kolones on the basis of its structural 
remains alone. We have argued that on these grounds there is as much to recommend 
a Byzantine origin as a Latin one, indeed, perhaps more. In such a debate, it is 
important to remember that there must have been much borrowing by one culture of 
the techniques of another, presumably mainly the Franks adopting what they found to 
be worthwhile Roman practices. In consequence, we see that the castles of differing 
builders in fact shared some techniques in common, one instance being the 
rectangular design used by the Byzantines in the Balkans, Syria and Asia Minor 61 and 
also the Crusaders as at Belvoir. That the latter adopted the Roman inspiration for 
such a layout does not help us say which culture was the builder in individual cases.
60 Boase, Cilician Kingdom, p. 160; Lawrence, pp. 177-9; Edwards, pp. 31,161 -7; Muller-Weiner, 
pp. 79-80; Foss, pp. 143, 146.
61 Foss, p. 4.
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Historical context of Saranda Kolones
As noted above, Rosser initiated the theory that the construction of the castle was 
influenced by the Hospitallers. He observed that they arrived in Cyprus in 1198, and 
from this argued that the castle must have been begun in Aimery’s reign (1194-1205), 
on the grounds that it must have taken some time to build it to the extent it had 
attained when wrecked in the earthquake of 1222.62 Megaw followed this line of 
reasoning, taking it that his pre-existing ‘watchtower’ was superseded by Saranda 
Kolones as early as 1198. For Megaw, construction on Saranda Kolones continued 
until 1204. The two dates here relate to an exhortation by Pope Innocent III to the 
Grand Masters of the Hospital and the Temple to aid in the defence of Cyprus - held 
by Megaw, Rosser and others 63 to be against the possibility of a Byzantine threat to 
recapture their lost province, and the Fourth Crusade which effectively eliminated any 
such threat.
It is worth looking in detail at the Pope’s initiative and the possible response of the 
military orders. Innocent’s letters of December 1198 to the Orders and the Latin 
princes of Antioch and Tripoli did not specify Byzantium as the threat to Cyprus. He 
may have had it in mind, or at any rate used it as an excuse, as such a danger was 
mentioned in letters he wrote in December 1199 to the Kings of England and 
France.64 However, Innocent’s over-riding concern was to retrieve the position in the 
Holy Land and recapture Jerusalem. Indeed he mentioned this in his letters which 
consequently should be seen primarily as support for King Aimery of Cyprus who had 
recently become King of Jerusalem as well. Quite likely Innocent knew that the 
circumstances for a renewed attempt on Jerusalem were favourable: the Ayyubids 
were disunited -  a position exacerbated with the death of al-‘Az!z in November 1198. 
The view has been made that Innocent’s letters to the Orders could not have been 
motivated by considerations of renewed war with the Muslims because of the truce of 
July 1198 that was to last for five years and eight months, but there is reason to
62 Rosser, Crusader Castles, p. 47.
63 e.g. see Hill, 2, p. 30, fh. 3; Rosser, (forthcoming). The papal letter of December 1198 is 
reproduced in Hageneder und Haidacher, 1, doc. 438 on pp. 661-2.
64 Hageneder und Haidacher, 2, doc. 241 (251) on pp. 459-62; Hill, 2, pp. 62-3; Coureas,
Latin Church, p. 8.
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believe that Innocent was not concerned with such a truce. This may perhaps be 
supported by the circumstances of another letter that the Pope wrote, this being in 
January 1212 -  exclusively to the Templars on that occasion -  again that they should 
aid in the defence of Cyprus. This was after the then King of Jerusalem, John of 
Brienne, had accepted al-‘AdH’s offer of another renewal of the truce in 1211, which 
came into effect in July 1212.65 It is worth adding that, like the letters of 1198, 
Innocents letter of 1212 did not specify any enemy imagined to be threatening 
Cyprus. Byzantium could not serve as a pretext after its destruction in 1204 and the 
concord with the Muslims precluded the use of propaganda of threat from that quarter. 
All the indications are then that in 1198 Innocent was simply concerned with 
bolstering the Latin East in a quest to recover the Holy City rather than having an 
overt fear of any danger to Cyprus posed by the Empire. This verdict is amplified 
when set against the backgound of the Empire’s decline and visible impotence, as set 
out in the History (above). In conclusion then, the view that the papal letter of that 
year was prompted by a genuine fear of Byzantium is quite over-stated.
As to any response of the military orders to the letters of 1198, as noted above,
Megaw drew on Hill who commented that the Hospitallers took over some of the 
island’s fortresses, in response to the letter from Innocent III.66 If we accept that this 
happened, it would argue that Saranda Kolones already existed and that the 
Hospitallers merely added to it. This would account for the similarity of such details 
as die wall capitals in the chapel that was situated above the inner gatehouse, with 
capitals from its counterpart at Belvoir, noted above. This does not have to be taken as 
an indelible Hospitaller fingerprint however: the safer evaluation of this would be 
merely that it is Crusader and that it is not specific to a particular military order.
However, it is by no means clear that Hill was correct, for there are a number of 
difficulties with his source. First, this is very late: this was Bosio, the Maltese 
historian of the Hospitallers, whose first volume was published in 1594. Second,
65 Ibn al-Athlr, pp. 39-50 for Ayyubid disunity in 1198; Edbury, Kingdom of Cyprus, p. 34 for the 
truce of 1198; Runciman, 3, p. 133 for the negotiationsof 1211 and truce of 1212 and pp. 145-6 
for Innocent's ambition for Jerusalem; Coureas, Latin Church, p. 126 for Innocent’s letter of 1212; 
Rosser, (forthcoming) for the opinion that the truce of 1198 precludes the view that the Pope’s 
letters of 1198 were motivated by anything other than apprehension of Byzantium.
66 Hill, 2, p. 30.
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Bosio provides the tenor of the papal letter, noting interestingly, that there was no 
record of it in the papal registry. Although there is no reason to suspect that Bosio had 
not seen a letter, he is confused as to whether the letter went directly to the Master of 
the Hospital or to King Aimery who then passed it on. Third, and as Hill noted, the 
letter is dated from the first year of Innocent’s pontificate -  1198, yet Bosio records 
that it was received by the Master of the Hospital - Goffredo le Rat who did not hold 
that office until 1206-7.67 Most important however, is that Bosio does not state 
directly that the Hospitallers did in fact take over any fortresses. He says only that:
Hauuto, c’hebbe il Re questo breue, presentandolo al Maestro Fra Goffredo le 
Rat; lo richiedette, ch’accettando la cura, e’l gouemo del’Isola di Cipro, fosse 
contento di mandar parte de’suoi Caualieri, e delle sue genti in presidio, & in 
guardia di quelle Fortezze:
After the King had received this brief, presenting it to the Master Brother 
Goffredo le Rat, he asked him that, accepting the responsibility and 
governance of the island of Cyprus, he should be willing to send part of his 
knights and of his people to defend and protect those Fortresses:
Bosio continued that Goffredo accepted the responsibility though it was a great 
burden, eventually adding that Hugh I’s accession in Cyprus in 1205 (whereupon the 
Lusignans lost their title to Jerusalem) obviated the need for Hospitaller help for 
Cyprus. Thus we are not in fact told that the Order had contributed anything to the 
defence of the island in the intervening period. Given these problems with this source, 
and moreover that it seems unlikely that King Aimery would have been inclined to 
give up his fortresses to another power, it is arguable that Innocent Ill’s letter had 
neglible effect. Equally, that King Hugh I was very favourably disposed to the 
Hospitallers as noted by Hill,69 cannot be taken necessarily as evidence for a 
Hospitaller tenure or influence over Saranda Kolones or elsewhere. As we will see, 
Hugh held the Templars in similar esteem.
Megaw supported his view that Saranda Kolones was the Hospitaller response to the 
papal initiative with his belief that the Order held estates in the neighbourhood,70 but
67 Delaville le Roux, pp. 131-2; Riley-Smith, Knights o f St. John, p. 155.
68 Bosio, 1, pp. 146-9. The quoted extract is from p. 147.
69 Hill, 2, p. 30.
70 Megaw, A Castle in Cyprus, p. 48. Hill, 2, p. 30 indicated these were only granted in 1210, but 
see next footnote.
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Edbury and Coureas have made it clear that it was the Order of the Temple that held 
property and vineyards in Paphos, and that this ‘estate’ only came to the Hospitallers 
after the suppression of the Temple in 1312.71 Indeed, given that the Hospitallers most 
probably made their main base in Cyprus elsewhere -  in Limassol -  from the outset, it 
seems unlikely that they should expend such considerable effort at Saranda Kolones.72
Further comparison with other Cypriot castles in the context of these years may also 
be of value. If, as per Megaw and Rosser, Saranda Kolones was the Hospitaller 
response to the papal initiative while the Templar contribution was Gastria on the 
other side of the island built about the same time, it would seem a little odd that there 
should be such a massive disparity in design if both had the same inspiration. Further 
comparison with Kyrenia is also worthwhile. If the Byzantine threat had been so 
prominent and that consequendy the Fourth Crusade brought this to an end, we might 
expect to find some concentrated effort to strengthen that castle up to 1204 and then a 
similar discontinuation of effort. Of course this is a little difficult to pursue because 
Kyrenia was subsequently so very heavily developed but at least it is worth noting 
that in Megaw’s detailed description of Kyrenia, there is no suggestion of any 
discernment of very early work suddenly halted as postulated for the Paphos site, nor 
has there ever been any suggestion that Kyrenia was ever downgraded from use as a 
castle after 1204.73
Alternative proposals were put forward by Antonio Cadei. He suggested that Saranda 
Kolones was commenced at some point between 1192 and 1198, a view that 
necessarily does not allow for Megaw’s earlier Crusader tower, nor his opinion as to 
the impact of the papal letter. Cadei continued that Saranda Kolones may have been a 
Templar castle. The argument is summarised below and if too this is hardly 
conclusive, it is both of innate interest in any event and perhaps helps to demonstrate 
the difficulties there are in depending on the type of process by which Megaw and 
Rosser arrived at their judgements. Cadei emphasised the Lusignan obligation to the 
Templars, which in his view terminated in 1210 when Hugh I assumed his majority 
and indicted the Regent, Walter or Gautier of Montbeliard, for false accounting. For
71 P. Edbury, The Templars in Cyprus, p. 191, fh. 7; Coureas, Latin Church, p. 125.
72 see gazetteer entry for Limassol, and Coureas, Latin Church, p. 156.
73 Megaw, Kyrenia Castle, passim.
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Cadei, 1210 was particularly significant, and that it could have been from that point 
that ‘Templar’ Saranda Kolones was downgraded into an agro-industrial entrepot?* 
The Lusignans were indeed very well disposed to the Templars: granting them great 
estates as Edbury noted, though as Edbury added, this harmony appears to have 
continued until 1273 and was not seriously undermined by the events of 1210.75
Of course, neither the presence of a Templar property around Paphos, nor the good 
relations of the Lusignans with the Order, has to mean that the castle was either built 
or occupied by the Templars. Similarly, Cadei’s further evidence adduced to support 
the case for the Temple, is of interest, but cannot be taken as irresistible argument. 
This is that on the south-west of the south-east tower of the castle, a workshop was 
found that had produced ceramics which appear in Palestine and which have been 
associated with the Templars. Cadei inferred that this might perhaps also attest that 
Templars remained in control of the site after its change of use from a strictly military 
function. He also recorded that shards of glass from drinking vessels had been found 
at Saranda Kolones that are very similar to shards found at Templar ‘Atlit.76 It is hard 
to accept however, that any specific category of glass or ceramics can be limited to a 
particular military order. The artisans who produced such artefacts would have had no 
cause to reserve their skills for one customer, and unless it may be established that a 
military order had its own exclusive patterns which they insisted upon, such 
‘evidence’ as this may be is unconvincing.
Yet another alternative theory was recently advocated by Kristian Molin. He took 
Wilbrand’s turris at face value and argued that consequently what fortification existed 
in Paphos in 1211 was merely a tower visible for many miles around.77 This he 
identified as the very early Crusader tower and courtyard wall which Megaw had 
found. Molin accepted Megaw’s attribution that Saranda Kolones was Crusader, but 
unlike Megaw, supposed that its construction was later - triggered perhaps by the start 
of the Fifth Crusade in 1217, and that it was further stimulated by the Muslim raid on 
Limassol in 1220. However, this argument is flawed, not only because of the
74 Cadei, pp. 138-9.
75 Edbury, The Templars in Cyprus, pp. 191-3.
76 Cadei, pp. 139-40. For Templar property in the area, Claverie, L 'Ordre du Temple (2005), 1, pp. 
322-3, 326-7.
77 Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, pp. 101-2,109, 115, 117, 124,126.
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unreliability of Wilbrand as a source for Paphos in 1211, but also because there is no 
evidence to suggest that Paphos was seen or used as a base or depot during the Fifth 
Crusade. Indeed the mustering point of the army, which included Hugh I and a 
Cypriot contingent, was Acre. Further, the Egyptian raid of 1220 was made against 
the Limassol area because that was where the Crusader fleet was moored -  not 
Paphos.78 In short, we are unable to accredit Molin’s attribution of early thirteenth- 
century Crusader work at Paphos to the contexts that he puts forward.
As with our examination of the architectural remains of Saranda Kolones, it can be 
seen from the foregoing that the various historical contexts put forward for Saranda 
Kolones as a Crusader castle have a number of problems. Furthermore, and in the 
same way that the castle’s architectural affinities with Byzantine fortifications have 
been neglected, there is a reasonable argument for seeing the castle as a Byzantine 
foundation in the context of historical events. In this respect, it is interesting that 
various scholars have speculated as to quite what circumstance prompted the
70foundations of other Cypriot castles that are irrefutably Byzantine in origin.
Comment is made on this in the Introduction, and in the Gazetteer entries for Kyrenia 
and for the three mountain castles. Briefly recited, these include the apprehension of 
Arab raids in the seventh century, the consolidation of the island after its recovery 
from the Arabs in 965, and later -  in the late eleventh century -  to any one of a 
number of reasons -  that the opposite Anatolian coast was overrun by the Seljuks; that 
the rebellious Rhapsomates created them in 1092; that Alexius I built them after that 
rebellion, and that Alexius similarly built them in reaction to a potential threat posed 
by the first Crusaders then established on the mainland to the east. If the northern 
castles were indeed built as a consequence of any of these reasons, then there is a 
good argument that castles were built on Cyprus elsewhere as well. Indeed, Paphos, 
and for that matter Limassol, were especially important as being regular calling points 
on the sea-route from the west to the east. Vessels would hug the Anatolian coast as 
far as Cape Taslik or Cape Chelodonia, cross the 145 miles to Paphos, procede along 
the south coast of Cyprus, driven by the prevailing wind, the meltemi, and then 
continue to Tripoli or Beirut. In 1102, the pilgim Saewulf recorded just such a
78 Oliver of Paderbom, (ed. Peters), ch. 1, p. 51; S. Runeiman, A History of the Crusades, 3, p. 166; 
Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, pp. 125-127.
79 e.g. Megaw, Military Architecture, p. 204; Hill, 2, p. 21.
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journey, in which his vessel sailed ‘ad Paffum civitatem’.80 Moreover, our review of 
the declining power of the Empire in the period leading up to the Ricardian conquest, 
as set out in the History above, could also be exploited to offer arguments that the 
Byzantines of those years had some reason to build at a place such as Paphos, even if 
by then, it was in decline as a port.81 The attenuation and fragmentation of the 
imperial navy made it more dependent than ever on its bases and those bases 
correspondingly more vulnerable. In such circumstances, it could be suggested that 
the creation of some serious fortification at Paphos would have been an entirely 
natural reaction.
Numismatic and pottery evidence and the end of Saranda Kolones
Whenever work on the castle per se may have been halted, it is clear that it remained 
unfinished. Although the inner ward is said to have been completed, it is clear that the 
outer curtain was not, nor was the ditch. Some of the sally ports were abandoned: in 
particular those on the north wall were reached by stairs from the wall top that are 
now quite unprotected and undisguised, suggesting that a screening outer wall was 
never completed. Similarly the postern on the west remained incomplete without any
SOdrawbridge leading from it. Indeed, the route from the castle via this postern 
appears to have been changed after the castle was decommissioned as a fortification, 
for it now prescribes three sides of a square in its descent to close to the apex of the 
adjacent cut-water tower, (see diagram and photographs). This arrangement merely 
negates the value of the tower and compromises the castle’s defensibility, so it cannot 
be a part of the original design.
Megaw inferred that the castle continued in use as some sort of administrative centre 
-  effectively a manorial headquarters, for he detected that the forge and mill were in 
use at the time of the earthquake of 1222 which he held brought about an end even to 
this activity. Indeed the findings of the excavation do bear an interpretation that the 
castle was downgraded to be a centre of agro/industrial production, although not
80 Saewulf; p. 61 and Pryor’s introduction, pp. 47-8; Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, pp. 511-5; 
Gertwagen, Harbours and facilities, pp. 112,115.
81 Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, p. 516; Gertwagen, Harbours and facilities, p. 115.
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necessarily involving the production of sugar as was once thought. The outside of the 
inner curtain wall became encumbered by a number of enclosures with thin walls of 
poor consistency, many of which possessed hearths. Indeed, the arrangements of the 
central courtyard and multiplicity of stables (see photograph) may just as easily be 
seen as a lowering of the guard and a change of use from war to economics. The 
transformation of the large bridge over the ditch outside the main entrance, on the 
east, to a permanent and immovable structure, with yet another stable between its 
arches, similarly indicates a fundamental change of purpose.83
Megaw believed that the downgraded castle did not, during this period, have any 
garrison worth the name. He records the discovery of just one sword and a one helmet 
which, as he commented, hardly attests the presence of a serious fighting force. The 
excavations in the inner curtain also revealed large quantities of iron heads for 
crossbow bolts and about 1,500 stone balls for catapults. The latter items could of 
course have been manufactured and stored in the castle for use elsewhere. Megaw 
also believed that the western coins and lead papal seal, dating from about the time of 
the earthquake, that the excavations discovered, reflected the castle’s additional use as 
some kind of high-class hostel.84
Some human remains discovered in the earliest seasons of excavation are thought to 
be those of the earthquake’s victims. Megaw and Rosser were convinced that the 
castle was never repaired and was merely utilised as a quarry by the townsfolk, and 
indeed Rosser and Cadei remarked on the robber ramps supposedly made to allow the
QC
stonework to be taken away to rebuild the city. The long absence of further 
references to a Paphos castle noted above, in conjunction with the pottery and 
numismatic evidence available, do indeed indicate that Saranda Kolones was not 
recommissioned in any way after this 1222 earthquake.
82 Megaw, A Castle in Cyprus, pp. 48, 51; Cadei, p. 137; Rosser, Crusader Castles, p. 45.
83 Cadei, p. 137; Rosser, Excavations... 1981-1983 in DOP, (1985), p. 88; Rosser, Crusader Castles, 
p. 45; Solomidou-Ieronymidou, p. 73; Rosser, review, 2008, p. 221.
84 Megaw, A Castle in Cyprus, pp. 48,51; Rosser, Crusader Castles, p. 47.
85 Megaw, A Castle in Cyprus, p. 51; Rosser, Crusader Castles, p. 47; Cadei, pp. 135,137, and 141, en 
10; Rosser, Archaeological and Literary Evidence, p. 47.
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A full report on the pottery evidence for Saranda Kolones has yet to be produced, but 
it does seem clear that this area of investigation reflects that the castle was largely 
abandoned after the earthquake of 1222. Dr. John Hayes has commented that there is 
a wide gap between finds that can be dated to the early thirteenth century and some 
surface finds and those from a ‘house’ in the ditch to the south-east which appear to 
be late thirteenth or early fourteenth centuries. Early thirteenth-century pottery that 
he identified on site included ‘Zenxippus Ware’. This was in use from the 1190s to 
after 1222 -  perhaps as late as the 1240s in fact, but this may indicate only that parts 
of the castle site were occupied for a little while merely by squatters or those rendered 
homeless by the earthquake. As to using this area of enquiry to establish quite when 
the castle was constructed, in 1986, Rosser wrote that the pottery found in 1981-3 
dated from the late twelfth or possibly early thirteenth century and that this argued 
soundly against a Byzantine origin for the castle; that the Byzantine castle must have 
been elsewhere and that Saranda Kolones was Crusader from inception. However, this 
ignores the fact that John Hayes has identified Middle Byzantine and Islamic pottery 
which antedate the main bulk of the finds: evidence which shows activity on the site 
in the 1160s-1170s, perhaps running into the 1180s.86 At the very least, this suggests 
that the site was occupied before the arrival of the Franks and indeed may further 
indicate some building activity.
A report on the numismatic finds has however, recently appeared, and broadly 
speaking, its ramifications are consistent with those that may be derived from the 
pottery evidence. In total, the finds constitute 135 coins, in addition to which is a large 
hoard of 74 pieces. The hoard is mid seventh century, while the 135 pieces consist of 
65 seventh-century Byzantine, being mainly from the reigns of Heraclius and 
Constans (610-668) but with three or four from the reigns of Justinian II and Tiberius 
III (685-711); 2 seventh-century Arab-Byzantine; 5 seventh-eighth-century Islamic;
12 eleventh-twelfth-century Byzantine (these include 4 Manuel Comnenus (1143- 
1180); 5 of these 12 bear the head of the ‘Emperor’ Isaac, but appear to have been 
demonetised, so quite likely they were discarded in the Lusignan period); 46 French,
86 Rosser, Crusader Castles, p. 47; correspondence with Dr. John W. Hayes, May 2004, September 
2007 and October 2008.
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Latin East and Kingdom of Cyprus (at least 5 of these, perhaps twice that number, 
post date 1222) and finally 5 various foreign coins.87
Given the importance of this numismatic evidence in assigning a date to the site, 
especially inasmuch as Rosser considers it unquestionably supports his view that 
Saranda Kolones is wholly Crusader in origin,88 it is worth considering certain aspects 
of this evidence.
First, the considerable quantity of seventh-century coins reflects commensurate 
activity on the site. Megaw and Rosser thought that this was with regard to a basilica. 
Even if this were so, it does not obviate activity involving fortification as well.
Second, the absence of coins from the eighth to the eleventh centuries is 
unremarkable. This is true of all of Cyprus and cannot in itself be taken as an 
indication that the site was unoccupied. Third, at the most, only 40 coins -  and of 
mixed provenance -  date from the period 1192-1222. Fewer still date from the period 
when Saranda Kolones was in commission as a Crusader Castle -  that is, before its 
demotion to an agro-industrial centre. If then, as per Megaw and Rosser, Saranda 
Kolones was built entirely at that time - as a sophisticated, state-of-the-art, concentric 
castle - that period has left a paucity of numismatic evidence in relation to the earlier 
periods.
Other archaeological evidence
Rosser is clear that the probes taken in the early 1980s into the castle’s foundation
QQ
trenches indicate that construction began around 1200. Without sight of the full 
report on this area of enquiry, it is impossible to pass judgement. That said, and if it is 
accepted that these findings apply to all the foundations, which may not be the case, it 
is worth asking if Crusader foundations may mask pre-exising ones. More to the 
point, it is worth bearing in mind a point made earlier with regard to masonry: how 
precise a science such testing can be? How certain may we be in distinguishing, in
87 Metcalf, Coins from Saranda Kolones, pp. 205- 9,216-20,225.
88 See eg his use of Metcalf, in Archaeological and Literary Evidence, pp. 43-4.
89 As most recently restated in his forthcoming article.
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this instance, between Middle Byzantine masonry and Crusader masonry of the same 
period?
Saranda Kolones: conclusion
In conclusion we may summarise as follows. A final date of 1222 for the end of 
activity at Saranda Kolones appears to be supported by all the evidence available to 
us. Prior to that date, the incomplete castle had been assigned primarily to agro­
industrial functions that involved the building of new structures that partly superseded 
and certainly dissipated what would have been the military potential of the castle. 
However, we cannot be certain quite when that change of use came about. Most 
important however, is the matter of who commenced the castle. Arguments for a 
Crusader origin and that it was Hospitaller or even Templar inspired -  perhaps indeed 
Hospitaller or Templar built and occupied, have been reviewed critically above. At 
the same time, alternative arguments have been put forward that may support the view 
that Saranda Kolones was Byzantine in origin. Unless further information is 
forthcoming, taking in the different types of evidence as set out above, it appears 
reasonable to believe that the castle was indeed commenced before the arrival of the 
Franks in 1191 and even that a good proportion of what is now extant -  particularly 
the outer enceinte - had been created by that time. The Lusignans quite probably 
continued with the work, most likely directing their efforts primarily on the inner 
enceinte. As John Hayes has suggested, it may be that any Byzantine structures in this 
area were eliminated when the Franks quarried it out to create their undercrofts and 
central courtyard. A shortage of Latin manpower in these very early years of the 
Lusignan period would lead them naturally to fortify only a lesser circuit than the 
outer ring, as indeed they may have done to some extent when they took over 
Kyrenia, as noted above. A lack of funds with which to build a complex, concentric 
castle would also reflect such a restricted programme - an alternative argument to 
John Rosser’s that early Lusignan impecuniosity must mean that only the Hospitallers 
could have afforded to build the whole complex. If the Lusignans did inded restrict 
their work to the inner enceinte, this would account for the comparability of the 
capitals in its inner gatehouse chapel with those elsewhere, and indeed perhaps justify 
a possible Latin influence on the overall design of this gatehouse as mentioned above; 
it would allow for the effective overbuilding of the earlier ‘watchtower’ discovered by
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Megaw; and explain why, unlike the outer enceinte, the construction of the inner 
appears to have been completed.90 We can only speculate as to any Lusignan intention 
to complete the outer enceinte. Advances in Muslim siege warfare appear to have 
stimulated the Crusaders’ development of concentric castles on the Syrian mainland 
from the late 1160s: 91 whether such considerations lay behind the Lusignans’ 
utilisation of an earlier Byzantine outer enceinte and that they intended to 
recommission it, is a matter of speculation, though such an intention would have been 
logical. At any rate, as we have noted, before any such effort was far advanced, work 
on the castle per se, fizzled out altogether, and instead it was adapted to the exclusive 
purposes of economic gain. It was not until some point in the following century that 
changing circumstances prompted the Crusader regime to reconsider the need for 
fortifications in Paphos.
Historical references from 1373
The absence of any reference to fortifications that existed in Paphos for over a century 
and a half after the earthquake of 1222 noted above is in stark contrast to the written 
information we have on the development of the walls of Famagusta, discussed 
elsewhere in this Gazetteer. Unlike Famagusta, Paphos declined economically and 
was depopulated: - two visitors in 1458 recorded that it was ‘ruined and almost 
without inhabitants’, 92 and ‘ruinata et quasi inhabitata’, 93 while in the 1480s it was 
described as ‘desolate, no longer a city, but a miserable village.. .the harbour is 
abandoned’. 94 This decline was probably owing to a combination of its proneness to 
earthquakes as noted by Ludolf of Suchen and others, and the gradual silting up of the 
ancient port, a process that may have begun as early as the fourth century, but which 
appears to have become considerably worse as a result of the earthquakes of 1159 and 
1222. 95 Unlike Famagusta where the creation of town walls reflected the exploitation
90 Megaw, A Castle in Cyprus, p. 48; A. Boas, Archaeology of the Military Orders, p. 153; J. Rosser 
(forthcoming).
91 Ellenblum, Siege Warfare, passim', Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, pp. 231-257.
92 Count Gabriele Capodilista in Cobham, p. 35.
93 Roberto da Sanseverino in Grivaud, p. 71.
94 Felix Faber of Ulm, in Cobham, p. 45.
95 Megaw, Reflections, pp. 149-50; Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, pp, 516-8; Gertwagen,
Harbours and facilities, p. 115; Rosser, Archaeological and Literary Evidence, p. 46. For von 
Suchen, see fn. 21 above. See too Felix Faber in Cobham, p. 45.
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of economic opportunity, at Paphos the absence of such opportunity rendered 
pointless the construction of harbour towers or cordons sanitaire. There was little 
scope at Paphos for their use in levying dues from visiting shipping or storing within 
them such levied cash or kind. There was not then the stimulus for investment in a 
castle and town walls that there was in Famagusta.
However, by 1373 when full-scale hostilities with Genoa erupted, there was some 
fortification in Paphos, for, early in the war, Makhairas reported that the Genoese 
collected 2000 Bulgarians, Romanian Greeks and Tartars with whom they
took the castles of Paphos [ta kastellia tis Paphou]. At that time the castles had 
low walls, and they set to work and heightened them, and they cut a trench, so 
that the sea flowed in and surrounded them with water, making the place so 
strong that, when the Cypriots brought up fighting-towers and soldiers in 
them, they resisted the attack without anxiety for the result. 96
The value of Makhairas* Recital is touched on in the History (above), and his detailed 
record of the part played by fortifications in this and later wars, is invaluable. As 
noted in the History, Makhairas goes on to describe two abortive attempts by the 
Lusignan forces to recapture the ‘castles’, one of which no doubt involved the attack 
with siege towers.97 Perhaps the second attempt was on 3 July when the Cypriots 
attacked ‘the tower of Paphos’. On that occasion, the Genoese used their galleys to 
help ward off the Cypriots, and though the Lusignan force used Greek Fire against 
these, the fortifications remained in Genoese hands.98 Subsequently another attempt 
to retake the fortifications was also foiled, in part because of the use made by the 
Genoese of their galleys.99 Our other two chronicle sources for this period are Amadi, 
who may have drawn from the same material as Makhairas, and Florio Bustron who 
wrote in the later sixteenth century and drew heavily from Amadi. Both also mention 
the low walls of Paphos, its capture by the Genoese and of Lusignan attempts to 
recapture it, in which the chroniclers refer to the forts in the plural -  ‘forteze’ (Amadi) 
and the ‘fortezze’ (Bustron).100
96 Makhairas, § 377, p. 359; Hill, 2, p. 390.
97 Makhairas, 2, pp. 157-8.
98 Makhairas, §§ 378-81, pp. 359-61; Aristodou, Pafos Castle, pp. 19-20.
99 Makhairas, § 382, p. 361; Hill, 2, p. 391; Edbury, Kingdom, p. 204.
100 Amadi, pp. 444-5 and FI. Bustron, pp. 300-2. Hill, 2, pp. 390-1.
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These various references to the fortifications, being mainly in the plural, and the 
evident proximity of the fortifications in question to the sea, must relate to a building 
complex the remains of which we see today as ‘the harbour forts’, discussed below, 
and do not lend themselves to an interpretation offered by von Wartburg that this may 
be evidence for a continuation of the castle of Saranda Kolones.101 Her view that 
references to fortifications at Paphos from 1373 can be taken to establish as much is 
certainly of interest however, and worth reviewing as we track through those, and 
others, taking us to the end of the Lusignan period and beyond.
Our next reference comes from a list of building works, some of which were fortified, 
that Amadi attributed to James I (1382 -1398). This account recorded that James 
‘fece fortificar la citadela et le forterezze di Bapho’.102 Florio Bustron evidently 
copied this word for word, so he too wrote that James ‘fecce fortificar la citadella e 
le fortezze de Baffo’ 103 but whether this work was merely the repair of damage 
perpetrated in 1373 as von Wartburg suggested is impossible to say. She attached 
some significance to this reference, considering it vital in her argument that it must 
imply the existence of something other than just ‘the two harbour forts’. 104 This is 
difficult, partly at least because we can not be certain of Amadi’s source for this, 
which is not in Makhairas, nor indeed whether we must necessarily infer quite distinct 
structures in Amadi’s ‘citadel’ and ‘fortresses’. The former could simply have been 
the prominent feature of the latter arrangement, as may possibly be inferred from what 
now remains (see below).
Nicolas of Martoni visited Cyprus on his pilgrimage to Jerusalem over the winter of 
1394-95. He mentions the ‘castrum quod dicitur Baffa’ and that ‘in quo castro fit 
magna quantitas zuccare’.105 It is not impossible that, in writing up his experiences, 
Nicolas conflated New Paphos with Old Paphos/Kouklia, where sugar was certainly 
in production,106 but if he was in fact referring to New Paphos, there is no reason for
101 Wartburg, pp. 134-6.
102 Amadi, p. 495.
103 FI. Bustron, p. 352.
104 Wartburg, p. 135.
105 Nicolas de Martoni, p. 637, and in Cobham, p. 28.
106 as suggested by Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, p. 518.
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us to infer from this that there was any sugar refining industry in the old castle and we 
should conclude then that a part of the new forts had been assigned to store sugar.
Most of our subsequent allusions to the later medieval fortifications of Paphos clearly 
refer to a complex based by the sea represented by two prominent towers. At some 
point in the first half of the fifteenth century, the 'Parma Magliabecchi’ portolan was 
drawn up; this mentions the outer tower with reference to anchoring.107 The towers 
are clearly mentioned by Stephen of Gumpenberg who visited Paphos in 1449. He 
noted that 'da ligen hiibscher Castel zwey an dem Meer’ (‘near the sea there are two
1 flftbeautiful castles’). Probably the same may be said of a reference we have to the 
Genoese failing to take ‘des chateaux de Paphos’ in May, 1452.109
By then, the periods covered by the chronicles of Makhairas and Amadi had come to 
an end and we are dependent instead on Florio Bustron and his kinsman George 
Boustronios, who is particularly valuable as an eye witness of the events of the 
Lusignan civil war and the reign of James II. In that civil war of the early 1460s, 
Paphos changed hands on more than one occasion. It was probably in late September, 
1460 that James the Bastard first obtained control here, then -  in early 1461 -  losing it 
but quickly regaining it. In all of Bustron’s references to these events, the 
fortifications are recorded as in the plural: ‘li castelli’.110 Boustronios however, refers 
to the castle(s) in both the singular and plural, also mentioning how Charlotte had on 
one occasion during this time, made ‘port by the castles’.111
Towards the very end of our period, there is a proliferation of references that survive 
from the notes or diaries of foreign visitors. Visiting in 1480, Pierre Barbatre noted 
‘deulx petis chasteaulx et la mer’. 112 In 1483, Bernhard of Breydenbach referred to 
‘gar starcker thum uff eynem berg in mitten der statt etwann gestanden’ (‘rather 
strong towers which stood once on a hill in midst of the town’)113 Of course, rather 
like Ludolf of Suchen, this is a reference to what had been and not what was. A visitor
107 Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, p. 518.
108 StefTan von Gumpenberg, in Grivaud, p. 63.
109 Otten-Froux, Limassol, p. 412.
110 FI. Bustron, pp. 401,409,410.
111 G. Boustronios, § 68, pp. 102-3; § 85, on pp. 110-1. See too Ibn Tagribardi, Arab Sources, p. 94.
112 in Grivaud, p. 100.
113 Peregrinato in terram sanctam, dentsch, (Mainz, 1486), s.v. Baffa, as cited by Wartburg, p. 135.
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of 1484 -  the Venetian Francesco Suriano, recorded that Paphos ‘is entirely ruinous, 
except one or two towers on the harbour.’ 114 In 1491, the visitor Dietrich of 
Schachten recorded that earlier that year, there was another earthquake causing 
severe damage to one of the castles by the sea, ‘siendt noch heuttiges tages zwene 
Thuerm da ann dem Meer’. 115 It must have been repaired quickly as later visistors’ 
reports give the clear impression that it was then in full commission. Thus yet another 
German visitor, Hans Schiirpf in 1497 also wrote of two castles: iigent vor der statt 
zwey starcke schloB’, 116 while in 1518, Jacques le Saige noted that ‘on the seashore 
there are still two massive towers, and there was once a strong castle’. 117
The next reference we have is Ludwig Tschudi’s description of 1519. He wrote that 
‘da seind vil starcke Thum auff einem Buhel, in mitte der Statt gelegen, gestanden, da 
ettlich noch schier gantz’ (‘many strong towers stood on a hill in midst of the town, 
some of which are near complete’). This reference and a similar description recorded 
in 1566 by Christoph Furers, were cited by von Wartburg as evidence for the survival 
of Saranda Kolones. Like Suchen’s and Breydenbach’s allusions, these references to 
what may well have been Saranda Kolones, should not, however, be taken to indicate 
that that castle was still in commission. In any event, after 1600, there is certainly no
t |  q
other description of the site of Saranda Kolones as anything but a ruin.
After these observations of 1518 and 1519, later allusions reinforce the impression of 
the existence of a seaside fortification in which two towers were especially prominent 
and that there had at one time been another considerable castle a little inland but that 
that was no more. In 1529, Marino Sanudo reported ‘a li do castelli di Bapho.. .ha do 
torre antiche per securta del porto.’ 119 The Attar map of 1542 shows just one tower at 
the entrance to the harbour.120 The description of a ‘tour, haute et carree, desarmee’ 
provided by Oldrich Prefat in 1546 reflects a perception that one tower was the more
114 in Cobham, p. 49.
1.5 Dietrich von Schachten in Grivaud, p. 133; Hill, 2, pp. 18, 87; Megaw, Military Architecture, p.
199.
1.6 Hans Schurpf- P. Wachter: ed. J. Schmid, Luzemer und Innerschweizer Pilgerreisen zum Heiligen 
Grab in Jerusalem vom 15. bis 17. Jahrhundert, (Lucerne, 1957), p. 30 as cited by Wartburg, p. 
135, and in Grivaud, p. 164.
117 in Cobham, p. 61.
118 Wartburg, pp. 135-6; Rosser, Archaeological and Literary Evidence, p. 49.
119 I Diarii di Marino Sanuto, 3, ed. R. Fulin, 1118; LI, ed. F. Stefani, (1898), 446 cited by Wartburg, 
p. 135.
120 Attar, pp. 46, 89.
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prominent, but this cannot be adduced as evidence, as Corvisier would have it, that
the destruction wrought to the other tower in the 1491 earthquake was never
remedied. The testimonies of those who described the harbour fortifications in the
1^1intervening period contradict that view. In the later sixteenth-century, Florio 
Bustron commented that there was hardly anything worth seeing except ‘due torri in 
foggia di castelli’.122 Writing about the same time, Stephen of Lusignan said much 
the same: ‘there were two very strong castles on the sea whose walls were always 
washed by the waves; the kings of the Lusignan family had provided them with all 
things necessary for their defence but since the Venetians have become lords and 
masters of the island they have completely demolished and levelled them.'
121 Corvisier, Le Chateau de Pafos in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 402.
122 FI. Bustron, p. 15.
123 Lusignan - Description, ff. 16 and 17. [Noted and translated in Enlart, p. 503]. See too f. 211.
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P A P H O S  F O R  I
Plan of Lusignan fort
Ground plan with Ottoman additions
]  A ncien t wall 
|  L usignan  
I  O ttom an
Upper level with Ottoman additions
20m
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Description of the harbour forts 124
What we see today appear as two quite separate structures. They are situated 
immediately outside the western breakwater, while on their seaward facing sides, they 
are protected by extensive fields of boulders. Both breakwater and boulderfield were 
made in the twentieth century as part of the improvements to the yacht harbour. Prior 
to that, the sea washed right up the outer walls, as reflected in a number of 
photographs dating from the late nineteenth century.125 An engraving published as 
early as 1878 also shows the surviving fort as then encompassed by the sea, but this 
impression disguises the extent to which the the ancient port had silted up, dredging 
first commencing in 1910.126 Certainly in the later middle ages the forts were 
accessible by dry land, judging by the reference to the trench dug in 1373. Both were 
constructed on the base of the ancient, man-made mole that was created in classical 
times.
The lower courses of both consist of big reused ashlar stone, most probably from the 
Hellenic mole. The structure by the seaward end of the breakwater is very badly 
ruined, while the other is a quadrangular fort which in the main dates from after the 
end of our period. The ruin is presumably the ‘castle’ noted as damaged by the 
earthquake of 1491. However, it is still possible to discern within it the ashlar inner 
wall of a chamber at first floor level. This chamber wall leads obliquely to a narrow 
window or embrasure, now blocked with stones. (See photograph). This looked over 
the ancient mole that formed the outer rim of the harbour. The engraving from 1878 
strongly suggests that this was connected by a considerable wall to the quadrangular 
fort at the landward end of the modem mole. Indeed there is still clear evidence of 
such a connecting wall to be seen today. Half way along the line of this wall is a 
prominent lump of stonework that may have constituted some intermediate structure. 
It is also possible that this ‘sea wall’ extended from the quadrangular fort to the land,
124 This description derives primarily from personal observations in September 2004 and the account 
provided by C. Corvisier -  Le Chateau de Pafos in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 400-5.
125 e.g. such as those by Th. Mogabgab printed in Vaivre et Plagnieux, p. 404 and J.P. Foscolo (c.
1890) and an anonymous one (c. 1900) in L. Bonato et al, pp. 142-3.
126 Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, p. 520; Denham, plate opp. p. 101; engraving by Amadee Damour,
1878, in Severis, p. 114 -  see illustration attached.
127 Gertwagen, Maritime Activity, p. 518.
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for there is modem work there now that appears to contain and utilises older masonry. 
In origin, this ‘complex’ was likely conceived as a whole, the two ‘forts’ being its 
most prominent parts.
The landward fort is better preserved. The Lusignan work was taken over by the 
Venetians but quickly abandoned by them in 1503. The Turks in turn took it over and 
added to it substantially. As a result of their work, it is now extremely difficult to be 
clear as to what may be Lusignan. Christian Corvisier has, however, made an 
admirable attempt to disentangle the Lusignan work from the later Ottoman overbuild.
Its nucleus is a tower set inside and against the southern wall of an enclosing curtain 
that constitutes a trapezoid (38 x 31 x 17 x 16.5 m). This southern wall of the 
enclosing curtain does not follow a straight line, implying that it is superimposed on 
an older sea wall that was built on the ancient mole. On the opposite, northern side, 
the curtain wall is now pierced in its centre by the entrance with its drawbridge 
operated by two drawbars, the recess groves for which are visible. This entry may not 
be original however, but rather Ottoman as indeed is suggested by the marble plaque 
set above the entrance, recording that Ahmet Pasha built the castle in 1592. The 
Lusignan entry may well have been elsewhere, and Corvisier has suggested it was 
most likely in the short west wall, perhaps strengthened by a small fore-work, at the 
point where we can still see earlier masonry in the later Ottoman thickening. The 
Lusignan curtain was 1.7 m thick and pierced by V shaped archeres : Corvisier has 
suggested that there were as many as five on the long northern side, but the two set in 
the west wall, though encased and well within the later Ottoman work built onto the 
outside, are much more clearly apparent. Stylistically these are no later than the 
fourteenth century.
At its north-east comer -  on the eastern curtain, the wall appears to have been 
thickened and hence projected outwards beyond the line of the rest of this side. The 
original work at the south-east comer is particularly intriguing however, and there 
Corvisier has detected ‘une portion de tour carree de l’enceinte antique’, next to 
which he has inferred the possibility that there was an opening from which a chain 
may have been arranged that connected with the outer ‘fort’. Given that both forts 
were built on the line of the old, artificial mole, a chain would have been unnecessary
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of course, but the proposition that at this point, the Lusignans’ trapezoid incorporated 
another tower, whether their own or the vestiges of an earlier one that they adapted, is 
not unimportant. Taken alongside the separate structure midway between the two 
‘forts’, noted above, this might help signify the existence of intervening lesser 
‘fortifications’ that were a feature of an overall plan. Such ancillary defensive works 
must have been inconsiderable of course; Corvisier’s findings, the absence of any 
remarks in the diaries of visitors, and the fragmentary nature of the stump now visible 
on the breakwater, all attest this.
Like the curtain, the inner Lusignan tower has been the subject of much Ottoman 
work. Corvisier discerned evidence that suggested a possible original entrance at its 
north-east by means of a wooden stairway, and noted the four archeres covered with 
lintels still apparent in the north-west angle of the upper floor, indicative of further 
archeres but now lost in the Turkish works. These archeres are at a height of 6 m, 
suggesting that the outer curtain must have been low if it was built at the same time 
and did not supersede the firing lines of the inner tower. At this upper level, the walls 
are only 1 to 1.1 m thick, suggesting that, at most, there could have been only one 
additional storey, the tower then being no higher than as at present. Indeed as may be 
seen on the plan, the Ottoman works have not greatly affected the tower’s overall 
dimensions, these being some 8.5 m by 6.8 m.and assuming there was no second 
upper storey, 9 m. high.128
It would seem likely that these ‘two harbour forts’ originated at some point in the 
fourteenth century, as is generally thought. As noted in the History (p. 29 above) 
Kristian Molin dated them to the very early part of the century as a response to the 
Genoese raids that we noted earlier. For his part, Corvisier assigned a similar date, or 
even the later thirteenth century, on architectural grounds.129 The accounts we have 
from the 1330s and 1340s make this unlikely. As we have seen, it is from the later 
fourteenth century that we have a string of references to fortifications at Paphos, and 
it is more likely that they were first commissioned not long before this time.
128 M egaw , M ilitary Architecture, p. 199; Perbellini, 1973, p. 50; Corvisier, Le Chateau de Pafos in 
Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 400-5.
129 M olin, Unknown Crusader Castles, pp. 116-7; Corvisier, op. cit. p. 405.
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Paphos Fort
Inner walls of first floor level chamber in the ruined fort at the seaward end of the
mole.
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POTAMIA
As is the case with La Cava, the sources do not altogether agree as to which king 
founded this establishment, Makhairas 1 having Peter II as the builder, whereas our 
other sources suggest that we should attribute its foundation to King James.2 
Makhairas has James as commissioning one 'Perot' to construct 'a beautiful garden 
and a beautiful house at Potamia’ so that king at least enhanced it.3 Like La Cava, it 
was damaged by the Mamluks in the wake of their victory at Khirokitia in 1426, but 
was afterwards brought back into use as a royal residence.4 In 1470, Gaudenz of 
Kirchberg visited the ‘schlop genannt Visilopatamo’ -  most likely Potamia, although 
without providing any detail.5
Unlike La Cava, however, Potamia had no pretension to be a fortification of any sort. 
Amadi described it variously as ‘bella et gentil casa real', and ‘stantia bella et uno 
delectevole zardin’.6 It is thus quite clear that its status was that of a manor, or 
perhaps rather, a chateau deplaisance, as Mas Latrie described it -  a country estate.7 
Indeed this is clear from the surrounding remnants of cisterns, irrigation systems and 
windmills.8 Enlart’s gazetteer commented on the building as it then survived. He 
reports a building ‘of dressed stone’, with walls 80 cm thick, consisting of two square 
rooms, coomunicating with each other through a pointed arcade. One was a little 
smaller than the other, this lesser chamber having a pointed window and a pointed 
barrel vault whereas the larger was unvaulted. The smaller room was set at a slightly 
lower level. He recorded evidence that there had been an upper floor.9 Potamia was 
ultimately demolished by the Venetians.10
1 op. cit. § 597, p. 593.
2 Am adi,, p. 494; FI. Bustron, p. 352; Lusignan, Description, f t  36, 153, 210; Chorograffia -  Grivaud, 
f. 18 a; Chorography - W allace, § 60, p. 25. See too Enlart, p. 414; Jeffery, p. 204; H ill, 2, p. 430; 
Perbellini (1973), p. 51.
3 Makhairas, § 620, p. 611.
4 Makhairas, § 692, p. 669; Amadi, p. 510; Lusignan, loc. cit.
5 Grivaud, p. 80, who identifies this as Vassilopotam os.
6 These quotations are from, respectively, pp. 510 and 494. FI. Bustron, p. 352 says much the sam e; 
Enlart, p. 414.
7 In h is fh . to h is edition o f  Amadi on p. 510.
8 Vaivre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, pp. 43-4.
9 Enlart, p. 414  (with plan), and following him, Perbellini (1973), p. 51.
10 Lusignan, Description, f. 210.
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PYLA
Pyla lies a little to the north-east of Lamaka. During the Lusignan period, this 
‘lordship of Piles’ was one of the principal fiefs of the kingdom and was held by the 
Gibelet family. During the reign of James II it was manned by francomati (freemen). 
Pyla’s small rectangular keep is at once reminiscent of the larger mid-fifteenth 
century castle at Kolossi, and quite probably dates from not long after this time, rather 
than the Venetian period as Perbellini thought. In 2004 it was sympathetically 
restored with funds from the EU.
Internally the tower measures 3.32m x 7.2 m. Its walls are constructed of rubble 
masonry with ashlar blocks at the comers, made of local white limestone. It consists 
of a basement, a first storey entered via a square doorway on its west - presumably 
accessed by means of a wooden staircase, and an upper storey with a flat roof. The 
rooms were unvaulted and had simple timber roofs. The basement was a storage area, 
having no external apertures, while the two storeys above had arrowslits opening 
under low curved arches at the end of deep embrasures. A brattice on two corbels 
defended the first storey doorway, while another brattice at roof level on the opposite 
side of the tower appears to have served as a latrine, its stone seat being still in place. 
This latrine brattice is supported on corbels or brackets that Enlart thought to be no 
earlier than the Renaissance and accordingly he dated the whole building to this 
period.1 Given the fortifications policy of the Venetians, it is unlikely that this tower 
could be their initiative. Rather, it is probable that it was built in the uncertain times of 
the last years of the Lusignan period.
1 Enlart, pp. 3 7 5 ,4 8 2 -3 ; Perbellini, 1973, pp. 3 3 ,3 6 ; Vaivre in Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 53. Site visit 
27 Oct. 2005.
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Pvla 1
West face with entry at first floor level.
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Pyla 2
East face with latrine at roof level.
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SIGOURI
SIGOURI (Greek); Sivouri/Sivorie; Sigur; Chateau Franc; Castel Franco
(Genoese).
Very little remains of Sigouri today. It appears as an inconspicuous rectangular 
earthwork rising a mere 3 m above an unremarkable terrain of uncultivated, open 
grassy flatlands. The site lies 4 km south of Prastio (Dortyol-Turkish) on the east side 
of a minor, modem road just after it crosses over the dried up bed of the once river 
Pedieos -  a location of no significance whatever today. In the Lusignan period, 
however, it was at an important junction where roads ran off to Famasguta ten miles 
to the west, to Kyrenia in the north-west, to Limassol in the south-west, Lamaka in 
the south and the Karpas peninsula in the north-east. Long before the construction of 
the castle, there was a ‘lodge’ of the Archbishop of Nicosia here, as recorded in 1196 
and 1202. There was a ‘seigneurial residence’ here in 1374, perhaps, though not 
necessarily, belonging to the Archbishop. 1
The emergence in 1373-4 of an independent and hostile Genoese colony with a 
territorial radius of about ten miles around Famagusta, left Sigouri in a new frontier 
area, perhaps also giving it some commercial and administrative importance to the 
truncated Lusignan state. Indeed it is possible that the later Lusignans looked to 
develop Sigouri in some small measure, to compensate for their loss of Famagusta. 
Thus for example it may be that it was used as the site of a replacement mint for that 
lost at that city,2 and it would in any event have been a natural check point for 
merchants coming through from the coast. It would then quite likely have attracted a 
population. Indeed, if Sigouri was not already a settlement of some size by the time of 
the Genoese invasion, later travellers’ records indicate that it quickly became so.3
1 Makhairas, § 454, p. 439; Enlart, pp. 475,477; Metcalf, The Case for Sigouri, p. 408; Vaivre in 
Vaivre and Plagnieux, p. 367.
2 Metcalf, The Case for Sigouri, pp. 403-8.
3 Grivaud, Excerpta Cypria Nova, pp. 50-1.
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It is not surprising then that Sigouri was prominent in the programme of works 
initiated by King James I just a few years after his return to the island in 1385. As 
Constable during the reign of his nephew, Peter II, he had become familiar with 
Sigouri when manoeuvring to ambush a Genoese raiding party in 1374, 4 so 
presumably he had formed an appreciation of its location. Indeed, according to 
Lusignan,5 James established a fortified base here in order to counter raids launched 
from Famagusta. Accordingly, in 1391, he ‘fece el castello Sivuri’, 6 an attribution 
endorsed by FI. Bustron who was present when his Venetian employers began to 
dismantle the castle. As it has now all but totally vanished, it is especially helpful that 
Bustron provided a brief description. He observed that it was on level ground, 
rectangular with four comer towers and had a gateway with a drawbridge (‘ponte 
levador’). He added that it was surrounded by broad and deep ditches filled with 
water from die river Pedieos.7
King James' castle impressed those who recorded their visits. A Gascon nobleman, 
Nompar, Lord of Caumont passed through ‘Chateau Franc’ in 1418. He remarked 
that:
en partant de Famagoste, je passay devant ung chasteau en terre playne, qui 
s’appelle Chasteau franc, a iiij. lieves; lequel le roy de Chypre avoye fet fere, 
n’avoit guierres, et me sembloit etre bien basti et fort, sellon le lieu playn ou il 
estoit assis.8
Travelling through in 1518, Jacques le Saige noted ‘a big village’ and ‘a great castle’ 
five miles from Famagusta called ‘Sinore’.9
Bustron’s description accords very well with what Enlart was able to discern at the 
end of the nineteenth century, corrected in a few details by Vaivre’s very recent 
description. From this, we know that the castle was rectangular and constructed on an 
earthen platform that was raised approximately 3 m above ground level. This in turn 
was surrounded by a ditch 35 m wide which drew in water from the river via a 
drainage ditch. The rectangular enceinte measures 60 m x 48 m. Its walls were about
4 Makhairas, § 454 on p. 439.
5 Description, f. 35.
6 Amadi, p. 495.
7 FI. Bustron, p. 24.
8 Caumont, ed. la Grange, p. 77. A translation is in Cobham on p. 30.
9 in Cobham, p. 58.
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1.4 m thick but are not now visible above ground. Enlart noted that the four square 
comer towers varied from 4.4 m to 4.5 m x 3.5 to 4.1 m internally, but today, it is 
only possible to trace fragmentary elements of the southern pair of towers, for which 
Vaivre supplied corrective measurements of 8.3 x 7.5 for the south-west tower and 4.7 
x 4.1 for that at the south-east comer. Gone now, but visible to Enlart, were barrel 
vaulted basements in the towers, in one of which a conduit made of bottomless jars 
indicated the presence of a cistern. No trace of the gateway has been found. As Enlart 
also noted, at the time he was writing, the British administration was busily 
completing the demolition commenced by the Venetians, so, as with Bustron in the 
sixteenth century, Enlart’s commentary is particularly valuable.10
Given the paucity of architectural and historical evidence, it is hardly surprising that 
modem historians have found little to say on Sigouri. As some have observed, it was 
of a fairly basic design, and indeed, in its basic plan, somewhat reminiscent of the so 
called castrum castles of the twelfth century, typified by Coliath in the County of 
Tripoli.11 Its wide ditch no doubt added considerably to its defensibility, but it is 
likely that this may frequently have been dry during the Summer campaigning season. 
It was not then, an especially formidable fortification by the standards of the time. 
Interestingly, the castle appears to have had no role in the skirmishes with the 
Mamluks in 1425 that occurred around Sigouri.12
Sigouri was a castle nonetheless, and given James I’s financial constraints, its 
building must have constituted a heavy investment. It had its own captain or 
commander appointed by the Crown and appears to have been used on occasion as an 
arms depot}1 Although we can not be certain that it did house a mint, or even the 
apparatus of local government, it was certainly seen as very important, as 
demonstrated by the fact that one of the first initiatives of James the Bastard on 
invading the island in September 1460, was to establish his control here. 14 His
10 Enlart, pp. 385,477; Jeffery, pp. 199-200; Vaivre,.. .les sites de chateaux disparus..., passim;
Vaivre in Vaivre et Plagnieux, pp. 52,368.
11 Hill, 2, pp. 23-4,446; Megaw, Military Architecture, pp. 203-4; Peibellini, (1973), p. 51;
Molin, p. 118.
12 Makhairas, § 654, pp. 633-5.
13 For Charlotte’s and Janies II’s rival commanders and for a bombard that had been taken from here -  
Boustronios, §§44, 50, pp. 92-4.
14 Boustronios, § 44, p. 92.
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recapture of Famagusta shortly after must inevitably have caused Sigouri to lose 
importance. But as we have seen, it was still impressive in the very early Venetian 
period.
An excavation would no doubt provide information on the location of the gateway, 
about internal buildings etc. Fragments of yellow and green glazed earthenware of a 
late fourteenth-century date and of majolica of the early sixteenth century have been 
found, but all is now obscured by the prolific carpet of flowers that covers the whole 
enceinte}5
15 Vaivre in Viaivre and Plagnieux, p. 368. Site visits: 24 Feb. 2007 and 9 April 2007.
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Wallace.
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